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Popular culture is a multifaceted, global phenomenon and has become a new 
research ield in the last decade.1  The term 
popular culture can have many diferent 
meanings, but it does imply a certain temporal 
contextǱ irst and foremost, it refers to the 
musical and artistic output of American 
and British society from the 1950s on, which 
rapidly spread to diferent regions of the world 
– including the “Eastern bloc” –  through a 
process of cultural transfer. It is associated 
with such atributes as freedom or subversion, 
accessible to broad sections of the population, 
and ofers lifestyles that can be adopted or 
adapted informally and without commitment 
and which therefore – at least to some extent 
– remain beyond the reach of political control. 
The articles in this volume do ask how Soviet 
society did change from the late 1950s on, when 
the state at times retreated to a laissez-faire 
position and so allowed new areas of cultural 
activity to emerge. Popular culture embraces 
here (urban) songs, dances, light reading 
ǻpulp ictionǼ, the entertainment stage ǻsuch 
as cabaret and musicals), cinema, television, 
radio, sports, leisure activities, fashion (such as 
jeans and trainers, as well as hairstyles), styles 
of behavior, gestures, emulative postures 
ǻe.g. of cinema starsǼ, speech paterns, jokes, 
narrative styles, mass graphics etc. Thus, 
popular culture has a much stronger link with 
the everyday experiences of ordinary people 
than is the case with what might be considered 
culture in an elitist sense. And a global 
phenomenon such as “Beatlemania” would 
not have been possible without the technology 
1  Handbuch Popkultur, eds.. Thomas Hecken, Mar-cus Kleiner, StutgartǱ J.”. Mezler, ŘŖŗŝǲ  “ compa-
nion to popular culture, ed. Gary Burns, Chichester, 
West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2016, Hochkultur 
für das Volk? Literatur, Kunst und Musik in der Sowje-
tunion aus kulturgeschichtlicher Perspektive, eds. Igor V. Narskij, Jчrn Reterath, M(nchenǱ De Gruyter Ol-
denbourg, 2018.
for reproducing both sound and images. The 
issue of popular culture also raises questions 
of consumer habits, medialization and 
entertainment culture. Popular culture relects 
concepts of order, paterns of interaction and 
shifts in mass culture through the media, 
consumer goods or cultural transfer. From 
this point of view, it is possible to analyse 
processes of negotiation or loyalties between 
state and society – as well as cultural practices 
– that point to hegemonic concepts, distinction 
or integration. 
The irst oicial Soviet Rock festival took place 
in March 1980 in Tbilissi, the capital of the 
Georgian SSR (Vesennye ritmy, Tbilisi-80). The 
winner of the festival’s competition was the 
group Mashina Vremeni (The Time Machine) 
from Leningrad. The journalist Artem Troitsky 
wrote about the event:
“The songs performed by The Time Machine are 
neither wild nor soapy along the lines of ‘Why did 
you stand me up?Ȃ The group abhors ampЧiied, 
heavy, metallic style of playing (one wonders 
whether the loudness is there to compensate for 
lack of talent?) (p. 65) [...]
But songs with political and social messages have 
always been central to The Time Machine.
The group invites its audience to look closer at the 
world around them, at themselves, at their friends. 
In praising noble, good things and deeds, they urge 
Чisteners to ight eviЧ and anything that interferes 
with the people’s happiness. (p. 66)”2
TroitskyȂs article was irst published in the 
Soviet magazine Klub I khudozhestvennaia 
2  Winner of the national pop festival award in Tbi-
lissi 1980, group Time Machine (Mashina Vremeni 
with frontman Andrei Makarevich). Artem Troits-
ky, “New Leader on the Soviet Pop Scene”, Sputnik 
8, 1981, pp. 62-66. (Originally published in Klub I 
khudozhestvennaia samodeiatelnost‘, here p. 66. [Ori-
ginal translation from Sputnik.]
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samodeiatelnost’, later translated into English 
and published for a foreign audience in Sputnik, 
Digest of the Soviet Press. The author wrote 
important books about Soviet pop culture,3 
and what is interesting: he was himself one of 
the organizers of the Tbilissi festival. 
We can assume that there were oicial frames 
how to write about such a unique event. So 
when reading Troitsky’s article, the audience 
got to know not only news in the ield of 
Soviet mass culture, but also oicial values, 
transmited by party or state institutions and 
checked by censors before geting published. 
Troitsky wrote about the band, its members like 
Andrei Makarevich and their music, but how 
he did it says a lot about oicial norms in the 
late Brezhnev period: implicitly the loudness, 
3  Artemy Troitsky, Tusovka: who’s who in the new 
Soviet rock culture, London: Omnibus Press, 1990.
wildness and the whole style was criticized 
and slightly tolerated, which tells the reader 
that there existed another understanding of 
culture. The short quotes give an idea how 
pop culture was oicially regarded in the 
late Soviet Union before Perestroika, where 
culture was part of state politics and seen as a 
top down process. 
According to Marxist-Leninist ideology 
there existed two diferent, antagonistic 
understandings of culture. In the Soviet 
encyclopedia of 1973 this distinction was 
explained. First a bourgeois understanding of 
culture was explained, which had due to the 
Soviet perspective a bad impact on youth and 
elites as it was nihilistic, a counter-culture and 
liked to resist authorities.4 On the other hand, 
the Marxist deinition of culture regarded 
it as a mirror for the human development. 
The target was the creation of a new man 
(formirovanie novogo cheloveka)5 with high 
educational standards, mores, good behavior 
and wide knowledge. In the context of the 
1980 festival, a dissolution of this polarized 
understanding of culture gets visible, even 
though the critique tries to rely on still deined 
normative standards. The festival itself was 
marginalized and took place without a broader 
audience. ”ut oicial cultural institutions had 
at least to accept the wish of young people and 
other members of the Soviet society for pop 
and rock culture. Thus Tbilissi 1980 can be 
regarded as a turning point in Soviet cultural 
politics, even though changes took place in a 
grassroot manner long before.6
Already in the late Stalin period, in the years 
after the Second World War, the phenomenon 
4  Bol’shaia sovetskaia encyklopedia, Moscow: Sovets-
kaia Encyklopedia 1973, 3. ed., t. 13, p. 595.
5  Ibid., p. 596, column 1775.
6  Gleb Tsipursky, Socialist Fun: Youth, Consumption, 
and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Cold War 
Soviet Union, 1945-1970, PitsburghǱ University of Pitsburgh Press, ŘŖŗŜ, p. ş.
Figure 1: “New Leader on the Soviet Rock SceneȄ. “rticle writen by “rtem Troitsky 
in Sputnik, August 1980, reporting about the 
Tbilisi festival.
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of the Stiliagi (style hunters) occurred.7 There 
are no reliable numbers how many young 
people tried to be diferent from norms and 
propaganda by dressing stylish, listening to 
western music, hanging around in Gorkii 
street in Moscow and performing unusual 
dances in that time. Supposedly there were 
only a few, small, marginal groups in urban 
places, mostly young men. However, in the 
reception of the Soviet past this juvenile 
subculture became a myth, not least via the 
music ilm Stiliagi from 2008.
The inluence of Rock ȂnȂ Roll on Soviet 
culture was observed by foreign journalists. 
Klaus Mehnert, born 1906 in Moscow,8 was 
a German expert for the Soviet Union. As 
a member of an oicial German delegation 
accompanying chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 
he visited Moscow in 1955. He walked around 
and listened to normal people. After his return 
to West Germany, Mehnert produced a 90 
minutes radio feature based on his talks to 
Muscovites.9 Beyond political comments he 
talked about the daily life and moods of the 
people. During his walks in Moscow he visited 
a Park Kul’tury (it was not Gorkii park), a 
leisure place with sport facilities, a dance loor 
and kiosks. Mehnert made some unexpected 
indings. First he listened to a walz from Isaak 
Dunaevski (1900-1955), the famous composer 
who had died recently.10 He met citizens 
singing Shirokaia moia strana, a patriotic hit 
from the 1930s11. “And suddenly there were 
7  Mark Edele, “Strange Young Men in Stalin’s 
Moscow. The Birth and Life of the Stiljagi. 1945-
1953”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50, 1, ŘŖŖŘ, pp. řŝȮŜŗǲ see also the cartoons from Krokodil on htpǱ//www.coldwarjazz.org/stilyagi.
8  He died in 1984.
9  “Wiedersehen mit der Sowjetunion“. Radio fea-
ture from Klaus Mehnert, Germany 1955. Private 
holding of the author.ŗŖ  Mathias Stadelmann, Isaak Dunaevskij, Sänger 
des Volkes: Eine Karriere unter Stalin, Köln: Böhlau 
2003.
11  The song about the Fatherland was composed 
sounds of contemporary dance rhythms” 
Mehnert told in the feature, “similar to jazz 
music from the 1930s, a well-known melody. 
I listened to ‘In the Mood’ from Glenn Miller.” 
He went to the conductor looking for the 
name of the music piece. The title writen on 
the notes was “Satirical Song” composed by 
Ostrovskii. But it was indeed “In the Mood”, 
only hidden as a parody. This episode shows 
how oicial rules could be undermined by 
tricks like trivializing the “bourgeois” culture, 
using Aesopian language in literature or 
discrediting objects of desire which could be 
shown in such a way at the same time. 
A real fanal for the new politics after the 
repressive Stalin regime was the World Youth 
Festival taking place in Moscow 1957.12 
The international meeting of young people 
from all over the world was a showcase for the 
political change under Khrushchev. It resigned 
from obvious political propaganda for the 
socialist model. Instead, slogans for peace and 
mutual understanding were the moto of the 
two weeks meeting. Visitors were impressed 
by the peaceful atmosphere in festival 
Moscow, the sport and folklore presentations, 
the happenings on the streets, the opportunity 
to meet people from many Soviet republics 
and diferent countries.13 Oicials made 
many eforts to show a proper city ǻcleaning 
it in advance from prostitutes, criminals 
and beggars), a perfect organization and the 
achievements of the Soviet system in times 
of the cultural cold war. But they could not 
inluence the reception nor the consequences 
for the popular movie Cirk (Circus) in 1936, the 
composer was as well Isaak Dunaevskii.
12  Pia Koivunen, “The 1957 Moscow Youth Fes-
tival. Propagating a new, peaceful image of the 
Soviet Union”, Soviet state and society under Nikita 
Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilic, London: Routledge, 
2009, pp. 46-65.
13  Leo Weismantel, Tagebuch einer skandalösen Reise, 
Jugendheim: Weltkreis Verlags GmbH, 1959.
6Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Editorial
of the event. In the west, the Youth Festival 
was regarded as part of communist policies. 
In Swizerland for example, visitors coming 
back by train were “expected” by angry Swiss 
citizens, beating on the travelers who dared to 
cross the iron curtain.14
All Youth Festivals organized by the World 
Federation of Democratic Youth had a socialist 
connotation and were perceived as a mega 
event in the communist part of the divided 
world.
Important waves of global popular culture 
such as new fashion trends, Rock ‘n’ Roll, 
14  Unpublished paper from Nadine Steinmann, 
Bern 2017.
the Beatles, Hippies, Rock, Disco, Punk or 
Heavy Metal entered the Soviet Union quite 
promptly and inspired Soviet artists to create 
new cultural forms themselves. The children 
or members of elites who could travel to 
eastern bloc countries, tourists, journalists or 
diplomats imported tapes, discs, magazines, 
pictures, ilms, fashion or their own 
experiences. Beneath such personal cultural 
transfers regions or cities on the border of the 
Soviet Union like Lviv in Western Ukraine, 
Estonia or port cities were gates for trends and 
products coming from the near abroad.15 
Recent research has come up with many 
propositions of how to deine ȃpop cultureȄ. 
John Storey gives a good survey about diferent 
approaches.16 He distinguishes between: 
ǻŗǼ a quantitative approach, deining relevance 
by numbers and empirical data. But this might 
not explain the meanings and not any mass 
phenomena has the same relevance. 
ǻŘǼ an approach focusing on the deinition of 
high culture, ixing a hierarchy of a superior 
and inferior culture. This scheme means at 
the same time a typology for classes. And 
it neglects that cultural production and 
meanings are not ahistorical or ix, but shift 
through diferent times. “n example is the 
perception of Shakespeare or Charles Dickens 
as popular writers and today part of a high 
culture.
(3) an approach that sees pop culture as mass 
culture, only for economic purposes and 
15  Wiliam Jay Risch, “Soviet ‚Flower Children‘. 
Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s 
L‘viv”,  Journal of Contemporary History 40, 3, 2005, pp. śŜś-śŞŚǲ Wiliam Jay Risch, The Ukrainian West: 
culture and the fate of empire in Soviet Lviv, Cam-bridge, Mass. ŘŖŗŗǲ Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and roll in 
the Rocket City: The West, identity and ideology in So-
viet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985, Washington, D.C: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010.
16  John Storey, Cultural theory and popular culture: 
An introduction, HarlowǱ Pearson/Longman ŘŖŖş 
(5th ed.).
Figure 2: Article in the women’s journal Rabotnica, 
March 1957, announcing the upcoming International 
Youth Festival in Moscow.
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mass consumption. This connotation is often 
used with a traditional connotation that mass 
culture is American culture and goes together 
with processes of Americanization since the 
1950s. The new American way of life seemed 
more exciting than the well-known every 
day culture. Popular culture conigured as a 
collective dream world and mutated as such 
to a form of escapism.
(4) an approach that understands pop culture 
as folk culture, coming from the people and 
understood as authentic.
(5) an approach following Antonio Gramsci, 
seeing pop culture as a concept of hegemony, 
an interdependence between resistance and 
incorporation or at least (6) as culture of 
industrialization and urbanization.
Which approach is making most sense always 
depends on questions, targets, sources and 
methodologies.
For the Soviet context, John Fiske’s 
understanding of pop culture is of special 
interest. Fiske develops a theoretical 
framework in order to beter understand 
culture as a social process:
Culture making (and culture is always in process, 
never achieved) is a social process: all meanings 
of self, of social relations, all the discourses and 
texts that play such important cultural roles can 
circulate only in relationship to the social system.
[…]
Popular culture is made from within and below, 
not imposed from without or above as mass cultural 
theorists would have it. There is always an element 
of popular culture that lies outside social control, 
Figure řǱ Mosocw Youth Festival ŗşśŝǱ Oicial photo published by Leo Weismantel, who participated 
in the event.
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that escapes or opposes hegemonic forces. Popular 
cuЧture is aЧways a cuЧture of conlict, it aЧways 
involves the struggle to make social meanings that 
are in the interests of the subordinate and that are 
not those preferred by the dominant ideology.[...]
Popular culture is made in relationship to 
structures of dominance. This relationship can take 
two main forms – that of resistance or evasion.17
Fiske provides a deinition of pop culture as 
part of culture as such, a culture as practice. 
It is not only about phenomena, actors, 
forms, aesthetics, trends, fashions, traditions, 
performances, medialization, marketing and 
politics, but allows insights in society. Pop 
culture relates to diferent forms of culture in 
17  John Fiske: Understanding popular culture, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-2.
a society, is part of a larger understanding. 
Structures like the relation between leadership 
and society, the diferent groups in a society, 
mechanisms of integration or marginalization, 
the production of social meanings, counter 
positions to state politics and escapism from it 
can get visible with Fiskes deinition. 
In the Soviet Union, pop culture was a 
counterpart to the oicial mass culture. 
Since ŗşřŚ, the later had been based on the 
paradigm of socialist realism which ended 
earlier cultural experiments, for example 
those associated with the notion of proletkul’t.
What is more, till the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union we ind a distinction ǻand strict 
hierarchy) between high culture, such as 
classical ballet, literature or classical music and 
Figure 4: “Hipi”. Article in the Lithuanian magazine Mokslas ir gyvenimas (Science and lifeǼ, ŗşŜŝ, mentioning hippies for the irst time.
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mass culture. A similar understanding of “high 
cultureȄ can be seen in the irst theoretical texts 
about mass culture, writen by Horkheimer 
and Adorno.18 In his American exile Adorno 
could study new forms of mass culture which 
he described as pure consumption, proit 
oriented, an industrial product which supports 
conformity instead of individualism. His ideal 
was high culture understood as art whereas 
mass culture was only entertainment and 
completely depoliticizing. Adorno criticized 
the homogenization of taste, opinions and 
political thinking by mass cultural products. 
The contributions to this volume shed light 
on diferent aspects of Soviet popular and 
mass culture. Gleb Tsipursky, the author of 
the book Socialist fun19 gives insights in the 
Thaw period were the so called cultural cold 
war tried to inluence the societies of the 
“others”. Even though Soviet people were 
fascinated by the real or imagined west they 
also appreciated their genuine cultural stars 
like the famous bards Bulat Okudzhava 
and Vladimir Vysotskii, as Danijela  Lugarić 
Vukas’ contribution shows. Irina Mukhina 
asks for consumer practices and shows the 
importance of port cities as market places. 
Sergei I. Zhuk opens insights into popular 
culture in Soviet Ukraine, Kirsten Bönker 
and Kristian Feigelson describe the meaning 
of Soviet TV as a new media since the 1960s. 
Isabelle De Keghel explores a famous Soviet 
TV series (Seventeen Moments of Spring), Aimar 
Ventsel deals with Estonian popular culture. 
Boris Belge and Tatjana Hofmann both look on 
more classical cultural products, the music of 
the famous composer “lfred Schnitke and the 
literature from Vasilii Aksënov.
18  Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Ador-
no, DiaЧeЦtiЦ der “ukЧärungǱ PhiЧosophische Fragmen-
te, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969.
19 Tsipursky, Socialist Fun.
For the future we need a beter understanding 
of the exchange processes who are too often 
regarded as one sided from the west to the 
east. But if we look at the time period before 
the Second World War we have an exchange 
other way round as well.20 To understand 
adaptations, impulses, traditions, inventions 
and translations inspired by new trends the 
concept of contact zones from Mary Prat21 
could be useful as well, as we avoid a container 
thinking of culture in clear cut boxes. The 
political debates about culture in the Soviet 
Union and the role of oicial institutions, 
responsible persons and controversies have 
also to be researched in the future. 
The articles published here were originally 
presented on a conference about pop culture 
in 2013 at the University of St. Gallen. It is a 
contribution to the steadily growing ield of 
popcultural studies who too often still focus 
on western Europe. We ind a lot of pop 
culture in Eastern Europe as well which is 
unfortunately often unknown in the west like 
popular TV series,  cartoons,  famous singers 
and music groups with their own rock stars. 
Main questions were the following:
How did Soviet society change from the late 
1950s on, when the state at times retreated to 
a laissez-faire position and so allowed new 
areas of cultural activity to emerge? What 
trends were there, and who set them? How 
was taste discussed, and how did fan-based 
communities come into being? What was 
the relationship between the new cultural 
dynamics and the discourse of ideology and 
the politics of identity? Was Soviet popular 
culture an expression of subversion and 
protest? Did it tend to break down the system, 
20  Birgit Menzel, Ulrich Schmid, ”Der Osten im 
Westen. Importe der Populärkultur”, Osteuropa 57, 
5, 2007, pp. 3-21.Řŗ  Mary Louise Prat, ȃ“rts of the Contact ZoneȄ, 
Profession, 1991, pp. 33-40.
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or rather to exert a stabilizing inluence? 
How did popular culture inluence peopleȂs 
lifestyles and leisure activities? How can 
processes of cultural transfer – such as 
between east and west – be described? What 
autonomous developments took place?
We thank all authors for their contributions. 
Our thanks goes as well to the Center for 
Governance and Culture in Europe (GCE) 
at the University of St. Gallen, Prof. Ulrich 
Schmid, Dr. des. Sandra King-Savic, Prof. 
Michael Dobbins, Prof. Julia Richers, Samir 
Malek-Madani and the editorial board of the 
open access online journal Euxeinos. 
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by Gleb Tsipursky 
“Let’s Talk About Tastes and Manners” was 
the title of a 1956 youth event at the Labor 
Reserves Central House of Culture. At this 
meeting, “all those present condemned 
the devotion of certain comrades with 
‘ultramodern’ fashion”, instead endorsing 
the opinion that “dressing well means 
dressing in a tasteful, not lashy, mannerȄ.1 
This report about the meeting comes from 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, the national newspaper 
of the Komsomol.2 One among many such 
articles in youth newspapers in the mid-1950s, 
it suggests the importance of fashion both to 
the authorities and to young people alike. In 
particular, this story highlights the problem 
of ȃultramodernȄ atire, a euphemism for 
western-style clothingǲ it also suggests some 
of the ways that the Soviet system during 
these years fought against youth fascination 
1  “Pogovorim o vkusakh i manerakh”, Komso-
mol‘skaia pravda, February 3, 1956.
2  This mass Soviet youth organization was dedi-cated to socializing young people from ifteen to 
twenty-eight. In  1958, the Komsomol included 
about half of those eligible by age. Membership in the Komsomol had substantial beneits for those 
seeking upward social mobility and white-collar 
professional careers. For more on the Komsomol, see Juliane F(rst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet 
Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 32-63.
with such styles, namely through public 
condemnation. The abovementioned article 
thus embodies the two central questions at 
the heart of the present essay. First, why was 
it important for the Soviet state of the mid-
ŗşśŖs to deine appropriate clothing? Second, 
what methods did it apply to do so? To answer 
these questions, the essay draws on archives, 
newspapers, instruction booklets, memoirs, 
and interviews.3
The present paper proposes that the eforts 
to combat extreme devotion to western 
fashion in the mid-1950s constituted part of 
the endeavor to build a broadly appealing 
socialist version of modernity in the “Thaw”, 
the decade and a half following I. V. Stalin’s 
death in 1953 and the rise of N. S. Khrushchev 
to power.4 This Thaw-era quest for a socialist 
3  The archives include: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialȂno-politicheskoi istorii ǻRG“SPIǼǲ 
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii ǻRG“NIǼǲ TsentralȂnyi arkhiv obshchestvenno-po-liticheskoi istorii Moskvy ǻTs“OPIMǼǲ Tsentralȁnyi arkhiv gosudarstva Moskvy ǻTs“GMǼǲ Gosudarst-
vennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii saratovskoi oblasti 
(GANISO).
4  This essay adopts the term “Thaw” to convey the 
series of thaws and chills in this ambiguous and 
multivalent, but overall more pluralistic era. For more on this term, see Stephen V. ”itner, The Many 
Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory 
in Moscow’s Arbat, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
Abstract
This paper proposes that the mid-1950s drive to combat extreme devotion to western fashion 
constituted part of the endeavor to build a broadly appealing socialist version of modernity in the 
“Thaw,” the decade and a half following I. V. Stalin’s death in 1953 and the rise of N. S. Khrushchev 
to power.  This Thaw-era drive for a socialist modernity involved forging a society, culture, and a 
way of life widely perceived at home and abroad as progressive and advanced, and as ofering a 
viable alternative to the predominant western paradigm.  The end goals of this post-Stalin endeavor 
to construct an appealing socialist alternative involved reaching the utopia of communism, a drive 
that stagnated under Stalin, while also winning the Cold War and in the process spreading the 
Soviet model of socialist modernity across the globe.
Keywords: socialist modernity, fashion, thaw, cold war culture.
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modernity involved forging a society, culture, 
and a way of life widely perceived at home 
and abroad as ofering a viable alternative 
to the predominant western paradigm in the 
Cold War context.5
An essential aspect of building a socialist 
version of modernity involved creating young 
model citizens, ȃNew Soviet PeopleȄ, it for 
constructing and living in the upcoming 
communist utopia. In doing so, the Soviet 
party-state complex, the combination of 
government institutions and Communist 
Party-controlled social organizations such 
as trade unions and the Komsomol, sought 
to reshape youth cultural tastes, and thus 
identities, to it prescribed notions of 
appropriate norms.6 Several recent studies 
have shed signiicant light on youth identities 
and cultural practices in the postwar decades.7 
However, there has been a lack of studies 
examining the perspective of and eforts by 
the authorities to remake youth tastes.
My essay also contributes to the ield of 
socialist fashion. Much excellent literature has 
appeared on the post-Stalin turn to satisfying 
2008, pp. 1-13.ś  On socialist modernity, see David L. Hofmann, 
Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and 
Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939, Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2011, p. 3.
6  For the role of taste in shaping identity, see Pi-
erre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ŗşŞŚ, pp. ŚŜŜ-ŞŚǲ Sarah Thornton, Club Cul-
tures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital, Hanover: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1996, pp. 163-68.
7  Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The 
West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 
1960-1985, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ŘŖŗŖǲ William J. Risch, The Ukrainian West: 
Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv, Cam-bridgeǱ Harvard University Press, ŘŖŗŗǲ “lexei 
Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No 
More: The Last Soviet Generation, Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, ŘŖŖŜǲ Gleb Tsipursky, Having 
Fun in the Thaw: Youth Initiative Clubs in the Post-Sta-
lin Years, in the series The Carl Beck Papers in Russian 
and East European Studies, No. ŘŘŖŗ, PitsburghǱ Uni-versity of Pitsburgh Press, ŘŖŗŘ.
consumer desires and tastes in fashion.8 Still, 
such works have not undertaken in-depth 
examinations of the symbolic and physical 
violence exerted by the party-state to combat 
the tastes and preferences of those who 
refused to follow oicial prescriptions.9 
“ focus on the later issue enables this paper 
to make another historiographic intervention, 
joining the recent scholarship that rejects 
previous depictions of the Thaw as a time 
of liberalism by pointing to elements of 
continuing and even increasing coercion 
during this era.10 A number of scholars have 
pointed to the growing role of collective 
surveillance and volunteer policing as 
increasing the prevalence of social control 
at the daily level under Khrushchev.11 These 
8  Larissa Zakharova, “Dior in Moscow: A Taste 
for Luxury in Soviet Fashion under Khrushchev”, 
Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eas-
tern Bloc, eds. David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010, pp. şś-ŗŘŗǲ L. ”. ”rusilovskaia, Kul’tura povsednev-nosti v epoЦhu ȃotepeЧiȄǱ Metamorfozy stiЧia, Moscow: IzdatelȂstvo UR“O, ŘŖŖŗ, pp. ŗŜş-ŝŚǲ S. V. Zhu-
ravlev and Jukka Gronow, “Krasota pod kontro-
lem gosudarstva: Osobennosti i etapi stanovleniia 
sovetskoi mody”, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review řŘ.ŗ, ŘŖŖś, pp. ŗ-şŘǲ Olga Gurova, ȃThe “rt of Dres-
sing: Body, Gender and Discourse on Fashion in So-
viet Russia in the 1950s and 60s”, The Fabric of Cul-
tures: Fashion, Identity, Globalization, eds. Eugenia 
Paulicelli and Hazel Clark, New York: Berg, 2008, 
pp. 73-91.ş  Following Dipesh Chakrabarty, this essay deines 
symbolic violence as coercion via means other than 
physical force: see his Provincializing Europe: Post-coЧoniaЧ Thought and HistoricaЧ Diference, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 1-27.
10  Robert Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repressi-
on in Khrushchev‘s Soviet Union, New York: Cam-bridge University Press, ŘŖŗřǲ Miriam Dobson, 
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, 
and the Fate of Reform after Stalin, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ŘŖŖşǲ ”rian LaPierre, Hooligans in KhrushchevȂs RussiaǱ Deining, PoЧicing, and Produ-
cing Deviance during the Thaw, Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
11  Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Indivi-
dual in Russia: A Study of Practices, Berkeley: Uni-versity of California Press, ŗşşş, pp. Řŝş-řŖŘǲ Gleb 
Tsipursky, “Citizenship, Deviance, and Identity: 
Soviet Youth Newspapers as Agents of Social Con-
trol in the Thaw-Era Leisure Campaign”, Cahiers 
du monde russe 49.4, October-December 2008, pp. 
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works have not yet suiciently explored the 
oicial perspectives on the struggle with 
“ultramodern” fashion among youngsters.
Finally, this paper considers the Cold War 
implications of Soviet youth wearing styles 
perceived as western. The historiography on 
the Cold War’s cultural struggle has made great 
advances within the last decades, convincingly 
showing the vital role played by the cultural 
front in shaping the nature and outcome of this 
conlict. The large majority of extant literature 
focuses on the production of western cultural 
propaganda.12 Some pioneering works have 
begun to uncover the complex question of the 
actual fruits of this propaganda for Soviet daily 
cultural life.13 Yet this area requires much more 
research, enabling my study to expand the 
available historiography, especially in regard 
to how the Soviet authorities sought to present 
an image abroad of Soviet domestic cultural 
practices as worthy of respect and emulation, 
an aspect of foreign policy known as cultural 
diplomacy, as part of the party-stateȂs efort to 
ofer an appealing socialist modernity to the 
outside world. 
The context for and the launch of the mid-
1950s campaign 
In the immediate postwar period, young 
upper-class men and some women in the USSR 
629-49.
12  Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting 
America in the Cold War Era, Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, ŘŖŖşǲ Greg Castillo, Cold War on 
the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design, MinneapolisǱ University of Minnesota Press, ŘŖŗŖǲ 
Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: 
Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War, Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2004.
13  Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral 
History of Russia’s Cold War Generation, New York: Oxford University Press, ŘŖŗŗ, pp. ŜŜ-ŘŜŝǲ “nne 
E. Gorsuch, All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism 
at Home and Abroad after Stalin, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, pp. 79-167.
became fascinated with western European 
and American popular culture.14 The party-
controlled press disparagingly homogenized 
such young people with the label of “stiliagi” 
(or the ‘style-obsessed’). A notorious 1949 
article in the satirical journal Krokodil set 
the standard for the deinitions of stiliagi in 
oicial discourse. The piece described a male 
youth clothed in a jacket with an orange back 
and green sleeves, yellowish-green pants, and 
socks in colors suggestive of the American 
lag. The article censured stiliagi for ȃbeing 
familiar with fashion of all countries and 
times” and for “developing their own style 
in clothing, conversations, and manners”, 
where “the main thing is to not be like normal 
people.”15 This narrative makes references to 
the most important signiiers in actual stiliagi 
cultural practices, most notably fashion. 
Somewhat surprisingly in the context of the 
wide-ranging anti-cosmopolitan campaign 
against western cultural inluence launched 
in ŗşŚŜ, these youngsters drew litle atention 
from the postwar Stalin leadership. Several 
factors explain thisǱ irst, the late Stalinist 
state was always reluctant to publicize 
social problemsǲ second, the demands of 
postwar reconstruction occupied much of 
its atentionǲ third, many of the early stiliagi 
were the children of party elites.16 Though 
14  Mark Edele, “Strange Young Men in Stalin‘s 
Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-
1953”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50.1, ŘŖŖŘ, pp. řŝ-Ŝŗǲ Gleb Tsipursky, ȃLiving ȁ“mericaȂ 
in the Soviet Union: The Cultural Practices of ‘Wes-
ternized’ Soviet Youth, 1945-1964”, The Soviet Union 
& The United States: Rivals of the Twentieth Century. 
Coexistence & Competition, ed. Eva-Maria Stolberg, 
New York: Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 139-64.
15  “Stiliaga”, Krokodil, March 10, 1949.
16  Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illu-
sions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, ŗşşŞ, pp. ŗ-śŗǲ N. I. Nikolaeva, ȃNekoto-
rye itogi antiamerikanskoi kampanii v SSSR v kont-
se 40kh-nachale 50kh godov”, Novaia i noveishaia is-
toriia, eds. A. V. Gladyshev and V. S. Mirzekhanov, 
Saratov: Izdatel’stvo Saratovskogo universiteta, 
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some criticism of westernized youth in 
newspapers did appear with the launch of 
the anticosmopolitanism campaign, it likely 
reached its apogee with the 1949 article, 
decreasing afterward.17
However, soon after Stalin’s death the new 
leadership rapidly launched a new public 
drive against all sorts of youth misbehavior, 
including stiliagi-like behavior, most notably 
targeting fashion. The keynote speech of 
the 1954 Twelfth Komsomol Congress, in 
contrast to the lack of criticism at the 1949 
Eleventh Komsomol Congress, strongly 
condemned “young men with Tarzan-style 
haircuts dressed up like parrots, the so-called 
‘stiliagi’”.18 Regional Komsomol commitee 
conferences sent similar messages: for example, 
in contradiction to the lack of criticism of 
stiliagi in the keynote speech of the December 
1952 Saratov Komsomol city conference, 
the keynote speaker at the December 1953 
conference disparaged “young women and 
men, with so much make-up that they are 
unrecognizable, garbed in wild costumes.”19 
The Komsomol strengthened its anti-stiliagi 
campaign with an “ugust ŗşśś closed leter 
to branch Komsomol organizations that 
demanded the intensiication of the struggle 
against young people who “lead a party 
lifestyle”, a euphemism for stiliagi.20
This new campaign was all the more 
remarkable owing to the warming relations 
with non-socialist states in the early Thaw 
and the accompanying tolerance for 
elements of western popular culture in 
Soviet life, unimaginable during the Stalinist 
2004, pp. 100-12.ŗŝ  F(rst, Stalin’s Last Generation, pp. 200-249.
18  A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad TsK VLKSM 
XII s‘‘ezdu komsomola, Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 
1954, p. 48.
19  GANISO, f. 4529, op. 10, d. 6, l. 218.
20  RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 878, ll. 76-78.
anticosmopolitan campaign.21 As part of 
this transformation, outsiders traveled to 
the Soviet Union in growing numbers. In 
particular, post-Stalin public diplomacy 
encouraged western youth associations to send 
delegations to the Soviet Union, perceiving 
such institutional ties as helping legitimate 
the USSR in the eyes of the outside world. 
However, the outcome of these trips did not 
always go as planned by the Soviet party-
state. In one instance, the Ministry of Foreign 
“fairs reported that a member of a visiting 
delegation of English students, after returning 
home, published an article in the English 
newspaper Observer entitled “Speculators and 
Hooligans”. This story related how a small 
minority of Soviet youth tried to emulate 
western ways in a “vulgar and loud” manner 
and atempted to purchase western products 
from foreign visitors. The ministry suggested 
that youth organizations deal with these 
problems.22 Nonetheless, western newspapers 
kept publishing stories about Soviet youth 
who longed for western material and cultural 
products.23 This undoubtedly drew top-level 
ire as undermining the Soviet Cold War 
cultural diplomacy eforts.
Still, while the number of young people 
fascinated with western styles did rise after 
1953, the gradual rate of this increase suggests 
that this factor had no more than a secondary 
part in the rapid launch of the new measures 
targeting stiliagi. Instead, the coming to 
21  Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Po-
litics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 
1999, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. řş-ŞŘǲ “leksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 
Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Insider Story of an Ame-
rican Adversary, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, p. ś-řŘǲ Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet 
Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Cha-
pel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007, 
pp. 62-94.
22  RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, l. 87.
23   “Moscow’s Jet Set Rides High”, The New York 
Times, November 4, 1956.
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power of the new leadership and its decisive 
turn toward forging a socialist modernity 
through re-launching the drive to construct 
communism and win the Cold War played 
the central role. The ŗşśś leter itself presents 
the motivation as inherently ideological, 
linking the current “concluding stage of the 
construction of socialism and gradual transition 
to communism” to the need for a “decisive 
struggle with” youth misbehavior.24 The 
resolution of the Seventh Komsomol Central 
Commitee plenum of ŗşśŝ underscored the 
need to struggle with misbehavior “with all 
our might, because it is especially intolerable 
right now, when the country is coming closer 
and closer to communism everyday.”25 In 
a March 1957 speech at a conference of the 
Moscow Komsomol city commitee, the First 
Secretary and thus leader of the Komsomol 
A. N. Shelepin demanded that “Komsomol 
organizations lead the struggle against blindly 
kowtowing to all that is western.”26 Such 
evidence underscores that the rapid shifts 
in discourse and policy against stiliagi after 
StalinȂs death relect the changes taking place 
at the top. This indicates the need to nuance the 
conclusions of those recent publications that 
consider Thaw-era innovations as primarily 
structurally-determined policies evolving 
organically from broader processes associated 
with postwar reconstruction as opposed to the 
result of a conscious new course by the post-
Stalin Kremlin.27
24  RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 878, l. 79.
25  Ibid., d. 930, l. 6.
26  TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 13-17, 44-45.Řŝ  F(rst, Stalin’s Last Generation, pp. ŘŖ-Řşǲ Julie 
Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, 
Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. 296-336.
Enacting the mid-1950s campaign against 
stiliagi
The anti-stiliagi drive resulted in newspapers 
deploying symbolic violence as a means 
of using the power of public censure, 
humiliation, and shame, a sharp break 
with the late Stalinist practices of avoiding 
publicizing social problems. Less than two 
months after Stalin’s death the Moscow 
Komsomol city commiteeȂs paper published 
a mocking poem entitled “Stiliaga” about a 
young person whose costume “is reminiscent 
of a peacock’s tail.”28 The national Komsomol 
organ published an article that harshly 
criticized a youth for legally changing his 
name to Andre Johnson Rockefeller, wearing 
“narrow pants with zippers”, and harassing 
women.29 Newspapers also reproached 
female stiliagi, as in a published leter from 
a group of young women ashamed of their 
friend, Valia. According to this denunciation, 
Valia wears excessive makeup and shows 
too much of her body.30 The publication of 
a multitude of response leters condemning 
Valia patently illustrates the intentions of 
the press to convince readers that all worthy 
citizens need to participate in the collective 
censure of misbehaving young women.31 The 
press disparaged stiliagi by name, printing 
their personal information, as in a story about 
Arkadii and his friends, condemned by the 
newspaper for illegal trading with foreign 
sailors “for the sake of striped socks and a 
dozen packs of chewing gum.”32
28  ”Stiliaga”, Moskovskii komsomolets, April 23, 
1953.
29  “Rockefeller iz Noril‘ska”, Komsomol‘skaia prav-
da, July 11, 1959.
30  “Nam stydno za podrugu”, Komsomol‘skaia pra-
vda, June 21, 1955.
31  For the responses, see “Net, eto nashe delo”, 
Komsomol‘skaia pravda, August 11, 1955.
32  “Okhotniki za podtiazhkami”, Komsomol‘skaia 
pravda, July 1, 1960.
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Editorial cartoons in newspapers visually 
illustrated and condemned stiliagi style and 
behavior. A youth newspaper in Saratov 
published two caricatures of stiliagi, focusing 
on their atire ǻsee Figure ŗǼ. 
Both images exaggerated elements to mock 
stiliagi styles. A more complex, multi-panel 
example from Komsomol’skaia Pravda bears 
the title of “What is Good and What is Bad”, 
with the left side devoted to praiseworthy and 
the second to proscribed practices (see Figure 
2).  
The irst panel denounces those who spend 
a great deal of time shopping and buy 
skimpy, western-style clothing. The second 
critiques people siting by themselves at home 
listening and singing to boogie-woogie music. 
The third panel most explicitly condemns 
western fashion. The last panel disparages 
individualistic separation from the collective. 
The wide reliance on public censure links 
directly to the Thaw-era administration’s 
belief in the power of collective judgment in 
the struggle to achieve communism. At the 
1957 Moscow city Komsomol conference, 
Shelepin cited a Chinese folk saying that states 
that if 1000 people point to a thief, he will die: 
this, according to Shelepin, “is about the great 
power of the collective.”33 The newspaper 
articles set the goal of helping construct a 
self-surveying, authoritative collective, whose 
disparaging, shaming voice constitutes the 
only punishment necessary for correcting 
misbehavior in the communist utopia.34
Perhaps the most direct means of using the 
symbolic violence of public opprobrium to 
condemn inappropriate tastes came through 
33  TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 240, ll. 44-45.
34  On surveillance managing behavior, see Michel 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Pri-
son, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, pp. 178-79.
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Figure 1: “Stiliagi”, Zaria molodezhi, February 17, 1957.
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direct censure of Komsomol members 
exhibiting stiliagi-like traits at Komsomol 
meetings. The Party Central Commitee 
promoted the employment of this and similar 
tactics in March 1959.35 Local Komsomol 
commitee testimony depicts this range of 
public shaming as an efective technique.36
Such symbolic violence constituted a necessary 
basis for mobilizing young Komsomol 
35  Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika, Vypusk III, 
Moscow, 1961, pp. 577-79.
36  RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 64.
members to deploy both symbolic and 
physical violence against youth misconduct 
through Komsomol-managed volunteer 
militias. The mid-1950s campaign against 
juvenile delinquency resulted in the quick 
organization of Komsomol patrols under the 
auspices of local Komsomol commitees across 
the country. The patrols, consisting of groups 
of ideologically commited young volunteers, 
strove to monitor and police the everyday 
activities of youth in their free time.37 At a 
Moscow city Komsomol conference in 1957, 
the Komsomol secretary of the Likhachev 
automobile factory described how “[we] help 
guys get a beter haircut, with the help of 
scissors, of courseȄ, a euphemism for cuting 
of the ȃwesternȄ haircuts of stiliagi.38 A former 
patrol member’s memoirs relate his dislike for 
stiliagi: “To our high ideals [they] juxtaposed 
narrow pants and loud ties”, and he recalls a 
number of ights with them.39 In a press story, 
a Komsomol patrol “took a group of girls 
who danced an improper dance [meaning 
in a “western” style] outside the capital, and 
cut the hair of four of them.Ȅ40 The patrols 
deployed symbolic and physical violence to 
impose horizontal social controls on stiliagi 
and expunge this perceived deviance, thus 
removing the roadblocks toward the ideal 
řŝ  For more on patrols, see Juliane F(rst, ȃThe Im-
portance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Iden-
tity in Late Stalinism”, Late Stalinist Russia: Society 
between Reconstruction and Reinvention, ed. Juliane F(rst, New YorkǱ Routledge, ŘŖŖŜ, pp. ŘŖş-řŖǲ Gleb 
Tsipursky, “Coercion and Consumption: The Khru-
shchev Leadership‘s Ruling Style in the Campaign 
against ‘Westernized’ Youth, 1954-64,” Youth, Rock, 
and the Soviet Bloc: Youth Cultures, Music, and the Sta-
te in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. William J. Risch, 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014, pp. 82-127.
38  TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 75-76.
39  V. E. Ronkin, Na smenu dekabriam prikhodi-
at ianvari: vospominaniia byvshego brigadmil‘tsa i podpoЧȂshchiЦa, a pozzhe – poЧizaЦЧiuchennogo i dissi-
denta, Moscow: Obshchestvo “Memorial”, Izd-vo 
“Zven‘ia”, 2003, pp. 71-74
40  “Vospitanie… nozhnitsami”, Moskovskii komso-
molets, February 24, 1959.
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Figure 2: “Chto takoe khorosho i chto takoe 
plokho”, Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 12, 1957.
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communist future and helping manage its 
Cold War domestic cultural front. 
Soviet law enforcement also participated 
in the struggle against stiliagi. In 1960-61, 
the government passed more stringent laws 
against illegal products, including western 
goods.41 A booklet describes how the police 
uncovered a clique of youths who bought 
goods and currency from foreign tourists for 
resale in the Soviet Union, and put them on 
trial.42
Still, oicial discourse and public policy in the 
Thaw opened signiicant room for negotiation 
on the extent of western style allowed in 
comparison to the late Stalin years. The 
Moscow Komsomol organ in ŗşśś ran a leter 
from a young woman in a prominent position 
on its front page. The leter stated thatǱ
Lately, many young women have begun to wear 
pants. Yet this clothing surprises some passersby, 
and occasionaЧЧy one hears ȃstiЧiagaȄ addressed to 
those women. I think pants are comfortable clothes 
for industrial work, for housework, and, of course, 
for sports. If pants are convenient for working with 
machinery, skating, hiking, and cleaning, then you 
shouЧd wear them, and pay no atention to those 
who, because of their stagnant mindset, call such a 
costume stiliaga-like.43
This and other stories in youth newspapers 
echoed broader debates among Soviet fashion 
workers and in the pages of specialized 
magazines on appropriate styles, which 
41  Harold J. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Inter-
pretation of Soviet Law, Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1966, pp. 84-86.
42  A. Lavrov and O. Lavrova, ChP – darmoed! 
Moscow: Znanie, 1961, pp. 6-16.
43  “A kak dumaete vy?” Moskovskii komsomolets, 
March 10, 1957. For other articles where the let-ters of readers provide a conlicting deinition of 
stiliagi, see Moskovskii komsomolets, March ŗř, ŗşśŝǲ 
Komsomol‘skaia pravda, July ş, ŗşśŞǲ Komsomol‘skaia 
pravda, August 6, 1958.
frequently argued over the appropriateness 
of “western” models. These discussions 
helped expand greatly the amount of room 
for western-like fashion allowed to Soviet 
citizens. 44
Such discussions within Soviet newspapers 
and journals emblematize a deliberate opening 
of negotiating room on the deinition of 
stiliagi and draw atention to the KomsomolȂs 
willingness to extend a compromise to the 
many people tempted by some aspects of 
western culture yet faithful to communist 
ideology at heart. These youth, in other words, 
could still be New Soviet People while adopting 
a degree of western style.45 At variance with 
the tendencies of the postwar Stalin years to 
totalizing exclusion, this novel Khrushchev-
era approach endeavored to excise only the 
minority of full-ledged stiliagi who were 
not willing to compromise and expressed a 
spectacular opposition to mainstream norms. 
Such repression of small-scale youth cultural 
groupings that spectacularly went against 
mainstream norms paralleled some of the 
practices of western governments in regard to 
spectacularly nonconformist youth.46
44  For such debates, see Zhuravlev and Gronow, ȃKrasota pod kontrolem gosudarstvaȄǲ Gurova, 
“The Art of Dressing”.
45  For similar tensions in regard to other kinds of western cultural inluence, see Yurchak, Everything 
was Forever, pp. 164-65.
46  Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The 
Creation of the Mods and Rockers, New York: Basil ”lackwell, ŗşŞŝǲ Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: 
Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided 
Germany, Berkeley: University of California Press, ŘŖŖŖǲ James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s 
Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s, New YorkǱ Oxford University Press, ŗşŞŜǲ Steven Minz, 
Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood, Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 275-řŖşǲ John Springhall, Coming of Age: Adolescence in 
Britain, 1860-1960, Dublin: Gill and Macmillian Ltd, ŗşŞŜǲ John R. Gillis, Youth and History: Tradition and 
Change in European Age Relations, 1770-Present, New 
York: Academic Press Inc., 1981, pp. 132-210.
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Conclusion
My essay has made a number of interventions in 
the current scholarship. It placed the campaign 
in the mid-1950s against styles perceived by 
the hierarchy as excessively western within the 
broader framework of the Thaw-era endeavor 
to construct an appealing socialist alternative 
to western modernity, one atractive at home 
and abroad alike, as a means of winning the 
Cold War and building communism in the 
Soviet Union and across the globe. The paper 
proposed that forging model young Soviet 
citizens it to construct communism and carry 
out the Cold War constituted a key component 
of making a socialist alternative modernity. 
As part of a cohesive and holistic identity, this 
New Soviet Person had to have appropriate 
cultural tastes and aesthetic preferences, the 
authorities believed. This meant, among other 
things, rejecting excessive western cultural 
inluence, including in fashion, while opening 
the door to a much greater amount of western 
culture than permissible under Stalin. 
To ensure the forging of Soviet youth 
into model builders of communism, the 
Khrushchev authorities launched the 
campaign against youth misbehavior in the 
mid-ŗşśŖs, a signiicant part of which targeted 
stiliagi and their fashion. The authorities strove 
mightily to enforce a limit on the boundaries 
of acceptable clothing. This contrasted with 
the Stalinist period when oicial discourse 
publicly condemned western cultural 
inluence, but the party-state did not undertake 
any signiicant and systematic measures to 
combat westernized youth cultural practices 
in fashion. 
The mid-1950s campaign relied heavily 
on symbolic violence as expressed via the 
opprobrium of public discourse and oicial 
collectives as its premier tool of social control. 
A crucial secondary tool consisted of social 
mobilization at Komsomol meetings and 
especially Komsomol patrols, with the 
later deploying both symbolic and physical 
violence. Law enforcement organs provided a 
third, less important element, owing to the de-
emphasis on state policing under Khrushchev. 
The new mid-1950s initiative underscores the 
important role that the conscious decisions 
of the post-Stalin leadership had on the 
content of central policies and the methods of 
enacting these in everyday life, thus shaping 
the frameworks of Soviet youth lives and 
cultural practices. However, these policies 
simultaneously responded to the realities 
of youth desires, including for western 
fashion, illustrating the complex process of 
interactions between governing structures 
and the population in the USSR.
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by Danijela Lugarić Vukas
In the period after Stalin’s death and the crisis of the monolithic dogma of socialist 
realism, some of the most exciting cultural 
practices were associated with three cults: the 
cults of youth, individualism and westernness. 
In the following period of Stagnation (zastoi) 
and Brezhnev’s less liberal political doctrine, 
the process of cultural disintegration was even 
intensiied. Avtorskaia pesnia (literally “author’s 
song”) responded ideally to the ‘zeitgeist’. It 
was not only close to individualism, youth 
culture and student population, but also to the 
process of cultural disintegration. Avtorskaia 
pesnia is sometimes called the poetry of wild 
youth. Emerging as a ‘temporary autonomous 
zone’ (cf. Hakim Bey), as part of the so-
called apartment culture or the institution of 
communal art, it is related to the phenomenon 
of ‘magnitizdat’ (from ‘magnitofon’ = magnetic 
tape recorder and ‘izda(va)t’’ = to publish). 
It directly inluenced the development of 
Russian rock music (it is argued that this 
is one of the reasons why text dominates 
over music in Russian rock). Moreover, due 
to its immense popularity, avtorskaia pesnia 
inluenced contemporary Russian poetry in 
general. In the period of late Soviet socialism it 
was probably the most atractive and the most 
widespread form of cultural production and 
consumption.
Two theoretical protocols frame this 
analysis. First, I approach avtorskaia pesnia 
as a deterritorialized milieu (A. Yurchak) 
par excellence. Yurchak developed his 
understanding of  “deterritorialization” in close 
epistemological connection with Bakhtin’s 
concept of vnenakhodimost’ (translated usually 
as “outsideness” or “exotopy”), which has 
been re-articulated in Yurchak’s writings in 
the form of the famous operative term vnye 
(‘outside’). Yurchak’s understanding is closely 
related to what American anthropologists 
depict as the “performative shift” which 
authoritative discourse experienced during 
late Soviet socialism.1 According to Yurchak, 
the authoritative language after Stalin’s 
death developed the ability to create the 
reality it names. This performative shift was 
accompanied by a decreasing ability of the 
same language to relate to the objective reality 
it names.2 As a result, authoritative language 
inspired “new temporalities, spatialities, 
social relations, and meanings that were not 
necessarily anticipated or controlled by the 
state, although they were fully made possible 
by it”.3 New aesthetic paradigms, identities 
1  Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It 
Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 134.
2  This refers to the “constative” function of langua-
ge, cf. John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 
second edition, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1975.
3  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 128.
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and social interactions created, as Yurchak 
further elaborates, “a major deterritorialization 
of late Soviet culture”4, which included a 
set of cultural and social practices that were 
operating within and yet beyond the hegemonic 
Soviet ideological discourse.
Secondly, I will do a close reading of the 
poetry of two prominent Russian bards, B. 
Okudzhava and V. Vysotskii. In doing so, I 
will pay special atention to one of the most 
authoritative ideological concepts of Soviet 
cultural and political history, which was often 
subject to mystiication and gloriications of all 
kinds – that of “motherland” (rodina).
Avtorskaia pesnia 
During the last few decades, both in 
humanities and in social sciences, theoretical 
descriptions of Soviet culture very often use 
binary terms, such as repression and freedom, 
oppression and resistance, oicial and 
unoicial, state and society. “t the same time, 
various popular cultural formations belonged 
to the “grey zone” of culture, situated between 
such dichotomies.5 It was precisely these 
practices which relected crucial paradoxes of 
late Soviet socialism and inluenced the ways 
in which ideology was constructed, regulated 
and understood among Soviet citizens.
4  Ibid.
5 The “high policy” played an important role in the 
formation of this rather disorientated (and disori-entatingǼ cultural ield. During late Soviet socialism 
political authorities dealing with censorship were 
rather lost. Very often it was not clear what belon-
ged to the sphere of the forbidden and to the sphere 
of the allowed. This resulted in frequent absurdi-
ties, such as the fact that in the 1970s a large number 
of subversive bands played in dance parties orga-
nized by the Komsomol (cf. Alexei Yurchak, “Gaga-
rin and the Rave Kids”, Consuming Russia. Popular 
Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev, ed. Adele 
M. Barker, Duke University Press, 1999, p. 83). See 
also: Rachel Platonov, Singing the Self: Guitar Poe-
try, Community, and Identity in the Post-Stalin Period, 
Northwestern University Press, 2012, pp. 38-56.
In this essay, I understand avtorskaia pesnia as 
one of the most signiicant cultural formations 
of the time. Emerging from the “grey zone” of 
culture, it relected trajectories of late Soviet 
socialism while actively preparing political and 
economic changes. Speaking with Bourdieu, 
this popular cultural practice operated as a 
“structuring structure”6, which means that it 
had an ability to do both – organize cultural 
practices and their perception.
Avtorskaia pesnia gained immense popularity 
during late Soviet socialism. Bards used 
forbidden ways of distribution (magnitizdat) 
and played their songs on guitar7, which was 
6  Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgment of Taste, Cambridge ǻMassachusetsǼǱ 
Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 170.
7  In the practice of avtorskaia pesnia the guitar oc-
cupies a strong symbolic space. Therefore it is not 
surprising that many scholars refer to this genre as 
“guitar poetry” (see, for example, Rossen Djaga-
lov, “Guitar Poetry, Democratic Socialism, and the 
Limits of 1960s Internationalism”, The Socialist Six-
ties: Crossing Borders in the Second World, ed. Anne 
E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013, pp. 148-166). While 
in the time before Stalin’s death guitar bore con-licting meanings, symbolizing the negativity of 
bourgeois lifestyle, after his death it became a cult 
instrument for youth self-expression. It should, 
however, be emphasized that, apart from its re-
putation of being a “democratic” instrument, the 
Thaw saw the rise in its popularity for other, more 
practical reasons. One of them was availability: gu-
itars were cheap, for example in 1964 a guitar cos-
ted only seven rubles. Also, parallel to economic 
growth and increase in purchasing power in the 
1960s, the Soviets became increasingly interested 
in traveling and hiking. These leisure practices – 
with the guitar as a frequent fellow-traveller – were 
the symbol of a liberating and politically carefree way of life among the youth. The conirmation of 
its symbolic and associative relation with leisure 
can be found in Okudzhava’s poetry, where the 
guitar motif is most frequent in songs referring to 
an “empty” time (past or leisure, or holidays). For example, in a ŗşŝş self-relexive song Chuvstvuiu, 
pora proshchat’sia (I Feel, Here Comes the Time to 
Say Goodbye) the lyrical I of Okudzhava’s song in-vites friends to his home, for ȃdinner and guitar / 
and words of days long gone” (Bulat Okudzhava, 
Stikhotvoreniia, Sankt-Peterburg: Akademicheskii 
proekt, 2001, p. 264). The guitar was primarily as-
sociated with intimacy, private cultural practices 
taking place behind closed doors. For bards it car-
ried a deep symbolic meaning – it was the absolute 
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not repressed, but out of favor with the party. 
People associated their songs not with labor, 
but with leisure activities, i.e. with “doing 
nothing” – hiking, camping, traveling8, or just 
siting, drinking and smoking in a khrushchevka 
kitchen or in a communal apartment. The 
poetry of the two most prominent bards, Bulat 
Okudzhava (1924, Moscow – 1997, Paris) and 
Vladimir Vysotskii (1938, Moscow – 1980, 
Moscow), was rarely published in its original 
form. Songs of Okudzhava were oicially 
published as writen, not sung poetry. “s 
for Vysotskii, who was remarkably famous 
during his lifetime because of his acting career 
object of the poet’s devotion, as well as the symbol 
of his artistic freedom and autonomy, which is also 
the theme of one of Vysotskii’s most well-known 
songs, Serebriannye struny (Silver Strings) from 1962.
8  From the point of view of “high policy” of the 
time, traveling was to a certain extent problematic. 
On the one hand, weekends spent outside and or-
ganized leisure practices witnessed to the fact that 
the Soviet Union, like other countries, went through 
deep economic changes. On the other hand, these 
practices were marked by what culturologist P. Cor-
rigan describes as “doing nothing”. The subversive 
potential of this seemingly passive social behavior 
is obvious. Although “doing nothing” seems as an 
endless waste of time, an absence of purpose, it is, in 
fact, “full of incident, constantly informed by ‘weird 
ideas’” (Paul Corrigan, “Doing Nothing”, Resistance 
Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Bri-
tain, second edition, eds. Stuart Hall and Tony Jef-
ferson, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 
84-87). Therefore, it is not surprising that “simple” 
walking was the most popular activity, along with 
camping, hiking, alpinism and speleology, because 
it obscured the fact that it was an end in itself. A 
witness of the period, quoted in A. Yurchak’s book, 
points out that archaeological expeditions did not 
have much to do with archaeology, but with fos-
tering the culture of independent thinking: “It 
was very important on these expeditions... that 
everyone developed in his own direction and no one 
stood in the way of another’s thinking and feeling 
in his own way. That was very important... It was 
like meditation” (Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 
p. 138). According to Yurchak, the metaphor of me-
ditation “captures well the experience of living in 
deterritorialized worlds of friendship, poetry, and 
never-ending discussions in the contexts of nature, bonires, and hiking. The practice of meditation also 
stands for a particular relationship to the world – 
one stays acutely present in the world and yet un-
involved in its concerns, which is synonymous with 
the relationship of being vnye” (ibid.).
(which includes a highly praised performance 
of HamletǼ, the irst oicial recordings of his 
songs from the movie Vertikal were published 
in 1966. But almost none of Vysotskii’s 
songs were released by the state-owned 
recording label Melodiia, and only one song (Iz 
dorozhnogo dnevnika – From a Traveller’s Diary) 
was published in printed form through oicial 
channels, after harsh censorship. Okudzhava’s 
and Vysotskii’s poetry circulated the country 
in the form of privately-made copies. Their 
content and form did not follow the axioms of 
socialist realism, which – after Khrushchev’s 
famous speech at the twentieth party congress 
in 1956 – lost some of its discursive power, 
but was not abandoned in practice until the 
second half of the 1980s.9 Okudzhava’s work 
at Literaturnaia gazeta was compromised 
by phone calls by authorities, who were 
“surprised to have a guitar player working 
at the poetry section”10. Okudzhava’s poetry 
was discredited as naive, anti-patriotic, 
pessimistic, and paciistic.11 Vysotskii, by 
contrast, was “the star of the underground 
showbusiness”12. His poetry was part of an 
unoicial artistic stream in his career. Oicial 
acknowledgements of his poetical activities 
came only posthumously. 
In this essay I argue that the popularity 
of Okudzhava and Vysotskii, as well as of 
the genre of avtorskaia pesnia, was directly 
9  M. Epstein refers to the period after Stalin’s death 
as “socialist sentimentalism”. Mikhail Epstein, 
“After the Future: On the New Consciousness in 
Literature”, Late Soviet Culture: From Perestroika to 
Novostroika, eds. Thomas Lahusen and Gene Ku-
perman, Durkham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1993, pp. 257-287.
10  Alexandr Gorodnitskii,  “… Nam ne khvatalo 
Okudzhavy”, Golos nadezhdy, Vyp. 2, Moskva: Bu-
lat, 2005, p. 78.
11  Andrei Krylov, “Vspomnim ikh poimenno”, Go-
los nadezhdy, Vyp. 2, Moskva: Bulat, 2005, pp. 237-
284. 
12  Maxim Kravchinskii, Russkaia pesnia v izgnanii: 
Khudozhestvennoe oformlenie, Nizhnii Novgorod: 
DEKOM, 2007, p. 9.
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connected to the fact that they did not take – 
in their poetry and in their personal lifestyles 
– a clear and decisive political stand.13 By 
considering themselves anti-Stalinist, but 
neither anti-Soviet nor pro-Soviet, they 
relected and incorporated the lifestyle that “. 
Yurchak describes as “living vnye”.14 Further 
on, I argue that the prevailing characterization 
of avtorskaia pesnia as the sung poetry of “the 
loyal opposition”15 is not accurate.16 As a 
13  The question of the level of oppositionality, that 
is inscribed in avtorskaia pesnia, is nowadays still 
vital among the genre‘s historians. J. M. Daughtry emphasizes that ȃunoicial, grassroots recordings 
such as these – known popularly as magnitizdat – 
generate ambivalence on the part of Soviet authori-
ties, who treat them at times as a benign by-product 
of amateur artistic activity, at times as a pernicious atempt to circumvent the stateȁs monopoly on 
the mediation of cultural production“ (J. Martin Daughtry, „‚Sonic SamizdatȁǱ Situating Unoicial 
Recording in the Post-Stalinist Soviet Union“, Poe-
tics Today 30:1, Spring 2009, p. 28). In his book Songs 
to Seven Strings: Russian Guitar Poetry and Soviet 
Mass Song (1984), Gerald S. Smith emphasizes that 
many bards, and Okudzhava and Vysotskii respec-
tively, “stayed by and large within the tolerated 
limits of [...] the middle ground between what is 
actively promoted and what is actively persecuted 
by the authorities” (cf. Platonov, Singing the Self, p. 
6). R. Djagalov writes that “guitar poetry enjoyed a liminal, semioicial status, never particularly liked 
by Soviet bloc cultural bureaucracies for the un-
controllable public sphere it fostered and the near-
impossibility of censoring highly improvised, oral 
performances but not explicitly forbidden either” 
(Djagalov, „Guitar Poetry, Democratic Socialism“, 
p. 155).
14  Living vnye, according to A. Yurchak, refers to 
the refusal of an individual to take a clear political 
stand. It includes the position of being uninterested, 
and is applied to those who “considered themselves 
neither anti-Soviet nor pro-Soviet but non-Soviet 
(asovetskie), uninterested in political and ideological 
topics” (Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 138).
15  Namely, even the Soviet emigration of the time 
criticized their poetry on account of their “singing songs about VanȂka Morozov or the litle blue ballȄ 
(Gorodnitskii, “… Nam ne khvatalo Okudzhavy”, p. ŝşǼ instead of ofering a harsh, explicit and de-
cisive criticism of Soviet authorities. Some authors 
claim that Okudzhava’s and Vysotskii’s poetry, un-
like the poetry of A. Galich, was not dominated by 
political oppositionality but rather a symbolic one 
– at best (Ol’ga Shilina, “Chelovek v poeticheskom 
mire Vladimira Vysotskogo”, Mir Vysotskogo, Vyp. III/Ř, MoskvaǱ GKCM V. S. Vysotskogo, ŗşşş, p. řŞǼ.
16  This image of avtorskaia pesnia was predomi-
nantly shaped in Russian scholarship, see for ex-
mater of fact, the ȃmildnessȄ of their criticism 
had nothing to do with their “loyalty” to the 
authoritative discourse and to the system in 
general, but with their genuine and overall 
indiference towards it. It is unquestionable 
that the bards addressed various politically 
sensitive topics in their writings, but direct 
political oppositionality does not centrally 
deine the genre. “ccording to “. Yurchak, 
a key feature of Soviet lifestyle during late 
socialism was to think of discussions on daily 
policy as rather uninteresting (neinteresno). It 
could be argued that the socio-cultural impact 
of avtorskaia pesnia was closely related to its 
ambivalent and often – especially in the case 
of Okudzhava – almost completely absent 
political oppositionality. The “ideological 
dislocation” of the genre contributed to a 
lifestyle of double-existence: “Guitar poetry 
evolved not just as a song genre but as a 
sociocultural phenomenon [... that] formed 
communities that were never entirely within, 
yet also never outside of the Soviet ‘kollektiv’ 
(collective)”17. This contributed to the existence 
of ȃdiferent forms of living in a more or less 
deterritorialized reality”18.
Yet, it is important to mention that it was the 
ample Argus (M. K. Zheleznov), “Zoshchenko 
v stikhakh”, Mir Vysotskogo, Vyp. III/ŗ, MoskvaǱ GKCM V. S. Vysotskogo, ŗşŜŞ, p. řŘŖǲ Vladimir G. 
Dagurov, “Odin poet na svete zhil”, Golos nadezh-
dy, Vyp. ř, MoskvaǱ ”ulat, ŘŖŖŜ, p. Řřǲ Liudmila L. 
Ivanova, “Istoria i pustota. K voprosu o postmoder-
nizme”, Mir Vysotskogo, Vyp. V., eds. Andrei Kry-
lov and Valentina Shcherbakova, Moskva: GKCM V. S. Vysotskogo, ŘŖŖŗ, p. ŘŞŘǲ “ndrei Krylov, ȃO 
zadachakh i osobennostiakh tekstologii poetiche-
skikh proizvedenii Okudzhavy: K postanovke pro-
blemy”, Okudzhava: Problemy poetiki i tekstologii, ed. 
Andrei Krylov, Moskva: GKCM V. S. Vysotskogo, ŘŖŖŘ, p. ŗŞŝǲ Mark Tsybulȁskii, Planeta Vladimir Vy-
sotskii, Moskva: Eksmo, 2008, p. 501
17  Platonov, Singing the Self: Guitar Poetry, p. Ś.ǲ see 
also Adele M. Barker, “The Culture Factory”, Con-
suming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society Since 
Gorbachev, ed. Adele M. Barker, London: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1999, pp. 20-21.
18  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 139.
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authoritative regime that made avtorskaia pesnia 
possible. Most bards, including Okudzhava 
and Vysotskii, were never imprisoned or 
exiled. M. Daughtry even emphasized that the 
tapes of avtorskaia pesnia were submited ȃto 
the customs oicers for review [...] before the 
oicers emerged, smiling, to return the tapes 
and approve their export“.19 The popularity 
of Vysotskii ȃwith state oicials was 
unmatched”20, and by the end of the 1960s, 
there were strong institutional ties between 
the bard movement in the Moscow Amateur 
Song Club (Klub samodeiatel’noi pesni) and 
the Komsomol.21 In fact, it could be argued 
that it was the system itself that enabled 
the phenomenon of avtorskaia pesnia to gain 
popularity.22 Outside the Soviet state project 
this cultural practice would presumably have 
lost its social signiicance and ultimately 
made no sense. Okudzhava even explicitly 
complained that avtorskaia pesnia lost its 
credibility and meaning, and became a form of 
mass culture, i.e. ‘estrada’, as soon as it became 
oicially approved.23 A. Krylov therefore 
rightly claims that “the genre would never 
have achieved its cultural centrality without 
19  Daughtry, “‚Sonic Samizdat‘”, p. 28.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid.ŘŘ  Unoicial culture ǻor, as in the case of avtorskaia 
pesnia, semi-forbidden culture, cf. Svetlana Boym, 
Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 
1994, p. 116) depended on its ability to manipulate oicial channels. “n illustrative example is the phe-
nomenon of magnitizdat, since magnetic tape recor-
ders were manufactured in state-owned factories 
and sold in state-owned stores, while the state also 
determined the price of magnetic tape recorders. 
Also, it should be mentioned that the ambivalent, 
and often weak and unsophisticated subversive 
capacity of the texts of popular culture illustrates 
one of the key features of popular culture in gene-
ral: What is to be resisted is present in the resistance 
to it, cf. John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
23  Dmitrii Suharev (ed.), Avtorskaia pesnia: Antolo-
gia, Ekaterinburg: U-Faktoria, 2002, p. 455.
oicial censorshipȄ24, and that “censorship’s 
disappearance in the late 1980s robbed the 
genre of the advantage it enjoyed over print 
culture and ironically doomed it”.25  
Recalling the famous analogy between 
postmodernism and the cultural logic of late 
capitalism by F. Jameson, Yurchak describes 
late Soviet socialism in terms of the “double-
sided cultural logic of the Soviet universe”.26 
ȃThe absence of any political atitude, either 
pro-oicial or anti-oicial, was a way of 
avoiding oicial meanings, of existing within 
them – and even pretending to support them 
– without needing to think about them.“27 
Yurchak gives an apt example where listening 
to Vysotskii’s sung poetry reverberates this 
particular lifestyle:
At the moment Lena mentioned Vysotskii to her 
editor, a mutual recognition of svoi occurred. They 
both liked Vysotskii, and although both also wrote 
formulaic texts, they were not completely cynical 
about the socialist ideals and ethics, and regularly 
had to atend KomsomoЧ and party meetings. 
The editor looked at me thoughtfully and asked: 
ȃDoes your friend ЧiЦe VysotsЦii?Ȅ
ȃYes, I thinЦ so.Ȅ
ȃ“nd what about you?Ȅ
ȃI couЧd aЧso say that I do.Ȅ
He was quiet for a moment and then said: “OK, I 
need to go to the party commitee. In the meantime, 
you may Чisten to this.Ȅ
He turned on the tape recorder. It was Vysotskii. 
He added: “When you get tired of it you can turn 
it of.Ȅ
How can I GET TIRED OF VYSOTSKII?!?28
24  Cf. Djagalov, “Guitar Poetry, Democratic Soci-
alism”, p. 155.
25  Ibid.
26  Yurchak, “Gagarin and the Rave Kids”, p. 81.
27  Ibid.
28  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 123. 
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This example illustrates the gap between the 
private life of an average Soviet citizen and 
its public representation. Even if the citizens 
publicly approved of many ideas of socialism, 
they participated in socialist practices rather by 
default, without contemplating their symbolic 
meaning. They “inserted” socialist practices 
between actions they were really interested in 
doing, frequently in a subversive way. 
Extra-textual characteristics of avtorskaia 
pesnia, concerning its production and 
consumption (aspects which are well known 
and already researched thoroughly) as well 
as intra-textual characteristics (that I will 
address in the second part of this essay) 
make these songs a paradigmatic example 
of a cultural practice that was “in peculiar 
relationship to the authoritative regime – 
they were ‘suspended’ simultaneously inside 
and outside of it, occupying the border zones 
between here and elsewhere”29. In order to 
elaborate this argument and to illustrate how 
the vnye lifestyle was structured, operated, 
and maintained, I will do a close reading of 
the “motherland” discourse in the poetry of 
the two bards.
“Motherland”
The discourse of the “motherland” went 
through diferent stages during Soviet history. 
It became more deined in ŗşřŚ,30 after the 
29  Ibid., p. 12. 
30  In his text Arkhetipy sovetskoi kul’tury (The Ar-chetypes of Soviet CultureǼ H. G(nther writes 
that it is the year 1934, the year of the First Sessi-
on of Soviet Writers where M. Gorkii presented 
his famous paper O sotsialisticheskom realizme (On 
Socialist Realism), that saw the appearance of the female/feminine/maternal principle in the arche-
typal scheme of the Soviet myth. This principle, 
which found its most intense expression in the cult 
of the Homeland and the soil, is closely related to 
the changes of the Soviet myth, which, according to H. G(nther, should be viewed as the core which 
generated but also maintained the Soviet culture in 
beginning of socialist realism, and peaked in 
the poetry writen during the Second World 
War and its aftermath.31 During Thaw and 
Stagnation, “motherland” represented the 
marginal contents of the weakening state 
culture. These developments are more or 
less clearly relected in OkudzhavaȂs and 
Vysotskii’s poetry. 
The key framework of the “motherland” 
concept is the female, the maternal. In the 
Soviet period, when the role of the Great Father 
was atributed to Stalin, the patron of general 
welfare32, the female archetype was limited 
to the mother aspect, where the mother, like 
the mother of the wet soil (mat’ syra zemlia), 
has the ability of self-impregnation. Mass 
song (massovaia pesnia), the representative 
genre of socialist realism in art, and one of the 
most important propagandistic expressions 
of “homo sovieticus” as an ideal form of 
its oicial form. While in the ŗşŘŖs, with fresh me-
mories of the October Revolution, the Soviet myth 
assumed a horizontal direction, grouping around 
the ideal of egalitarian brotherhood (the idea of fra-
ternalism), the late 1920s and early 1930s saw the emergence of the igures of an older brother and 
wise, authoritative father (the idea of paternalism). 
This is the period when the Soviet myth assumed a 
vertical (hierarchical) direction, which implied the 
tendency of “ascent” from the concrete to the abs-
tract, from action to idea, from the individual to the 
collective, in a word: from the low (concrete, real) 
to the high (ideal, symbolic) level. The horizontal 
distribution of the Soviet myth develops into the 
“complete triangle of the Great Family”, cf. Hans G(nther, ȃ“rkhetipy sovetskoi kulȁturyȄ, Socrealis-
ticheskii kanon, eds. Hans G(nther and Evgeny Do-
brenko, Sankt-Peterburg: Akademicheskii proekt, 
2000, pp. 743-784. The wise father is at its top, and 
with the replacement of the linear with the vertical, 
hierarchical idea, the brothers turned into (heroic) 
sons and daughters. Since the sons and daughters 
needed the mother, and the father needed the wife, 
the image of a Motherland embodied the archetype 
of the female sex.
31  See also: Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: 
Soviet Political Poster under Lenin and Stalin, Berke-
ley, Los Angeles and London: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1996 (Introduction and Chapters Two 
and Three).řŘ  Samarin inǱ G(nther, ȃ“rkhetipy sovetskoi 
kul’tury”, p. 765.
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Soviet political subjectivity, conceived of the 
“motherland” as follows:
1. The “motherland” is seen as a place that 
constantly renews its energy (light and 
warmth). The energy originates in Moscow, 
or in the Kremlin, and thanks to the strength 
of the source, the light and warmth reach 
Siberia, the outer border of the “motherland”. 
Along the vast stretch from the centre to the 
frontier there are also other sources of energy. 
The “motherland” represents the synergy 
of all these sources, constantly renewing its 
energy potential (like a star or the sun). Due 
to the fact that it revolves around motives of 
source, origin and development, this speciic 
discourse of the “motherland” can be termed 
“cosmogonical”. 
2. In this discourse, the most characteristic 
symbolic ornament, representing the 
“motherland” chronotope, is the circle. Apart 
from the fact that it symbolizes perfection, it 
also signiies the femininity of the concept. 
3. In this kind of poetry, there are only two 
types of subjects (“I” and “we”), and both of 
them express their airmative relationship 
with the “motherland”. Both subjects are 
impersonal, but presumably masculine. The 
love of the (masculine) subject towards the 
(feminine) object is asexual and protective 
(resembling the relationship between a son 
and his mother) and primarily moral. Loving 
the ȃmotherlandȄ is a mater of collective, as 
well as individual duty.33  
33  These conclusions are based on my readings of 
numerous popular mass songs of the time (1920s-
early 1950s), such as Pesnia o Rodine (Song About 
“Motherland”), Marsh veselykh rebiat (March Of the 
Cheerful Children), My Rodinu slavim trudom (We 
Celebrate “Motherland” With Labour), Pesnia o Vol-
ge (Song About Volga) by V. Lebedev-Kumach, Ver-
nulsia ia na Rodinu (I‘ve Returned to “Motherland”) 
by M. Matusovsky, Rodina (“Motherland”) by D. 
Altauzen, Letiat pereletnye pticy (Migrant Birds Fly) 
by M. Isakovsky, Daleko ot doma (Far From Home) 
by H. Labkovsky, Toska po Rodine (Yearning For the 
“Motherland”) by E. Dolmatovsky, Kreml‘ noch‘iu 
Such a discourse of the “motherland” is 
not only characteristic of the “golden age” 
of socialist realism (from 1934 till 1953). 
The stereotypes of the “motherland” are 
also echoed in the cultures of the Thaw and 
Stagnation (until the early 1980s), especially 
in the works of writers and poets whose art 
ofered an aesthetical revision of socialist 
ideas in the spirit of Leninism.34
Okudzhava’s Arbat
Okudzhava “gave birth” to the bard movement 
– a movement of “singers of guitar poetry 
who would forever elude oicial control, and 
whose intimate songs distributed by modern 
tape technology opened a space for free 
discourse in Soviet society”.35 Okudzhava’s 
avtorskaia pesnia Ȯ like the one writen by other 
poets – has a distinctive urban quality. In his 
texts, Moscow carries a strong symbolism, 
resembling the stereotype of “motherland” in 
mass poetry. However, Okudzhava’s lyrical 
subject uses Moscow to express feelings 
opposite to those emanating from mass 
poetry: the sense of lack, of not-having, of 
radical emptiness, loss and disappointment. 
The Kremlin is associated with darkness, 
while the author’s focus lies on the iconic (but 
(Kremlin by Night) by S. Vasil‘ev and many others. More inǱ Danijela Lugarić Vukas, Ruski bardi. Mo-dusi popuЧarnog u poeziji ”uЧata OЦudžave i VЧadimira 
Vysockog (Russian Bards: Popular Aspects in the 
Author’s Song of Bulat Okudzhava and Vladimir 
Vysotskii), Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2011, pp. 161-
248. Valuable insights, many of whom inspired my analysis as well, are ofered inǱ Irina Sando-
mirskaia, “Kniga o Rodine. Opyt analiza diskursiv-
nykh praktik”, Wiener Slawistischer Almanach, Son-
derband 50, 2001.
34  See: Mikha Javornik, ”Ekologija teksta in ruska 
kultura 20. stoletja”, PrimerjaЧna Цnjiževnost, vol. 30, 
issue 1, 2007, p. 63.
35  James von Geldern, “1961. Bulat Okudzhava”, 
Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, htpǱ//www.so-viethistory.org/index.php?page=subject&SubjectI
D=1961okudzhava&Year=1961, accessed 31 August 
2017.
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– in spatial terms – marginal) Arbat street. For 
Okudzhava the Arbat represents a “garden 
of Eden”, a “motherland in miniature”, a 
microcosm, a “genetic motherland” and the 
most valuable source of creative inspiration. 
In his song Rechitativ (Recitative), which 
belongs to the so-called “Arbat cycle”, the 
Arbat is represented as a unique and modest 
private space (the Arbat courtyard) existing 
exclusively in the poet’s memory. This space, 
originating from the personal memory of the 
poet, becomes a ‘lieu de mémoire’ in Pierre 
Nora’s understanding, i.e. an “entity […], 
which by dint of human will or the work of 
time has become a symbolic element of the 
memorial heritage of any community”36. 
Autobiographical details (a private courtyard, 
planted birches) are intertwined with elements 
of collective cultural memory (Homer, of 
whom there are no traces, and Glazkov, who 
lived across the street): 
 Т˓˘ ˖аː˩ˇ ʹʵ˓˕, ʶʹʺ ˮ ˖ажаˏ ʴʺ˕ʺз˩,
 ʴ˩ˏ ˖˓зʹаˑ ˔˓ зак˓ˑаː ʵʺˣˑ˓ˇ ˔˕˓з˩
 ˆ ˓ʴ˕азˢ˓ː ʹʵ˓˕˓ʵ а˕ʴа˘˖кˆˠ ˖ˏ˩ˏǱ
 ˘аː, ˔˕аʵʹа, ˑʺ ʵ˩˕а˧ˆʵаˏˆ˖˪ ˕˓з˩,
 ʹа ˆ ɫ˓ːʺ˕ ˘˙ʹа ˑʺ заˠ˓ʹˆˏ...
 За˘˓ ˔˓˫˘ ɫˏазк˓ʵ ˑа˔˕˓˘ˆʵ жˆˏ […]37  
In his famous Pesenka o moskovskom murav’e 
(Poem of the Moscow Ant), the poet contrasts 
the great city of Moscow with the lyrical 
subject – a tiny ant. What is highlighted are 
not the political or otherwise signiicant parts 
36  Pierre Nora, Preface to the English-language edition. 
From Lieux de memoire to Realms of Memory, http://
faculty.smu.edu/bwheeler/Joan_of_Arc/OLR/03_Pier-
reNora_LieuxdeMemoire.pdf, p. xvii, accessed 31 August 
2017.řŝ  ȃThat same yard where I planted birch, / was established by the laws of eternal prose / and by the sample of “rbat yardsǱ / there, however, roses did not grow, / and Homer did not go there... / ”ut 
the poet Glazkov lived opposite.” (Translated by D. Lugarić Vukas.Ǽ Okudzhava, Stikhotvoreniia, p. 239.
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of the city, but rather its empty, disorientating 
“winding streets”. Even though the city carries 
the “higher rank and name of Moscow”, 
the lyrical subject perceives it as warm. The 
interaction between the lyrical subject and the 
city efectively deconstructs the idea of Soviet 
and Stalinist culture that a man, being a part of 
a collective “we”, was the image and mimicry 
of his (political and ideological) environment. 
In Okudzhava’s song the reader encounters a 
diferent logical direction. In the last verse the 
lyrical ȃIȄ statesǱ ȃ“ˠ, ˫˘˓˘ ʶ˓˕˓ʹ, ˓ˑ ˘ак˓ˇ, 
˔˓ˠ˓жˆˇ ˑа ːʺˑˮȄ ǻȃ“h, that city, it is like 
me”).38 In this case, the city is represented as 
the image of the ant(i)-subject, rather than 
vice versa. This turns Arbat into a metaphor 
that grasps trajectories of political and 
cultural transition in a profoundly atainable, 
popular way. In the song Arbatskii dvor (Arbat 
Courtyard, 1959) the city topos is referred to in 
a similar way. Accordingly, the city loses the 
aspect of physical and geographical vastness 
and becomes a humane space, a stage of 
private and ideologically insigniicant lives. In 
Pesenka ob Arbate (The Poem of Arbat, 1959), 
the famous central song of the cycle, the Arbat 
is compared to a clear and transparent river 
(the Russian word prozrachnyi means glowing, 
gentle, but also clear, easy to understand). 
The Arbat becomes – just like a river – a site 
in motion, movable and di cult to grasp. It 
becomes a symbol of the irreversible passage 
of time, of loss and forgeting, and inally an 
ininite spiritual space of self-relexivity, an 
unlimited source of creative inspiration.
Despite the heterogeneity of symbolism in 
Okudzhava’s poetry, Moscow’s Arbat never 
represents the canonical “motherland”. On 
the contrary, Arbat is a space where big 
words and big ideas are avoided. Apart 
38  Okudzhava, Stikhotvoreniia, p. 47.
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from its smallness, its key atributes are 
urbanity, humanity, intimacy and sexual 
neutrality, but also motion and change. 
What is more important, it does not possess 
the ability to expand like the big Soviet 
“motherland”, neither in the geographical, 
nor in the temporal sense. Okudzhava’s Arbat 
has no future, it rather resonates a certain past. 
Unlike the Soviet “motherland”, it is not the 
projection of an ideal future, but the product 
of memory, relection and nostalgia. ”eing 
turned towards the past, transience is Arbat’s 
signiicant property. Unlike the monolithic 
and resistant image of the Great Motherland, 
the imagological construct of the Arbat is 
volatile – just like the sentimental “old-school 
romantic” subject who sings about it. 
Vysotskii’s liminal zones
One of the characteristics of Vysotskii’s poetry 
is its liminal quality, its duality: he frequently 
plays with symbolic borders between high and 
low, stereotypical and original, artistic and 
everyday, et cetera. In his song My bditel’ny 
– my tain ne razboltaem (We Are Careful – 
We Will Not Blurt Out Secrets, 1978), topics 
like the racial discontent in the USA, Yasser 
Arafat’s health and the politico-economic 
situation in China which are taken extremely 
seriously by a devout Soviet citizen, are 
intertwined with everyday activities, such as 
bathing a child and watching a hockey match. 
This – often grotesque – duality, as described 
by the Slovenian scholar M. Javornik,39 is 
characteristic of Vysotskii’s poetry in general. 
However, unlike Okudzhava, for whom Arbat 
represents a bridge to the “other” world, the 
world beyond the “objective” reality, Vysotskii 
purposefully stays within the (authoritative) 
39  Javornik,”Ekologija teksta in ruska kultura 20. 
stoletja”, p. 63.
language and within the world view of mass 
consciousness. His lyrical “I” does not speak 
about “a devout Soviet citizen”, it rather is 
this Soviet citizen. As the poem unfolds, 
images of mass consciousness are disrupted 
by poetic devices such as catachresis. They 
are also degraded as the authoritative 
discourse and Soviet iconography are reduced 
to mere performativity. Vysotskii acts as 
a “hero” (object) and at the same time as 
“the author” (subject) of the authoritative 
discourse. This intertwined relation between 
subject and object illustrates the process of 
deterritorializing Soviet life from within. It 
bestows new meanings to the authoritative 
script that a poet uses and simultaneously 
abuses. 
Moreover, unlike Okudzhava’s poetical 
discourse, which can be termed centripetal 
in the context of its logic (all elements and 
aspects of the discourse are drawn by the 
central ȃlitle motherlandȄ of the “rbat into 
a single structure), Vysotskii represents and 
articulates the motifs of his poetry in terms of 
greatness, expansion, even hyperbole. In this 
sense, his discourse can be termed centrifugal. 
It is hence no surprise that traveling is one 
of the central themes of Vysotskii’s poetry.40 
It is also one of his most interesting ways to 
subvert canonized principles. Unlike Soviet 
mass poetry, which tolerated only one reason 
for leaving the native land (going to war), and 
unlike Okudzhava’s poetry of space and stasis 
Vysotskii’s songs can be viewed as poetry in 
motion, as poetry of non-rootedness. With his 
oeuvre containing references to 67 Soviet and 
56 foreign cities,41 the number of geographical 
ŚŖ  See alsoǱ Danijela Lugarić Vukas, Ȅ“spekti no-
madizma u stvaralaštvu V. Vysockog” (Aspects of 
Nomadism in Poetry of V. Vysotskii), Nomadizam 
(Nomadism), ed. Jasmina Vojvodić, ZagrebǱ Disput, 
2015, pp. 205-218.
41  Sergei I. Kormilov, ”Goroda v poezii V. S. Vy-
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toponyms in his songs makes Vysotskii unique 
among Russian writers. It is worth pointing 
out that the poet travels both horizontally and 
vertically in his songs. Vertical traveling does 
not necessarily imply going upwards, but 
downwards as well, and it is interesting to see 
that it is especially in moments of precipitation, 
falling or entering the hypothetical gate 
of the earth and the subterranean, that the 
stereotype of the Soviet “motherland” seems 
to be partially rehabilitated. For example, in 
his song V denȂ, Цogda my, podderzhЦoi zemЧi… 
(When We Will, Supported By The Soil..., 
1973) we encounter the comparison between 
the earth and the “faithful bride” or between 
the sea and the “mother of unruly children”: 
[...] А к˓ʶʹа ˆз ʹ˕˙ʶ˓ˇ, ˑʺ˔˓ˠ˓жʺˇ ʵʺ˖ˑ˩
ʂ˩ к ˕˓ʹˑ˓ː˙ ˔˕ˆˣаˏ˙ ˔˕ˆʹʺː ˔˕ˮːˆк˓ː, –
ʇа˖˘ʵ˓˕ˮ˘˖ˮ ː˓˕˖кˆʺ ʵ˓˕˓˘а ˖˘˕аˑ˩
ʆʺ˕ʺʹ кажʹ˩ː ˖ʵ˓ˆː ː˓˕ˮк˓ː.
ɪ ː˓˕ʺ – ʵ˓ʹˑаˮ ʶˏаʹ˪, ʹа ʺ˧ʺ – ʴˏаʶ˓ʹа˘˪!
И ʵʺ˖˘ʺˇ – ˑˆкакˆˠ, ˖к˓ˏ˪к˓ ˑаː ˑˆ ˔ˆ˦ˆ...
ʅ˘˘˓ʶ˓ ː˓˕ˮкаː ˘ˮжʺˏ˓ ˔˕ˆʵ˩ка˘˪
За˖˩˔а˘˪ ˔˓˖ˏʺ каˣкˆ ʵ ˙˭˘ˑ˓ˇ ˘ˆ˦ˆ.
И ˓˔ˮ˘˪ ˙˔ˏ˩ʵаʺː, ˖ зʺːˏʺˇ ˓ʴ˕˙ˣа˖˪ –
ʈ ˫˘˓ˇ ˖аː˓˭ ʵʺ˕ˑ˓ˇ ˑʺʵʺ˖˘˓ˇ ˖ʵ˓ʺˇ, –
ʕ˘˓ʴ ʵʺ˕ˑ˙˘˪˖ˮ ʵ ˑазˑаˣʺˑˑ˩ˇ ˣа˖,
Как ʴ˩ ˘аː ˑˆ ʴа˭каˏ˓ ˑа˖
ʂ˓˕ʺ – ːа˘˪ ˑʺ˔˙˘ʺʵ˩ˠ ʹʺ˘ʺˇ. [...]42
sotskogo”, Mir Vysotskogo, Vyp. VI, Moskva: GKCM 
V. S. Vysotskogo, 2002, pp. 234-272.
42  “[...] When we come from a foreign, unusual spring / “nd we near the MotherlandȂs wonderful shores, / Then all gates will the country wide open swing / To embrace every seaman of hers! // Velvet water is stretched, so soothed, so smoothed, / To the outer world there arenȂt any threads... / Coming back sailors ind it too hard to get used / To the com-
fort of home and cozy beds.” (Translated by Geor-ge Tokarev [ŘŖŖŘ, htpǱ//www.wysotsky.com/ŗŖřř.htm?śŞŗ, accessed ř September ŘŖŗŝ]Ǽǲ Vysotskii, So-
chinenia v dvukh tomakh, Ekaterinburg: Y-Faktoria, 
1997, Tom 1, p. 445.
In this song, the hegemonic representation 
of “motherland” is reminiscent. However, 
Vysotskii’s intervention is obvious: The 
voices of his unruly children, resembling the 
“happy children” from the Soviet mass song 
Marsh veselykh rebiat (March Of the Cheerful 
Children), do not originate from the solid body 
of the disciplined Soviet “motherland”, but 
from the body of an unstable and precarious 
sea, symbolizing hostile and dangerous 
spaces, or even life in all its hardship and 
uneasiness. Further on, by introducing the 
motive of an engagement between the sailor 
and the earth – the “most faithful bride” – 
the poet does not reach for the motive of the 
Soviet “motherland”, but instead refers to a 
diferent popular cultural myth, that of the 
ȃunatainable bride RussiaȄ43. 
If the brilliant Soviet “motherland” served for 
Soviet poets as an ideal metaphor for the true 
mother of the Soviet state in its futurity, if the 
Moscow Arbat served Okudzhava as an ideal 
metaphor for the ȃlitle motherlandȄ of a ȃlitle 
hero” in his past-ness, it is travel – physical 
and mental – that served Vysotskii as an ideal 
form to articulate that the Soviet “motherland” 
is reduced to its performativeness. Since 
the poet’s favorite place of devotion does 
not exist as a stable and geographically 
delimited site, but rather as elusive, the 
image of “motherland” in his poetry exists 
only hypothetically, as a non-place that can 
be epitomized by the following formula: 
ȃʃаʵ˖ʺʶʹа ˆ ˑˆк˙ʹа Ȯ / ɪʺˣˑ˓ʺ ˖˘˕ʺːˏʺˑˆʺȄ 
ǻForever and nowhere Ȯ / Eternal strivingǼ44. 
The non-existence of the authoritative cultural 
signiier of the ȃmotherlandȄ in VysotskiiȂs 
Śř  Ellen Ruten, UnatainabЧe ”ride RussiaǱ Gendering 
Nation, State, and Intelligentsia in Russian Intellectual 
Culture, Evanstone: Northwestern University Press, 
2010.
44  Vysotskii, Sochinenia v dvukh tomakh, Tom 1, p. 
236.
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poetry illustrates a “performative shift of 
authoritative discourse” during late socialism, 
leading to a situation where “the meanings of 
authoritative symbols, acts, and rituals were 
not supposed to be read literally, as constative 
statements. Therefore discussing them made 
no sense and was considered a mistake and 
a waste of time”.45 Unlike the Soviet mass 
poetry, which had anchored itself in the 
goodness of this world (Kremlin, Moscow, 
Volga, Siberia) pointing at the same time to 
the evil other world (on the other side of the 
border), and unlike Okudzhava for whom the 
Arbat represents a dislocated chronotope, the 
source of memory and creative inspiration, 
Vysotskii’s images of space resemble the 
chronotope of the threshold in Dostoevskii’s 
prose writings – the spaces “in-between”, 
such as staircases or nameless city streets. As 
M. Bakhtin argues, the fundamental quality of 
these chronotopes is that they signify “crisis 
and break in a life”46, which – in the context 
of Vysotskii’s poetry – eludes the “I” of the 
(broken) poet. The bond between the own 
and the foreign, essential for the image of 
the Soviet “motherland”, is irrelevant in the 
context of Vysotskii’s poetical images of space. 
While the fundamental feeling associated with 
the Soviet “motherland” was faith in the bright 
future, and with Okudzhava’s Arbat nostalgia, 
longing and wistfulness, the essential feeling 
associated with Vysotskii’s non-(mother)
land-as-mental-travel is deep-seated inner 
restlessness and rootlessness. 
Conclusion 
Given the popularity of the authoritative 
45  Yurchak,  Everything Was Forever, p. 129.
46  Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: 
Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquistǲ transl. Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin: University 
of Texas Press, p. 248.
concept of “motherland” throughout Russian 
and Soviet history, one could expect that 
Okudzhava’s and Vysotskii’s songs, which 
contain so many details of Soviet everyday 
life and often openly speak to (and about) 
collective consciousness, would relect Ȯ at 
least to a certain degree Ȯ that inluential and 
powerful stereotype. However, the canonical, 
hegemonic version of the “motherland” 
almost completely disappeared from 
Okudzhava’s and Vysotskii’s poetry. Instead, 
Okudzhava articulates the idea of the ȃlitle 
motherlandȄ signifying smallness, initeness, 
pastness and gender neutrality. In Vysotskii’s 
poetry, the representation of the stereotype of 
the “motherland” is deeply interlaced with 
the polyphonic foundations of his poetry. The 
variety of possible subjects in his poems, the 
“heroes in roles” (rolevoi geroi), undermines 
the exclusiveness, homogeneity of a masculine 
impersonal “I” or “we” that expresses the 
“motherland” in Soviet mass songs. Like 
in other contexts of his poetry, the image of 
“motherland” is referred to so rarely that it can 
be analytically discussed in solely hypothetical 
terms. Reduced to mere performativity, this 
powerful image is unmasked as emptiness, 
as pure “nothingness”. The ideal ornament 
of the Soviet “motherland”, the circle, is 
broken and turned into a curve, a voyage 
crossing borders and overcoming the binary 
opposition between the own and the foreign, 
an essential distinction for the discourse of 
“motherland”. This leads to an image of a 
borderline non-(mother)land, a “motherland” 
as a perpetually liminal space, which is 
international, belonging to everyone and no 
one simultaneously. 
The analysis allows me to draw two 
conclusions. By not harshly and overtly 
criticising the Soviet authoritative discourse, 
Russian bards including Okudzhava and 
Danijela Lugarić Vukas
31Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Vysotskii do not express their faithfulness to 
the system, but rather mirror their indiference 
towards it. Their poetry is not inherently 
oppositional, but rather apolitical. Secondly, 
the cultural ield of the late Soviet socialism 
was not homogenous. A comparative analysis 
of the ways the two bards treat the concept 
of the ȃmotherlandȄ reveals that indiference 
towards the Soviet authoritative ideological 
and political discourse intensiied during 
Stagnation. That intensiication remained 
inscribed in Vysotskii’s poetry in a profoundly 
sophisticated way: not with what has been 
said, but with what the poet has chosen to 
remain silence about.47
47  Research for this essay was partially supported 
by funding from the Croatian Science Foundation 
(project no. 6077).
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Soviet Port Cities and Consumerism
in the 1970s and ‘80s
In 1983, Konstantin Chernenko gave a speech about the “political naiveté” of 
Soviet youth who fall prey to enemies’ 
atempts ȃto exploit the speciic features 
of youth psychology for its own ends.” 
Predictably, he referred to the western 
popular culture, and especially music, that he 
believed was “corrupting” the young minds 
of the communist state. Chernenko called on 
the youth to develop “a strong immunity” to 
western fashions, and he despaired over how 
much of this bourgeois culture was already 
circulating in the Soviet Union. The call was 
primarily aimed at the Komsomol-aged youth of 
the capital cities who were deemed especially 
vulnerable to this corrupting inluence of the 
West.1  
The culturally dominant cities of the 
Soviet Union were indeed important to the 
consumption of western pop culture.2 Yet 
these capital cities were also unlike many 
smaller towns for at least two reasons: the 
residents of the former were more exposed 
ŗ  The protocol of the June ŗşŞř Central Commitee 
meeting on ideology, as published in Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda, 9 July 1983.Ř  See, for example, Svetlana ”oym, Common Places: 
Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994; Thomas Cush-
man, Notes from Underground: Rock Music Counter-
culture in Russia, New York: State University of 
New York, 1995; Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth 
and Its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and Construc-
ted, LondonǱ Routledge, ŗşşŚ, “lexei Yurchak, Eve-
rything was Forever, Until It was No More: The Last 
Soviet Generation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
to foreign tourists and journalists than 
anywhere else in the country, and most of 
the Soviet trade representatives, diplomatic 
corps, and international journalists were 
recruited from among Muscovites or 
resided in Moscow. Thus, any location other 
than a large city might reveal alternative 
paterns of Soviet consumption and peopleȂs 
exposure to western products, and the study 
of Soviet consumerism needs to consider 
simultaneously the diversity of consumer 
nightmares and consumer utopias that existed 
across the Soviet Union.3 Novorossiysk, a case 
study for this project, demonstrates such a 
3  The terminology of consumer utopias is derived 
from Kate ”rownȂs study of Soviet ȃgated commu-
nities” (closed cities with residents working for 
the top-secret military industries). Brown argues 
that ȃthese communities were so atractive Ȯ such 
consumer utopias, in fact Ȯ that residents gave up 
important rights and freedoms in order to live in 
themȄ ǻp. śŖǼ. There was no shortage or deicit of 
anything in these places, and they were a substan-
tial rather than a marginal phenomenon in the nar-
rative of Soviet consumption. Kate ”rown, ȃUtopia 
Gone Terribly RightǱ PlutoniumȂs ȁGated Com-
munitiesȂ in the Soviet Union and United States,Ȅ 
Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War 
Eastern Europe, eds. Paulina Bren and Mary Nau-
burger, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 
49-67. In contrast, Ekaterina Emeliantseva, writing 
about a diferent closed city of Severodvinsk, con-
cluded that regarding ȃconsumer goods such as 
clothing or furniture, the situation was not much 
beter [in Severodvinsk] than everywhere else.Ȅ See 
Ekaterina Emeliantseva, ȃThe Privilege of Seclusi-
onǱ Consumption Strategies in the Closed City of 
Severodvinsk,” Ab Imperio 2, 2011, pp. 238-259, here 
p. 257.
Abstract
Being close to the west did not necessarily result in a westernization of Soviet identities. The case of 
Soviet port cities illustrates that during the 1970s and 80s, close intercultural contact and easy access 
to western goods sharpened people’s critical view about the west, and the quality and usefulness of 
its products for Soviet everyday life.
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departure from the mainstream narrative. Its 
residents indeed craved western goods and 
appreciated them, and they had relatively easy 
access to them in this small Soviet consumer 
utopia. Partially for this reason, the residents’ 
understanding of western fashions and styles 
and the choices that they made in acquiring 
them were distinct from their counterparts in 
capital cities.4
”ased on extensive oral history ieldwork 
and research in various port administration 
archives, my study investigates the role of 
port cities in the Soviet Union as magnets 
of change and cultured spaces shaped 
by cosmopolitanism and consumption. It 
demonstrates that Soviet consumers of the 
1970s were far from unfortunate victims of 
massive shortages. Even if expensive, western 
clothing and styles were available to most 
residents of capital cities and port towns, 
thus shaping their tastes, their sense of style, 
and their personal aspirations. Speciically, 
the ports of Novorossiysk, Batumi and 
others created perfect loopholes through 
which material objects passed in surprisingly 
substantial numbers. Sailors brought enough 
foreign clothing to meet the needs of those 
port town residents who could aford it on 
the black market. People employed by port 
authorities and those who bought foreign 
goods exempliied the lifestyle and outlooks 
that many beyond the boundaries of these port 
towns aspired to achieve.5
This inlux of goods played an important role 
in shaping popular atitude to consumption. In 
the Soviet Union, the consumption of foreign-
4  The project relies heavily on interviews (oral his-
tory) and utilizes local archives and newspapers as 
well.ś The Ministry of the Merchant Marine ǻMorlotǼ as 
well as the Shipbuilding Ministry of the Soviet Uni-on employed thousands of workersǲ some sailed abroad and many more did not, but a job in Morlot 
made foreign goods more readily available for all.
made goods – any goods that were labeled as 
made in places other than the USSR – was deeply 
“sacramental” in the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s. That 
is, these objects symbolically represented the 
west and its values of consumerism and style. 
Moreover, though it is beyond the purpose 
and the scope of my work to prove or disprove 
any direct links between the consumption of 
western culture and goods and the demise of 
the Soviet system, western goods were often 
presented as symbols of rebellion against 
the system, and they were coveted for this 
reason. In just a few examples among many, 
Olga Gurova asserts that underwear was a 
batleield between the state and the manǲ 
Susan Reid writes that “consumption choices 
could, and did, articulate resistanceȄǲ and 
Ekaterina Emeliantseva acknowledges that 
in the existing scholarship the vision of the 
consumption of western culture as subversive 
or opposing the regime is dominant, if not 
mainstream.6
Partially, the material objects that were 
integral to this sacramental consumption were 
dispersed through capital cities’ channels. 
But many of them entered by means of 
imperfectly controlled port towns’ border 
crossings, and sailors in particular were 
important players in channeling the goods. 
Yet ironically, precisely because of the greater-
than-average availability of foreign goods, 
especially clothing, the port town residents 
became non-sacramental consumers and 
shifted away from the paterns of ȃthe center.Ȅ 
While no precise date for the change can be 
6  See, for example, Olga Gurova, Soviet Underwear: 
Between Ideology and Everyday Life / Sovetskoe nizhnee 
bel‘e: mezhdu ideologiei i povsednevnost‘iu, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, ŘŖŖŞǲ Style and So-
cialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War 
Eastern Europe, eds. Susan E. Reid, David Crowley, OxfordǱ ”erg Publishers, ŘŖŖŖǲ Ekaterina Emeli-
antseva, “The Privilege of Seclusion: Consumption 
Strategies in the Closed City of Severodvinsk,” pp. 
238-259.
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identiied, by the early ŗşŞŖs people came to 
have relatively litle concern for the intrinsic 
meanings of the goods. “s a mater of fact, the 
analysis of interviews of sellers and buyers 
in Novorossiysk demonstrated no direct 
correlation between consumption of “made in” 
clothing and interest in western pop culture, 
i.e. those who craved jeans did not necessarily 
want to listen to The Beatles (or even knew of 
them!Ǽ. For port town residents at large, the 
craving for particular western atire was not 
necessarily an act of admiration of western 
valuesǲ instead, it was a manifestation of their 
social status (whether real or self-proclaimed) 
and a sense of fashion that was deeply 
embedded into realities of their daily lives. As 
such, much like their western counterparts, 
my respondents wanted beter, more beautiful, 
and more reliable products that met their sense 
of fashion, style, and taste.7 
The port towns saw an abundant, even if 
clandestine, supply of foreign clothing that 
was transported by the workers of Soviet 
cargo leetǲ indeed, it was a well-established 
and clearly recognized reality of life. The 
sailors who went to zagranka (abroad) were a 
privileged group by all means. In port towns 
in particular, nearly all young men aspired to 
such a career, and nearly all young women 
hoped to marry a sailor (even though most 
ships left home for six months at a time). This 
profession presented a unique opportunity 
in the Soviet Union to see the world and 
experience other cultures. But this idyllic 
opportunity for encountering exotic places 
was always closely intertwined with more 
7  See, for example, a discussion of consumer re-
volution by Natalya Chernyshova, in “Consumer 
Revolution? Society and Economy in the Soviet 
1970s,” presented at the ASSEES Annual Convention, ŘŖŗŖǲ also Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private 
Life of The Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Sta-
lin Russia, New York and Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1989.
mundane and practical reasons for joining 
the crew. Sailors found nothing dichotomous 
or incompatible in this, and remarkably, 
contrary to all others who sold foreign goods, 
such proits or activities did not diminish the 
sailors’ romantic (even if idealized) reputation 
for masculinity, honor, and success. “I’d truly 
seen the world,” one sailor recalled. “We 
went from the Black Sea through Dardanelles 
into the Mediterranean to the ports of Egypt, 
Syria, Yugoslavia (near Dubrovnik), and from 
there we took of across the “tlantic to the 
Caribbean, to Cuba.” This sailor added that 
ȃseeing the world and making a proit was 
important,Ȅ and he made a proit not only on 
clothing (very few could buy much because the 
wages were paid in bonny, or cash-equivalent 
coupons that could be used in specialized 
stores in the Soviet Union) but other items 
as well. Sea shells, postcards, calendars, and 
plastic bags that he received virtually for free 
were popular among friends, and whatever 
was not given out as gifts could be sold for one 
to ive rubles a piece. 
The mechanism for this clandestine trade 
had its unwriten rules. Typically, there was 
a lot of camaraderie among the sailors, and 
the novices received advice on what to bring 
with them to various countries for exchange 
or resale. Peers eagerly shared their “contacts” 
abroad, and once a person joined the crew, 
the competition was minimal. Most sailors 
acknowledged that this was largely because 
the market was far greater on both sides of 
the encounter than what the sailors could 
possibly saturate. But there also existed a 
strict hierarchy of what and how much each 
and every person could bring. The hierarchy 
was based on the rank of the person, and 
the volume and value of goods was closely 
monitored. If a sailor overstepped a certain 
barrier and was perceived as greedy by his 
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peers, he almost always ended up “accidently” 
being discovered by customs oicials or the 
port administration. One now retired captain 
explained that turning someone over to the 
oicials was not betrayal but precautionǲ 
irrational acts threatened the reputation and 
thus proits of the entire crew. This is not to 
say that there was no freedom of choice at 
allǲ in fact, sailors managed to smuggle a full 
range of products from clothing to medicine 
to exotic animals. But the safety of the crew 
remained a top priority on all occasions. “This 
is the reason why,” the retired captain added, 
“here [in ports] kitchen talk was aimed not at 
poking fun at Soviet leaders. Instead, people 
shared tips on how to drug exotic parakeets so 
they can be hidden in socks during the border 
crossing yet survive the ordeal.”8
The preferred channels of distribution were 
almost always informal. Even though there 
were consignment shops (komissionki), most 
sailors preferred to use them sparingly. 
Not komissionki but babushki were the most 
important distributors in this economy. 
A story of one woman (now deceased) is 
indicative of this process.9 Unlike her friends 
with no connections to the business, she 
intentionally cultivated her image of babushka 
(she was 65+ when she did the most business), 
and eventually Baba Mania, as most people 
called her, became a powerhouse in this trade. 
8  The quote is from an interview with Aleksandr 
D., conducted by the author in Novorossiysk in 
2007.
9  Several informal interviews were conducted with 
Baba Mania and her friends and relatives. The in-terviews spanned over the course of nearly ifteen years. The irst interview with ”aba Mania took 
place in August 1997 and we continued over seve-
ral meetings (she died in July 1998). The relatives, 
including her sister (to be mentioned later), carried 
on with our informal conversations until the pas-
sing of Baba Mania’s sister in 2007 and stepsister in 
2012. Interviews also included former sailors of all 
ranks who went abroad between 1972 and 1982. The 
collection of interviews for this group is on-going.
Baba Mania received sailors in her two-room 
apartment, which she shared with her sister 
and brother-in-law. The system was similar 
to some of the elite clubs of the present day. 
A sailor’s background was closely scrutinized 
for reliability and inancial security ǻthere 
was an interest in building a regular clientele 
base rather than taking in someone who only 
sold an item or two occasionally). Then “an 
insider” had to recommend that person, and 
after that the sailor received the address of “the 
contact”, i.e. Baba Mania, and an acceptable 
time to bring goods. Baba Mania was cheerful 
and welcoming and seemed to befriend 
everyone. She always had a botle of vodka on 
her kitchen table and a smile to accompany it. 
”ut she was the inal judge of what was taken 
in and how much one could charge for their 
goods. Baba Mania mostly took in high-end 
clothing, while the rest was either discarded 
as unsellable (to be distributed to friends as 
gifts) or was passed onto an extended network 
of lower-key sellers who took in what was too 
problematic to sell and of no interest to Baba 
Mania. Tekhasy (jeans), Italian shoes, leather 
boots, and dress shirts were her favorite items 
because they were in highest demand and 
yielded highest proits. KidsȂ clothing ranked 
relatively low on her list of prioritiesǲ it was 
too expensive and not long-lasting enough for 
most consumers (an average T-shirt cost 15-
25 rubles, and since kids grow, it could last 
only a couple of seasons at most). Baba Mania 
was careful not to overcharge and marked 
up the goods by no more than ten percent. 
Nonetheless, ”aba ManiaȂs proit margin 
came to 500-600 rubles monthly, nearly ten 
times her oicial retirement beneit and a 
substantial amount by all means.
Her distribution channels were analogous 
to her system of acquiring goods in the irst 
place. Potential buyers from among the 
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acquaintances were invited to see the goods 
in the apartment, and the most reliable and 
regular customers could even place orders 
for speciic goods. ”ut for things that did not 
sell to svoi (insiders), Baba Mania had to go to 
the open-air markets and seek buyers there. 
In order to avoid the charges of speculation 
ǻa criminal ofense in the Soviet UnionǼ, she 
never took more than one item with her, and 
even if caught selling that item, she always 
managed to plead innocence. Needless to say, 
most militsionery knew her well and relied on 
her services, though there were always loners 
who were incorruptible and who wanted 
to uphold the system and socialist values 
at all cost. Overall, as several respondents 
reported, babushki were much more reliable 
as distribution channels for sailors than 
consignment shops, and most goods that 
did not circulate among family and friends 
passed through their hands. “Newcomers” 
and “youngsters” went to shops with their 
goods, but there was always a desire to ind 
a “contact” like Baba Mania. In this particular 
town, as Baba Mania remembered, there were 
about a dozen women like herself, and then 
a wild range of pety sellers ǻor speculators, 
the term she used with a degrading tone) 
who did not have regular clientele and did 
not last long in the business. The business 
came with its share of risks (“though only the 
greedy ones got prison terms,” commented 
”aba ManiaǼǲ nonetheless, the beneits were 
substantial as well. “side from direct inancial 
considerations, these women acquired so 
many “contacts” among various groups of 
people that they could even make transactions 
that involved property or high-deicit socialist 
commodities which ranged from vacation 
passes to cars.10 
10  This system was reminiscent of “blat” as presen-
ted in Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favor: 
A widow herself (like all other “important” 
women), Baba Mania had her sister’s and her 
brother-in-law’s opinions to consider, not the 
least because they shared the apartment. Her 
sister was a hard-core communist who never 
criticized party decisions and supported the 
system to her last breath. She even insisted 
that the scarcity of some goods and the 
imperfect distribution system was one of the 
best achievements of the system that taught 
people to depart from veshchism (obsession 
with material goods) and embrace eternal 
values of kindness, mutual support, and 
intellectualism. Ironically, these views did not 
prevent her from buying foreign clothing that 
her sister had access to, and the explanation 
was often rather trivial. She either liked the 
design of strawberries on a particular shirt, 
or the color was “cute,” or something similar. 
Consistently, this woman and many other 
respondents emphasized that they wanted 
quality clothing that was both durable and 
appealing. This woman shunned Soviet 
undergarments for herself and preferred to 
see her grandchildren wear colorful dresses 
and trousers in colors that did not fade after 
a few washes. But she never once saw her 
purchases as being in any way contradictory to 
her internalized values of Soviet communism. 
In this way, the consumption for Baba 
Mania’s sister (and many others in port cities, 
for that materǼ was not linked to a sense of 
westernization but to people’s sense of quality 
and esthetics. This correlates to the scholarship 
that critiques current mainstream research 
on socialist production and consumption for 
concentrating on the quantity of goods and 
their apparent shortages. The consumers were 
more sophisticated than they are commonly 
credited with, and they were not pushed or 
Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
37Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Irina Mukhina
forced into buying only what was available to 
them. Even if the selection was not endless, the 
sailors atempted to match their goods to the 
tastes of their customers and did not ofer a 
selection of random items. They worked hard 
to keenly pick designs and fashions of the 
day.11 
Most of my respondents also did not see their 
consumption as linked to the black market. 
For the majority of the Soviet population, 
access to western fashions was possible 
only by tapping into the black market, or 
fartsovka. People who were associated with 
the black market, fartsovshchiki, resold items 
that they acquired from western visitors for 
astronomical prices. People who worked in 
the service sector, especially in hotels, and 
tour guides were regularly drawn into the 
business. Yet if fartsovka by deinition included 
the “worship of the West” (zapadopoklonstvo) 
and the rebellion against the regime, then the 
consumption of the port towns was a diferent 
phenomenon, which bordered fartsovka only 
in marginal ways.12 The buying of made-in 
clothing in port towns, though indicative of 
peopleȂs fascination with speciic brands and 
styles, coexisted with their support for the 
system without any contradictions. Moreover, 
residents of these towns did not necessarily 
demonstrate an interest in western pop music 
or in disseminating “forbidden” literature 
(either nationalistic for minorities, critical of 
the regime, or from the list of banned western 
authors).13 Looking back at their experiences, 
ŗŗ  See, for example, Rossiza Guentcheva, ȃMate-
rial Harmony: The Quest for Quality in Socialist 
Bulgaria, 1960s-1980s,” Communism Unwrapped: 
Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe, eds. Pauli-
na Bren and Mary Neuberger, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012, pp. 140-168.ŗŘ  For a speciic discussion and use of this termino-
logy, see Dmitrii Vasiliev, Fartsovshchiki: Kak delalis’ sostoianiiaǱ IspovedȂ Чiudei ȃiz teniȄ, Sankt-Peterburg: 
Vektor, 2007.ŗř  For further discussion of the later, see, for ex-
the respondents shared the notion that their 
consumption was “the process of adding to, 
not subtracting from our outlook,” or the 
process which integrated their support for 
what the Soviet system had to ofer with a 
strong interest in consuming foreign goods. 
One respondent, for example, was puzzled 
to hear a suggestion that there existed a link 
or some sort of connection between her near 
obsession with western goods and opposition 
or negative feelings towards the Soviet state. 
“I really wanted those foreign brands,” she 
reported.
And I was fortunate enough to buy a new coat from 
Italy in late ‘70s, and then dress shirts for myself, 
from West Germany I believe, and some shirts for 
my kids, I think from the same place. These were 
not cheap at all, like I paid 100 rubles for leather 
boots and about 20 rubles a piece for two kid-sized 
T-shirts. My own dress shirts were something like 
45 rubles. I made only about 120 rubles a month 
then and had to borrow from relatives to make 
those purchases. But it was worth every penny 
(kopeika), and I was ready to give up anything 
for those outits. I Чoved how we ЧooЦed, and the 
quality, style and designs were all outstanding. 
I loved how this clothing made me feel – special, 
priviЧeged in some ways, at Чeast not worse of than 
all those wives of sailors. Did I wear this clothing 
because it had something to say against the Soviet 
system? That’s nonsense. I was a true patriot of my 
motherland. I loved the Soviet Union, especially 
the pioneer camps. They were fun; you sort of got 
a three month paid vacation if you worked there. 
And my kids were there as well. If given a chance, I 
would go back to Soviet days in a blink of an eye.14
ample, Sergei Zhuk, “Popular Culture, Identity, 
and Soviet Youth in Dniepropetrovsk, 1959-84”, 
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 
no. 1906, 2008.
14  From an interview with the author, Lena P., 
born in 1953, interviewed in Novorossiysk in 2004. 
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Over and over again the same sentiment was 
shared by people of diferent backgrounds in 
the small port towns when they recalled their 
lives in the Soviet 1970s. Though reported 
years after the events (more on this later), 
such comments were more than passing 
remarks suitable for the study of subjectivity 
and nostalgia. The tapping into the black 
or grey market was such a commonplace 
experience for these people that it made the 
binaries of oicial and unoicial, legal and 
illegal, rebellious and loyal meaningless or 
at least highly challenging to use in assessing 
their remarks. The two worlds were not polar 
opposites but formed an integral part of the 
same core that shaped these people’s lives.
Furthermore, an interesting insight was 
provided by another respondent who moved 
from Moscow to the Black Sea coast in the mid-
1970s. Then a young woman, Sasha wanted 
to come across as “modern” (sovremennaia) 
and cherished everything that seemed to go 
with that term. But what she found in her 
new hometown was quite diferent from her 
experiences as a Muscovite. She recalled: “In 
Moscow I could buy recordings and listen to 
ABBA at any time but I had to tailor my own 
lared pants, whereas here I could buy foreign-
made lared pants at any time but no one 
cared to listen to ABBA.” Sasha also shared 
her observation that at times, the display of 
foreign fashion knew no boundaries or sense 
of moderation. All too often she saw people 
pile up clothing that did not match just because 
they could aford it, and she sympathized with 
a foreign visitor to the Soviet Union who was 
shocked to see many a young man in “baggy 
Bermuda shorts in gaudy colors that began at 
Though this project is still in its developing stages as of ŘŖŗŘ, it was envisioned some ifteen years ago, and the irst set of interviews took place in ŗşşŝ. Se-
veral key informants have passed away since then. 
All other quotes from interviews as well.
his knee and reached a crescendo of bad taste 
with clashing shirt.”15
Overall, there was suicient supply and 
demand of western goods to create a steady 
low of goods. While the precise volume of 
trade is hard to calculate, the widespread 
availability of certain products, especially 
textiles, was hard to miss.16 Thus, well 
before the Soviet production of such items, 
women routinely showed of their mohair 
and crimplene clothing. Crimplene is a type 
of polyester which became fashionable and 
commonplace in the Soviet Union. All of it 
was imported through illegal channels in the 
1970s in the form of “cuts” (otrezy), or one to 
two meter pieces of fabric. The cuts were used 
to tailor dresses and skirt suites. Crimplene 
had both esthetic and practical advantagesǲ it 
came in a variety of designs and was wrinkle-
free and easy to wash. One meter of crimplene 
went for 30 rubles, and most skilled tailors 
needed about 1.25 meters for a dress or two 
meters for a skirt suite. Mohair is a type of 
textile made of Angora goat wool (not to be 
confused with more high-end Angora rabbit 
wool). Mohair was typically used for hats, 
scarves, and sweaters, and in combination 
with highly popular lared trousers ǻbriuki-
klesh), any piece of clothing made from mohair 
made one into a true fashionista. 
Anecdotally, every woman had a crimplene 
15  Lois Fisher, Survival in Russia: Chaos and Hope in 
Everyday Life, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1993, 
p. 9.
16  Some indirect insight might be gained by loo-
king at the number of ships that docked at an ave-
rage port. Thus, Novorossiysk dates its post-WWII 
operations from 1963 (the piers were in too bad of 
a shape to support much business prior to 1963). It 
started with 162 ships annually in 1965 and expan-
ded to over 400 ships, both domestic and foreign, 
that docked at the port after the new pier was com-
pleted in 1978. In post-Soviet times, the port chan-ged its status to one of the most signiicant outlets 
on the Black Sea and has an average capacity of 
over 4,000 ships per annum.
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dress and a mohair hat, or at least a popular 
perception was such that the two products 
were widely available to consumers who 
could aford such textiles, and this is at the 
time when the Soviet light industry did not 
produce either fabric at all. Indeed, every 
respondent in port towns reported that they 
had both in their possession, oftentimes more 
than one item made of each textile. The same 
was true of a highly popular Lurex, though 
it became commonplace in port towns only 
by the end of the 1970s. Fabrics and textiles 
with metallic yarn, or Lurex, became a point 
of obsession that once again came with a 
high price tag for consumers. Overall, though 
this clandestine market “was rather limited 
in scope and technically illegal” and did not 
provide all the consumer goods, it nonetheless 
had the potential to create a signiicant low 
of some products, esp. speciic items of 
clothing.17 The consumption paterns of port 
towns were more complex than the empty 
shelves in state stores, and the emphasis on 
the later might obscure or simplify the reality 
of everyday life under late socialism. Instead, 
the circulation of goods became a normal part 
of life for port town dwellers, and they learned 
to aptly navigate the system and successfully 
combine the various forms and avenues of 
consumption. 
The residents enjoyed wearing western clothing 
and drinking Pepsi ǻthe irst Pepsi factory 
opened in the port town of Novorossiysk in 
1974) but they seemed to be oblivious to and 
ignorant of any subculture or the message 
of resistance per se. The “golden youths” of 
Moscow could have listened to Bing Crosby 
and Louis Armstrong and worn T-shirts with 
Stars and Stripes and “US Army” logos on 
17  Quote from Svetlana Barsukova, Vadim Radaev, 
“Informal Economy in Russia: A Brief Overview,” 
Economic Sociology ŗř/Ř, ŘŖŗŘ, pp. Ś-ŗř, here p. ś.
them, but no equally open signs of resistance 
were evident in small towns.18 A particular 
fascination with foreign goods was directly 
linked to people’s sense of what represented 
their success and position in the society. 
This, of course, was in no way unique to port 
towns. In a state of self-proclaimed equality 
for all, there was litle room for expressing 
one’s social status. Social classes did not cease 
to exist, unlike what the Soviet people were 
assured, and the gap between the have and 
have-nots reached down to all layers of society 
by the 1970s and 1980s. The party elites always 
enjoyed special access to goods and facilities 
that distinguished them from the rest of the 
population. But for the population at large, 
which was becoming increasingly stratiied, 
there were few avenues to express their 
social position and distinguish themselves 
from peers. Housing was distributed by the 
state and property was not privately owned, 
and thus the housing situation could not be 
improved or changed even with greater-than-
average inancial resources. In short, property 
ownership could not function as a sign of 
one’s social status. Cars, refrigerators, TV sets 
and other valuables were “sold” according 
to a distribution system and not purchased 
at will. Thus the only true outlet for visibly 
asserting one’s social position was clothing, 
which was priced on a black market out of 
all proportion to incomes precisely because 
it represented more than a way to cover one’s 
body. Aesthetic and practical considerations 
played a role (western clothing by all means 
looked more appealing than Soviet-produced 
atireǼ, but oneȂs sense of personal worth 
and status that was vested into clothing was 
crucially important as well. 
18  Alan Ball, Imagining “mericaǱ Inluence and Ima-
ges in Twentieth-Century Russia, New York: Rowman and Litleield, ŘŖŖř, pp. ŗŞř-ŗŞś.
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“ Soviet proverb exempliied this obsession 
with fashions when it proclaimed that “you 
judge a person irst by his clothing and later 
by his intelligence.” Though in its deeper 
meaning the proverb was meant to downplay 
the importance of looks ǻwhich only matered 
in making that irst impressionǼ and elevate 
the importance of intelligence (which with 
time revealed the true worth of a person), 
many misjudged it to mean that looks and 
irst impressions were more important than 
any other atribute of human life. This was 
especially true of younger people of the 
1970s, many of whom thought that “clothing 
gave young people status, prestige, and self-
conidence.Ȅ19 If clothing and consumerism 
were markers of personal and collective 
identity, then those markers were deeply 
social and socially ingrained into the fabric 
of everyday life.20 Most consumers of western 
brands and clothing wanted to be like the 
people around them or beter of in order to 
be embedded into their social milieu, not to 
oppose it. The same mentality persisted into 
the present day. In order to be accepted, one 
has to own a handbag of a particular designer 
or wear shoes with the acceptable minimal 
price tag. “nd even though speciic costs and 
boundaries shifted depending on the layer of 
the society (the higher up the more expensive), 
the clothing, that proverbial irst impression, 
nevertheless was and continues to be valued 
as status symbol.
Needless to say, retrospective accounts, like all 
memoirs and interviews, tend to be idealized, 
romanticized, and tainted by at least a hint 
19  Fisher, Survival in Russia, p. 11.
20  For the discussion of consumption under soci-
alism as part of one’s individual or collective iden-
tity, see Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material 
Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe, eds. Susan E. 
Reid, David Crowley, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 
2000.
of nostalgia for those good old days. The 
new challenges of life in post-Soviet Russia 
displaced many peopleǲ for those who learned 
to navigate the system so masterfully,  “the 
end of communism meant more loss than 
gain when suddenly the rules of the game, in 
which they had been so proicient, radically 
changed. […] the new game was much more 
impersonal, global, and corporate, while 
networks of family and friends were no longer 
paramount to the functioning of the system”21 
(as a side note, Baba Mania was reduced to 
poverty by this “new game”). 
Nonetheless, these realities do not take 
away from a more general observation of 
consumption in the Soviet Union of the 
1970s and 1980s. Historian John Bushnell 
wrote that “throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
Soviet society developed spontaneously 
and dynamically, with a booming second 
economy, […] and an increasingly complex 
and heterogeneous urban population.”22 
Though the original context of the statement 
refers to the rise and lourishing of youth 
subculture, the same would equally apply to 
the consumption paterns of the ever-growing 
number of port town residents. The volume of 
foreign goods that passed through port towns 
was so substantial that it made them almost 
mundane, or at least readily available. While 
to some residents these foreign goods in fact 
represented rebellion and freedom, to many 
more the “made-in” goods acquired added 
value only in the context of and in relation to 
socialist reality. The consumption was global 
and local at once, and foreign goods that 
circulated in small towns had less sacramental 
meaning atached to them than was the case 
21  Bren, Communism Unwrapped, p. 142.
22  John Bushnell, “An Introduction to the Soviet 
Sistema: The Advent of Counterculture and Subcul-
ture,” Slavic Review Śş/Ř, ŗşşŖ, pp. ŘŝŘ-Řŝŝ, here p. 
276.
41Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Irina Mukhina
for major cities. Even when residents of port 
towns craved foreign clothing, they did not 
demonstrate the behavior associated with it. 
As Baba Mania commented, “cities are for 
culture, but small places like ours are where 
you can buy everythingǲ here we have it all.Ȅ
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Limits of Westernization during Cultural Détente 
in Provincial Society of Soviet Ukraine: A View from Below
One Soviet high school student who returned to the small Ukrainian town of 
Novomoskovsk in ŗşŝŜ, after ive years living 
in Poland with his parents, was shocked by 
what he saw in Soviet Ukraine: 
I could not recognize my old neighborhood. It 
looked like the entire cultural landscape (peizazh) 
of my native town has changed. Everybody was 
dressed in Levi’s jeans; everybody listens here to 
the British bands Sweet, Slade, Geordie, Nazareth, 
UFO and T.Rex. In the movie theaters they show 
onЧy the iЧms from the West, incЧuding a ”ritish 
movie O Lucky Man! with Alan Price band. As 
my father noted, it was the new cultural landscape 
of modernity (sovremennosti).1
During the period of relaxation of international 
tensions in the 1970s known as détente not 
only the political and cultural centers of Soviet 
civilization were opened to foreign guests 
from the ȃcapitalist west,Ȅ such as Moscow 
and Leningrad, but also the provincial 
1  Interview with Vladimir Sadovoi, Novomos-
kovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Region, Ukraine, June 3, 
1993. For the cult role of O Lucky Man!, the British ilm by Lindsay “nderson, among Soviet rock mu-
sic fans see Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket CityǱ The West, Identity, and IdeoЧogy in Soviet Dnie-
propetrovsk, 1960-1985, ”altimore, MDǱ Johns Hop-kins University Press & Washington, D.C.Ǳ Wood-row Wilson Center Press, ŘŖŗŖ, pp. ŘśŘ-Řśś.
Soviet towns became exposed to the massive 
audio and visual information from capitalist 
countries on Soviet radio, television and movie 
screens. On March 4, 1972, a communist leader 
from one industrial region of Soviet Ukraine 
complained to local Komsomol ideologists, 
There is too much capitalist West on our Soviet 
television screens today… Television shows 
(teleperedachi) about American music and 
iЧms, and western fashions prevaiЧ on our centraЧ 
channeЧ from Moscow. It ЧooЦs ЧiЦe a Цind of 
Americanization (amerikanizatsiia kakaia-to)! 
It confuses our Soviet youth who try to imitate 
these foreign images in their behavior, which 
is Чosing famiЧiar features of the ȁSoviet young 
man’… We need to stop it!2  
Ten years later, in 1982, a local newspaper still 
complained about “Americanization on Soviet 
screens.3  
2  Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Dnipropetrovskoi Oblasti, 
(hereafter - DADO) f. 22, op. 19, d. 2, ll. 135-145, 
especially 142-143. Compare with my interview with Igor T., KG” oicer, Dniepropetrovsk, May 
15, 1991, and Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vy-
shchykh Organiv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy 
(hereafter – TsDAVOVUU), f. 4915, op. 1, d. 3438, 
ll. 4-9.
3  E. Iakovlev, “Navazhdenie (kinoobozrenie),” DneprovsЦaia Pravda, 1982, February 4, p. 3.
Abstract
Using  the  personal  diaries  of  young  people  from  “provincial”  towns  and  cities  of  Soviet 
Ukraine,  this  essay  illustrates  the  obvious  limits  of  Westernization  during  the  cultural  détente 
of  the  ŗşŝŖs  in  Soviet  provincial  society.    The  narratives  of  the  personal  diaries,  writen  during 
the  1970s  and  80s,  demonstrate  that  Soviet  young  people  still  shared  the  same  communist 
ideological  discourse,  internalized  it,  imagined  and  perceived  the  outside  world  through  the 
communist  ideological  “discursive  lenses”  and  constructed  their  own  identity,  using  the  same 
communist ideological  discursive  elements. 
Keywords: Soviet  identity,  cultural  détente,  youth  culture, personal  diaries.
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Television and Movies in the Soviet Provinces 
during the Brezhnev Era 
According to my analysis of the section in the 
local newspapers with “television programs” 
from the Kyiv, Cherkasy, Zaporizhie, Donetsk 
and Dnipropetrovsk regions of Ukraine, 
the number of television shows containing 
“material from capitalist West” increased 
from 7-10 shows per week (10 percent of 
the broadcast time with prevailing material 
of the “informational programs” such as 
Mezhdunarodnaia panorama, and one “capitalist” 
movie, like the French Count of Monte Cristo) 
in 1968, to 14-18 per week (20 percent of the 
time with “capitalist” music numbers during 
music shows like Ogonek, special shows about 
Angela Davis from the US, and two capitalist 
movies such as ””C feature ilms and Italian 
television series) in 1972, and reaching a peak 
in 1978 with 24-27 shows per week (from 30 to 
40 percent of the time with numerous popular 
music shows, like ”eneis, and numerous US 
television series for children, like Lassie).4 As 
one sixteen-year rock music fan reacted to the 
cultural détente on television in late 1977, 
It’s amazing to see what is going on - on our 
television: since 1975 we have watched an 
American movie about Lassie, various broadcasts 
about Soviet-“merican space lights of Soyuz-
Apollon and scientiic exchanges between us 
and Americans. Then we have seen an English 
detective movie The Moon Stone, and inaЧЧy, 
on Soviet teЧevision the oiciaЧ poЧiticaЧ show 
Mezhdunarodnaia panorama is introduced by 
the [unannounced] meЧody of One of These Days 
from Pink Floyd’s album Meddle.5
4  I used local periodicals such as Ukrains’ka Pravda, 
Shevchenkiv krai, Vechernii Donetsk, Dnepr vechernii 
etc.
5  School Summer Diary of Aleksandr Gusar, Pav-
lograd, Dnipropetrovsk Region, 1970-1977: Novem-
During ŗşŝŗ three ilms directed by the leftist 
“merican ilmmakers were awarded by the 
Moscow International Festival – LitЧe ”ig Man, 
The Sandpit Generals, They Shoot Horses Don’t 
They – and in a few years they were released 
for the ordinary Soviet viewers.6 After that 
SoveЦsportiЧm released on average four US 
ilms annually. Special ilm exchanges were 
organized with professional support of Soviet 
ilm critics. Some of them, like Viacheslav 
Shestakov, became regular visitors to the 
US.7 In 1974 SoveЦsportiЧm released six US 
ilms, and “merican and Soviet ilm makers 
began a collaborative project on a new ilm 
production Blue Bird starring Elizabeth 
Taylor.8 In 1977 SoveЦsportiЧm released Ŝř ilms 
ber 8, 1977. The Soviet children watched on Sovi-
et television not only the broadcast from America 
about the ice hockey matches between the Soviet 
and Canadian hockey teams, but also the Ameri-
can television series Lassie about the adventures of a collie dog, the ”ritish mystery ilm The Moon 
Stone based on Wilkie Collins’ detective novel and 
various BBC television mini-series like David Cop-perieЧd based on Charles Dickens’ novel. Mean-
while, the adult Soviet audiences fell in love with 
the BBC television series The Forsyte Saga based 
on John Galsworthy’s novel and other western te-levision movies, like the Italian ilm The Life of Le-
onardo da Vinci by Renato Castellani. According to the Soviet ilm critics, these movies were the most popular western feature ilms, shown on the So-
viet TV during the 1970s. See an article about the 
BBC adaptation of David CopperieЧd which was 
shown on the Soviet TV in Aleksandr Anikst, “Bez 
vdokhnoveniia,” Sovetskii ekran, 1975, No. 24, p. 4. See also a negative review of the ”ritish TV ilm The 
Moon Stone based on Wilkie Collins’ detective novel 
which was shown on the Soviet TV in Aleksandr 
Anikst, “Kamen’ okazalsia ne dragotsennym,” So-
vetskii ekran, 1975, No. 20, p. 4.
6  Sovetskii ekran, 1971, No. 17, pp. 1-2.
7  A. Borodin, “My mozhem dat’ drug drugu mno-
go tsennogo…,” Sovetskii ekran, 1971, No. 16, pp. 16-
17. See especially the books: Viacheslav Shestakov, АmeriЦa v zerЦaЧe eЦranaǱ “meriЦansЦoe Цino ŝŖ-Цh go-
dov, ʂoscowǱ Soiuz kinematograistov SSSR, ”iuro propagandy sovetskogo kinoiskusstva, ŗşŝŝǲ Na ek-
rane Amerika, Collection ed. I.E. Kokarev, ʂ˓scow, ŗşŝŞǲ АmeriЦansЦaia Цhudozhestvennaia ЦuЧȂtura v 
sotsial’no-politicheskom kontekste 70-kh godov 20 veka, 
ed. A. S. Muliarchik and V. P. Shestakov, Moscow, 
1982.
8  Sovetskii ekran, ŗşŝŗ, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗşǲ ŗşŝŘ, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗŝǲ ŗşŝŚ, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗŝǲ Semen Chertok, ȃSkazka 
44Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Sergei I. Zhuk
Figure ŗ-ŘǱ Extracts from the diary of ŗś-year old Sergei Zhuk, writen in “ugust 
1974 in Vatutino (Cherkasy Region, Soviet Ukraine). On 12 August, the author describes the tremendous popularity of the US western ilm ȃMackennaȂs GoldȄ 
(Zoloto Makkeny) among Soviet adolescents. On 24 August, the fascination exerted by the US ilm ȃThe Sandpit GeneralsȄ ǻGeneraly peschanykh karȂerovǼ 
and its music is noted. Private collection Sergei I. Zhuk.
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from socialist countries and 67 movies from 
capitalist countries, including 12 American 
ilms, and since ŗşŝş it kept releasing till ŗşŞŘ 
on average eight US movies annually.9 Even 
in 1984, during an anti-American ideological 
campaign in the Soviet Union the most 
popular foreign ilms among the Soviet public 
were still American movies such as The Deep, 
The China Syndrome, Kramer vs. Kramer, 3 Days 
of the Condor, and Tootsie.10 Soviet oicials 
noted that by the end of the 1970s, more than 
90 percent of all songs in the Ukrainian city 
disco clubs and restaurants were of western 
origin. According to six personal diaries of 
Ukrainian high school students (four from 
the Dniepropetrovsk region and two from the 
Cherkasy region), they listened to western 
pop music almost every day. In 1966 almost 60 
percent of all movies shown in the Ukrainian 
cities were of foreign origin, and 50 percent 
of them were ilms from the capitalist west. 
Ten years later, in 1975, almost 90 percent of 
the ilms were foreign movies, and almost ŞŖ 
percent were western ones. In 1981 more than 
95 percent of all movies were of foreign origin, 
and 90 percent came from western capitalist 
countries. According to the same six diaries 
of Ukrainian middle school students, each 
of them watched two or three movies during 
a normal school week in the 1970s. During 
school breaks they usually watched six to 
seven ilms per week. “fter ŗşŝś ǻwith an 
addition of television ilmsǼ, an average Soviet 
child (between 12 and 16 years of age) watched 
at least twenty six movies per week during the 
summer breaks. And more than a half of these 
o schastie,” 1975, No. 13, pp. 10-13, about the  shoo-ting of the US-Soviet ilm ȃSiniaia ptitsaȄ ǻ”lue 
Bird) with US actress Elizabeth Taylor.
9   Sovetskii ekran, ŗşŝŝ, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗŝǲ ŗşŝş, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗśǲ ŗşŞŗ, No. ŘŚ, p. ŗśǲ ŗşŞŘ, No. ŘŘ, p. ŗśǲ Iskusst-
vo kino, 1980, No. 6, p. 192.
10  Sovetskii ekran, 1984, No. 24, pp. 17-18.
movies came directly from the capitalist west 
during the ŗşŝŖs!11 
Soviet Culture of Diary Writing
This essay is based on personal interviews 
and six diaries of male contemporaries (two 
from the cities and four from townsǼ writen 
in Russian and Ukrainian and covering the 
period from 1970 to the beginning of the 1980s 
as well as the analysis of archival documents 
and contemporary periodicals. The diaries 
belonged to diferent authors, who represented 
various social groups of urban residents in 
Soviet Ukraine. I now explore the inluences 
of the massive exposure to audio and visual 
cultural products from the “capitalist west” on 
the self-construction of identity of Soviet youth 
from provincial Ukrainian towns. This essay is 
an atempt to study the concrete development 
of cultural détente from ȃthe botom upȄ 
perspective, avoiding the Moscow/Leningrad 
ȃelitist/conformistȄ emphasis of the recent 
scholarship.12 My major goal is to trace the 
11 Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, 
pp. 125, 126, 166. See also my essays: Sergei I. Zhuk, 
“The ‘Closed’ Soviet Society and the West: Con-
sumption of the Western Cultural Products, Youth 
and Identity in Soviet Ukraine during the 1970s,” 
The Crisis of Socialist Modernity: The Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia in the 1970s, eds. Marie-Janine Calic, Sa-bine Dabringhaus, Dietmar Neutaz and Julia Ober-treis, GчtingenǱ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ŘŖŗŗ, 
pp. 87-117, and Sergei I. Zhuk, “Zapad v sovets-
kom ‘zakrytom’ gorode: ‘chuzhoe’ kino, ideologiia 
i problemy kul’turnoi identichnosti na Ukraine v 
brezhnevskuiu epokhu (1864-1982 gody),” Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2009, No. 100 (6), pp. 548-565. 
About the notion of the “closed society” see Sergei 
I. Zhuk, “Closing and  Opening Soviet Society (Int-
roduction to the Forum Closed City, Closed Econo-
my, Closed Society: The Utopian Normalization of 
Autarky),” Ab Imperio, 2011, No. 2, pp. 123-158. See for western ilm consumption the summer school 
diary of Andrei Vadimov, June-August 1971, and 
compare with the entries from June-August 1975, ŗşŝŜ and ŗşŝŝǲ the school diary of “leksandr Gusar, 
May 30-June 7, and June 7-27, 1970, compare with 
the entries from June-August, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 
1978.
12  I refer especially to Alexei Yurchak, Everything 
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construction of the notion of the “young man” 
(molodoi chelovek) in the available narratives of 
the personal diaries writen by Soviet young 
people of diferent ages ǻfrom an adolescent 
stage of their life to their college graduation) 
during the last decades of socialism in Soviet 
Ukraine. Analyzing the published “personal 
stories of the Soviet experience,” Irina 
Paperno noted that those memoirs always 
emphasize “the negotiation between the self 
and community,Ȅ and ȃdeine themselves 
as accounts of lives embedded in a social 
matrix.”13 In contrast to Irina Paperno, Jochen 
Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Ge-
neration, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2005. Although the recent cultural studies implicit-
ly present a history of westernization of Soviet po-
pular culture, they missed a crucial moment in this 
westernization – the détente of the 1970s, especially 
the period from 1972 to 1979. The majority of recent 
studies miss and ignore the role of the détente in the 
westernization of Soviet media and Soviet youth 
culture. See, e.g., a recent book about Soviet media 
without even mentioning the détente: Kristin Roth-
Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built 
the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War, 
Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, ŘŖŗŗ, p. ŗŘ. Compare with the irst history of 
Russian comic books in José Alaniz, Komiks: Comic 
Art in Russia, Jackson, Mississippi: University Press 
of Mississippi, 2010. The new agreements between 
the Soviet Union and the capitalist west about vari-
ous forms of cultural exchange, signed during the 
1970s, especially the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Hel-
sinki by the Soviet leaders together with other 34 
heads of state on August 1, 1975, opened the Soviet society to new western inluences through various 
forms of media. The beginning of the détente in US-
Soviet relations and the relaxation of international 
tensions also resulted in some important changes 
in youth cultural consumption. See for the détente 
from the American point of view Walter LaFeber, 
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2007, esp. pp. 282-298. Com-
pare with the Soviet participants’ point of view in: 
Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet  Uni-
on in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007, pp. 
215-264. See also a German historian’s analysis in 
Ragna Boden, “Soviet World Policy in the 1970s – A 
Three-Level Game,” The Crisis of Socialist Modernity, ed. by Marie-Janine Calic et al. GчtingenǱ Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2011, pp. 184-203.
13  Irina Paperno, Stories from the Soviet Experience: 
Memoirs, Dairies, Dreams, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2009, p. xiii. Compare with another 
Hellbeck and other scholars who concentrated 
their research on the diaries and memoirs 
writen before ŗşŝŖ, on the materials, whose 
authors were mature adults and mainly Soviet 
intellectuals, I use diaries writen mostly by 
Soviet children of middle and high school 
age and by very young college-age people. 
Moreover, in contrast to Paperno, I will 
demonstrate how these children’s diaries 
were directly “embedded in a social matrix” 
and served as their intimate reactions to and 
personal relections on various developments 
of the outside world. As some scholars argue, 
personal narrative analysis demonstrates that 
human agency and individual social action is best 
understood in connection with the construction 
of seЧhood in and through historicaЧЧy speciic 
social relationships and institutions. Second, these 
analyses emphasize the narrative dimensions of 
seЧhoodǲ that is, weЧЧ-crafted personaЧ narrative 
analyses not only reveal the dynamics of agency 
in practice but also can document its construction 
through culturally embedded narrative forms that, 
over an individual’s life, impose their own logics 
study based on memoirs and diaries from the Stalin 
era: Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Wri-
ting a Diary under Stalin, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006, especially pp. 3-13. See the 
general studies about writing a diary: Paul John 
Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, Ithaca, NYǱ Cornell University Press, ŗşşşǲ idem, 
Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity 
in Narrative, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, ŘŖŖŞǲ Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, ”arbara Laslet, Telling Stories: The Use of Personal Narratives 
in the Social Sciences and History, Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2008. Compare with a recent 
discussion about biography and historical narrative 
in: “AHR Roundtable: Historians and Biography,” 
The American Historical Review, June 2009, Vol. 114, 
No. 3, pp. 573-661, and a recent study based only 
on the oral histories of late socialism: Russia’s Sput-
nik Generation: Soviet Baby Boomers Talk about Their 
Lives, Translated and edited by Donald J. Raleigh, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006, 
and Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral 
History of Russia‘s Cold War Generation, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011.
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and thus also shape both life stories and lives.14
Such a construction of the self is especially 
apparent in diary writing.
Diary writing became the model of construction 
of the Soviet self from the early childhood 
during the period of late socialism. As an 
intellectual exercise, the diary writing was 
introduced in secondary school by the Soviet 
curriculum. This model for writing was based 
on the popular literature for children, which 
became obligatory for reading by all students 
of the Soviet middle school ǻfrom the ifth to 
seventh grade). As early as the beginning of 
the 1950s, Soviet teachers at this school level 
started to recommend their students to write 
everyday diaries. Usually, every May before 
the school breaks the teachers of literature 
announced the list of books they suggested 
to read during the summer. At the same time 
they gave special instructions how to write a 
diary, what kind of events the students were 
supposed to describe in their journals. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, Russian and Ukrainian 
language teachers encouraged their students 
to write personal diaries, especially during 
summer school breaks.15
Common practice in a majority of the Ukrainian 
urban schools was the recommendation to 
write just “a summer diary of the adventures.” 
Sometimes teachers required their students to 
write these diaries as a method of collecting 
the necessary material for the irst literary 
composition with the title “How I spent my 
summer break?Ȅ during the irst classes in the 
fall. As a model for students’ diaries, teachers 
14  Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, Barbara Las-let, Telling Stories, p. 2.
15  See my article and recent book: Sergei I. Zhuk, 
“Book Consumption and Reading Practices in Sovi-
et Dniepropetrovsk during the Brezhnev Era,” Ab 
Imperio, ŘŖŖş, No. ř, pp. ŘŖŝ-ŘŚřǲ  idem, Rock and Roll 
in the Rocket City, especially pp. 109-123.
recommended using the cultural practices, 
which were described in the popular novels 
writen by the famous Soviet writer Nikolai 
Nosov.16 As one eleven-year-old student from 
a small town in Soviet Ukraine noted in May 
of 1970, 
I used Tatiana Petrovna’s suggestions about 
Nosov’s books. So I started by reading his stories 
about Vesiolaia semeika, Dnevnik Koli 
Sinitsyna and of course, I began his new book 
about the adventures of Vitia Maleiev, which our 
teacher strongly recommended to read. Now I use 
all these Nosov’s stories as a model (obrazets) for 
my own diary writing.
At least three other student’s diaries from 
the 1970s mentioned a model role for writing 
the personal journal provided by Nosov’s 
characters such as Kolia Sinitsyn and Vitia 
Maleiev.17 Later on some of these middle 
school students ignored NosovȂs ȃpaternsȄ 
and emphasized other inluences on their 
writing style. As one of them wrote in 1971, 
“why should we imitate those childish stories 
by Nosov in our diary writing? I will learn 
how to write a personal journal using some 
ideas from my favorite Quadroon novel by 
Mayne Reid or other adventure stories.”18
16  Nikolai Nosov, Vitia Maleiev v shkole i doma, 
in N. Nosov, Sobranie sochinenii v 3 tomakh, vol. 1, 
Moscow: Detskaia literatura, 1968, pp. 489-661. For 
Nosov’s books for children, see Catriona Kelly, 
Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890-1991, 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 
127.
17  School diary of Aleksandr Gusar, May 20, 1970. 
Gusar referred to other famous stories by Nosov. 
All these stories were presented as the special dia-ries of Soviet middle school students, writen in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s.
18  School diary of Oleg Grin, Vatutino, Cherkas-
sy Region, June 12, 1971. He referred to a famous 
adventure novel by Mayne Reid, which was tre-
mendously popular among Soviet kids. Regarding 
its popularity see Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in 
the Rocket City, pp. 109-123, and idem, “Book Con-
sumption”, pp. 207-243.
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For many Soviet students it became an 
important part of their everyday life – to write 
down events in their life. Writing helped them 
not only to articulate their thoughts and make 
notes about the remarkable events in their 
life (especially during their summer breaks), 
but also to construct their own intellectual 
self. And in this process the authors of these 
diaries followed to some extent traditional 
topics that their teachers recommended 
them to address. Over time, some of these 
topics disappeared from the diaries, but 
many of them were still present in implicit 
or explicit forms in their narratives. All these 
topics relect the interesting moments in the 
construction of the Soviet self in writing by 
these Soviet students. As some scholars argue, 
their personal narratives in so-called “summer 
diaries” became “documents of social action 
and self-construction.”19 I will focus on the 
most popular topics from those diaries, 
which are related to the self-construction of 
the Soviet young man and various identities 
formed by this construction: Soviet patriotism 
vs. capitalist world, cultural consumption and 
creating modern style (“to be modern and 
become a harmonious man”), reactions to 
the détente of the ŗşŝŖs, ixation on western 
popular culture and commercialization of 
youth culture.
Soviet Patriotism vs. Capitalist West
The irst topic, which prevailed in all student 
diaries from the early stage of the Soviet 
middle school ǻifth to seventh gradeǼ through 
the high school years (eighth to tenth grade) 
and the irst college years, is an emphasis on 
the authors’ Soviet patriotism and rejection 
of negative aspects of capitalism. For these 
19  Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, Barbara Las-let, Telling Stories, pp. 4-5.
authors a Soviet child is a patriot of his socialist 
ȃmotherland.Ȅ Despite the growing inluence 
of western cultural products, which became 
available during the détente in the 1970s, 
and the beginning of the cultural ixation on 
movies, popular music and fashion in the last 
years of high school and irst years of college, 
the self-construction of the young man in 
the diaries is still based on the dichotomy of 
“Soviet patriot vs. western capitalism.”20 
According to the available diaries of Soviet 
adolescents in the Brezhnev era, the Soviet 
ilms about the adventures of Soviet young 
patriots during the Civil War (1918-20), the 
Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and after the 
war, when young boys and girls were ighting 
various enemies of the Soviet state (from 
the Whites to “capitalist spies”), were “the 
most inspiring for the Soviet imagination” 
and “instrumental for building the Soviet 
identity” among the Soviet children. These 
ilms included Soviet blockbusters such as 
Armiia Triasoguzki, Neulovimye mstiteli, Yunga 
so shkhuny Kolumb and Skazka o Mal’chishe-
Kibal’chishe.21 The most popular Soviet movie 
for children during the late 1960s and early 
ŗşŝŖs was the ilm Akvalangi na dne, which 
20  According to the sociologist Thomas Cushman, 
the limited sources of foreign cultural practices al-
ways produce “an intense idealization” of the ear-
ly available forms of such practices in the societies 
with strong ideological control and limitations. In 
the closed Soviet society the literature, music and ilms of ȃan important, but limited range,Ȅ Cush-
man explained, were “seized upon early on and be-
came the central objects” upon which subsequent 
cultural practice was based. See Thomas Cushman, 
Notes from Underground: Rock Music Counterculture 
in Russia, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1995, p. 43.
21  I quote my interview with Vladimir Sadovoi, 
Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Region, Ukraine, 
June 3, 1993. Regarding the tremendous popula-rity of these ilms see Sovetskii ekran, 1965, No. 1, 
p. 20, and G. Medvedeva, “Repertuar: svet i teni,” 
Sovetskii ekran, 1965, No. 17, pp. 4-5, V. Tsygankova, ȃNa more i na susheȄ, ȃKinematograisty Ȯ detiamȄ 
ibid., pp. 6-7.
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was released in ŗşŜś. This ilm was directed 
by Yevgeni Sherstobitov who had already 
released his previous movie for children, 
Skazka o Mal’chishe-Kibal’chishe. In the new 
Sherstobitov ilm, the story of a brave Soviet 
boy, who tried to help the Soviet border 
guards to catch a foreign spy in a small Soviet 
resort town on the Black Sea coast, inspired 
millions of Soviet children. As one of them 
noted in his diary after watching this ilm the 
second time, in July 1971, “I want to be like 
Roman Marchenko to help to arrest a spy who 
was an enemy of my country.”22 Many years 
later the author of that diary still recalled 
how inluential these patriotic Soviet images 
were for the construction of his own self. At 
the same time the images of the ilms from the 
“capitalist west” (which were made mostly by 
the leftist, anti-capitalist inclined ilm directors 
like Stanley Kramer or Sydney Pollack) helped 
the authors of “summer diaries” to justify their 
construction of the Soviet self. 
The irst and most popular “merican comedy 
ilm that opened the ”rezhnev era in Soviet 
Ukraine and became the new movie sensation 
was Stanley KramerȂs ilm of ŗşŜř, It’s a Mad, 
Mad, Mad, Mad World. It was released in the 
Soviet Union in late 1965, and was shown 
in eastern Ukraine for the irst time in full 
theaters with all tickets sold out in January and 
February 1966.23 “ccording to the Soviet ilm 
magazine statistics, this ilm became one of the 
most popular foreign ilms that were shown in 
the Soviet Union in 1966.24 A young moviegoer, 
fourteen-year-old Vladimir Solodovnik, noted 
during the irst showing of the “merican 
22  Summer diary of Vasilii Leshchinskii, Cherkas-
sy Region, Vatutino, July 2, 1971. See a very critical review of this ilm in M. Chernenko, ȃSnimaetsia 
kino,” Sovetskii ekran, 1966, no. 11, p. 5, and Novyny 
kinoekranu, 1966, no. 6.
23  See Dneprovskaia Pravda, January 1 and January 
12, February 16, 1966.
24  Sovetskii ekran 1967, No. 10, pp. 1-2.
comedy in March 1966 that it was funny and 
dynamic. However, at the same time he felt 
very uncomfortable about the main story of 
the ilm, the search for money. ȃIt looks like 
everybody ǻin the ilmǼ was driven crazy by 
this search,” Solodovnik wrote, “the capitalist 
West is mad about money.” He concluded 
this entry with a remarkable phrase: “So our 
propaganda was correct, in America a human 
greed and lust for money is the most important 
driving force. Even the “merican ilmmakers 
such as Stanley Kramer demonstrated this 
in their movies.”25 Such ambiguous feelings 
about themes in KramerȂs ilm were present 
in another twelve-year-old boy’s writing. 
Andrei Vadimov noted, “It is funny to watch 
this hunt for money, but it’s good to know 
that we live in a normal country, safe and 
comfortable, without this American madness 
about money.”26 Many Soviet ilmgoers 
were shocked by the realistic portrayal of 
human greed in KramerȂs ilm. In KramerȂs 
comedy America looked “like an abnormal 
dysfunctional country” compared to the 
normality and stability of the Soviet Union.27 
The American comedy about “a mad hunt for 
money” played the role of the “negative other” 
from the west in the imagining of “normal” 
Soviet identity by young ilmgoers during the 
beginning of the Brezhnev era. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s Soviet 
college students watched new “merican ilms 
like The Sandpit Generals, They Shoot Horses 
Don’t They, The New Centurions, Bless the Beasts 
and Children, The Domino Principle, Oklahoma 
Crude, Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore, Tootsie, 
25  School diary of Vladimir Solodovnik, Dniepro-
petrovsk region, Sinelnikovo, March 7, 1966.
26  School diary of Andrei Vadimov, Dniepropet-
rovsk, July 5, 1969.
27  Author interview with Vitalii Pidgaetskii at the 
Department of History, Dniepropetrovsk Universi-
ty, February 10, 1996.
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and 3 Days of Condor which presented mainly 
the leftist criticism of the American realities, 
contributing to the construction of a positive 
identity of Soviet self. One college student, 
who loved American rock and roll and western 
movies, noted after watching in one week of 
“ugust of ŗşŞŘ diferent “merican movies 
such as The Domino Principle, Oklahoma Crude, 
Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore and 3 Days 
of Condor, “we perhaps do not have enough 
products in our food stores and fewer cars on 
our roads, but our youth has a much brighter 
future than those Americans.”28 As Aleksandr 
Gusar commented in his diary after watching 
the American police drama New Centurions, “it 
is good to live in the West if you have money 
and power, but it is very dangerous to live 
there if you are just an ordinary poor man. I 
would rather stay in my own country.”29  Two 
anti-CIA thrillers – 3 Days of Condor by Sydney 
Pollack (1975) and The Domino Principle by 
Stanley Kramer ǻŗşŝŝǼ Ȯ especially inluenced 
the negative perception of America and of 
“western imperialism” among Soviet college 
students. As some college students from 
eastern Ukraine explained in their writing, 
“The military industrial complex and the 
intelligence agencies rule the west. After 
watching PollackȂs and KramerȂs ilms, we 
understand that the capitalist west has no 
future.”30 And another young author who 
28  School summer diary of Oleg Grin, Kyiv, August 
29, 1982.
29  See the school diary of Aleksandr Gusar, July 
5, 1975. New Centurions originally released in US in ŗşŝŘ became a very popular ilm in ŗşŝŚ-ŝś in the 
Soviet Union. See Sovetskii ekran, 1975, No. 10, p. 6. 
See how local periodicals described the American ilms, especially in E. Iakovlev, ȃNavazhdenie ǻki-
noobozrenie),” Dneprovskaia Pravda, 1982, February 
4, p. 3.
30  School diary of Andrei Vadimov, Dniprope-
trovsk, December 5, 1978. 3 Days of Condor was a 
1975 US political thriller movie directed by Sydney 
Pollack and starring Robert Redford, Faye Du-naway and Max von Sydow. “nother ilm, The Do-
mino Principle was a ŗşŝŝ US thriller ilm starring 
watched these two “merican ilms after 
Anderson’s O Lucky Man! movie in 1979, and 
who was a very enthusiastic rock music fan, 
noted “the capitalist society has some potential 
for modern development, but it is suppressed 
by the CIA and military machine. That is 
why rock music was born to challenge and 
criticize the politics of the West!!! “nd all these 
ilms, like rock music, criticize the politics of 
the capitalists.”31 As some of these authors 
later acknowledged, during the détente the 
“westernization” of the imagination had 
certain ideological limits for young Soviet 
consumers, and overall, it had an obvious 
very strong anti-capitalist bias.32
Western Popular Culture and the Soviet 
Harmonious Man
Another important topic of self-construction, 
which is present in all personal narratives 
in student diaries, is the goal of the authors 
“to become harmonious men (stanovitsia 
garmonicheski-razvitoi lichnost’iu)” – to be 
modern and stylish. According to a fourteen-
year-old boy from a small Ukrainian town, 
he would devote the entire summer school 
break, like Leonardo da Vinci, to “harmonious 
education” of himself (garmonicheskomu svoemu 
razvitiiu), developing his physical abilities in 
sports games like volleyball, swimming every 
day, reading a list of “important” books, 
listening to Mozart concerts and the Beatles 
albums and playing guitar (at least two hours 
per day).33 This goal involved certain aspects of 
Gene Hackman, Candice Bergen, Mickey Rooney 
and Richard Wildmark directed by Stanley Kramer.
31  Summer school diary of Vasilii Leshchinskii, 
Vatutino, Cherkasy Region, August 22, 1979.
32  See especially my interviews with Vadimov, 
Gusar and Suvorov.
33  Citation from the school diary of Oleg Grin, Vatutino, Cherkassy Region, May řŖ, ŗşŝŗ, p. řǲ see 
also the diaries of Leshchinskii, May 28, 1972, and 
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cultural consumption directly connected to the 
products of western mass culture such as jeans, 
“beat (rock) music” etc. Paradoxically, these 
elements of western popular culture became 
connected to old notions about the major goal 
of Marxist education in Soviet schools – to 
“construct a harmonious personality.” As one 
ifteen-year-old student argued in ŗşŝŗ, 
Our teachers told us that socialism is the avant-
garde of our modern civilization, so it means that 
everything modern, positive and humane should be 
incorporated in our culture. Therefore progressive 
music of the Beatles with their anti-capitalist songs 
like Eleanor Rigby or Lady Madonna should be 
part of our socialist culture as well. The socialist 
young man should be developed in harmony – 
you need to know physics, history, literature and 
contemporary music, not only Mozart, but the 
Beatles and Rolling Stones, etc.34
”ut these ideas went against the oicial 
ideological perception of western popular 
culture. In January ŗşŜş, the irst secretary 
of the regional commitee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in a large industrial 
city in eastern Ukraine explained to Komsomol 
activists that the main essence of the socialist 
cultural consumption was the ability of young 
Soviet consumers to give a “correct class 
evaluation of the pieces of bourgeois arts 
and music and avoid non-critical atitudes 
toward a eulogy of the capitalist way of life.” 
He emphasized that a Marxist ideological 
approach would help young consumers to 
make good cultural consumption choices. In 
contrast to the degenerate western culture, the 
Soviet ideologist noted, Komsomol members 
the diary of Aleksandr Gusar, Pavlograd, Dniepro-
petrovsk Region, May 30, 1970.
34  Summer diary of Vasilii Leshchinskii, Cherkassy 
Region, Vatutino, May 28, 1971.
had to promote the best forms of their own 
socialist national culture. They should use the 
most progressive paterns of their Ukrainian 
culture in the struggle against western 
inluences.35
“ccording to the oicial statistics, in ŗşŜś, 
90 percent of all music material produced 
in the city music studios in eastern Ukraine 
included popular songs by Soviet composers, 
while fewer than 10 percent had recordings of 
western songs.36 In 1970, however, more than 
90 percent of this music material had “western 
beat music,” mainly songs by the Beatles and 
the Rolling Stones. In 1971, nine out of ten of 
the most popular songs belonged to the “beat 
music” category and only one of them was a 
song by Vladimir Vysotskii.37 These igures 
relected the general situation on the music 
market in other Ukrainian cities, especially in 
the Odesa, Kyiv and Cherkasy regions. By the 
middle of the 1970s, rock music became the 
most popular form of cultural consumption 
in Soviet Ukraine. As one contemporary 
mentioned, “listening to Black Sabbath, 
Nazareth or UFO music in the 1970s became 
a signiier, or marker of being a modern man 
even in the provincial society of the small 
towns of Soviet Ukraine.”38
35  DADO, f.22, op. 15, d. 252, l. p. 62.
36  DADO, f.416, op. 2, d. 1565, ll. p. 306-307.
37  Author interview with Mikhail Suvorov, 
Dnipropetrovs’k, June 1, 1991. See the interview 
with Natalia Vasilenko, Dnipropetrovs’k, July 19, 
2007. See also the interview with Evgen D. Prud-
chenko, the Central Library of Dniepropetrovs’k 
Region, July 18, 2007 and the interview with Galina 
V. Smolenskaia, the Central Library of Dniepropet-
rovsk Region, July 18, 2007.
38  Author’s interview with Eduard Svichar in 
Vatutino, Cherkassy Region, Ukraine, June 8, 2004. 
See also a good article about the black market in 
Odessa: V. Tarnivs’kyi, “Tse tam, de tovkuchka,” 
Molod’ Ukrainy, 1967, May 16, p. 2.
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Class and Ethnic Identity
The main result of the mass consumption of 
western music products was the Russiication 
of Ukrainian youth cultures in Soviet Ukraine. 
To some extent, it was related to the origins 
and sources of information about new music 
which the local youth consumed. During the 
ŗşŝŖs, all oicial Soviet recordings of western 
music were released on the state-owned label 
Melodiia with comments in Russian only. All 
movies from the west shown in Ukraine were 
dubbed in Russian only. All the best radio 
shows about rock music were of foreign or 
Russian origin.39 Young consumers of western 
popular music from eastern Ukraine also relied 
on Russian periodicals because the Ukrainian 
editions were more cautious and conservative 
than the central Moscow ones. The Ukrainian 
Komsomol magazine Ranok always published 
awkwardly writen articles with incompetent 
criticism of the developments in the western 
youth culture. Sometimes local readers were 
appalled by the ignorance and incompetence 
of Kyiv journalists. “I am tired of reading this 
mixture of lies and fantasy in Ranok,” wrote one 
young enthusiast of rock music, “these guys 
from Kyiv invented the idea that American 
hippies were a satanic sect with a mixture of 
palmistry, astrology and black magic, and 
that hippies were looking for a virgin girl for 
their devilish black mass ritual and couldn’t 
ind such girls among themselves. I would 
39  Interview with Mikhail Suvorov and Andrei Va-dimov, Dnipropetrovsk, July ŘŖ-Řŗ, ŘŖŖřǲ D“DO, 
f. 19, op. 52, d. 72, ll. 25-28. Interview with Igor T., KG” oicer, Dniepropetrovsk, May ŗś, ŗşşŗ. Re-
garding the radio stations Maiak and Yunost see 
Aleksandr Sherel’, Audiokul’tura XX veka: Istoriia, 
esteticheskie zakonomernosti, osobennosti vliianiia na 
auditoriiu. Ocherki. Moscow: Progress-Traditsia, 
2004, pp. 90-94. See also entries in: School diary of “leksandr Gusar, May-“ugust, ŗşŝŘǲ May-“ugust ŗşŝřǲ May-“ugust ŗşŝŚǲ and school diary of Vladi-mir Solodovnik, June ŗŘ, ŗşŝŖǲ July-“ugust ŗşŝŗǲ 
July-August 1972.
rather read a boring Feofanov’s book about 
rock music than Kyiv magazines.” Because of 
this disappointment he stopped reading the 
Ukrainian youth periodicals as early as 1974, 
and read only Rovesnik.40 Many Ukrainian rock 
fans preferred Rovesnik as well. As a result, 
the most popular youth magazine among the 
local rock music fans was a Russian language 
journal Rovesnik. 
The Russian language became the major 
language of local rock bands. From the mid-
seventies, the repertoire of the student concerts 
changed dramatically. In fact, the Russian 
language ousted the Ukrainian language at 
the major concerts organized in major cities 
of eastern Ukraine during the 1970s. In June 
1982, during the traditional music festival 
“The Student Spring” in Dniepropetrovsk, 
all college rock bands performed songs in 
Russian. Even the Ukrainian folk rock band 
Dniepriane performed fewer songs in Ukrainian 
than usual. One journalist complained about 
the lack of national Ukrainian songs in the 
repertoire of the student bands in comparison 
to previous music festivals during the 1970s.41 
During the 1980s more local college rock 
bands switched from the Ukrainian language 
40  School diary of Aleksandr Gusar, June 1, 1974. 
Gusar mentioned an article by Mykola Solomatin, 
“Zhertvy chornoi magii,” Ranok, 1974, January, No. 
1, pp. 18-19, and a book devoted to the history of 
the western pop music by Moscow journalist Oleg 
Feofanov, Tigr v gitare, Moscow: Detskaia literatu-
ra, 1969. See also other publications of Ranok: Ana-
tolii Povnytsia, “Tvoi dity, Brytanie,” Ranok, 1970, No. Ŝ, June, p. ŗŝǲ ŗşŝŗ, No. Ś, pp. Ş-şǲ Valerii Vor-
onin, “Amerykans’ki zustrichi,” Ranok, 1975, No. 9, 
pp. 17-18.
41  L. Vdovina, “Khto vidkrye molodi talanty?” 
Prapor iunosti, May 25, 1982, p. 4. See also the of-icial reports about the concerts organized by the 
trade unions and Komsomol in: DADO, f. 22, op. 26 ǻŗşŝşǼ, ll. ŗ-ŗŜŖǲ f. ŗŞŜŖ, op. ŗ, d. ŘŚŘŝ, ll. ŗ-ŘŜǲ and 
publications about the dominance of the Russian 
language in pop culture in “Nebo muzyky,” Prapor 
iunosti, June 1, 1982, p. 3, and ibid., June 3, 1982, and 
many other issues of this periodical for 1982.
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to Russian.42 Local Komsomol periodicals also 
emphasized that in the early 1980s disco clubs 
stopped playing Ukrainian music.43
By the end of the 1970s some Ukrainian 
speaking enthusiasts of rock music began 
speaking Russian and replaced their native 
language with Russian. Aleksandr Gusar, 
who was a native Ukrainian speaker switched 
from Ukrainian to Russian during the summer 
of 1976. Between 1971 and 1975 he wrote his 
diary exclusively in Ukrainian. As Gusar 
explained in his journal in August 1976, the 
language of young rockers should be English 
or Russian, rather than Ukrainian. That is why 
he switched to Russian.44 At the same time 
his own mental construction of his national 
identity was developing all the time. Aleksandr 
Gusar, a sixteen-year-old high school student, 
who was always more interested in science 
(especially chemistry) than in the humanities, 
was thrilled by reading Ukrainian historical 
books like Ivan Bilyk’s novel Mech Areia and 
decided to read all the books about Ukrainian 
history, including those about the Kievan 
princes Sviatoslav and Volodymyr and about 
the legendary Zaporizhian Cossacks. In his 
summer diary, in June of 1975 he wrote: 
My father criticizes me for reading in Ukrainian 
and reminds me that for my career and studies 
at Dniepropetrovsk University I will need good 
knowledge of Russian. But I can’t stop reading 
the Bilyk’s novel. My friend whose mother is a 
42  V. Sotnikova, “Eti alye ‘Maki’,” Dnepr vecher-
nii, ŗşŞř, January ŗř, p. Śǲ L. Tsaregorodtseva, ȃNa 
stsene – ‘Vodograi’,” Dnepr vechernii, 1983, January 
17, p. 4.
43  I refer also to my conversation with Natalia 
Ambrosimova, a journalist from the Komsomol 
newspaper Prapor iunosti, Dniepropetrovsk, May 
12, 1991. See also T. Vin’kova, “Profesionaly chy dy-
letanty,” Prapor iunosti, 1983, June 13, p. 4.
44  See the school diary of Aleksandr Gusar, May-“ugust, ŗşŝŜǲ see especially the entry on “ugust Řş, 
1976.
librarian gave me this copy in Ukrainian. He told 
me that this book was forbidden and removed by 
the authorities from circulation. However, I am so 
impressed by what I had read in Bilyk’s novel. It 
turned out that the Huns leader from the fourth 
century “D, “tiЧa the Hun who controЧЧed aЧЧ 
of Eurasia, was our Ukrainian ancestor, Prince 
Hatyla. It is unbelievable! We were a great and 
ancient nation even before the Kievan Rus! And 
now we Ukrainians have been transformed into a 
nation of stupid and timid peasants.45
This entry from his school diary is a good 
illustration of the role of the Ukrainian 
historical novels in identity formation in the 
Dniepropetrovsk region. Gusar, who idealized 
western rock music and whose native language 
was Ukrainian, switched from writing in his 
diary in Ukrainian to Russian in 1976 under 
the inluence of his parents. The same year, he 
still continued reading his favorite Ukrainian 
books, and in his diary he expressed an 
obvious pride for the past achievements of the 
Ukrainian nation. 
On the one hand, Aleksandr followed a 
typical path of Russiication. He entered 
Dniepropetrovsk University where the 
language of instruction was Russian and he 
switched to Russian to communicate with his 
classmates. Eventually, Gusar adopted the 
Russian language. He also publicly criticized 
the stupidity and incompetence of Ukrainian 
intellectuals and Soviet conservatism of the 
local Ukrainian apparatchiks, whom he felt 
personiied all the reactionary moments of 
the Soviet reality. On the other hand, Gusar 
wanted to know more about the historical past 
of his nation. He read Ukrainian historical 
45  School diary of Aleksandr Gusar, June 21, 1975. 
See also regarding the popularity of Bilyk’s book 
Oles Buzyna, Tainaia istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi: Vtoroe iz-
danie, Kyiv: “Dovira”, 2007, pp. 32-35.
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novels and idealized the glorious past of 
Ukraine which he contrasted with backward, 
anti-western elements in contemporary Soviet 
Ukrainian culture.46
Many contemporaries of this mass 
Russiication noted a signiicant social factor 
that contributed to this development: the 
inlux of young migrants from local Ukrainian 
villages to the city. A majority of vocational 
schools (professional’no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche 
– PTU) and college students came from 
Ukrainian peasant families. During their 
years of study they adjusted to the new urban 
conditions of life and began consuming 
the popular music of the city en masse.47 
As one scholar explained, these young 
Ukrainian peasants experienced the shock of 
encountering a new lifestyle. They were losing 
their old peasant identity, cultural preferences 
and stereotypes. In a russiied Ukrainian city 
like Dniepropetrovsk many of these migrants 
adopted the new style of behavior that they 
had experienced in vocational school and 
college dormitories.48 To some extent, they 
replaced elements of their Ukrainian peasant 
identities with new elements of urban 
popular youth culture, including not only the 
“obligatory” American jeans and long hair, 
but also dancing to new music, especially 
hard rock and disco. Many police oicers 
and communist ideologists expressed their 
46  Author’s conversation with Professor Yurii My-
tsyk, May 12, 1991, Dniepropetrovsk. He expressed 
similar feelings.
47  Regarding the ethno-demographic develop-
ments in the big industrial cities of Ukraine see also: 
Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National 
Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine, London: Macmillan, ŗşŞś, pp. ŗŝŗ-ŘśŞǲ Wsevolod Isajiw, 
“Urban Migration and Social Change in Contem-
porary Soviet Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 
(March 1980), pp. 56-66.
48  See for a typical situation in PTU dorms M. Kar-
pov, “Vechir u gurtozhytku,” Prapor iunosti, 1982, 
August 24, p. 3.
concerns about this transformation.49 During 
police interrogations PTU students who were 
arrested for diferent crimes during the late 
1960s and 70s blatantly denied their Ukrainian 
identity. In conversations with the police 
oicers these students, former Ukrainian 
peasant children, stressed that they “were not 
bumpkins (byki, or baklany) from the village.” 
They explained to the police that they wore 
western clothes and listened to western rock 
music because they wanted to look “cool” 
(irmenno) and “stylish” (modno).50
According to Yurii Mytsyk, “PTU and college 
students, former Ukrainian peasant children, 
became the victims of the Soviet cultural 
uniication during mature socialism.Ȅ This 
cultural uniication or homogenization 
afected Ukrainian children in big industrial 
cities like Dniepropetrovsk. When these 
children left their villages for Dniepropetrovsk 
and tried to adjust to urban lifestyle, they 
became completely immersed in the cultural 
homogenization of the big industrial Soviet 
city.51 Many of them lost the major features of 
their Ukrainian identity. They tried to speak 
Russian instead of Ukrainian and wore new, 
49  See my interview with Professor Yurii Mytsyk, 
Dnipropetrovsk University, January 15, 1992, and 
my interview with Vitalii Pidgaetskii at the Depart-
ment of History, Dnipropetrovsk University, Feb-
ruary 10, 1996. See also numerous complaints about the loss of Ukrainian identity on the dance loor in D“DO, f. ŗŝ, op. Ş, d. ŚŚ, ll. ŗ-ř, ŗŝś-ŗŝŜǲ f. ŚŗŜ, op. Ř, d. ŗřśř, ll. Řř-ŘŜ, ŚŖ-Śşǲ d. ŗşşŗ, ll. Ś-ŝ, ŗŚ-Řř. Some 
experts connected the loss of identity to the rise of 
crime among the local youth. See: DADO, f. 416, op. Ř, d. ŗŜşŚ, ll. Ŝ-ŗŚǲ f. ŗŞ, op. ŜŖ, d. ŘŞ, ll. ŝŚ-ŝŜ, ŝş.
50  DADO, f. 19, op. 53, d. 109, ll. 28-31, 38, 39, 40, 
41, 46. See also statistics for 1980-84 in DADO, f. 
p-18, op. 60, d. 28, l. 79.
51  Interview with Professor Yurii Mytsyk. For ho-
mogenization as part of the Soviet cultural project 
see: Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: 
Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras, New YorkǱ St. MartinȂs, ŘŖŖŖ, pp. ŘŘ-Řř. See an efect of 
the urban Soviet culture of the big industrial cities 
on the new workers, migrants from the villages and 
small towns in: M. D. Afanasiev, Za knigoi. Mesto 
chtenia v zhizni sovetskogo rabochego, Moscow: Kniga, 
1987, esp. pp. 36-43.
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fashionable western dressǲ they listened and 
danced to the new fashionable musicǲ and they 
stopped reading Ukrainian literature. Urban 
Soviet mass culture Ȯ inluenced by western pop 
culture Ȯ illed a vacuum in the development 
of Ukrainian peasants who moved to the cities. 
Soviet cultural homogenization that involved 
millions of young migrants from villages to the 
cities laid the foundation for the consumption 
of western mass culture during late socialism. 
Paradoxically, this process included mass 
consumption of the cultural products that had 
previously been rejected as dangerous tools 
of imperialist propaganda, such as American 
rock and roll or disco clubs.
The détente led to an immense popularity of 
hard rock/glam rock among male audiences 
and disco among female audiences in 
provincial towns of Soviet Ukraine. It 
revealed a certain class division among a new 
generation of young rock music consumers. 
Many contemporaries noted how quickly 
after Beatlemania these consumers diverted 
their interest toward British pioneers of heavy 
metal like Led Zeppelin, Deep Purple, Black 
Sabbath, Nazareth and Uriah Heep. The most 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon 
came from the interpretation of similar 
developments during the same period among 
Anglo-American fans of hard rock. According 
to a music sociologist, a major characteristic 
of hard rock and heavy metal music was 
“its consistent non-invocation of rock 
history or mythology in any self-conscious 
or genealogical sense.” He discovered that 
people with a limited educational background 
in America used this music as an expression of 
their aggressive masculinity. The heavy metal 
look (long hair, denim jackets and jeans) “came 
to acquire connotations of low socioeconomic 
position.” As a result of their low social status 
and educational background, consumers of 
heavy rock music were not interested “in 
tracing the roots of any musical traits back 
to periods preceding the emergence of heavy 
metal.”52 We can see certain parallels with the 
situation in the Soviet hard rock and heavy 
metal consumption. Up until 1975 rock music 
consumers were predominantly from the 
middle and upper middle groups of Soviet 
society – college students, children of college 
professors, teachers of secondary schools, 
physicians, party and state functionaries 
ǻincluding police oicersǼ, whose music 
preferences included diferent styles of 
popular music – from the Beatles to Pink Floyd. 
After 1975 a new generation of pop music 
consumers emergedǲ the male part of these 
consumers (predominantly representatives 
of lower working class families, many of 
them came from Ukrainian villages), in many 
cases students of vocational schools or young 
industrial workers, preferred only hard rock 
music, from Led Zeppelin to “C/DC, while 
the female part preferred the “light” dancing 
tunes of Soviet Estrada or disco music. These 
young Ukrainian working class people 
embraced western mass culture and the 
52  “While the terms ‘rock’ and ‘rock and roll’ re-
cur within song lyrics and album titles,” Will Straw 
noted, “this is always in reference to the present of 
the performance and the energies to be unleashed 
now, rather than to history or to myth. Any ‘rebel’ 
or non-conformist imagery in heavy metal may be 
seen as a function of its masculine, ‘hard’ stances, 
rather than as a conscious participation in rock’s growing self-relexivity… If, within a typology of male identity paterns, heavy metal listeners are 
usually in a relationship of polar opposition to 
‘nerds,’ it is primarily because the former do not re-
gard certain forms of knowledge (particularly tho-se derived from print mediaǼ as signiicant compo-
nents of masculinity – if the ‘nerd’ is distinguished 
by his inability to translate knowledge into socially 
acceptable forms of competence, heavy metal peer 
groups value competence demonstrable in social 
situations exclusively… Heavy metal … provides 
one of the purest examples of involvement in rock 
music as an activity subordinate to, rather than 
determinant of, peer group formation.” See Will 
Straw, “Characterizing Rock Music Culture: The 
Case of Heavy Metal,” The Cultural Studies Reader, 
ed. Simon During, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 
368-381. Citations are from pages 375, 377-378, 380.
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Russian language in the forms available on the 
dance loor and in their dormitories. 
Sometimes the oicial Russiication co-
existed with sporadic explosions of the 
interest in Ukrainian national roots, which 
was provoked by trips abroad. The parents of 
young Vladimir Solodovnik from a small town 
in eastern Ukraine, who traveled to Canada 
as tourists during the spring of 1978, had a 
similar reaction after their trip abroad and 
meeting Canadian Ukrainians. As he noted in 
his diary, “My parents just returned from their 
tourist trip abroad yesterday. They brought 
for me great stuf Ȯ a pair of jeans, Pink FloydȂs 
album Animals and some souvenirs. They were 
shocked to ind out how nice and kind the 
Ukrainians in Canada were. As I understood 
from their conversation, their tourist group 
supervisor (starshii grupy) tried to stop these 
contacts with Canadians. But the impact [of 
these meetings with Ukrainian Canadians] 
is obvious. My old people (stariki) suddenly 
resumed speaking Ukrainian at home. They 
put the large pictures of Taras Shevchenko 
and Lesia Ukrainka in our living room! Now 
I am shocked! They are now Ukrainized 
(ukrainizirovanyǼ!Ȅ53 
Yet overall the consumption of western mass 
culture products during the 1970s led to 
Russiication as the main trend in cultural 
development of eastern Ukraine.54 As 
53  Diary of Vladimir Solodovnik, Sinel’nikovo, 
Dniepropetrovsk Region, 1966-1978, note from May 
12, 1978.
54  See: Ralph S. Clem, “The Integration of Ukraini-
ans into Modernized Society in the Ukrainian SSR,” 
The Soviet West: Interplay between Nationality and 
Social Organization, ed. Ralph S. Clem, New York: Praeger Publishers, ŗşŝś, pp. ŜŖ-ŝŖǲ  L. I. Poliakova, 
“Zminy v etnonathional’nomu skladi naselennia 
pivdnia Ukrainy v 60-80-ti roky XX st.”, Pivdenna UЦraina XX stoЧitiaǱ ZapisЦi nauЦovo-dosЧidnoi Чabora-
torii istorii Pivdennoi Ukrainy Zaporiz’kogo Derzhavno-
go Universytetu, ed. A. V. Boiko, Zaporizhzhia, 1998, 
pp. 227-237. See also a good analysis of these trends 
in English: Bohdan Krawchenko, “Ethno-Demogra-
phic Trends in Ukraine in the 1970s,” Ukraine after 
Solodovnik wrote in 1976, 
What is going on with our television? A few years 
ago a Moscow TV channel presented rock music 
as ‘sound of capitalist degeneration and of cultural 
crisis.Ȃ Now they incЧuded western rocЦ [music] in 
every show. So everybody loves watching Moscow 
television rather than our boring Ukrainian 
channels with our peasant Ukrainian language. 
Now even my patriotic Ukrainian parents prefer 
‘Muscovite’ (moskal’skie) channels rather than 
Kyiv television. It looks like Moscow television 
now promotes our own Soviet westernization 
(vesternizatsiia) in Russian!!! A year ago (1975), 
in ”eneis of Larisa GoЧubЦina they permited 
Soviet musicians to cover ‘Ms Vanderbilt’ by 
McCartney and the Wings. This year in one show 
Volshebnyi fonar’ I noticed at least four Russian 
covers of arias from rock opera Jesus Christ 
Superstar, including my favorite ‘King Herod’s 
Song’, two covers of Beatles songs like ‘Octopus’s 
GardenȂ and ȁLet It ”eȂ [”udet Tak!], one with 
Sweet ‘Funny, Funny’ and Russian covers of 
music from “merican iЧms ЧiЦe The Godfather, 
Love Story and My Fair Lady.55  
Next year another student from another small 
Soviet town noted, 
It is amazing how this international Détente has 
changed our television, cinema and, especially 
our perception of popular music even here in our 
provincial town. On a channel of the Central 
television, our family recently watched concerts 
of western music featuring ABBA and Smokey. It 
Shelest, pp. 101-119. See also: Goskomstat USSR, 
Dnepropetrovskoe oblastnoe upravlenie statistiki, 
Naselenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti po dannym Vsesoi-
uznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda, Dnepropetrovsk, 
1991, pp. 100, 102, 106, 116.
55  School diary of Vladimir Solodovnik, 
Sinel’nikovo, Dnipropetrovsk Region, December 7, 
1976. He used both the Russian and Ukrainian lan-
guage in his writing.
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is impossibЧe to imagine this even ive years ago, 
when we had only Tatraskii’s radio show about 
western music and some parodies of western beat 
music in the cartoon iЧms such as Bremenskie 
muzykanty. And that’s it. In 1972, I could buy 
here at the ЦiosЦ onЧy smaЧЧ [pirate] records by 
Melodiia (label) of the old Beatles or Deep Purple 
songs. If I needed to buy a real album of western 
rock group, I had to go to the Kyiv black market. 
But today, here, in our provincial small town 
ǻ!!!Ǽ, I bought an oiciaЧЧy Чicensed Melodiia disc 
of Band on the Run by McCartney at the same 
kiosk, and without going to Kyiv I bought (without 
any problem) an audiotape with recordings of 
my favorite disc Wish You Were Here by Pink 
FЧoyd from the same vendor at the same ЦiosЦ [iz 
pod prilavka] for onЧy ŗŖ RoubЧes!!! In our smaЧЧ 
town this entire week only foreign movies were 
shown. I myseЧf watched two “merican iЧms, one 
ItaЧian, and one French iЧm this weeЦ. Tonight 
my mom watched teЧevision shows and iЧms onЧy 
from the capitalist West. She was so frustrated by 
this ‘capitalist invasion’ in our culture that she 
called this situation ‘the détente’s new cultural 
revolution’.56 
As one contemporary summarized the 
situation in the Soviet media during the 1970s, 
It was a real western cultural invasion in the 
Soviet Union. Since 1975 the Soviet audiences 
had been exposed to the massive atacЦs of images 
and sounds from the capitalist West on television, 
in movies, on the radio, on music records, and of 
course on the dance loor. ParadoxicaЧЧy, everybody 
here (in Ukraine) who loved western music and 
iЧms and considered himseЧf a ȁmodern young 
man’ began to mentally associate and identify 
himself with ‘progressive and westernized’ 
Moscow and Russian language as a language of 
56  School diary of Oleg Grin, Vatutino, Cherkasy 
Region, January 16, 1977.
modernity [iazyk sovremennosti], rather than 
with conservative and backward Kyiv and their 
stupid policy of Soviet Ukrainian anti-western 
patriotism.57 
The search for the authentic west deeply 
impacted the process of identity formation of 
the young Soviet consumers of the western 
cultural products. In the Soviet Ukraine, these 
consumers tried to identify only with the west 
or its legitimate substitutes, which by the end 
of the 1970s lost any connections with Soviet 
Ukrainian culture. In the imagination of 
these consumers, the oicial Soviet Ukrainian 
culture represented all the most conservative, 
backward and anti-western elements in 
their life. “Only idiots and peasants listen to 
Ukrainian Estrada, the normal razvitye (smart, 
intelligent) people listen to real rock music 
from the real West,“ wrote Andrei Vadimov, 
a future activist of the discotheque movement, 
in September 1976. The same year Aleksandr 
Gusar, a future organizer of a dorm disco 
club at Dniepropetrovsk University, noted in 
his high school journal, “You must be stupid 
enough to say that Ukrainian Estrada songs 
are beter than western rock music. Ukrainian 
music exists only for bumpkins. All intelligent 
youth now listen to classic rock from the 
West.”58  
By accepting the real west as a part of their 
identity, these young rock music fans and 
discotheque activists rejected the oicial 
Soviet version of their own ethnic identity. 
Eventually this process of identiication 
57  Interview with Mikhail Suvorov, Dnipropet-
rovsk, June 1, 1991.
58  The quotations are from a school diary of Andrei 
Vadimov, September 10, 1976, Dniepropetrovsk, 
and school diary of Aleksandr Gusar, October 21, 
1976, Dniepropetrovsk. See also the school diary 
of Vladimir Solodovnik, June 12, 1972. Compare 
with the entries from the school diary of Mikhail 
Suvorov, February 12, 1977.
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with the real west leveled national cultural 
diferences among the active consumers of 
western mass culture and contributed to what 
some scholars called a homogenization of the 
Soviet culture that meant a mass Russiication 
of the youth cultures in eastern Ukraine during 
the 1970s.59
The personal diaries relect an appearance 
of the new model of construction of the 
young man during the beginning of the 
1980s. Growing up, the authors, now college 
students, began distancing themselves from 
their idealistic perceptions of Soviet patriotism 
and incorporating more idealization of the 
products of western popular culture in their 
narrative and describing their commercial 
activities in an unusual cynical way. At the 
same time, their narratives demonstrate a 
presence of the traditional discourse of young 
Soviet men, Komsomol activists, who tried to 
adjust to the new realities of Soviet life.  As one 
now sophomore college student from eastern 
Ukraine, who was actively involved in black 
market activities and recently married, noted 
in 1982, “What is bad about wishing to live a 
beter and comfortable life under socialism? 
Is it against the teaching of Karl Marx? I am 
making money by trading musicǲ therefore I 
add something to our family budget, because 
59  Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution, 
pp. 22-23. For the homogenization of Soviet Culture 
during Stalin’s time see Evgeny Dobrenko, The Ma-
king of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic Contexts 
of the Reception of Soviet Literature, Transl. by Jesse 
M. Savage, Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 
1997, and during the Brezhnev era in Natalia E. Do-
brynina, Cherty dukhovnoi obshchnosti: Russkaia khu-
dozhestvennaia literatura v chtenii mnogonatsional’nogo 
sovetskogo chitatelia, Moscow: Kniga, 1983, esp. pp. śŗ-Ŝş. For a concept of ȃSoviet peopleȄ see Yizhak 
M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia, 7, pp. 43, 92. For 
the Soviet evaluation of the homogenization of the 
youth culture through cultural consumption see 
Sergei I. Plaksii, Tvoi molodoi sovremennik: Problemy 
sovershenstvovania obraza zhizni rabochei molodiozhi 
v zerkale sotsiologii, Moscow: “Molodaia gvardiia,” 
1982, esp. pp. 146-160.
my salary is not enough for my family.”60 In 
December 1978, another college student, who 
became the most prominent disc jockey in a 
big Ukrainian industrial city, wrote in his 
personal diary, 
I am twenty years old. Sixty years ago people of 
my age carried out the Revolution in my country. 
Meanwhile, our Komsomol bosses criticize me for 
being too young to organize the central city disco 
cЧub and have aЧЧ inanciaЧ responsibiЧities!
Ten years later, in November 1989, the same 
author, who now graduated from his college 
and became a successful organizer of a 
Komosmol business in the same city, still 
complained in his diary, “This young jerk 
[pridurok], a regional Komsomol secretary, 
who is much younger than me, tries to teach 
me that I am too young to handle video 
salons in this district!!!Ȅ61 Other personal 
diaries of Soviet young men who lived during 
late socialism also show how their authors 
internalized the Soviet ideological clichés, 
which they used constantly in their narratives 
to explain their commercial activities.
As we see, personal narrative analyses of 
diaries writen by young people from Soviet 
Ukraine demonstrate how the authors of these 
diaries constructed their own intellectual 
model of the Soviet young man, relecting the 
outside inluences and their own intellectual 
adjustment to these changing inluences. 
It is true that my analysis of these diaries 
demonstrates ȃtheir rootedness in speciic, 
and generally very limited social milieus and 
phases of the life cycle as well as the changing 
conventions that afected what they expected 
60  Summer school diary of Mikhail Suvorov, Dnieprope-
trovsk, May 28, 1982.
61  Summer school diary of Andrei Vadimov, Dnie-propetrovsk, December ś, ŗşŝŞǲ and his diary, No-
vember 17, 1989.
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to reveal and conceal.”62 Yet at the same time 
these diaries give us a unique opportunity 
to see personal perceptions of the reality in 
writing and their evolution during the period 
of late socialism.
Conclusions: The Limits of Soviet 
Westernization
The personal diaries from “provincial” Ukraine 
are a good illustration of the obvious limits of 
westernization during the cultural détente of 
the 1970s in Soviet provincial society.63 Despite 
the discursive atempts in the diary narrative 
of these authors to distance themselves from 
the Soviet cultural forms (especially in their 
consumption of popular culture) and embrace 
the forms of western mass culture, the diaries 
are a proof of the dominance of various 
elements of the Soviet ideological discourse in 
their mentality. 
The entire point of reference, the system 
of moral values used in this construction 
derived from and was adjusted to Soviet 
ideological discourse, which was based 
on the popular notions of Soviet socialist 
modernity (sovremennost’). Even the choice 
62  Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce, Barbara Las-let, Telling Stories, p. 92.
63  For the limitations in the détente politics among 
the Soviet intellectual elites see Sergei I. Zhuk, 
“‘Academic Détente’: IREX Files, Academic Re-
ports, and ‘American’ Adventures of Soviet Ame-
ricanists during the Brezhnev Era,” Les Cahiers du 
Monde russe, 2014, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 81-106. The best conirmation of this process can be found in re-
cent studies of consumption in late socialism. See 
Natalya Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in 
the Brezhnev Era, London and New York: Routledge, 
2013 and Anna Ivanova, Magaziny ȃ”erezЦaȄǱ Para-
doksy potrebleniia v pozdnem SSSR, Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2017 and Sergei Zhuk, “’The Disco Maiaȁ and ȂKomsomol Capitalismȁ in Sovi-
et Ukraine during Late Socialism,” Material Culture 
in Russia and the USSR: Things, Values, Identities, ed. 
Graham H. Roberts, London and Oxford: Blooms-
bury Publishing, 2017, pp. 173-195.
of language, the preference for Russian over 
Ukrainian for a native Ukrainian speaker, 
was inluenced by these notions of Soviet 
modernity. Paradoxically, westernization of 
Soviet provincial popular culture during the 
détente led to cultural Russiication of youth 
culture in non-Russian (in my case Ukrainian) 
“provincial” society. Moreover, this analysis 
challenges the ideas of recent literature about 
Soviet youth culture during late socialism. 
According to these ideas, after Khrushchev’s 
de-Stalinization, communist ideology in Soviet 
society underwent a so-called performative 
shift, when Stalin’s authoritative discourse 
lost its importance and became a mere ritual 
for many Soviet people, who tried to exist 
vnye – outside – this communist ideological 
discourse since the 1950s. The narratives of the 
personal diaries, writen during the ŗşŝŖs and 
80s, demonstrate that Soviet young people 
still shared the same communist ideological 
discourse, internalized it, imagined and 
perceived the outside world through the 
communist ideological “discursive lenses” 
and constructed their own identity, using 
the same communist ideological discursive 
elements. 64 
64  See also how the Soviet youth became obsessed 
with the western (especially American) cultu-
ral products even before Khrushchev, during the 
1940s, before Yurchak’s “performative shift, when 
Stalin’s authoritative discourse lost its importance 
and became mere rituals for many Soviet people” 
in my article: Sergei I. Zhuk, “Inventing America 
on the Borders of Socialist Imagination: Movies and 
Music from the USA and the Origins of American 
Studies in the USSR,” REGION: Regional Studies of 
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 2013, 2 (2), 
pp. 249-288, and in my recent book, Sergei I. Zhuk, 
Nikolai Bolkhovitinov and American Studies in the 
USSR: People’s Diplomacy in the Cold War, Lanham, MD and ”oulder, COǱ Rowman and LitleieldȂs Le-
xington Press, 2017, pp. 45-74.
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Watching Television and Emotional Commitment
 in the Late Soviet Union
“I sincerely believed to live in the best country, everything [was] ine.Ȅ Georgii, 
who frankly admited that he has thought this 
way in Soviet times, was born in Leningrad in 
1953 and raised in the family of an established 
scientist. He also conirmed his perception of 
Soviet TV1 contents insightfully: “I believed 
that everything [he aimed at TV broadcasts] 
was true.Ȅ2
In an interview in ŘŖŗŖ, Georgii was asked to 
talk about his TV watching habits during the 
Soviet period of his life. I take his remarks as 
a starting point to explore Soviet televisionȂs 
capacity to evoke an emotional commitment 
among viewers towards their Soviet life. Thus, 
I am interested in airmative as well as reject-
ing emotions that were stimulated by watch-
ing television and that potentially contributed 
1  When speaking of ȃSoviet TVȄ, I refer to diferent interest groups and actors that inluenced television programsǱ the professional groups such as jour-nalists, editorial staf members, artists, producers, directors, anchor people, presenters and technical staf, on the one hand, and representatives of party and state organs trying to impinge on the program-ming on the other hand. This is, however, far from a sharp diferentiation between the ields of action and interests, as many people belonged as party members e.g. at least to two spheres.
2  Georgii is higher educated, but currently works as a minor public employee in St. Petersburg. Like his father he was a member of the Communist Par-ty. The interview was conducted by Elena ”ogdan-ova in September ŘŖŗŖ in St. Petersburg.
to the cohesion of the Soviet society or chal-
lenged it.3 This question ties into the much 
3  Emotions constitute a highly complex phenom-
enon and unsolved interdisciplinary problem in-
curring competing and sometimes even opposite 
answers to the question of how to explore them. Historians ind it di cult to detect them beyond 
their linguistic, discursive or symbolic representa-
tions. Based on a predominantly social-construc-
tivist approach, historical research mostly does not diferentiate between the inner self and the outside 
representation of emotions. This means that histori-
ans more or less disregard emotions as a psycholog-
ical state of mind that may exist without language. 
The obvious reason is that we have no or at least 
only few sources to analyze emotions in past times 
apart from their external representations. For sim-
ilar pragmatic reasons I will explore here the emo-tional seting in the course of watching television 
on the basis of oral history interviews. Therefore, I 
tend to the social-constructivist approach in order 
to trace, on the one hand, how the respondents ret-
rospectively represent their emotional state watch-
ing Soviet television. On the other hand, I aim to relate these emotional atitudes to the socio-cultur-
al factors possibly shaping and framing them. For 
this purpose, I draw on the concept called ‘media 
culture of emotions’ (‘Medien-Gefühlskultur’). In 
my understanding, the term describes a process 
of emotional commitment that referred to the so-
cio-political subtext of the TV program represent-
ing the Soviet way of life. Thus, the ‘media culture 
of emotions’ was immediately entangled with an oicially routinized and socially accepted popu-
lar culture. Cf. Rüdiger Schnell, Haben Gefühle eine 
Geschichte? Aporien einer History of Emotions, Teil ŗ, GчtingenǱ V&R, ŘŖŗś, pp. ŗśȮśşǲ Ulrich Saxer, 
Martina Märki-Koepp, Medien-Gefühlskultur: Ziel-gruppenspeziische Gef(hЧsdramaturgie aЧs journaЧis-
tische Produktionsroutine, M(nchenǱ Oelschläger, ŗşşŘǲ Knut Hickethier, ȃDas Fernsehen der DDRȃ, 
Wie im Westen, nur anders: Medien in der DDR, ed. Stefan Zahlmann, ”erlinǱ Panama-Verlag, ŘŖŗŖ, pp. ŗŗşȮŗřŖ, here p. ŗŘř, ŗŘŞ.
Abstract
As a popular consumer good, television transformed Soviet households’ material culture and 
lifestyle. It interconnected time and space in a new way and helped to constitute the Soviet audience 
as ȁemotional communitiesȂ. It did so by providing a speciic entertainment culture that supported 
the regime’s claim of guaranteeing a decent lifestyle to many groups of Soviet society. Oral history 
interviews reveal that people’s representations of Soviet television are a still persistent source of 
emotional commitment to the former Soviet life.
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broader discussion on how to explain the du-
rability of the Soviet Union during the 1960s 
and 1970s until perestroika. Georgii’s interpre-
tations raise questions about the role of televi-
sion in this context. Like in capitalist Europe, 
television became part of everyday life from 
mid-1960s on. My thesis, that I try to outline 
here, is that many people felt entertained by 
Soviet television broadcasts and thus engaged 
with a new Soviet popular culture which 
was not least shaped by the medium. Televi-
sion constituted a dynamic force within the 
ield of new materialism, mass consumption, 
and the demand for extended leisure time.4 
Kristin Roth-Ey has demonstrated that early 
TV enthusiasts envisioned the new medium 
bringing back ‘truth’ into Soviet society after 
Stalinism and shaping the New Soviet Man. 
However, the search for ‘cultural authority’ 
turned out to be much more ambivalent than 
TV producers initially thought.5 The Commu-
nist Party developed its own demands for cul-
tural education towards the medium, whereas 
the audience perceived TV more and more as 
the most important medium of entertainment. 
The viewer leters to Central TV provide in-
sight into the audience’s preferences: Most 
viewers just wanted to relax and to get into a 
good mood watching television at home.6
4  Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender 
and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the 
Soviet Union under Krushchev”, Slavic Review 61, ŘŖŖŘ, pp. ŘŗŗȮŘśŘǲ David Crowley, Susan E. Reid, 
“Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism?”, Pleasures in 
Socialism. Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc, eds. David Crowley, Susan E. Reid, Evanston/Ill.Ǳ North-
western University Press, 2010, pp. 3–51.
5  Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the So-
viet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cul-
tural Cold War, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, ŘŖŗŗ, pp. ŘŘřȮŘŞŖǲ see also Simon 
Huxtable, “The Problem of Personality on Soviet 
Television, 1950s-1960s”, VIEW. Journal of European 
Television History and Culture 3, 2014, 5, pp. 119–130.
6  Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, p. ŘŖŗǲ Kirsten 
Bönker, “’Dear television workers…’: TV consump-
tion and Political Communication in the Late Soviet 
Union”, Cahiers du Monde Russe 56, 2015, 2–3, pp. 
Roth-Ey argues that the idea of a self-suicient 
and superior Soviet media culture became “a 
life-and-death exercise in self-defense”. She 
suggests that the Soviet Union “lost the cultur-
al Cold WarȄ, as it failed to establish an atrac-
tive media empire.7 I would be more cautious 
about this interpretation of media cultures as 
binary black boxes. Exchanges of television 
programs among the socialist states, between 
eastern and western TV stations, broadcasts 
of common features within the transmission 
range of Intervision or live link-ups between 
Eurovision and Intervision let us suppose that 
cross-references and amalgamations pros-
pered across the Iron Curtain.8
Based on a sample of 80 interviews cover-
ing practices of watching television in the 
late Soviet Union,9 this article focuses on the 
371–399.
7  Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, pp. 7, 23.
8  Cf. Katalin Lustyik, “From a Socialist Endeavour 
to a Commercial Enterprise: Children’s Television 
in East-Central Europe”, Popular Television in Eastern 
Europe During and Since Socialism, eds. Anikó Imre, 
Timothy Havens, and Katalyn Lustyik, New York and LondonǱ Routledge, ŘŖŗř, pp. ŗŖśȮŗŘŘǲ Thom-
as Beutelschmidt, Richard Oehmig, “Connected 
Enemies? Programming Transfer between East 
and West during the Cold War and the Example of 
East German Television”, VIEW. Journal of European 
Television History and Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. ŜŖȮŜŝǲ 
Yulia Yurtaeva, “Intervision: Searching for Trac-
es”, VIEW. Journal of European Television History and 
Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. ŘřȮřŚǲ Heather L. Gumbert, 
“Exploring the transnational media exchange in the 
1960s”, VIEW. Journal of European Television Histo-
ry and Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. śŖȮśşǲ Michael Meyen, Denver CЧan und Neues DeutschЧandǱ Mediennuzung 
in der DDR, ”erlinǱ Christoph Links Verlag, ŘŖŖřǲ 
about Poland: Patryk Wasiak, “The Great Époque 
of the Consumption of Imported Broadcasts: West 
European Television Channels and Polish Audienc-
es during the System Transition”, VIEW. Journal of 
European Television History and Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. 
68–78.
9  For more details see my forthcoming book Brave 
New World? Watching TV and Political Communication 
in the Late Soviet Union, Lanham/MDǱ Rowman & Litleield/Lexington ”ooks, ŘŖŗŞ. The sample com-
prises 48 women and 32 men born between 1929 
and 1965. Women are overrepresented for prag-
matic reasons, because they were much more will-
ing to be interviewed. Most of the interviews were 
conducted by experienced Russian sociologists and 
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“ordinary” TV viewer.10 The interviews were 
conducted between 2010 and 2012 in a phase 
of increasing nostalgic outlooks on the Soviet 
past. The sample does not thoroughly repre-
sent the social structure of European Russia. 
Instead it drew on a variety of ideal types.11 
People with higher education are overrepre-
sented in relation to the Soviet populace, be-
cause they tend to ofer a greater variety of 
viewing habits and to assess TV content in a 
more diferentiated way than people with less 
education.12
First, I will give a quick overview of the phe-
nomenon of nostalgia that we encounter in 
the interviews. Second, I will outline how 
historians. The guideline was applied in a lexible 
way to react to the topics the respondents touched 
upon. The questions should stir the interviewees to 
think of earliest memories of television and then to 
look back on concrete practices and changes during 
her or his life. This kind of “interview of remem-
brance” refers to: Gabriele Rosenthal, Erlebte und 
erzählte Lebensgeschichte: Gestalt und Struktur biogra-
phischer Selbstbeschreibungen, Frankfurt a.M., New YorkǱ Campus, ŗşşś, pp. ŝŖȮşŞǲ Roswitha ”reckner, ȃVon den ‚ZeizeugenȂ zu den ‚”iographenȂǱ Me-
thoden der Erhebung und Auswertung lebensge-
schichtlicher Interviews [1994]”, Oral History, ed. 
Julia Obertreis, StutgartǱ Franz Steiner, ŘŖŗŘ, pp. 
131–151.
10  “Ordinary” refers to people who did not enjoy 
access to the elites’ system of distribution. They were deined by their lack of formal political pow-er. The notion ȃregimeȄ refers to oicial represen-
tatives of organizations such as the party, govern-
ment, trade unions etc.
11  For the ideal types of viewers, I follow Michael 
Meyen’s approach to GDR television audience. He identiied ive ideal typesǱ the compliant, the air-mative, the indiferent, the reserved and the sub-
versive one. Cf. Michael Meyen, Einschalten, Um-
schalten, Ausschalten? Das Fernsehen im DDR-Alltag, 
Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-Verlag, 2003, pp. 
98–109.
12  The majority of the respondents were urban 
dwellers, although rural areas are well represented. 
During the Soviet era, they primarily lived in the 
cities and counties of Moscow, Leningrad, Kuiby-
shev (Samara), Rostov on Don, Yaroslavl, Irkutsk, 
and Kemerovo. All levels of education were includ-
ed, but academics (64% among women, 70% among 
men) constitute the majority of respondents. The in-terviewees belonged to diferent social groups and difered in their purchasing power, privileges, and 
social networks.
watching TV became part of leisure practices. 
In the third part I will take up a perspective 
on television’s capacity to familiarize societal 
topics, ideas, and values by engaging in the 
discourse of the ‘good Socialist life’. Although 
it especially does so in the ield of entertain-
ment and popular culture, television was 
not devoid of political potential. I will argue 
that television became a force that decisively 
shaped the ‘politics of pleasure’13 by choosing 
entertainment topics with everyday relevance. 
This means that television was able to create 
meanings and interpretations on which view-
ers could negotiate. I track Stuart Hall’s inter-
pretation according to which television could 
be a source of social consensus. One should 
not paint a harmonious and uncontested pic-
ture of Soviet popular culture. However, my 
point is that Soviet television at least suggest-
ed interpretations that could be accepted by 
viewers without necessarily fully agreeing. 
I give more emphasis to the idea that televi-
sion refers to broadly familiar interpretation 
frameworks in order to have made ‘ordinary’ 
viewers to go along with them.14 Certainly, the 
frameworks of interpretation in a Soviet-style 
society were much straighter than in liberal 
systems. But Soviet television, nonetheless, 
opened up a variety of interpretations from 
hegemonic to oppositional readings. The turn 
to less overt and less violent control after Sta-
lin’s death changed the rules of communica-
tion. It went hand in hand with the search for 
13  I borrow this term without fully adopting the 
cultural studies’ suggestion of a hegemonic order 
that is contested by ‘oppositional’ popular plea-
sure. See the discussion in Politik des Vergnügens: 
Zur Diskussion der Populärkultur in den Cultural 
Studies, eds. Udo Gчtlich, Rainer Winter, KчlnǱ 
Halem, 2000.
14  See Stuart Hall, ȃDie strukturierte Vermitlung 
von Ereignissen“, Grundlagentexte zur Fernsehwis-
senschaft: Theorie – Geschichte – Analyse, eds. Ralf 
Adelmann et al., Konstanz: UVK, 2001, pp. 344–
375, 357.
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more pleasure and joy, with the cultural thaw, 
and with the pressing question how to balance 
individual and collective ‘Soviet’ interests.15
Interviews, Commitment, and Post-Soviet 
Nostalgia
Oral history interviews are not an easy type 
of source, especially as the interviewees may 
tend towards nostalgia.16 However, interviews 
stimulate the respondents to update memories 
by entangling temporal and spatial layers of 
the Soviet past with current perceptions. Al-
though nostalgia difers from contemporary 
contentedness, the respondents’ narratives 
may reveal the communicative foundation of 
the society. They give us a notion of how the 
interviewees atribute sense to their past So-
viet lives by contextualizing their memories.17 
15  See the articles in Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure 
and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc, eds. David Crowley, Susan E. Reid, Evanston/Ill.Ǳ Northwestern Univer-sity Press, ŘŖŗŖǲ Oksana ”ulgakowa, Cine-Weath-
ers: “Soviet Thaw Cinema in the International Con-
text”, The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 
1950s and 1960s, eds. Eleonor Gilburd and Denis 
Kozlov, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013, pp. ŚřŜȮŚŞŖǲ The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Nego-
tiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev 
Era, ed. Polly Jones, Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
16  Nostalgia is a phenomenon that involves difer-
ent groups of agents from within and outside the 
respective society. For a conceptualization with re-
gard to former socialist societies see the instructive 
book of Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, New 
York: Basic Books, 2001, p. xviii. Boym conceptual-
ized nostalgia as consisting of two narratives, the relective and the restorative one. The restorative 
strategy seems to have preponderance in contem-
porary societies of former bloc states. Nostalgia is 
a somehow ubiquitous phenomenon in all former 
socialist states. For nostalgia in contemporary Rus-
sia see recently Ekaterina Kalinina, “Multiple faces 
of the nostalgia channel in Russia”, VIEW. Journal of 
European Television History and Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. 
108–118. With regard to nostalgic TV consumption 
in the Czech Republic: Veronika Pehe, “Responses 
to The Thirty Cases of Major Zeman in the Czech Re-
public”, VIEW. Journal of European Television History 
and Culture ř/ś, ŘŖŗŚ, pp. ŗŖŖȮŗŖŝ.
17  SОО Пor tСО ОfОМt Cold WКr МСronotopОs stТll СКvО todКв: AlКТnК LОmon, “SвmpКtСв Пor tСО WОКrв StКtО? Cold WКr CСronotopОs Кnd MosМoа OtСОrs“, Com-
Further, Soviet television has itself interlaced 
diferent time layers and dimensions of space. 
From its beginnings in the mid-1950s, viewers 
perceived television as having opened a “win-
dow to the world”, as some respondents put 
it.18 Current television complicates these lay-
ers even more by rerunning Soviet features 
today. In this context, the interviews reveal 
self-perceptions, individual practices, mo-
tives, and interpretations on TV watching and 
media use.
Georgii’s statements on the credibility of So-
viet television contradict long established ar-
guments claiming that television did a great 
deal to destabilize Socialist states.19 And in-
deed, new research on Socialist mass media 
takes another track: Some researchers have 
recently underlined socialist television’s ca-
pacity to atract viewers.20 Historian Paulina 
Bren explains the great popularity of Jaroslav 
Dietl’s TV series by showing how they man-
ifested the normalization of daily life. They 
had become the CSSR’s “shared common 
places” during the 1970s and 1980s and were 
symbols of the “banality of normalization”.21 
parative Studies in Society and History 51/4, 2009, pp. 832–864.
18  With special regard to the evening news pro-
gram Vremia (Time): Christine Evans, “A ‘Panorama 
of Time’: the Chronotopics of Programma Vremia”, 
Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Na-
tionalism in the Post-Soviet Space 2, 2010, pp. 121–146.
19  Cf. Kurt R. Hesse, Westmedien in der DDR: Nuzung, Image und “uswirЦungen bundesrepubЧiЦan-
ischen Hörfunks und Fernsehens, Köln: Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 1988.
20  Meyen, Denver Clan, chapter Śǲ Heather L. 
Gumbert, Envisioning Socialism. Television and the 
Cold War in the German Democratic Republic, Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2014, pp. ŗřśȮŗśşǲ Sabina Mihelj, “The Politics of Privatiza-
tion: Television Entertainment and the Yugoslav 
Sixties”, The Socialist Sixties: The Global Movement in 
the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba, eds. Anne 
Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, Bloomington, IN: In-
diana University Press, 2013, pp. 251–267.
21  Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and his TV: The 
Culture of Communism After the 1968 Prague Spring, 
Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 
2010, pp. 202–206.
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The banality of normal life, one could argue, 
was the downside of the new consumerist 
lifestyle with its privatized leisure practices.22 
It was the seed of emotional commitment to-
wards the socialist regimes, because television 
opened up a place for negotiation between TV 
program-makers, journalists, artists, and the 
party elite.23 “lthough most of the TV staf be-
came party members until the 1970s, the nego-
tiations crisscrossed the lines of political con-
trol as television provided new media logics 
that were more di cult to control.24
Georgii’s narrative very well represents the 
retrospective airmation to the lost Soviet state 
that often disregarded aspects of control and 
repression.25 Today, Russian state television 
circulates representations of the Soviet social 
life via Soviet crafted serials and ilms. Thus, 
it is television, in particular, that keeps Sovi-
et signs, interpretations, values, and emotions 
current.26 This kind of circulation reminds us 
not to presuppose that television destabilized 
the political regime and to draw a continuous 
22  Lifestyle, notions of personality, individuality, 
and consumption gained an intrinsic relationship 
since Khrushchev had promised to catch up with 
the USA. See Larissa Zakharova, S’habiller à So-
viétique: La mode et le Dégel en URSS, Paris: CNRS Ed., ŘŖŗŗǲ “nna Paretskaya, ȃ“ Middle Class with-
out Capitalism? Socialist Ideology and Post-Col-
lectivist Discourse in the Late-Soviet Era”, Soviet 
Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964-1985, eds. Neringa Klumbytė and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 43–66.
23  SОО CСrТstТnО EvКns, “SonР oП tСО YОКr Кnd SovТОt CulturО Тn tСО 1970s“, Kritika: Explorations in Russian 
and Eurasian History 12/3, 2011, pp. 617–645.
24  Dana Mustata, “Television in the Age of (Post-)
Communism: The Case of Romania”, Popular Tele-
vision in Eastern Europe During and Since Socialism, 
eds. Anikó Imre, Timothy Havens, and Katalyn 
Lustyik, New York, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. ŚŝȮŜŚǲ Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, pp. 236–268.
25  See for a critique of historiography updating 
Cold War tropes and being blind to emotional as-
criptions to the state Lemon, “Sympathy for the 
Weary State?”.
26  With regard to post-Soviet TV: Elena Prokhoro-
va, “Challenging Nostalgic Imagination: The Case 
of Dmitry Astrakhan”, The Slavic and East European 
Journal ŚŞ/ř, ŘŖŖŚ, pp. ŚŘŗȮŚřŝ.
line from a westerly supposed incredibility of 
television as a source of information from our 
western perspective to its would-be rejection 
as a pleasure-giving entertainment medium. 
Apart from the audience living on the Soviet 
periphery most viewers had no access to for-
eign TV programs that might have disturbed 
Soviet media representations. Even listening 
to foreign radio stations like Radio Liberty 
should not be supposed to be a practice of me-
dia use that necessarily generated criticism on 
the Soviet way of life.27
Leisure Time and the Spread of Television
Television substantially changed the Soviet 
lifestyle. Recent research strongly suggests 
that the consumer culture of the 1960s and 
1970s became a cohesive factor that rather 
held the regime and society together instead 
of destabilizing it because of the deiciencies 
of the consumer society.28 Small family apart-
ments as well as technical household equip-
ment such as refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, 
radios, and TV sets became symbols of the 
improving quality of life for many people af-
ter the late 1950s.29 During the 1960s however, 
TV sets had constituted more or less luxury 
goods, before they lost their aura of singu-
larity as former Soviet TV viewers indicated. 
Many of the respondents reported that TV sets 
27  See Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, p. ŗŝŚǲ Kirsten 
Bönker, “’Muscovites are frankly wild about TV: 
Freizeit und Fernsehkonsum in der späten Sowje-
tunion“, ‘Entwickelter Sozialismus’ in Osteuropa: Ar-
beit, Konsum und Öffentlichkeit, eds. Nada Boškovs-
ka, Angelika Strobel, and Daniel Ursprung, Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2016, pp. 173–210, 198–201.
28  Cf. Ekaterina Emeliantseva, “The Privilege of 
Seclusion: Consumption Strategies in the Closed 
City of Severodvinsk”, Ab Imperio: Studies of New 
Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet 
Space Ř, ŘŖŗŗ, pp. ŘřŞȮŘśş, esp. ŘřŞȮŘŚŚǲ Natalya 
Chernyshova, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezh-
nev Era, London, New York: Routledge, 2013.
29  Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” p. 219.
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were among the irst purchases of young cou-
ples after the late 1960s.30
Watching television had long been a rather ur-
ban practice, because TV sets were much more 
common in urban areas than in the villages. 
Many interviewees remembered well that they 
irst watched TV when visiting relatives in the 
cities. The respondents claimed that in the 
countryside watching TV remained a joint so-
cial practice of family, friends, and neighbors 
until the early 1970s. Thus, most of the Soviet 
people had access to television since the late 
1960s. Statistics counted one TV set per seven 
persons in 1970, one per four persons in 1980, 
and one per 3.2 persons in 1988. They spread 
in a similar way in the GDR or West Germa-
ny.31 However, televisions were among the 
commodities that Soviet customers most often 
returned for warranty to the retailers.32 Not-
withstanding these technical problems, view-
ers and TV staf were fascinated by the trans-
mission speed of the new medium: “Political 
information entered our domestic life as if we 
ourselves had been involved”, cheered a view-
er on the occasion of Khrushchev’s visit to the 
United States in 1959. This TV consumer even 
described the medium as having evoked pride 
30  Boris Firsov, “Srednego zritelia net”, Zhurnal-
ist ŗŘ, ŗşŜŝ, pp. ŚŘȮŚś, Śřǲ ”чnker, ȃȂMuscovites are 
frankly wild about TV’“, p. 181.
31  Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1922-1972, Moscow: Statisti-ka, ŗşŝŘ, p. řŗŚǲ Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1988 g.: 
Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, Moscow: Statistika, 1989, p. ŗŗşǲ Stephan Merl, “Staat und Konsum in der 
Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft: Rußland und die ostmiteleuropäischen Länder“, Europäische Kon-
sumgeschichte: Zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte 
des Konsums (18.-20. Jahrhundert), eds. Hannes 
Siegrist, Hartmut Kaelble, and J(rgen Kocka, 
Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 1997, pp. 
205–241, 227.
32  Alone 31 % of the annual production of colour 
televisions and 25 % of black and white sets were 
claimed under warranty in 1987. See the statistics of 
the ministry of trade: RGAE (Rossiiskii Gosudarst-
vennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki), f. 465, op. 1, d. 4510 ǻŗşŞŞǼ, ll. ŜȮŗŚ. These rates had changed litle since 
the 60s. I am much obliged to Stephan Merl for pro-
viding me with these data.
among the audience watching all the historical 
events of the year.33
The broadcasting time rose quickly: Since 1955 
TV aired daily in Moscow and Leningrad. In 
the mid-1950s, viewers received two programs 
in big cities. They could watch three programs 
in the capitals from 1965. A fourth program 
and regular color television were aired since 
1967. TV stations also spread quickly. There 
were only nine stations in 1955, but in 1960 al-
ready 84, 1965 121, reaching an amount of 131 
in 1975, all providing a nationwide TV cover-
age.34
Starting from mid-1950s, Soviet sociologists 
demonstrated that TV consumption had be-
come an integral part of the socialist way of 
life.35 People watched more and more televi-
sion while the TV program steadily expand-
ed. This was not least due to the fact that the 
party gradually included television in its pro-
paganda strategies from the mid-1960s.36 The 
1977 constitution let Soviet citizens explicitly 
perceive cultural consumption as a legitimate 
demand to the new Soviet lifestyle. It granted 
them the right to rest and to leisure, as well 
as the right to enjoy cultural beneits ǻ“rticle 
41, 46). The Soviet state was supposed to en-
sure this by “developing television and radio 
broadcasting”.37
Contemporary Soviet audience studies al-
ready observed in the mid-1960s that televi-
sion especially atracted the less educated. 
33  GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii), f. 6903, op. 1, 1933-1970 gg.: Sekretariat 
predsedatelia i otdel kadrov, d. 612, 1959: Steno-
gramma zasedaniia obshchestvennogo soveta 
telezritelei pri tsentral’noi studii televideniia, ll. 
4–5.
34  Aleksandr Ia. Iurovskii, Televidenie – poiski i resh-
eniia: Ocherki istorii i teorii sovetskoi telezhurnalistiki, 
Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1983, pp. 41–43.
35  BorТs FТrsov, Televidenie glazami sotsiologa, Mos-Мoа: Iskusstvo, 1971, p. 105.
36  Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, pp. 208–222.
37  Cf. htpǱ//www.constitution.org/cons/ussrŝŝ.txt 
(accessed 1 September 2014).
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However, respondents of all social groups 
described “entertainment” and “rest” as tele-
vision’s prime functions.38 Many viewers ea-
gerly strove to schedule their work days not 
to miss interesting programs and repeatedly 
demanded more entertainment programs.39
From the beginning, watching practices se-
verely depended on gender as well as on the 
professional and educational background of 
the viewers. Both sexes spent about half of their 
leisure time more or less concentrated in front 
of the TV set. Especially for men, watching TV 
became a more and more absorbing practice, 
whereas women more often watched TV while 
doing housework. In the mid-1970s working 
men watched about 10, in 1986 14.5 hours per 
week. In contrast working women spent only 
3.5 hours every week in 1965 and 10.7 hours in 
1986 in front of the screen.40 Moreover, the bet-
ter educated the people, the smaller the scale 
of TV consumption. Especially men favored 
watching TV to reading newspapers or books 
from the 1970s onwards.41 People in villages 
watched more programs than the urban pop-
ulation from the late 1960s because of the lack 
of leisure activities.42
38  Firsov, “Srednego zritelia net”, p. 44.
39  GARF, f. 6903, op. 10, 1952-1970 gg.: Otde-
ly pisem, d. 46, 1963, Obzor pisem telezritelei ob 
uluchshenii programm Tsentral’nogo televideniia, 
podgotovlennyi nauchno-metodicheskim otdelom, ll. ř, ŝǲ G“RF, f. ŜşŖř, op. ŗ, d. ŜŗŘ, ŗşśş, l. Řř.
40  Boris T. Kolpakov, Vasilii D. Patrushev, Biu-
dzhety vremeni gorodskogo naseleniia, Moscow: Statis-tika, ŗşŝŗ, p. ŘŗŘǲ Leonid “. Gordon, Ėduard V. 
Klopov, Leon A. Onikov, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo 
obraza zhizni: Byt gorodskikh rabochikh vchera, segod-
nia, zavtra, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Znanie, 1977, pp. 
59–66, 149–150.
41  Rosemarie Rogers, “Normative Aspects of Lei-
sure Time Behavior in the Soviet Union”, Sociology 
and Social Research śŞ, ŗşŝŚ, pp. řŜşȮřŝşǲ Gordon, 
Klopov, Onikov, Cherty sotsialisticheskogo obraza 
zhizni, p. ŗśŗǲ Firsov, ȃSrednego zritelia netȄ, p. Śř.
42  Rozalina V. Ryvkina, Obraz zhizni sel’skogo 
naseleniia: Metodologiia, metodika i rezul’taty izucheni-ia sotsiaЧȂno-ėЦonomichesЦiЦh aspeЦtov zhiznedeiateЧȂno-
sti, Novosibirsk: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka“ Sibirskoe 
otdelenie, 1979, pp. 215–216.
TV programs had the power to integrate peo-
ple with diferent backgrounds. Like radio 
but in contrast to the press, television was 
more likely to form a nationwide audience 
that could access the same information and 
entertainment services. My sample of ethnic 
Russian interviewees shows two important 
aspects: First, the memories of the respon-
dents reveal a tendency towards pop-cultural 
homogenization as people often mentioned 
the same ilms and series regardless of their 
educational background. But the interviews 
also make clear that media usage and the eval-
uation of media contents remained socially di-
verse until the end of the Soviet Union.
TV Consumption as a Source of Emotional 
Commitment
The TV set became the symbol of a retreat 
into privacy in all socialist states. The inter-
views demonstrate how people made use of 
the opportunity to reshape their private space 
by means of TV. Essentially, hardly anybody 
perceived him or herself as a “victim” of pro-
paganda. On the contrary, some described the 
perception of Soviet TV programs very en-
thusiastically. Others stressed that they were 
able to acquire a critical media competence be-
cause of the social milieu they were embedded 
in. The conversations with family and friends 
became part of the ‘normalization’ in which 
viewers basically accepted TV’s representa-
tions of the ‘normal life’ in series, late night 
or game shows. This ‘normalization’ was a 
political process sustaining the socio-political 
order.43
43  See for a more diferentiated argumentation 
Bönker, Brave New World? (forthcoming 2018) and for a similar argument Neringa Klumbytė, ȃPoliti-
cal Intimacy: Power, Laughter, and Coexistence in 
Late Soviet Lithuania”, East European Politics and 
Societies Řś/Ś, ŘŖŗŗ, pp. ŜśŞȮŜŝŝ.
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TV changed the mixture of private and public 
spheres, of private and public communication 
strategies. The new experiences of sound and 
images, of bridging the gap between space 
and time, of bringing public afairs to private 
homes gave TV viewers the opportunity to 
inscribe personal meanings to the acquired 
information. The regime set the ideological 
framework for these interpretation processes, 
although it was not able to fully control them. 
Viewers could simply turn of their TV sets. 
However, most of them did actually not do 
that, as Liudmila described representing many 
women: “Coming back home, you turn on the 
TV setǲ while you are running and taking care 
of your housekeeping, you are always keeping 
an eye on the telly.”44
Even those of my interviewees who present-
ed themselves as critical media consumers 
never basically rejected Soviet television. 
Elena recalled it as a “source of information” 
adding that “it was a small window showing 
the world.”45 Many narratives demonstrate 
that people had felt more entertained in So-
viet times compared to Russian television 
today. The retrospective construction of So-
viet TV consumption is certainly inluenced 
by current watching practices. However, the 
merging of diferent time layers might be un-
derstood as the way the respondents come to 
terms with their Soviet media usage. In the 
light of the current media situation most of 
the respondents ofered ambivalent, partly 
very positive, partly very critical assessments 
of Soviet TV’s entertainment and information 
services. Those, who saw themselves as criti-
44  The interview was conducted by Elena Bog-
danova in St. Petersburg in November 2010. Liud-
mila was born in 1942 in Leningrad and received 
mid-level education.
45  The interview was conducted by Elena Bogdan-
ova in St. Petersburg in November 2010. Elena was 
born in 1961 in Leningrad and graduated from uni-
versity.
cal-reserved Soviet media users, distinguished 
between news, documentary features, and 
entertainment programs. With regard to en-
tertainment, they clearly tended to dismiss 
today’s programs in comparison to the So-
viet one. They described the development of 
the last twenty years as “Americanisation” and 
commercialization. In their view these charac-
teristics clearly denoted a deterioration of tele-
vision’s entertainment qualities. The academic 
Iurii46, whom I quote as a representative of this 
standpoint, was very interested in this topic. 
He remarked:
TeЧevision, sureЧy, was not ЧiЦe ours [i.e. todayȂs], 
not independent, but purer. […] ”ut the Russian 
Чanguage was lawЧess. What you sometimes hear 
today is terribЧe. […] Of course, mass media have 
changed. Not to grumble and to be discontent – 
what is possible today, that was not possible in 
the Soviet Union, of course, including bad things. 
This is in the irst pЧace. In the second, certain-
ly, let’s say, regarding the television as the most 
far-reaching mass media, I regret the loss of certain 
substance […], if you wish a ine aesthetic content. 
They aired artistic productions that, in contrast to 
today, in most cases aЧso ofered further informa-
tion and food for the mind. […] “nd, indeed, aЧЧ, 
who prefer more substance and thoughtful things, 
could no longer count on television. One probably 
has to get used to it. Because when I traveled to the 
West for the irst time, I turned to teЧevision there. I 
was overwhelmed then by the 20 channels, whereas 
we had only 3 or 4, I don’t remember. But I then 
already saw that you also could actually watch 
nothing there. Although I did not understand the 
language, I understood that it was some crock of 
shit. And we very strongly and very well adopt 
this crock of shit with the western style of mass me-
dia.… The mass media have changed. Some infor-
46  Interview with Iurii (born in 1938, Leningrad) 
by Elena Bogdanova, October 2010.
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mation that could be broadcast today was taboo in 
the Soviet Union.47
Rather compliant, content, and partly indif-
ferent viewers often criticized the amount of 
advertising today. Others, like Liudmila, who 
was also a content, compliant Soviet view-
er, complained about ubiquitous violence on 
television today. Many of the respondents 
– even some of the critical and reserved ones 
– grasped Soviet TV as a representative of a 
superior Soviet popular culture in contrast to 
western representations.
The feeling of being rather well entertained 
in Soviet times supposedly had a consen-
sus-building impact on what was the good 
Soviet lifestyle. Television framed potentially 
politicizing depictions of western-style con-
sumption or utopian promises of Soviet con-
sumption in ilms or documentaries. This new 
politicization of leisure time went hand in 
hand with the promise to live a good and cul-
tural life in the future USSR.48 The regime ben-
eited from the fact that it was easier to provide 
media products than consumer goods. The 
interviews reveal that television supported 
viewersȂ common appreciation of Soviet ilms, 
thus evoking a predominantly airmative 
emotional commitment to the Soviet life – at 
least retrospectively. Even if this kind of com-
mitment does not necessarily imply a positive 
assessment of the political system, TV played 
a vital role in propagating the Communist 
utopia of abundance. Some respondents con-
irmed the rise of an ȃimagined communityȄ 
based on an atractive vision of the future.49 TV 
47  Interview with a male respondent (born in 1938, 
Leningrad, higher education), October 2010.
48  See with regard to the CSSR, Bren, The Greengro-
cer, pp. 173–174.
49  Only recently, Graeme Gill argued that the Sovi-
et regime tried to gain legitimacy and to generate a 
collective identity by making people believe in the 
coming of a golden age. See Graeme Gill, Symbols 
seemed to have ‘normalized’ this metaphoric 
promise of a coming paradise.50 It inluenced 
at least less critical, rather content, or even 
compliant viewers who enjoyed television 
as a medium of entertainment. Such a media 
user was Svetlana Vladimirovna. Born in 1947, 
she received mid-level technical education, 
and still lives in Samara, formerly Kuibyshev. 
When asked if any communist utopias were 
broadcast, she airmed that the medium told 
the viewers: “It will be like that, we will rear 
the calves and everyone will eat meat.”51 She 
found the narrative of future aluence con-
vincing. Soviet ilms appealingly represented 
what she called “our future normal life”. She 
was not the only one to mention that she also 
loved to watch imported ilms from western 
capitalist states. Looking back to the past, the 
respondents did not interpret these ilms as 
beyond reach but embedded them in their ev-
eryday imagination, so that they might have 
even become a positive symbol of the new 
Soviet lifestyle. This efect is interesting as Ni-
kita Khrushchev’s proclamation to overtake 
America made consumption a central factor in 
legitimizing the Soviet regime. From then on, 
private consumption practices belonged to the 
core themes on which the Soviet regime invit-
ed people to communicate.52
All this becomes even more comprehensible 
if we consider the regime’s cultural policies. 
After Stalin’s death, Soviet propaganda urged 
a shift towards new emotional qualities of the 
and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics, Cambridge: Univer-
sity Press, 2011, p. 4.
50  Bren argues that screening produced ‘imagined 
communities’: “This cult of the television serial 
produced a nation that regularly sat down in front 
of the small screen.” Cf. Bren, The Greengrocer, pp. 
122–129 (quote p. 129).
51  The interview took place in September 2010 in 
Samara.
52  Stephan Merl, “Konsum in der Sowjetunion: 
Element der Systemstabilisierung?“, Geschichte in 
Wissenschaft und Unterricht śŞ, ŘŖŖŝ, pp. śŗşȮśřŜǲ 
Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen”.
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Soviet way of life. These partly very normative 
demands became inluential starting in the 
late 1960s.53 Private emotions became a new 
mater of public interest. This was especial-
ly due to the fact that the regime recognized 
television’s power to evoke a good mood and 
an airmative commitment among viewers to-
wards their Soviet life. Christine Evans draws 
our atention to the late-night talk show Ot vsei 
dushi (From the ”otom of My Heart). First aired 
in 1972 and hosted by Valentina Leont’eva, 
a still warmly remembered star of Central 
Television, viewers identiied the show with 
conveying the “Soviet way of life” and deci-
phered its emotionality. Represented by Le-
ont’eva’s face and her distinctive voice, the 
show shaped an “emotional community” in 
front of the screens, as Evans calls it.54
Conclusion
As a popular consumer good, television 
transformed Soviet households’ material cul-
ture and lifestyle. People spent an increasing 
amount of time in front of the screen. Tele-
vision became a distinctive part of changing 
communication practices within the private 
realm, as well as between people and the re-
gime. People gained new opportunities to 
53  Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist Mo-
rality in Khrushchev’s Russia, New York: Peter Lang, ŘŖŖŝǲ Neringa Klumbytė, ȃSoviet Ethical Citizen-
ship: Morality, the State, and Laughter in Late Sovi-
et Lithuania”, Soviet Society in the Era of Late Social-
ism, 1964-1985, eds. Neringa Klumbytė and Gulnaz 
Sharafutdinova, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, ŘŖŗř, pp. şŗȮŗŗŜǲ Larisa Honey, ȃPluralizing Prac-
tices in Late-Socialist Moscow: Russian Alternative Practitioners Reclaim and Redeine IndividualismȄ, 
Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964-1985, 
eds. Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdino-
va, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 117–
142.
54  See the intriguing piece by Christine Evans, 
“The ‘Soviet Way of Life’ as Way of Feeling: Emo-tion and Inluence on Soviet Central Television in 
the Brezhnev Era”, Cahiers du Monde Russe śŜ/Ř-ř, 
2015, pp. 543–69.
shape their private lives, to discover person-
al emotions and relationships. Television in-
terconnected time and space in a new way 
and helped to constitute the Soviet audience 
as ‘emotional communities’. All of this made 
many people ascribe positive meanings to 
their ‘Soviet’ lifestyles. People’s investment in 
the private sphere bolstered the regime. Oral 
history interviews show that positive memo-
ries of former Soviet life are no rarity today. 
They prompt us to consider the airmative as-
criptions bearing witness to former cohesive 
factors within Soviet society. The stability of 
the social and political seting in the ”rezhnev 
era may have derived to a great extent from 
these stable ‘emotional communities’ molded 
in front of the TV screen.
Shortly before the Russian-Ukrainian crisis 
evolved, Ukrainian historian Katerina Khinku-
lova argued that today’s Russian television 
culture is still much more shaped by traces of 
the Soviet popular culture than the Ukrainian. 
“s the main reason she stated diferent ati-
tudes towards the past. Whereas the Russian 
TV is much more nostalgia-driven and clings 
to an idea of a high-quality Soviet TV culture 
including predominantly ilms and formats of 
the ŗşŝŖs, the later followed western trends 
of reality TV to become part of a “West Euro-
pean” popular culture.55 These trends tell us 
much about TV producers’ perception of their 
audiences and the political setings. They also 
witness the persistent Russian thinking about 
a superior Soviet popular culture in contrast 
to western mass culture. Many of my respon-
dents would have agreed with this.56
However, today’s highly complex interplay 
55  Kateryna Khinkulova, “Hello, Lenin? Nostalgia 
on Post-Soviet Television in Russia and Ukraine”, 
VIEW. Journal of European Television History and Cul-
ture ŗ/Ř, ŘŖŗŘ, pp. şŚȮŗŖŚ.
56  See for more Bönker, Brave New World? (forth-
coming 2018).
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of producers’ perceptions of the audience, the 
expectations of the viewers towards the pro-
gram, the inancing of the TV stations, inter-
ests of advertisers etc. could not directly be 
linked to ‘ordinary’ citizen’s historical experi-
ences and consciousness without further ado. 
Nevertheless, the interviews reveal that peo-
ple’s representations of Soviet television are 
a still persistent source of emotional commit-
ment to the former Soviet life. Soviet viewing 
habits are regularly updated, because Russian 
television steadily repeats Soviet ilms and se-
ries. This strategy surely nourishes nostalgic 
yearning for the allegedly Soviet cultural and 
probably even political superiority.
It is worth noting that even retrospectively crit-
ical and reserved viewers reveal an airmative 
emotional atitude towards Soviet lifestyle. 
They at least did not simply identify media 
content with false propaganda. As television 
was embedded in a complex communication 
structure, we could not conclude from watch-
ing practices that it became a coin nail of the 
Soviet regime. On the contrary, it provided a 
speciic entertainment culture that supported 
living together, of the political, economic, and
social order to concrete igures presented on 
the screen. It thus not only shaped speciic So-
lifestyle to many groups of Soviet society. Tele-
vision tended to reduce complex questions of 
the regime’s claim of guaranteeing a decent 
viet chronotopes but also speciic Soviet life-
styles.
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Soviet Television and Popular Mass Culture in the 1960s
After Soviet television was widely estab-lished in the 1950s, it helped to legitimize 
a new culture of images in the USSR from the 
1960s onward. Prior to this, mass political edu-
cation through cinema became a central aspect 
of the Bolshevik policy during the revolution-
ary period, even though they failed until the 
ŗşřŖs to organize cinema as an efective pro-
paganda weapon. 
How was it possible to rebuild a new popu-
lar mass culture after the Second World War? 
Television eventually became a new weapon, 
able to educate but also to entertain. The so 
called “cultural revolution” (1928-1932) had 
altered the face of the previous mass culture 
once and for all.1 Collectivization and indus-
trialization almost destroyed the popular cul-
ture on an ancestral and rural basis, as the 
intelligentsia was eradicated and peasant cul-
ture almost ceased to exist during the Stalinist 
era. After the 1960s, a large urban audience 
focused on television was able to support the 
aims of this new audio-visual culture. Tele-
vision made this popular culture accessible 
to most citizens and a larger audience. Yet it 
was not an easy task, as Soviet mass culture 
operated under a double burden: television 
had to both edify and entertain. Its role was 
more to inspire than to report the truth, as cit-
izens were asked to identify with these Soviet 
1  Sheila Fizpatrick , Cultural Revolution in Rus-
sia (1928-1931), Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978.
values. This new mass culture was supposed 
to show how this audience made their lives 
more fulillingǱ workers and peasants devoted 
to the national economy, mothers and fathers 
devoted to their families, simple heroes devot-
ed to the Soviet Union, their homeland.2
State television of the Communist Party State 
became a showcase for every kind of experi-
mentation. From 1960 on, it was an essential 
socializing tool for propagating mass popu-
lar culture values.  Popular culture remains a 
di cult term expressing an even more di -
cult concept. “fter the era of the cinema “git-
prop movement (1917-1921), popular culture 
was in theory a set of rural, national and reli-
gious values that supposedly persisted in the 
peasantry and in rural locales.  In reality, the 
farmers and peasants were being wiped out 
by famines in the countryside, especially in 
Ukraine, religion and the bedrock atachment 
to Orthodoxy fell victim to the atheism of the 
”olsheviks and the coniscation of church 
property. The end of the decade (1929-1940) 
heralded Stalin’s policy of “liquidation of the 
kulaks as a class,Ȅ followed by the forced col-
lectivization of agriculture, which decimated 
the peasantry.  In the cities, forced marshalling 
and labor slavery quashed any hopes for the 
development of an urban folk culture. Popular 
culture, as presently understood, is distinctly 
2  Kristin Roth-Ey, ȃFinding a Home for Television in the USSRȄ, Slavic Review 66/2, 2007, pp. 278-306.
Abstract
In the 1960s, cinema was the most appreciated entertainment for a multicultural Soviet audience. In 
contrast, television was rather considered a propaganda tool. And yet, during the Thaw, television 
appears to have expressed an atmosphere of hope. Despite the heritage of Agitprop and the tradition 
of using visual media as a political weapon, television became the medium of the everyday life.
Keywords: agitprop, cinema, entertainment, everyday life, popular culture, television.
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urban, far from the rural values connected to 
the traditional folk culture: industrialization, 
mass media, social mobility and other forces 
have changed the whole notion of popular 
culture in the Soviet Union. An everyday art, 
television was by turns political, pedagogical, 
and entertaining, at once giving a new image 
of society, an ideal and the arena of every de-
bate taking place in the USSR.3 In the 1970s 
and 80s there was a brief renaissance of writ-
3  I conducted this research irst in the USSR in the 
mid-1970s, then after the publication of a book on 
ers and ilmmakers who gloriied rural and 
national values, but it never developed into a 
nationwide movement. Soviet television was 
infrequently explored during the 1960s and 
1970s, except from the angle of television as a 
propaganda instrument and an apparatus of 
the Party-State, an approach which neglected 
any deep understanding of its efects.4 “s litle 
as ten years after the emergence of the tech-
nology, Soviet society was being televised on 
a huge scale. Soviet culture in the framework 
of a multinational empire, claimed for the irst 
time the ability to describe the whole of reality 
at a time when this false ethnic harmony com-
posed of ŗŖŞ diferent peoples, among whom 
Russians only accounted for 54.65 per cent in 
1959, was fragmented and undermined by the 
enforced exile of entire nations.5 In conjunc-
tion with the whole Soviet cultural produc-
tion, television played a major and signiicant 
role in reshaping this society during the Thaw 
years (1954-1967) when cinema also contrib-
uted on a more critical level to these visual 
practices.6 However, because of its power of 
this subject: Kristian Feigelson, L’URSS et sa télévi-
sion, SeysselǱ IN“/Champ Vallon, ŗşşŖ. This vol-
ume was based on a research project on television conducted at EHESS/Paris to observe the Perestroi-
ka through Soviet television in the late 1980s, cf. 
chapter “La Télévision Soviétique à l’Heure de la 
Glasnost”, Culture et Révolution, eds. Marc Ferro and Sheila Fizpatrick, ParisǱ Ehess, 1989, pp. 167-
183.
4  Mark W. Hopkins, Mass-media in the Soviet 
Union, New YorkǱ Pegasus, ŗşŝŖǲ Georges Mond, 
La Télévision et les Masses, Paris: La Documentation Française, ŗşŝŖǲ Ellen Propper-Mickiewicz, Media 
and the Russian Public, New York: Praeger, 1981.
5  The last census of January 1959 in André De 
Moura, “Nationalités et cultures nationales en 
URSS”, Population ŗŞ/ŗ, ŗşŜř, pp. ŗŚŚ-ŗŚŞ. See also on this mater Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in 
the USSR: The Perspective from Below,  London, Syd-
ney: Allen and Unwin, 1986.
6  The so-called Thaw is a period of ambiguities 
(1954-1967) and referred to the novel of Ehrenburg OtepeЧ (1954). Cf. “Le XXéme Congrès et la cul-
ture”, La Revue Russe ŘŞ ǻŘŖŖŜǼǲ as well as the visit of 
Khrushchev to the USA in 1959. Cf. William Taub-
man, Khrushchev and His Era, New York: Norton, 
2003, pp. 396-441.
Figure 1: Old TV tower in Shabolovka street, Moscow. 
Private collection Carmen Scheide
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manipulation to afect viewers and to impress 
on them new images, television became the 
most important tool of the Soviet State, with 
the goal of creating “homo Sovieticus,” the 
new Soviet man.7 Television held the potential 
to fulil the longstanding dream of a Soviet 
New Man delivered directly to every home. It 
ofered a compelling symbol of a modern new 
Soviet “way of life” in which new consumers 
embraced this nascent medium and played an 
essential role in its promotion after the 1960s.
How can we revisit television’s origins and its 
role in the consolidation of a new mass cul-
ture, which since the Thaw of the Cold War 
has served as a force of cohesion for the great-
er Soviet population? Our research is inscribed 
in a theoretical social science framework, but 
makes use of numerous ield surveys con-
ducted on this subject in the past. How can 
we examine television as a vector of a speciic 
mass culture in order to understand the social 
appropriation of audio-visual culture in the 
USSR? 
This will prove of particular importance for 
the period after 1960, when the cinema often 
provides an alternative critique, while the 
gradually reforming USSR, exhausted after 
the Stalinist era, begins to put new resources 
into play for popular entertainment.8 Cultur-
al questions were a signiicant area of discus-
sions in the 1960s after the long darkness of the 
Stalinist period, but Soviet power still gave its 
determination to control them. Compared to 
the role played by cinema at this time, in do-
ing what literature under strict control could 
not accomplish, television appears to be con-
7  Cf. Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies 
of Everyday Life, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994.
8  Kristian Feigelson (ed.), Caméra Politique: Cinéma 
et Stalinisme, Théorème 8, Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, ŘŖŖśǲ Josephine Woll, Real Images: Soviet 
Cinema and the Thaw, New York: IB Tauris, 2000.
servative. Its central administrators failed to 
manipulate adequately the televised image 
as requested, despite the energetic debates 
within the society. Television, then, becomes 
an essential apparatus, despite being contin-
ually ill-perceived and poorly controlled. The 
authorities at irst seemed to encourage the 
critics but then moved back to regain con-
trol. They subsequently faced criticism main-
ly from other printed media. For millions of 
new audience members, however, television 
has become a kind of new art of the everyday, 
for it falls under the category of byt (everyday 
lifeǼ, a new, speciically Soviet lifestyle, con-
necting the collective values of real socialism 
with the emergence of a more individualistic 
mind-set that is promoted by television. New 
viewers or consumers wanted entertainment 
and as in other many countries television 
ofered a distraction from the di culties of 
daily life. Our task is therefore to revisit this 
audio-visual industry, which relects the com-
plexities of many other questions undergoing 
major evolutions after the fall of the USSR, the 
region’s entry into globalization later, and the 
emergence of other cultural industries.9
Visual culture of the 1960s
The 1960s are marked by a changing prefer-
ence for television over radio as a means to 
transmit political messages. In 1960, the state 
was forced to take up television with a kind 
of urgency: the USSR had to show its citizens 
an image of a world where the progress of so-
9  In a comparative perspective and further de-
velopments on these topics in the era of globalisa-
tion, see Kristian Feigelson and Iakov Iosskievitch, 
“Russie: un paysage chaotique et innovant”, Dos-
siers de l’Audiovisuel şŚ, ŘŖŖŖǲ Mediakul’tura Novoi 
Rossii, A.B Kirillova (dir.), Moskva: Akadem. izd., 
2007. Cf. Kristian Feigelson, Le Cinéma Russe Aujo-
urd’hui, Moscou: Regards de l’Observatoire fran-
co-russe, 2014, htpǱ//obsfr.ru/fr/le-rapport-annuel.
html.
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cialism was no longer a mater of doubt. This 
image would appear in multiple, progressive 
incarnations. Television reports will ofer vis-
ible and tangible proof of these “national re-
alities” and of the march toward “a radiant 
future.” The year 1960 sees the proliferation 
of live broadcasts of model workers. Televi-
sion played a role in Soviet citizens’ civic ed-
ucationǲ it bases its entire strategy on the ight 
against laziness and parasitism. Television did 
not however enjoy a particularly privileged 
status. Visual media remained “for internal 
usage” as the USSR did not yet have many 
cultural exchanges with the West. From the 
mid-1950s through the end of the Soviet peri-
od, Indian ilms were immensely popular with 
Soviet audiences, compensating for the lack of 
American movies during the Cold War.10 With 
the end of Stalinist isolation and the rise of a 
television culture that broadcasts new movies, 
Soviet cinema beneited too from exposure to 
a wider world. In this case, despite its con-
trol, television was still regarded with some 
suspicion by the Soviet authorities, who only 
wished to see it as an instrument for entertain-
ment.
By 1965, these antiquated conceptions were 
already irrelevant. The Soviets realized that 
they were lagging behind compared to the 
United States and demanded a beter analysis 
of programming. Traditional ideology was re-
placed by other new functions based on enter-
tainment.11 This institutionalization occurred 
progressively. Within a decade, thanks to a 
10  Cf. Sudha Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet 
Cinemas, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008. Cf. Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, 
Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle 
for Hearts and Minds, Lauwrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2010.
11  Which reminds us of the birth of another culture 
of entertainment in the 1930s, cf. Richard Taylor, 
“Boris Shumiatskii and the Soviet Cinema in the 
1930s: Ideology as Mass Entertainment”, Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television 6, 1986, pp. 48-54.
concentration of technical resources in large 
urban centers, a rationalization for the instal-
lation of television networks was reached: 
television must cover all space and reach all 
categories of people on a continent-wide scale.
The 1960s had seen the creation of a Com-
mitee for Radio and Television (Gosteleradio), 
subordinate to the Gosudarstvennyi Komitet 
Soveta Ministrov SSSR and the launch of about 
160 television studios. The Ostankino-Mos-
cow complex, chosen by these political elites, 
was the symbol of this centralized, technical 
development able to recruit new young gen-
erations of professionals well trained at the 
VGIK (Vsesovetskii gosudarstvennyi institut kine-
matograiiǼ ilm school.12 This spatial territori-
alization by means of audio-visual media was 
the object of a Party resolution in January 1960: 
O dal’neishem Razvitii Sovetskogo televideniia 
(On the future development of Soviet television). 
This act airmed the need for further program 
development, arguing from the perspective 
of “the ideological struggle against capitalist 
countries” and of “Socialist education of the 
masses.”13 Television has since then become 
the favourite medium of the State, despite the 
fact that members of the State Commitee for 
Radio and Television underestimated the ma-
jor changes that had taken place in Soviet soci-
ety since the 1950s.
On “pril ŗş, ŗşŜŘ, the State Commitee for Ra-
dio and Television was placed under the aegis 
of the Ministers’ Council without changing 
its personnel as a bureaucratic restructura-
tion. The technicians and those in charge of 
12  Cf. Kristian Feigelson and Clara Darmon, “Le 
VGIK: Une Ecole de Cinéma à Moscou”, Can We 
Learn Cinema – Knowledge, Training and Profession, 
co-ed. Martina Panelli, XIX International Film Stud-
ies Conference, University of Udine, March 2013, 
pp. 29-41.
13  O dal’neishem Razvitii Sovetskogo televideniia, Par-
ty Resolution January 1960 Moscow, in:  Pravda, 
January 1960. 
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programming are from this moment a part of 
the same state organism. Though programs 
remain relatively specialized, this act achieved 
a uniication of televisionȂs technique and con-
tent to control it in a beter and centralized 
way. Television was called upon to promote 
political unity in a society wherein many na-
tional debates are still thorny. By incorporating 
non-Russian entities, the policy of Russiica-
tion that began well before 1917 was intended, 
after World War II, to realize the dream of a 
uniied Soviet empireǲ television had to bring 
the “harmony of the total State” into reality. At 
the beginning of the 1960s, almost 10 million 
television sets were sold to a nationwide au-
dience of ŚŖ millionǲ however, these social in-
novations did nothing to quell criticism aimed 
at the medium. Conformity was still the order 
of the day. Take, for example, this comment on 
Soviet television by an American journalist: 
When not maЦing a feature iЧm, the Russians are 
content to iЧm a theatricaЧ pЧay, a round-tabЧe dis-
cussion, a concert or a dance recital, as if the func-
tion of this mode of expression could be reduced to 
rendering visible what was previously only heard 
and read... Everything is iЧmed head-on, without 
using camera angles or lighting to create move-
ment and surprise, without any sense of the speciic 
language that constitutes television.14
The programs’ absorption of ideology, along 
with their technical failures, explain televi-
sionȂs weak performance. Certain ilmmakers 
who contributed to the birth of post-war So-
viet cinema remained reluctant to experiment 
in television. An overall framework was still 
14  Maria Mannes, “Essay on Soviet Television”, 
New York Magazine, March 5, 1961. During the Cu-
ban missile crisis (1962), American media were covering diferent aspects of daily life in the Soviet 
Union. Cf. William Taubman, Khrushchev and His 
Era, New York: Norton, 2003, chapter 19.
missing, and the programs’ quality showed 
as much. Criticism accumulated in the press, 
which only encouraged an increased rigidity 
of top-down media control.
Many viewers complained about the quality 
of the television sets and the di culty of re-
pairing them or obtaining new parts. Nikita 
Khrushchev echoed a common lament in his 
report to the Central Commitee in November 
1962: 
The manufacture of teЧevision screens is aЧЧoted 
to ŗş businesses spread across diferent towns. In 
ŗşŜŘ, ŗŘ modeЧs were issued but difered from each 
other only in color and size. The multiplicity of the 
models and the excessive dispersion of the factories 
prevent the lowering of the price and, worse, an 
amelioration of quality.15
After 1960, television shows focusing on the 
everyday began to appear: children’s pro-
grams, such as Grandma Television’s Tales (Ska-
zki babuchkini); women’s programs, such as 
For You Women (Zhenshchiny); and for farmers, 
shows such as Conferences on Wheat Cultivation 
(Po sel’skochoziaistvo). Shows judged tedious or 
unconvincing were quickly set aside, as jour-
nalists saw their roles rehabilitated from that 
of mere propagandist to entertainer.
“Interactive programs”
Television began to adopt organizational tools 
such as surveys, discussions with audiences, 
collective screenings, and televised contests. 
“Interactive” programs appeared, including 
With All My Heart, Countrymen (Serdechenno 
kolchozniki) and Kontakt (Kontakt), which re-
15  O Razvitii televideniia, November 1962. Cf. Kris-
tian Feigelson, L’URSS et Sa Télévision, Paris: In-stitut National de lȂ“udiovisuel / Champ Vallon, 
Seyssel, 1990.
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sponded to audience leters. One of the main 
goals of 1960s television was to associate 
watching television with collective action. This 
new approach to television programs gradual-
ly brought forth a few changes, transforming 
television into a genuine forum, despite the 
fact that it remained a dependable, cowed pro-
paganda instrument of the regime. However, 
to some extent, television became a critical tool 
of a new type of social control step-by-step.
“t the same time, in this supposedly uniied 
and internally reconciled society, television’s 
diferentiated programing divided audiences 
into categories. This pigeon-holing contradicts 
Sovetskaia Kul’tura’s rhapsody: 
Television has united the schoolboy and his grand-
mother, the mathematician father and the school-
teacher mother. Television has reconciled tastes and 
satisies varied demands and diverse inteЧЧectuaЧ 
needs.16 
The public became more and more compart-
mentalized. Images were categorized by their 
intended audience’s age, sensitivity, and ac-
tivity. Television created an image of Soviet 
society that is much more fragmented than 
egalitarian, with diferent programs aimed at 
diferent categories of viewers ǻsoldiers, teach-
ers, workers, engineers…).17
From this moment, television embraced all 
aspects of the everyday. Programs diversiied 
and became less “political” and more “cul-
tural”, even though the ideological basis of 
fashioning the ȃNew ManȄ was not forgoten. 
Formal references to Lenin’s writings on the 
role of the revolutionary press did not lose 
16  R.A Boretsky, “Kogda est’ mnogo kanalov 
(When there are many channels),” Sovetskaia Kul’tu-
ra, September 11, 1965, pp. 2-3.
17  Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of 
the Soviet People, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989.
their place. On “ugust ŗŗ, ŗşŜŘ, the irst live 
satellite Vostok-3 transmission evinced a two-
fold efortǱ to spread the knowledge of Soviet 
progress in space exploration and to usher in 
a new era of the moving image in the USSR. 
Television was no longer simply a propaganda 
tool for the Partyǲ however, images were still 
shown selectively, even parsimoniously: “im-
ages of the farm, of the kombinat belong to a 
reality in motion.” Adapting certain montage 
techniques from the 1920s, depictions of kolk-
hozy in ŗşŜŖ were meant to remedy the efects 
of “bourgeois propaganda”18. Every day, the 
media showed socialism’s advantages over 
capitalism, relecting ȃthe harmonious devel-
opment of the USSR and its success in con-
structing socialism.”19 Every year on May 7, 
Radio day (called Den’ Radio), which took place 
on the day on which in 1895, Alexander Popov 
successfully demonstrated his invention, the 
policy of the Party for the audio-visual sector 
was reairmed.
Nevertheless, content changed gradually, and 
new techniques appeared in the mid-sixties: 
interviews and live transmission on Gorizont 
(Horizon), aimed towards youth, and in series 
like Slava geroiam truda (Glory to the Work-
ing Heroes) and Leninskii Al’bom (The Lenin-
ist Album). Later, the televised investigation 
appeared in Splav (Alloy) or Vzaimnaia anketa 
(Common Inquiry). These shows presented 
scientiic discoveries and their technical appli-
cations in factories, and end with a live discus-
sion. Shows like Priglashaem na iarmarku (We 
Invite You to the Market) brought producers 
and consumers, specialists and the public, face 
to face over a speciic common theme. Televi-
sion now seemed ready to supplant radio in 
18  Peter Kenez, “Cultural Revolution in cinema” 
in Cinema and Soviet Society from the Revolution to the 
Death of Stalin, London: IB Tauris, 2000, pp. 91-113.
19  Partiinaia Zhizn’ 4, February 1960.
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news coverage and the depiction of reality. On 
August 19, 1965, a Pravda editorial declared: 
“From television we expect complementary 
information and clear commentary, helping 
the public to beter understand the context 
of events. Thanks to these visual techniques 
ǻilm, snapshots, photosǼ, television, unlike 
radio, has every opportunity to make contact 
with the viewer convincingly and sensitively, 
permiting him to discern the facts by showing 
them to him.”20
Relations between the two media were not per-
ceived at that time as competing, but as com-
plementary. And yet, television was still only 
the “eye of radio”, since it ventures out rarely 
on location and produces most of its materi-
al in the studio: “Television isn’t television when 
it speaks to viewers about important events with-
out showing them” was a sentiment frequently 
voiced around 1965.21
A new mass culture
Toward the middle of the 1960s opinion turned 
more and more favorable toward the visual 
media. Television had to gain its independence 
and no longer be content to be an add-on to 
radio or a spokesperson of the printed press. 
However, the televised image was far from 
being completely mastered by the engineers. 
The divide between intentions and necessities 
seemed just as wide as ever. In addition, even 
if they could technically control the image at 
its source, producers had no concept of the im-
pact of its broadcasting into millions of homes.
In the past, the function of militant Agit-Prop 
in the 1920s was simply political and pedagog-
ical, a mater of eliminating any possible doubt 
about the reality of socialism by means of the 
20  Pravda, August 19, 1965. Anonymous editorial. 
21  Ibid.
image.22 With television, the image’s priority 
was to be a faithful mirror of reality, and only 
then as a showcase for social experimentation. 
Thus, the repetitive character of the programs 
on Soviet television was capable of threaten-
ing its own ideological foundations. In the 
ŗşŜŖs, these programs relected the legitima-
tion of private emotions and lives in an emerg-
ing focus on ordinary people living everyday 
life.23 The audience craved entertainment at 
a time when no mass culture audience could 
be forced to watch television. The State-Party 
needed its values legitimized by images, but 
Soviet mass culture needed accommodation, 
which encouraged diversity of opinion. Oi-
cial mass culture monopolized the media. In 
the context of a post-Stalinist society, thanks 
to television, diferent new categories or in-
terest groups were able to negotiate the con-
sumption of a new visual mass culture and to 
express their personal views. Outsiders at this 
time imagined Soviet society to be uniformǲ 
however, despite oicial censorship, under-
ground culture was lively, ofering a constant 
commentary on this culture of homogeneity 
dominated by mass media. The content of 
this alternative culture matered quite a lot, 
but its form counted far more because in the 
1960s these people, “the stiliagi”, paid partic-
ular atention to their style due to their belief 
that this generation should look diferent. “l-
ternatives were few for those from society’s 
margins in the post-Stalinist years, but they 
atracted great atention when stiliagi became 
22 Cf. Kristian Feigelson, “L’Héroisme Bolchévique: 
Entre Mythes et Représentations,” Héros et Super-
héros au Cinéma, Théorème 13, Paris: Presses Sor-
bonne Nouvelle, 2009, pp. 19-29.
23  “In the early and mid-1960s, the situation has changed in spite of the oicial resistance to the 
ideologically unacceptable division between elite 
and mass cinema, in reality a body of B-grade mov-
ies developed, many made for television” in Jose-
phine Woll, Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw, 
New York: IB Tauris, 2000, p. 14 .
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pioneers of the ȃunoicial cultureȄ.24 The Par-
ty had fewer options to impose new commu-
nist norms after 1956. The control provoked 
public dissent among some Party intellectuals, 
artists and ilmmakers. They felt a new free-
dom to distinguish between the Party political 
authority, which they almost did not question, 
and the ield of culture where they gained and 
prized a kind of new autonomy. 
Cinema and radio were still the main univer-
sal media of that time. Western movies started 
to circulate in Eastern Europe and the cultural 
competition of the early Cold War years was 
asymmetrical. Soviet television had nothing 
with which to compete, while Radio Free Eu-
rope was broadcasting 3 hours of American 
popular music every day.25 At the beginning 
of the 1960s, amid Soviet cinema’s post-Sta-
lin renaissance - that of Ivan’s Childhood (Iva-
novo detstvo) by Andrei Tarkovskii in 1962, 
The First Teacher (Pervyi Uchitel’) by Andrei 
Konchalovskii in 1965, and Shadows of Forgot-
ten Ancestors (Tini zabutikh predkiv) by Sergei 
Paraianov in 1964 – television was rebuked for 
detracting from the cinema.26 Going to the cin-
ema was still a strong collective pleasure in this 
era in the Soviet Union. Studios complained of 
the devastating impact it had on movie-go-
ing. Meanwhile, the cinema in this period of 
Thaw was already playing the role of social 
critique. Other kinds of ilms, new values of 
the 1960s, less enthusiastic or collective than in 
the 1930s (with the Stalinist slogan Life is get-
24  Juliane F(rst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet 
Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-
1956, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
25  Tony Judt,  Postwar, a History of Europe Since 
1945, Penguin, 2005, New-York, pp. 224-225.
26 Cf. Birgit Beumers, “The Thaws: New Begin-
nings, New Lives (1954-1966)”, A History of Russian 
Cinema, Oxford: Berg, 2009, pp. 112-145. Cf. Kris-
tian Feigelson, “Le Cinéma Soviétique du Dégel, lȂEnnemi TransiguréȄ, La Libération en Europe (1945-
2005), eds. Christian Delporte and Denis Maréchal, ParisǱ IN“/LȂHarmatan, ŘŖŖŜ, pp. ŚŖŚ-ŚŗŞ. 
ting beterǼ but more individualistic, ofered a 
chance of redemption. “n unoicial popular 
cultural visual form lourished beneath the 
surface.27 Culture was no longer a protected 
zone where everyone could get their instruc-
tions from above except in the ields of the 
media, where despite this new freedom every-
thing was still subordinate to politics. Televi-
sion productions, however, were criticized for 
their lack of ideology by leters received from 
the viewers. The press, Party leaders, and the 
public complained about television’s uninter-
esting, over-serious, and insuiciently diverse 
programming. The correspondence among 
members of the audience, which was now per-
mited, assumed a deinite inluence. Howev-
er, we still cannot speak of “public opinion”, 
which was still a rather vague notion in the 
USSR (obshchestvennost’).28
The second half of the 1960s saw crucial gains 
for the audio-visual ield in the USSR. Tele-
vised material was culturally integrated at 
last. The social functions of television diver-
siied, and more rigid audience sectors were 
formed. Television obeyed conventions that 
had come to be socially recognized. The bud-
get alloted to the television industry rose 
from 54.8 million rubles in 1961-1965 to more 
than 140 million in 1966-1970. By March 1969, 
124 million Soviets in over 70 percent of the 
territory could receive television signals, and 
ten years later the number climbed to 200 mil-
lion. Distorted transmissions between the cit-
27  Cf. Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: En-
tertainment and Society since 1900, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, ŗşşŘǲ James von Geldern 
and Richard Stites, Mass Culture in Soviet Russia, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
28  Cf. Kristian Feigelson, “Médias et opinions en 
Europe centrale”, Télérévolutions Culturelles, ed. Kristian Feigelson / Nicolas Pelissier, ParisǱ LȂHar-matan, ŗşşŞ, pp. Śŝ-śŝ. Cf. ”oris Firsov, Televidenie 
glazami sotsiologa, MoscowǱ Iskusstvo, ŗşŝŗǲ L.“. 
Gordon & E.V. Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty, Mos-
cow: Progress, 1976.
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ies and the country decreased. With 98 sets for 
every 100 families, televisions became one of 
the irst purchases of Soviet households. The 
USSR gradually developed and consolidated a 
new media culture able to give an emblematic 
image of the society.29 
I explore the shift in the changing mytholo-
gies of Soviet culture in order to emphasize 
the complexity of this new visual culture and 
its impact on the ordinary lives of Soviet cit-
izens. Thanks to television, the regime could 
reinforce its monopoly on culture production 
and broadcast it widely. Soviet culture indeed 
became a new mass media culture in the sense 
that it was shared and consumed by the vast 
majority of society, even though it was funda-
mentally diferent from western mass culture. 
Yet in that case, more atention should be paid 
to the question of the audience, the viewers 
and how they reacted.30 In the 1960s, the Sovi-
et system had inally setled on its own visual 
machinery to complement its multistoried pro-
paganda frames, its banners, its Leninist pa-
rades, etc. From the mid-1950s to the end of the 
1970s, a particular period of Soviet history, in-
cluding the ideological revision of the system, 
this new visual culture was able to juxtapose 
reality with images for a large and popular 
audience. Unknown at the beginning of Sovi-
et history, the media gradually became a way 
of life and the voice of fundamental change. 
Until the collapse of the Soviet system, where 
television also played a major role spreading 
29  Alexander Zinoviev, Les Hauteurs béantes, Lau-
sanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1977.
30  How are these cultural contents spread in a So-viet environment? How can we ill the gap in our 
knowledge about popular resistance toward these 
images and messages promoted by Soviet televi-sion and by this oicial culture? Soviet mass culture contained its own conlicts and was also a mixture 
of contents negotiated from above and from below. Cf. Gabor Ritersporn, ȃQui lit la Pravda?Ȅ, Le Dé-
bat 2 (Juin 1980). In a comparative manner, cf. Paul 
Yonnet, Jeux, Mode et Masses: La Société Française et le 
Moderne 1945-1985, Paris: Gallimard, 1985. 
news and forbidden images, the ascendance 
of television in the mid-sixties was the driving 
force of a new culture of mass entertainment. 
This visual mass culture could reach the mass 
audience only by compromising its audienc-
es’ tastes.31 The Homo Cathodicus (a “new TV 
addictȄǼ deined a new Homo Sovieticus split 
between collective solution and individual de-
sires. Paradoxically, through this communist 
public space, television symbolized the expan-
sion of privacy. Viewers were able or unable 
to re-appropriate these Soviet values in the 
intimacy of their homes. After the 1960s, tele-
vision tried daily to promote and articulate 
these Soviet values while meeting the expecta-
tions of this new audience: during this period 
de-Sovietization and westernization had not 
yet profoundly afected the roots of the Soviet 
system as they did later in the mid-1980s. Lat-
er, in the Perestroika years of 1986-1990, televi-
sion contributed paradoxically to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, mobilizing a large part of 
the population by means of the small screen 
to take part in frank debates about the vast 
changes in and the inal fall of the USSR.32 It 
may be the case that the Perestroika from 1986 
further reined the approaches of the sixties. 
This visual mass culture doubtlessly helped to 
maintain the Soviet system from the 1960s, but 
31 Even though the most popular movies stars in the 
USSR were American since the 1920s, from Douglas 
Fairbanks to Mary Pickford. Concerning the ques-
tions of stars and heroes in early Soviet Cinema, 
Kristian Feigelson, “L’Héroisme Bolchevique”. 
32  Marc Ferro, Les Origines de la Perestroïka, Paris: 
Ramsay, 1990. On this subject cf. Culture and the 
Media  in the USSR Today, eds. Julian Grafy and Geofrey “. Hosking, ”asingstokeǱ Macmillan, ŗşŞşǲ ”rian McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the 
Soviet Media, LondonǱ Routledge, ŗşşŗǲ Mass Cul-
ture and Perestroika in the Soviet Union, ed. Marsha Siefert, New YorkǱ Oxford University Press, ŗşşŗǲ 
Victoria E. Bonnel and Gregory Freidin, “Televo-
rot: The Role of Television Coverage in Russia’s 
August 1991 Coup”, Soviet Hieroglyphics, ed. Nancy 
Condee, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, ŗşşś, pp. ŘŘ-śŗǲ Tristan Matelard, Le Cheval de Troie 
de l’Audiovisuel, Grenoble: PUG, 1995.
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in the end its role in society was much more 
complex and unpredictable, as mentioned 
during this period in this last anecdote:  On 
television, Comrade Rabinovich raised his 
hand in favor of all Party resolutions. Since 
he was raising his hand so energetically, Ni-
kita Sergeevich asked him: “Don’t you have 
any of your own personal ideas?” “Yes, Nikita 
Sergeevich, but I donȂt agree with  them!Ȅ 33
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Seventeen Moments of Spring, a Soviet James Bond Series? Oicial 
Discourse, Folklore, and Cold War Culture in Late Socialism
The Soviet television mini-series Seventeen Moments of Spring (Semnadtsat’ mgnovenii 
vesny, 1973) is remarkable in several ways. First 
of all, it represents one of the most important 
products of oicial popular culture in the 
Soviet Union.1 On one hand, it was instigated 
through institutions of the Party state and thus 
was part of the Soviet hegemonic discourse. On 
the other, it was a product of popular culture 
through its format, which was intended to 
afect the masses.2  The series’ extraordinary 
popularity is also remarkable. Within a very 
short time, Seventeen Moments’ reception 
took on a cult character and it must be seen 
as one of the most successful productions in 
the history of Soviet television. This cult status 
is demonstrated, for example, in the cycle of 
anecdotes that developed from it, which is 
one of the largest from the Soviet era. Finally, 
the series represents a signiicant caesura in 
Soviet cultural history. As Stephen Lovell 
1  Elena Prokhorova, “The Post-Utopian Body 
Politic: Masculinity and the Crisis of National 
Identity in Brezhnev-Era TV Miniseries,” Gender 
and National Identity in Twentieth Century Russian 
Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux, 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006, 
pp. 131-150, here p. 135.
2  In terms of the Second World War theme, this 
format remained an exception, probably due to 
concerns that the accompanying trivialization 
could not do justice to the topic. Birgit Beumers, 
“The Serialization of the War,” Kinokultura 12, 2006, 
http://www.kinokultura.com/2006/12-beumers.
shtml, accessed 23 September 2012.
has convincingly demonstrated, Seventeen 
Moments marks the end of the Thaw and the 
beginning of 1970s culture because the new 
genre of the miniseries was “the major mass 
cultural innovation, and the quintessential 
cultural form, of the 1970s”.3 He argues that 
it stood for the emergence of a mass culture 
whose chief medium was the television 
and that could be experienced by the public 
simultaneously in real time. Furthermore, 
it represented a national culture that no 
longer included any kind of internationalist 
intentions.4
The aim of this article is to shed light on two 
questions: Why can Seventeen Moments be 
seen as a part of oicial popular culture and 
which values did it propagate? And how 
was this proposal negotiated in the popular 
culture “from below”, in the anecdotes told by 
average Soviet citizens in their everyday life?
It is already known that the series was ilmed 
on order of the KGB with the goal of improving 
its image by depicting its contribution to 
victory in World War II.5 The idea of producing 
3  Stephen Lovell, “In Search of an Ending: Seventeen 
Moments and the Seventies,” The Socialist Sixties: 
Crossing Borders in the Second World, ed. Anne E. 
Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 307.
4  Lovell, In Search, pp. 305, 307, 317.
5  Mark Lipovetskii, „Iskusstvo alibi: Semnadtsat’ 
mgnovenii vesny v svete nashego opyta,“ 
Neprikosnovennyi zapas 3, 2007, htpǱ//magazines.
Abstract
The Soviet television mini-series Seventeen Moments of Spring is one of the most important products of 
popular culture in the USSR. In the Cold War context, viewers considered the series’  main character 
Stirliz as an alternative to the western hero James ”ond. “lthough the mini-series was produced in 
the ŗşŝŖs, it communicates values that are close to Stalin-era paterns. While ordinary Soviet citizens 
criticized the numerous weaknesses about Stirliz, they never questioned the underlying communist 
ideology in the numerous anecdotes.
Keywords: television mini-series, Soviet Cold War culture, values, anecdotes.
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a series on the topic came from Andropov 
himself, who was head of the secret services 
at the time. He commissioned his deputy 
Tsivgun to advise and oversee work on it. The 
Central Commitee also supported the series 
and provided an adviser.6 A novel by the 
author Julian Semenov, who enjoyed close ties 
to the KGB, provided a model for the twelve-
part series.7 During ilming, director Tatiana 
Lioznova undertook extensive changes to the 
original and showed a good feel for what the 
public would like.8
russ.ru/nz/ŘŖŖŝ/ř/liŗŜ.html, accessed December 
20, 2012. In the context of Soviet ilm history, it 
was not unusual that the secret service advised 
Seventeen Moments. Many successful television 
series were curated by the KGB with the goal of 
spreading a positive image of the service. Other 
famous examples of this PR strategy, which can 
be characterized as a “KGB popular culture”, were 
Neulovimye mstiteli (The Elusive Avengers, 1966), Ad-
iutant ego prevoskhoditel’stva (The Adjutant Of His 
Excellency, 1970) and TASS upolnomochen zaiavit’ 
(TASS Is Authorized To Declare, 1984, also starring 
Viacheslav Tikhonov, the main actor of Seventeen 
Moments). On two of these productions, see Elena 
Prokhorova, Fragmented mythologies: Soviet TV-Series 
of the 1970s, PitsburghǱ University of Pitsburgh, 
2003, pp. 64-80. Additionally, the Ministry of the Interior initiated or promoted ilms made 
to improve the image of the Militsiia, the Soviet 
police. The most famous examples of this are the 
television series Sledstvie vedut znatoki ( Investigation 
Held By Experts, 1971) and Mesto vstrechi izmenit’ 
nel’zia (Can the Meeting Place Be Changed?, 1979, with the popular singer / actor Vladimir Vysotskii as protagonistǲ the idea for the production may 
have come from him). On this, see Serguei Alex. 
Oushakine, “Crimes of Substitution: Detection 
in Late Soviet Society,” Public Culture 3, 2003, pp. 
426-451 and Elena Prokhorova, “Can the Meeting 
Place Be Changed? Crime and Identity Discourse 
in Russian Television Series of the 1990s,” Slavic 
Review 3, 2003, pp. 512-24, here 515-6. See also 
Aleksei Leonidovich Murav’ev, “Za tech, kto ‘v 
pole’: Geroi nezrimogo fronta na ekrane i v zhizni”, 
Trudy istoricheskogo fakul’teta Sankt-Peterburgskogo 
universiteta 21, 2015, pp. 316-338.
6   Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 147, n. 11.
7  Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy, “The 
Blockbuster Miniseries on Soviet TV: Isaev-Shtirlits, 
the Ambiguous Hero of Seventeen Moments in 
Spring,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 29, 2002, 
pp. 257-276, here 259.
8  Marina Adamovich, “Ne dumai o „Mgnoveniiach“ 
svysoka…”, Iskusstvo kino 3, 2002, pp. 74-85, here p. 
76.
The plot of the ilm focuses on seventeen chosen 
“moments” and is set between February 2 and 
March 24, 1945.9 Thus, it is placed just few 
months before Germany’s capitulation and 
the collapse of the National Socialist system. 
The main character is the Soviet spy Maksim 
Isaev, who is working under the name Max 
von Stirliz as an SS regiment leader in the 
Reich Main Security Oice. He receives orders 
from Moscow to investigate rumors that the 
western Allies are negotiating a separate 
peace treaty with high-ranking Nazis. If the 
rumors are true, then he must undermine the 
negotiations. Stirliz maintains contact with 
Moscow with the help of a Soviet couple in 
Berlin using the names Erwin and Käthe Kien, 
who operate a radio room. When Erwin dies 
during a bombardment and Käthe is brought 
to the hospital to give birth, Stirliz is cut of 
from his contact to the Soviet Union. With the 
help of two German anti-fascists ǻthe paciist 
Pastor Schlag and the scholar Professor 
Pleischner) he tries to re-establish contact from 
the Swiss city of ”erne and ind out more about 
the possible negotiation between the western 
Allies and the Nazis. Although Pleischner fails 
at his mission and commits suicide, Schlag 
succeeds in eliciting the protagonists and key 
points of negotiation. Stirliz then exploits 
the rivalries among the Nazi elite to bring 
about the failure of the western Allies’ plans. 
Toward the end of the series Stirliz is in acute, 
life-threatening danger because the head of 
the Gestapo, M(ller, suspects him of being a 
traitor and tries in various ways to uncover 
him. When StirlizȂs ingerprints are found on 
KätheȂs suitcase, he is arrested by M(ller but 
extracts himself from the whole afair with 
an explanation for how the ingerprints got 
there. It is unclear whether Stirliz is arrested 
9  Nepomnyashshy, The Blockbuster, p. 259.
84Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
and killed after his return from Swizerland 
because of new suspicions. It is certain, 
however, that he rejected ofers from the USSR 
to return and voluntarily stays in Germany.
Despite its mass appeal, the series has been 
surprisingly litle researched to date. Though 
several studies are available, most deal 
with single aspects such as its cult status or 
the construction of masculine and national 
identity in Seventeen Moments.10 Until now, the 
broadest thematic studies address the question 
of which upheavals the series represents 
from 1970s Soviet cultural history, and when 
exactly the end of the Thaw was.11 The present 
text brings these hitherto disparate pieces 
together and delves further into aspects that 
have received less atention. First I analyze 
the constructions of identity and values that 
are represented in the ilm. Then I illuminate 
the series’ transnational references in a Cold 
War context through comparison to the James 
”ond ilms. Finally, I examine the reasons for 
the series’ popularity and question what the 
anecdotes about Seventeen Moments indicate 
about its reception.
National Identity, Masculinity, and He- 
roicism as Central Values
As Elena Prokhorova has emphasized, the 
primarily masculine Soviet identity fell 
into crisis after Stalin’s death because the 
father igure of the ȃGreat FamilyȄ12 was 
torn from its pedestal during the Thaw. 
10  Nepomnyashshy, The Blockbuster; Prokhorova, 
The Post-Utopianǲ Rodolphe ”audin, “Le Phénomène 
de la Série Culte en Contexte Soviétique et Post-
Soviétique: L’exemple de Semnadcat’ mgnovenij 
vesny,” Cahiers du monde russe ŗ, ŘŖŖŗ, pp. Śş-ŝŖǲ 
Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo alibi. 
11  Prokhovora, Fragmented mythologies, pp. Şŗ-ŗŗřǲ 
Lovell, In Search.
12  Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, 
Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, ³2000, pp. 114-135.
Restabilizing this identity was a major goal 
of Seventeen Moments.13 To this end, the 
series communicates an understanding of 
patriotism and masculinity that is heavily 
oriented toward Stalin-era paterns and stands 
in contrast to the cultural production of the 
Thawǲ both of these features are typical of 
”rezhnev-era ilms.14
Ideal Soviet patriotism is conveyed in StirlizȂs 
undercover work. For his merit he receives 
the title “Hero of the Soviet Union”. It is no 
coincidence that the series plays in the time 
of the “Great Patriotic War” because in the 
Brezhnev era, Marxist-Leninist ideology had 
lost much of its legitimacy – not least due to 
the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 – 
and oicial history and culture thus promoted 
memory of World War II as the single most 
important source of a common identity.15 This 
strategy permited the construction of a Soviet 
identity in which ideology played almost no 
role. The most decisive aspect of this identity 
Ȯ just like in oicial Soviet discourse during 
the war—was the defense of the motherland 
against National Socialism.16 This politics of 
history culminated with the 1965 declaration of 
May 9, Victory Day, as a holiday. Additionally, 
a multitude of publications and ilms on World 
War II appeared. Beginning in the 1970s more 
ilms were made showing an unusual and 
less monumental image of the war, to atract 
a younger audience. Seventeen Moments also 
served this goal:17 while the Red “rmy atacks 
13  Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 134.
14  Tony Shaw, Denise Youngblood, Cinematic Cold 
War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and 
Minds, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010, p. 
159.
15  Lev Gudkov, “Die Fesseln des Sieges: Russlands 
Identität aus der Erinnerung an den Krieg,” Kluften 
der Erinnerung: Rußland und Deutschland 60 Jahre 
nach dem Krieg, special issue, Osteuropa 4-6, 2005, 
pp. 56-73, here 64.
16  Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 133.
17  Denise J. Youngblood, Russian War Films: On the 
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the enemy from the outside, Stirliz ights 
against Germany by undermining it from 
within. He must look, talk, and act like a Nazi 
in order to fulil his mission, yet he proves a 
Soviet patriot because on the inside he remains 
true to his orders and Soviet values. Stirliz 
even celebrates Soviet holidays, though in a 
very conspiratorial manner – namely in his 
fantasy alone.18 The only visible signs are that 
he raises a glass and makes himself a humble 
festive meal by baking potatoes in the living 
room ireplace.
Stirliz is stylized not only as a Soviet patriot, but 
also as a superb representative of hegemonic 
masculinity.19 Some of his most important 
traits are ones that are traditionally coded 
masculine. First, Stirliz is thoroughly rational, 
in contrast to the emotional ilm hero of the 
Thaw.20 Each of his actions is thought through 
entirely, and the viewer often sees him deep 
in relection. “t the beginning of the series he 
reviews all the high-ranking dignitaries of the 
Nazi state, questioning whether they could 
be interested in a separate peace agreement 
with the western Allies. Then he researches 
which people are expediting negotiations and 
applies diverse strategies in order to hinder 
their endeavors. During his brief arrest in the 
basement of the Gestapo headquarters Stirliz 
once again proves to be a thinker, keeping a 
cool head as he goes through all the ways of 
delecting suspicion that he may be a Soviet 
spy.
Moreover, Stirliz exudes a physical power 
that corresponds to his inner moral strength. 
His body language shows authority and 
Cinema Front, 1914-2005, Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2007, pp. 143-4,159-165,170-3,184-5.
18  Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. 261.
19  Robert (Raewyn) Connell, Masculinities, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
20  Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, p. 3. Connell, Masculinities, 
pp. 164-5.
conidence. He never moves hectically or 
without coordinationǲ rather, his movements 
always appear well considered and single-
minded. The ilmic and photographic 
depiction of Stalin and Stalin-era heroes may 
continue to have an efect here.21 Furthermore, 
Stirliz is always self-possessed. He controls 
his facial expressions so that nobody can read 
his thoughts or emotions.
”eyond all of this, Stirliz also acts as a 
protector for people who are threatened by 
Nazis and thus conforms to the typical male 
role in war22: he defends his own (above all, 
women) against the enemy. In particular, he 
saves Käthe, who is arrested by the Gestapo 
and put under house arrest, and enables her to 
lee. Later he brings her and her baby to safety 
abroad. Indirectly, his hindrance of a separate 
peace treaty protects his own wife and all 
other citizens of the USSR.
Stirliz also follows the traditional male role 
in that he inds self-fulillment almost only in 
his work. In this respect he is lacking in the 
private and sexual side of masculinity. As 
scholarship has emphasized, this is a remnant 
of the hero model of the Stalin era. There, the 
father role in the family is kept for Stalin or 
the Party, while the man is to ind fulilment 
in the public realm.23 Stirliz has a wife, but he 
abnegates her love in favor of his mission and 
has spent twenty years in Germany without 
her. His relinquishment of private happiness 
distinguishes him from most of the heroes in 
ilms of the Thaw.
The masculinity gloriied by the series is 
21  See, for example, the character of the 
commander in Meeting on the Elbe. Isabelle de 
Keghel, “Meeting on the Elbe (Vstrecha na El’be) – 
a Visual Representation of the Incipient Cold War 
from a Soviet Perspective,” The Cold War in Film, 
special issue, Cold War History 4, 2009, pp. 455-467, 
here p. 456.
22  Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, London: 
Sage, 1997, pp. 93-96, 107-110.
23  Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 132.
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further strengthened by its dominance over 
any feminine presence. The main characters of 
Seventeen Moments are male. Lioznova added 
female characters to the novel in order to make 
Stirliz appear more humanǲ however, these 
women all play supporting roles. Furthermore, 
they speak litle or, as in the case of StirlizȂs 
wife, abide in silence.24
The Cold War Context: Stirliz and Bond
Stirliz is frequently called the Russian James 
Bond.25 However, the director of Seventeen 
Moments, Lioznova, claimed to have conceived 
of him as an alternative to the British-
American spy.26 ”ecause of these conlicting 
views, a comparison of the two characters is 
illuminating.27
“t irst sight, the ”ond ilms and Seventeen 
Moments are rather diferent formally and 
thematically. For one thing, they were made 
in the difering formats of cinema feature and 
television series. For another, the ”ond ilms 
all play in the post-war period, but Seventeen 
Moments during World War II. Nevertheless, 
a comparison is appropriate because both 
productions can be read as contributions to the 
cultural Cold War28 in that each side atempted 
to outdo the other with demonstrations of 
moral superiority. They also competed in 
seeing which side could achieve greater social 
cohesion and mobilization. The mass media 
was a weapon in this competition and was 
able, thanks to its wide distribution, to reach 
24  Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, p. Şǲ Connell, Masculinities, 
p. 74.
25  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 82.
26  Adamovich, Ne dumai, p. 74.
27  ”efore the irst broadcast of Seventeen Moments, there were eight ”ond ilms. The present comparison is based on these eight ilms.
28  David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle 
for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 1-16.
both national and international publics.29 
“ccordingly, the ”ond ilms and Seventeen 
Moments represent the competing value 
systems and images of the enemy in the east 
and west.30 The ”ond ilms, however, were 
intended for a global audience, including 
viewers who lived in either system, while 
Seventeen Moments was made exclusively 
for the “home front”, that is, for the public 
of the Soviet Union or another state socialist 
country.31
Because both productions worked within the 
same frame of reference of a cultural contest 
between the east and west,32 it is not surprising 
that the two heroes bear similarities. Both 
”ond and Stirliz ight for the interests of their 
countries against a criminal power, that is, 
they represent good against evil. They have 
in common that they are subject to great 
threats, and they master and survive the 
most dangerous episodes. As Umberto Eco 
has shown, even the plot structure is similar 
and in both cases it recalls the build-up of 
a fairy tale.33 Broadly speaking, Seventeen 
29  Caute, The Dancer, pp. ř-ś, ŗśǲ Thomas 
Lindenberger, “Einleitung”, Massenmedien im 
Kalten Krieg: Akteure, Bilder, Resonanzen, ed. Thomas 
Lindenberger, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2006, 
pp. 9-23, here p. 12.
30  Shaw, Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War, pp. 
65-6, 97-8. For a deinition of Cold War Culture 
see Marsha Siefert, “East European Cold War 
Culture(s): Alterities, Commonalities, and Film 
Industries,” Cold War Cultures: Perspectives 
on Eastern and Western European Societies, ed. “nnete Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk and Thomas 
Lindenberger, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2012, pp. 23-49, here p. 25.
31  The irst ”ond ilm was already shown in Moscow 
in 1970, but only for high-level functionaries. Lars-
Olav Beier, “Ein Mann wie eine Black Box,” Der 
Spiegel 40, 2012, pp. 124-132, here p. 131. In contrast, Soviet ilms with ȃCold war genresȄ like espionage 
were commercially exported only to the Socialist 
countries. Siefert, East European Cold War Culture(s), 
pp. 36-7.
32  Caute, The Dancer, p. 1.
33  Adamovich, Ne dumai, pp. 78-9. James 
Chapman, Licence to Thrill – a Cultural History of the 
James Bond Films, New York, London: Tauris, 2007, pp. Řś-Ŝǲ Marc Fчcking, ȃJames ”ond Ȯ Superuomo 
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Moments corresponds to this schema, but with 
the signiicant divergence that there is no 
counterpart to the Bond girl.34 ”ond and Stirliz 
are also similar in that they do not undergo 
any psychological development.35
Both of these cultural products reproduce the 
eraȂs images of the enemy, though to diferent 
degrees. “lthough the irst ”ond ilm was 
released in 1962, the year of the Cuban missile 
crisis, Bond’s early main enemies were not 
atached to a socialist stateǲ they represented 
international criminal organizations. Over the 
course of the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
Cold War’s opposing systems unmistakably 
form the broad context of the plot. Bond’s 
criminal opponents often try to play the 
superpowers of against one another or 
cooperate with (ex-)Soviet protagonists, who 
are in turn depicted as brutal and inhuman or 
deviant from gender norms.36 Similarly, the 
plot and sometimes even the terminology of 
Seventeen Moments are marked by the culture 
of the Cold War, although the series is set 
in World War II, because it had the duty of 
reminding the Soviet public during a détente 
in the Cold War that the west is unreliable 
and untrustworthy. Thus, although the Allies 
and the USSR cooperate with each other, there 
are already signs that this pact will soon turn 
di massa? Umberto Ecos Fleming-Lekt(re und 
ihre post-moderne (Selbst-)Revision,” James Bond 
– Anatomie eines Mythos, ed. Marc Föcking, Astrid 
Böger, Heidelberg: Winter, 2012, pp. 79-106.
34  I disagree with Adamovich’s assertion that the 
Bond girl is substituted in Seventeen Moments by 
the combination of multiple female characters (see 
Adamovich, Ne dumai, pp. 71-2), because these 
female characters are all missing the sexual aspect 
that the Bond girl has.
35  Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. 268.
36  Chapman, Licence, pp. 26-7. Cord Kr(ger, ȃȁMr. ”ond, I expect you to die!Ȃ ŖŖŝs Widersacher und 
die Transnationalisierung des Bösen,” Mythos 
007: Die James-Bond-Filme im Fokus der Popkultur, ed. “ndreas Rauscher, ”ernd Zywiez, Georg Mannsperger, Cord Kr(ger, MainzǱ ”ender, ŘŖŖŝ, 
pp. 122-149.
into a conlict between opposing systemsǱ the 
western Allies are negotiating with a higher-
up in the SS to bargain a separate peace 
treaty to the detriment of the USSR. Because 
of the Allies’ anti-communist stance, a new 
war against the USSR even seems possible.37 
Their negative portrayal corresponds to the 
oicial Soviet reading of fascism as an extreme 
development of capitalism.38
In sum, the diferences between the two heroes 
outweigh their similarities, which I propose is 
a result of the contrasting value systems of the 
east and west during the Cold War.
Stirliz is presented as an atractive man but 
no lady-killer, unlike Bond.39 Viewing women 
as objects of desire was not iting to the 
Soviet ideal of gender equality and women’s 
emancipation. In his work, Stirliz almost 
always inds himself in the company of men 
and he rarely encounters women. Unlike 
”ond, Stirliz is married and clearly has a deep 
commitment to his wife. That their love is still 
very strong becomes clear in the legendary 
scene in the cafe “Elefant” where they see each 
other again after many years, though only for 
a few minutes and from a distance. The wife 
looks at Stirliz lovingly while his eyes express 
more grief, longing, and restraint. Stirliz 
never has any afairs in the seriesǲ he does 
not even lirt. The women with whom he has 
contact are characterized asexually (such as 
the elderly Frau Saurich) or are—like Käthe—
mothers for whom the child takes center stage. 
The only woman who lirts with him is the SS 
member Barbara, but he does not respond 
to her advances for moral and ideological 
37  Baudin, Le Phénomène, p. 59. Lipovetskii, 
Iskusstvo, p. 7.
38      See Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 138.
39  The oversexualization of Bond, like the stylization of Stirliz as an ascetic, can be read 
as a reaction to a crisis of national identity. See 
Adamovich, Ne dumai, p. ŞŖǲ Prokhorova, The Post-
Utopian, p. 138.
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reasons.40
Bond’s hedonistic side distracts him over 
and over, even though his duties have higher 
priorityǲ Stirliz, by contrast, lives entirely for 
his professional work. StirlizȂs hedonism is 
limited to culinary pleasures and smoking. 
Beyond that, he cherishes good clothing, the 
amenities of home, and his car. His physicality 
is staged with utmost reserve and accentuated 
only through well-tailored clothing. Unlike 
”ond, Stirliz is never shown naked.
Stirliz, in contrast to ”ond, does not have 
access to any gadgets, which makes his 
successes appear all the more heroic. He 
uses only a rather upscale car and a common 
pistol. Even so, he hardly needs them because 
physical violence plays a marginal role in 
the series: he almost never commits acts of 
violence and is not subject to any either. He 
uses his pistol only the one time when he 
shoots his own agent, the informer Klaus. The 
other violent action takes place when Stirliz 
knocks unconscious the SS man Holtof, who 
provoked him. All other duels play out on the 
level of intellect, most importantly the conlict 
with his main opponent M(ller. Even when 
he questions Stirliz in the Gestapo basement, 
M(ller does not resort to violence. In contrast to 
”ond, there is no ȃactionȄ for Stirliz. While the 
”ond ilms must always have a car chase and 
hand-to-hand combat in which Bond makes 
split-second decisions, the major feature of 
Seventeen Moments is the opposite: its immense 
slowness and emphasis on dialogue. At the 
very moment when the Gestapo seeks him, 
Stirliz succumbs to immobility and naps in the 
car on the side of the road, oblivious to danger 
and thus probably escaping it.41 In contrast to 
40  Baudin, Le Phénomène, pp. śŜ-ŝǲ Prokhorova, The 
Post-Utopian, p. ŗřŞǲ Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, p. 8.
41  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, pp. 87-8. 
Baudin, Le Phénomène, p. 54.
”ond, Stirliz is above all a thinker who takes 
much time for relection. This gloriication of 
thinking in Seventeen Moments could be related 
to the logocentric character of Soviet culture 
in which intellectual achievement was a major 
criterion for success and respect.42
 
Reasons for the Series’ Popularity
The series became enormously popular 
immediately after its irst broadcast. This is 
all the more remarkable when one considers 
its serious weaknesses: the documentary 
sequences are not convincingly tied to the 
narrative and the plot does not always seem 
logical. “lso, the character of Stirliz himself 
is not coherent. It remains an open question 
how he could avoid participating in the 
crimes of the National Socialist regime while 
establishing a career in the SS. Furthermore, 
the series contains obvious anachronisms: 
the interiors and civilian clothing come from 
fashions of the 1960s, not the 1930s, and the 
Edith Piaf songs that Stirliz and Pleischner 
hear on their trip to Swizerland were recorded 
after the war.43
It is impossible to quantify how popular 
Seventeen Moments was, but it was a blockbuster 
for certain. Contemporaries have reported that 
when it aired the streets were empty, criminal 
activity dropped, and the energy demands of 
so many televisions brought power stations to 
their limits.44 The series was in such demand 
that it was rebroadcast up to four times every 
year. Another indication of its success is the 
immense popularity of the actor Tikhonov, 
who for the rest of his life was associated with 
42  Adamovich, Ne dumai, p. ŞŖǲ Prokhorova, The 
Post-Utopian, p. ŗřŞǲ Prokhorova, Fragmented 
Mythologies, p. şśǲ ”audin, Le Phénomène, p. 56.
43  Baudin, Le Phénomène, pp. 60, 64. Lipovetskij, 
Iskusstvo, pp. 2-3.
44  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 82.
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his role as Stirliz.45
What factors contributed to the legendary 
success of Seventeen Moments—success that 
came entirely unexpectedly for its makers, and 
for the director Lioznova in particular?46 I will 
review a few of the hypotheses developed in 
earlier research.
The ambivalence of Seventeen Moments’ 
characters caused a sensation. The ilm difers 
from earlier dramatizations of World War II in 
that it showed Germans as highly intelligent 
enemies and complex characters. M(ller 
especially—the head of the Gestapo—was 
hardly diferent from an ordinary police chief. 
The leading Nazi characters became even more 
complex by virtue of being played by actors 
whose roles in earlier, prominent Thaw ilms 
embodied sincerity and authority.47 Stirliz is 
multi-faceted and contradictory in his own 
fascinating way: although he looks like a 
representative of the lawless Nazi state, he is 
actually ighting for the ȃrightȄ, Soviet side. 
For this reason, Lipovetskii has correctly called 
him the “powerful archetype” of the “nash/
nenash” dichotomy, connecting the elements 
of “us” and “them.”48 This unusually positive 
ilmic representation of leading members of 
the SS had the unintended consequence that in 
the 1970s and 1980s numerous secret “fascist 
organizations” were founded in the USSR, 
with their members clearly more fascinated 
by the image of the Nazi than by National 
Socialist ideology. The KGB considered them 
45  After his death and burial, a large photograph of him as Stirliz was laid upon the fresh gravesite. 
See “Tikhonov Viacheslav Vasil’evich (1928-2009)”, 
Novodevich’e kladbishche, htpǱ//nd.m-necropol.ru/, 
accessed December 12, 2013.
46  Tat’iana Lioznova, “Populiarnost’ byla dlia nas 
sovershenno neozhidannoi…”, Krupnyi plan, htpǱ//www.close-up.ru/articles/detail.php?“ID=ŝŞśş, 
accessed 8 December 2012, p. 1.
47  Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, pp. 5-6. Prokhorova, 
Fragmented mythologies, p. 93.
48  Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, p. 4. See also Baudin, Le 
Phénomène, p. 56.
to be relatively harmless.49 In the early 1980s 
two youth groups in the Ukrainian city of 
Dnepropetrovsk were labelled “fascist” by the 
KGB in the course of an anti-rock campaign. 
The reason was that after their arrest they 
testiied that they felt inspired by the ȃimages 
of the ‘clean, intelligent, and civilized’ Nazi 
oicersȄ in the series and therefore tried to 
imitate their clothing and behaviour.50
Seventeen Moments’ popularity was increased 
signiicantly by some parallels between life 
under Brezhnev and under Hitler, at least as 
was shown in the series. In each case we see 
a political system in the phase of its decline, 
in which the ruling ideology had sufered 
the loss of most of its credibility. Each state 
was marked by a powerful bureaucracy that 
produced iles writen in a highly repetitive, 
stereotypical style.51 The series even addresses 
the surveillance of individuals—an experience 
familiar to Soviet citizens. The ilmȂs 
protagonists react to phone tapping with 
typically Soviet phrases such as “this isn’t a 
conversation for the telephone.”
Furthermore, the patern by which Stirliz 
acts in the National Socialist system strongly 
resembles the survival strategy used by many 
Soviets under late Socialism. Stirliz denies 
his inner thoughts and emotions in order to 
demonstrate outwardly his support for the 
regime as credibly as possibleǲ he hides his 
true self behind a mask.52
49  There had been underground Nazi groups in 
the USSR already since the second half of the 1950s. 
Semen Charnyi, “Natsistskie gruppy v SSSR v 
1950-1980 gody,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas 5, 2004, htpǱ//magazines.russ.ru/nz/ŘŖŖŚ/řŝ/chŗŘ-pr.html, 
accessed 14 May 2014.
50  Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The 
West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 
1960-1985, Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2010, p. 277.
51  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, pp. 91, şś, ŗŖřǲ Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. ŘŜřǲ 
Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, pp. 6-7.
52  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, pp. ŗŖŚ-ŗŖśǲ 
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The third aspect that made the series so 
atractive was that Stirliz is characterized as a 
member of the intelligentsia. This educational 
class was traditionally associated with high 
moral standards and a critical distance from the 
state, and continued to enjoy prestige during 
the Soviet era. Interestingly, Stirliz embodies 
only the intelligentsia’s positive aspects: wit, 
education, concentration, and irm ethical 
principles. Thus, as an intelligentsia hero, he 
especially invites the viewersȂ identiication. 
All negative aspects of the intelligentsia are 
atributed to Professor PleischnerǱ unlike 
Stirliz, he is unsuited to the practical, di cult 
things in lifeǲ he is overly trusting, inept, and 
scatered.53
The fascination borne by the series feeds on 
the way that it shows life in the west as it was 
imagined in the Soviet Union at the time.54 
Consumption and lifestyle thus occupy an 
important place.55 Stirliz lives in a roomy 
house with considerably more living space 
at his disposal than the average Soviet citizen 
had. He wears well-iting suits, loves good 
food, “rmenian cognac, and cigaretes, and 
frequents various Berlin cafes. The picture 
is completed by the lair of worldliness that 
encircles Stirliz, since he clearly knows his 
way around not only Germany, but also other 
countries that were inaccessible to most Soviet 
citizens such as France and Swizerland. These 
aspects of the ilm accommodate the increasing 
interest in the west in the Soviet Union during 
Baudin, Le Phénomène, p. 62. The persuasiveness 
of this description of Soviet citizens’ behavior 
towards the end of the USSR has been questioned 
since Alexei Yurchak’s study of the last Soviet 
generation. See Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 
Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 17.
53  Lipovetskii, Iskusstvo, pp. 3-4.
54  See for the “imaginary West”: Yurchak, 
Everything, pp. 161-162.
55  Prokhorova, Fragmented mythologies, p. 103.
the Brezhnev era.56
In addition, the series’ particular aesthetic 
gives it a distinctly authentic feel. Seventeen 
Moments is comprised largely of feature ilm 
scenes, but they are interspersed with Soviet 
newsreels and other archival footage and are 
ilmed only in black and white. The fade-in of 
speciic dates between sections of feature ilm 
and the introduction of leading characters 
with the help of their staf iles ampliies the 
documentary efect.
Stirliz Anecdotes
The broad popularity of the television series 
is probably the main reason why one of the 
largest bodies of anecdotes from the whole 
Soviet period is associated with it. Another 
factor is that Seventeen Moments comes from 
the Brezhnev era, a time when the telling of 
anecdotes reached its high point.57 
Drawing on the work of Seth Graham, I 
consider anecdotes to be orally passed on, 
ultra-short stories from unknown authors that 
are usually told in the third person and end 
with a punch line. Graham emphasizes the 
subversive potential of the anecdote, which 
represents a discourse counter to the oiciaЧ 
discourse under conditions of censorship. In 
contrast to samizdat, this counter-discourse 
was not chiely produced by the intelligentsia, 
but by all social strata. Soviet anecdotes 
can therefore be seen as a form of modern 
56  Lovell, In Search, p. 316.
57  Seth Benedict Graham, A Cultural Analysis of 
the Russo-Soviet Anecdote, PhD thesis Pitsburgh 
2003,httpǱ//etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-ŗŗŖřŘŖŖř-ŗşŘŚŘŚ/unrestricted/grahamsethb_
etd2003.pdf, accessed 3 December 2012, p. 4. Alexei 
Yurchak, “The cynical reason of late socialism: 
power, pretense, and the anekdot,” Public culture 2, ŗşşŝ, pp. ŗŜŗ-ŗŞŞ, here p. ŗŝŜ.ǲYurchak, Everything, pp. Řŝř-ŘŝŚǲ Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 
109. 
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folklore.58
In the following I analyze the Stirliz anecdotes 
as a product of popular culture that emerged 
from below in response to the oicial popular 
culture that the series represented. These 
anecdotes told by average Soviet citizens in 
their everyday life shed light on what viewers 
found especially interesting, confusing, or 
atractive about the series, as well as how it was 
read and given new meaning by its audience.59 
For this reason I have limited the analysis to 
Stirliz anecdotes that make direct reference to 
the theme and plot of the ilm, that is, those 
that fulil the criteria of intertextuality.60
Many anecdotes make irony of the series’ 
narrative structure, in which an omniscient, 
omnipresent speaker neutrally comments on 
or explains the plot in voice-over ǻread by Eim 
Kopelian). He creates connections between the 
fairly heterogeneous ilm segments and reveals 
the characters’ thoughts, which often stand in 
contrast to their actions. The narrator functions 
as the voice of the Party state and thus tries 
to steer its reception.61 Typical phrases from 
the voice-over are frequently made fun of in 
anecdotes. Thus, the frequent statement “He 
58  Graham, A Cultural Analysis, pp. 119-120, 122-4, 
137, 156.
59  The irst Stirliz anecdotes were created soon after the ilmȂs irst broadcast and more are still 
being invented in the present day. This poses a 
methodological problem: because the anecdotes are 
undated, it cannot be determined when they were irst told. I therefore only make use of anecdotes 
that do not explicitly reference the post-Soviet era. 
Nevertheless, some of the anecdotes possibly date 
from after the fall of the USSR.
60  On the intertextuality of anecdote to ilm, see 
Graham, A Cultural Analysis, pp. iv, 138.
61  Prokhorova, The Post-Utopian, p. 136. In a way, his semi-oicial function recalls Levitan, the radio 
newscaster who read the Sovinformbiuro’s news 
from the front during World War II. However, 
Kopelian reads with much less pathos in his voice. 
Vladimir Tol’ts, Aleksandra Arkhipova, “Novyi 
Shtirlits,” Istoriia i sovremennost’, 23-07-05, accessed 
December 12, 2012. htpǱ//archive.svoboda.org/programs/TD/ŘŖŖś/TD.ŖŝŘřŖś.asp, accessed 
December 9, 2012, p. 3.
[Stirliz] had never been so close to failureȄ 
is repeated ad absurdum, always after actions 
by the spy that would surely have led to his 
exposure—for example, the revelation of 
his Soviet identity through the exhibition of 
clichéd Soviet or revolutionary atributes like 
carrying a red banner or singing revolutionary 
songs.62
The anecdotes devoted to the narrator’s voice-
over simultaneously make straightforward 
fun of the superhuman abilities that the voice 
atributes to Stirliz.
Very frequently they ridicule his distinctive 
self-discipline, especially his ability to wake up 
without an alarm clock at exactly the desired 
time. The narrator mentions this ability when 
Stirliz takes a nap in the car while the Gestapo 
frantically searches for him. In the original, 
the voice-over assures listeners that Stirliz 
will wake up after twenty minutes out of 
trained habit,63 but the anecdotes often change 
the context and take a turn for the absurd.64 
For example, after having visited a bar, Stirliz 
stumbles into a puddle but—as the narrator 
assures us—he will wake up after twenty 
minutes thanks to this long-trained relex.65 
Here, StirlizȂs character oscillates between the 
indiscipline of the drunkard and the discipline 
of a man who can control when he will awake, 
despite excessive alcohol consumption.66
Numerous anecdotes question StirlizȂs self-
discipline without referencing the narrator. 
Frequently these stories abrogate the 
desexualization of the Soviet agent, which was 
clearly held to be unconvincing. They destroy 
the image of Stirliz as an ascetic by ascribing 
62  Literaturnyi proekt Dmitriia Kravtseva, htpǱ//maximych.axř.net/shtirlits.html,
accessed December 9, 2012.
63  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 96.
64  Baudin, Le Phénomène, p. 65.
65  Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 110.
66  Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. 263.
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him sexual relationships, mostly with the radio 
operator Käthe. Thus an anecdote featuring 
the Gestapo boss M(ller, for example, has 
him asserting that he knows everything about 
Stirliz and Käthe. Stirliz promptly admits to 
being a Soviet spy, but M(ller does not believe 
him and rejects the statement as a trick for 
circumventing child support. This insinuation 
undermines the agent’s integrity that had 
received so much emphasis in the original 
ilm. “side from the stories that embed the 
revelation of a secret sexual relationship in 
other communication, there are also diverse 
short anecdotes that mention Stirliz and 
Käthe having just had sex.67
Further anecdotes mock the way that Stirliz 
manoeuvers himself out of di cult situations 
with excuses that do not hold water. At the 
same time the anecdotes poke fun at M(llerȂs 
gullibility.68 A typical anecdote recounts how 
M(ller enters his oice to ind Stirliz siting 
near the safe, raising the suspicion that he 
wants to steal important documents. M(ller 
takes him to task and Stirliz answers that he is 
waiting for the tram. Initially, M(ller accepts 
that as an adequate explanation and leaves 
the oice again, but in the corridor he begins 
to doubt. Wondering how a tram could run 
through his oice, he hurries back, but Stirliz 
has disappeared. Instead of becoming even 
more alarmed, M(ller assumes that his enemy 
has already left by tram.69
These anecdotes about the narration and 
StirlizȂs self-discipline can be understood 
as a subversive reaction to atempts to steer 
the series’ reception through the omniscient 
narrator and as a reaction against the stylization 
of Stirliz as an unbeatable superhuman. The 
stories make StirlizȂs heroicism laughable 
67  Literaturnyi proekt.
68  Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. 261.
69  Literaturnyi proekt.
without completely undoing his hero status. 
They also make irony of the narrative’s 
inconsistencies and the composition of the 
characters. The tellers of the anecdotes make 
themselves into “media critics”70 and produce 
counter-narratives to particular aspects of the 
series. They re-form Stirliz into a more human 
hero with inadequacies—such as a disposition 
to alcohol—and sexual needs.
A further group of anecdotes concerns the 
contradictory, multiple, or blurred identities of 
the Stirliz character which clearly fascinated 
viewers: on one hand he was the Soviet secret 
agent Isaev and on the other, a member of the 
SS. “s a result, anecdotes represent Stirliz 
as a person who has trouble managing his 
multiple identities. For example, Stirliz wakes 
up in a cell and wonders which person he 
should be, depending on who the guard is. He 
decides to call himself Stirliz if confronted by 
a German guard and Isaev if a Soviet soldier 
walks in. The anecdote continues in a way for 
which Stirliz is unpreparedǱ he meets a Soviet 
policeman, but the policeman addresses him 
as Tikhonov, and accuses him of having been 
incredibly drunk the day before.71 Thus, the 
anecdote is not chiely about the self-image 
of the character Isaev/Stirliz, but about that 
of the actor Tikhonov who forgets his real 
identity because he is so absorbed in his ilm 
role. The context of this anecdote is that in the 
seriesȂ reception the character Stirliz and the 
actor who played him, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 
fused into one person.72
It is also noteworthy that national boundaries 
become porous in many of the Stirliz anecdotes, 
such that characteristics of the political 
70  Graham, A Cultural Analysis, p. 148.
71  Semnadtsat’ mgnovenii vesny: Sait liubimogo 
teleseriala. Anekdoty, accessed December 10, 2012, htpǱ//mgnoveniya.ru/anekdoty/.
72  Nepomnyashchy, The Blockbuster, p. 257. 
Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, p. 108.
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systems in the USSR and Nazi Germany start 
to melt. This type of anecdote probably hints 
at the ilmȂs visible parallels between the 
two countries. To name one exampleǱ M(ller 
announces to Stirliz he will have to participate 
in a subbotnik, that is, in unpaid work during 
leisure time for the beneit of Soviet society. 
Stirliz reports for work and realizes that he 
has uncovered himself by doing so. Then he 
admits to being a Soviet spy. M(ller then calls 
StirlizȂs superior Schellenberg and tells him 
that people are inventing the most impossible 
excuses to avoid the subbotnik.73 This story 
takes a particular form of labor mobilization 
from the Soviet Union and transfers it to Nazi 
Germany.
Were these anecdotes a subversive practice that 
held the potential to destabilize the political 
system, or were they humor that functioned 
within and stabilized the system? Many 
anecdotes had a certain subversive quality 
because they criticize the dominance of the 
narrator’s interpretation over the audience’s 
own. This applies to the stylization of Stirliz 
as a superhero and to the shortcomings in 
plot and character composition. Collectively, 
however, their subversive potential was far 
more limited than that of anecdotes about 
Soviet leaders or Communism’s central 
dogmas. This has much to do with the seting 
of Seventeen Moments in World War II. The 
main statement of the series pertains to the 
heroic struggle in defense of the country, and 
the Stirliz anecdotes never question this.
Conclusion
As this analysis shows, Seventeen Moments of 
Spring is not only one of the most important 
73  Semnadtsat’ mgnovenii.
products of oicial popular culture in the USSR, 
but also a successful PR project on behalf of 
the KGB. It contributed to the strengthening of 
patriotism and masculinity at a time when both 
were in crisis in the USSR after Stalin’s death. 
The series was also successful in terms of its 
Cold War context. Stirliz proved to be a viable 
alternative to his British counterpart Bond and 
embodied the superiority of the USSR over the 
west in a way that fascinated his home public. 
The Soviet viewers received the series with 
great enthusiasm, but also appropriated it and 
criticized its weaknesses, as the many Stirliz 
anecdotes indicate. However, the subversive 
potential of this popular culture “from below” 
was rather restricted and never put into 
question communist ideology or leadership. 
On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the series 
could not develop any PR-like efect because it 
remained – and remains – unknown.
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Soviet West: Estonian estrada in the Soviet Union
This paper1 analyzes a litle studied aspect of Soviet Estonian culture. The ŗşŝŖs and 
ŗşŞŖs were a period of extreme popularity for 
Estonian light pop music ǻestradaǼ all over the 
Soviet Union. “rtists like Jaak Joala, “nne Ves-
ki or Gunnar Graps as well as bands like Apel-
sin or Fix are today still well known to people 
over ŚŖ inside the former Soviet republics. In 
my paper I discuss the reason and mechanism 
for their success. Within the strict Soviet cul-
tural framework existed a pop culture that 
manipulated categories and structures of the 
oicial ȃworkersȂ cultureȄ. First of all, Estonia 
was the Soviet west and Soviet culture man-
agers in Goskontsert and other state organiza-
tions promoted that image in order to create 
popular stadium artists. Estonian artists were 
encouraged not to sing in Russian and appear 
as if they were western pop stars. This way Es-
tonian music was manipulated as a substitute 
for western pop music in order to satisfy de-
mand for western music. Last but not least, the 
success of Estonian artists was a product of the 
1  I am grateful to all musicians for their interviews and ”oris ”elge and Sergei I. Zhuk for their invalu-able comments and support. This research was supported by the European Union through the Eu-ropean Regional Development Fund ǻCentre of Ex-cellence in Cultural Theory CECTǼ and by the insti-tutional research funding IUTřŚ-řŘ of the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.
informal music industry in the Soviet Union. 
Every successful Estonian artist had one or 
multiple informal managers who used their 
contacts to get maximum airplay in key mu-
sical programs of Soviet central TV channels 
and as many big concerts as possible. The ar-
ticle shows that a proit-oriented music busi-
ness existed in the Soviet Union that operated 
within the framework of the socialist cultural 
institutions.
* * *
As soon as the taxi driver in the former cap-
ital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, heard where I 
came from he started to complain: “For a 
long time I have been looking for a song of 
Tõnis Mägi but they do not play it. Never.” 
And he hummed me a melody I was unable 
to recognize. This happened in March 2012 
and was not the irst time in a former Soviet 
republic where I encountered the fame and 
popularity of Estonian artists and their music 
during the Soviet era. “s a mater of fact I was 
not exactly surprised. Since the mid-1990s, 
when I began my research in Russian Sibe-
ria and the Far East, I constantly met people 
who associated my Estonian origin with the 
once famous singers such as Jaak Joala, Tõnis 
Abstract
In the last one and a half decades of the Soviet Union, Estonian pop and rock artists suddenly gained 
popularity on a Soviet national level. The number of these artists was limited, but they had a huge 
impact and are still well known in the former Soviet Union. The success of Estonian artists had 
many reasons. One of them was the Soviet cultural politics of light entertainment music. This type 
of music served both educational and leisure purposes. Another reason was the political situation 
of the time. Soviet citizens gained more access to western cultural products, including pop music. 
In this context, Estonian pop music was seen as a domestic replacement for western music. And last 
but not least, Estonian artists took the opportunity to travel, to make money and to get famous
Keywords: estrada, VIA, Estonian invasion, Soviet West, informal music industry.
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Mägi or Anne Veski. 
The short period between the mid-seventies 
and the end of perestroika in the late 1980s 
which some of my informants call “the inva-
sion of Estonian music”2 is generally neglected 
in academic and popular writing, both in Esto-
nia and abroad. In the few works that discuss 
Soviet popular and underground music, the 
topic is mainly associated with Russian music, 
and precisely with the music from the central 
cities of Moscow and Leningrad.3 The western 
academic interest in Soviet era music culture, 
especially the late Soviet period, seems to fo-
cus on rock as an ambivalent semi-illegal mu-
sic culture that embodies resistance to the so-
cialist mass culture.4 This is the only context 
where Estonia is mentioned in English lan-
guage articles Ȯ as a seting for the discussion 
2  It is di cult to prove, but some of my infor-
mants believe that the term “Estonian invasion” 
was coined by the singer Ivo Linna in one of his 
interviews. However, the term is currently widely 
used especially with regard to Estonian Soviet era 
musicians and culture managers. [Interviews with 
Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011 and Väino Land, 4 De-
cember 2012.]
3  David MacFadyen, Red Stars: Personality and Soviet 
Popular Song, 1955–1991, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, ŘŖŖŗǲ David MacFadyen, Estrada?! 
Grand Narratives and the Philosophy of the Russian 
Popular Songs since Perestroika, Montreal & Kings-
ton, London, Ithaka: McGill-Queen’s University Press, ŘŖŖŘǲ Robert “ Rothstein, ȃThe Quiet Reha-
bilitation of the Brick Factory: Early Soviet Popular 
Music and Its Critics”, Slavic Review 39 (3), 1980, pp. řŝř-řŞŞǲ Michael Urban, Russia Gets the Blues: Music, CuЧture, and Community in UnsetЧed Times, Ithaca and LondonǱ Cornell University Press, ŘŖŖŚǲ 
one of the rare exceptions is the analysis of Soviet 
Ukrainian rock in Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in 
the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in So-
viet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985, Baltimore, MD and 
Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press 
& Washington and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2010.
4  Thomas Cushman, Notes from Underground: Rock 
Music Counterculture in Russia, Albany: State Uni-versity of New York, ŗşşśǲ Julia P. Friedman and 
Adam Weiner, “Between A Rock and Hard Place: 
Holy Rus’ and its Alternatives in Russian Rock 
Music”, Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and 
Society since Gorbatchev, ed. Adele Marie Barker, 
Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1999, pp. 
110-137.
of the relatively liberal cultural shift where the 
irst rock and jazz festivals were organized.5 
This image of Soviet Estonia is also support-
ed by numerous non-academic pieces. Rus-
sian rock journalist (and probably the only 
rock journalist of the Soviet Union) Artemii 
Troitskii characterizes Estonia as a rock par-
adise of the Soviet Union, where rock was 
played on the radio and gained full support 
from the local institutions of culture.6 Howev-
er, other genres of popular music receive litle 
or no atention in his book. In Estonia, the pe-
riod of the “Estonian invasion” is also largely 
ignored, although for other reasons. Estonian 
artists, who in the 1980s performed in Russia, 
were often criticized in Estonia during the So-
viet era, especially for singing in Russian. In 
many respects, these musicians were regard-
ed as a form of “collaboration” with the Sovi-
et authority. This explains why this aspect of 
culture in Soviet Estonia is rarely mentioned 
in the wave of autobiographies, biographies 
and nostalgic publications. The “Russian pe-
riod” in Estonian language publications is ex-
tensively discussed only in two works.7 This 
article is a relection on the research of work-
in-process and draws on some very limited 
writen resources but also on interviews con-
ducted with former members of the Estonian 
bands Fix and Apelsin, and people related to 
the former Estonian Philarmony. Methodolog-
ically it combines anthropology and history to 
scrutinize the mechanisms of Soviet culture 
industry using Estonian artists as an example. 
5  Urban, Russia Gets the Bluesǲ “lexei Yurchak, Ev-
erything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last 
Soviet Generation, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006.
6  Artemii Troitskii, Back in the USSR, Sankt-Peter-
burg: Amfora, 2007, p. 117.
7  Harri Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, Tallinn: Varrak, ŘŖŖşǲ Vello Salumets, Rockrapsoodia, Tallinn: Eesti Ents(klopeediakirjastus, ŗşşŞ.
96Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Aimar Ventsel
Soviet culture industry
The term “culture industry” was developed 
by Adorno and Horkheimer in response to the 
notion that the music business is just a mech-
anism to make proit by establishing a coher-
ent “mass culture” to “manufacture” quite 
tasteless music that people passively accept.8 
It is possible that the skeptical sentiments 
of Adorno were shaped by his disillusion-
ment with the development of “low art” in 
general and a dislike of jazz in particular.9 
A strong antipathy to jazz and a critical view 
of the capitalist production of music was 
something that most Soviet ideologists and 
politicians of culture had in common with 
“dorno. The oicial understanding of Sovi-
et culture was that it was not proit-oriented 
but had ideological goals to educate and en-
tertain socialist people, a position that denied 
the existence of any kind of culture industry. 
However, by taking a closer look it seems that 
even in the framework of the ideological regu-
lations and planned economy the existence of 
a culture industry cannot be dismissed.
The development of the Soviet Estonian en-
tertainment music industry must be seen in 
the context of musical life in the whole of the 
Soviet Union. Soviet authorities were keen to 
provide “socialist fun”, but the details and 
meaning of how the “fun” should be constitut-
8  Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Decep-
tion”, Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks, eds. M. 
G. Durham and D. M. Kellner, Malden, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001, pp. 71-101.
9  Cited from Jay M. Bernstein, “Introduction”, The-
odor W. Adorno: The Culture Industry. Selected Essays 
on Mass Culture, ed. J. M. Bernstein, London and New YorkǱ Routledge, ŗşŞŖ, pp. ŗ-ŘŞǲ John Hutnyk, 
“At Womad: South Asian crossovers and the limits 
of hybridity talk”, Postcolonial Studies 1 (3), 1998, pp. ŚŖŗ-ŚŘŜǲ John Hutnyk, Critique Of Exotica: Mu-
sic, Politics, and the Culture Industry, London: Pluto 
Press, 2000.
ed were unclear and ambiguous.10 First of all, 
it must be noted that in the Soviet Union there 
was no perceived diference between ȃhigh 
brow” and “low brow” music as was the 
case in the west. Moreover, it seems that the 
boundaries between musical genres have nev-
er been as clearly formulated as in the western 
market-oriented music business.11 Opera and 
other genres of orchestrated classical music in 
the Soviet Union were accessible to the prole-
tarian masses.12 Composers like Shostakovich 
and Prokoiev were well known and listened 
to. Their music was not only taught in schools 
but even used in children’s cartoons. Further-
more, the border between “serious” folk and 
“light” entertainment music (which was later 
called estrada) remained blurry: orchestrated 
folk songs were in the repertoire of pop mu-
sic performers, who often switched groups 
and styles between the “serious” and “light” 
genres. Simultaneously, in Soviet music it was 
not unusual for folk groups to adopt the estra-
da style to achieve more success and respec-
tively re-arrange their songs to it that genre.13 
Unlike the western music business, there was 
also a lack of competition for recorded music. 
In the Soviet Union there was only one record 
company – Melodiia –, probably the biggest 
record company in world history. It released a 
chaotic multitude of diferent styles of music, 
10  Gleb Tsipursky, Socialist Fun: Youth, Consump-
tion, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet 
Union, 1945–1970, PitsburghǱ University of Pits-
burgh Press, 2016.
11  Keith Negus, Music Genres and Corporate Identi-
ties, London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
12  Rothstein, „The Quiet RehabilitationȄǲ Nelli 
Grigor’evna Shakhnazarova, Paradoksy sovetskoi muzyЦaЧ′noi ЦuЧ′turyǱ řŖ-e gody [Paradoxes of Sovi-
et Musical Culture: The 1930s], Moscow: Izdateloi 
muzykal’ev, 2001.
13  Laura J. Olson, Performing Russia: Folk Revival and 
Russian Identity, London and New York: Routledge, ŗşşşǲ Susannah Lockwood Smith, ȃFrom Peasants 
to Professionals: The Socialist-Realist Transforma-
tion of a Russian Folk Choir”, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 3 (3), 2002, pp. 393-425.
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but its policy (and output) remain a mystery 
even today. The reason for the distinctive na-
ture of Soviet music was its political and edu-
cational mission – controlled by several state 
institutions – to propagate socialist values. It 
must be noted that the debate about what pre-
cisely is proper “music for the masses” began 
with the early years of the Soviet Union and 
continued until its collapse.14 
The existence of the top-down control of state 
institutions did not mean that Soviet music 
was completely manipulated and controlled 
by the state. Tomof argues in his review on 
Shakhnazarova that classical music existed 
despite state control and was complete with 
artistic ambitions for high levels of musical 
expression and an ambivalent response to the 
pressure to create music according to the can-
ons of Socialist Realism.15 There were similar 
tendencies in the whole of the Soviet cultur-
al sphere. This does not mean that individu-
al and state interests were in conlict. “lexei 
Yurchak calls it a “deeper paradox of the so-
cialist systemȄ that at irst inspection contra-
dictory elements, positions and cultural man-
ifestations existed together.16 This argument 
in his book – and the paradox in general – is 
mostly neglected in academic writing, where-
by several scholars support the view that Sovi-
et citizens lived a double life where the public 
and private spheres were strictly separated.17 
14  MacFayden, Red Stars; Rothstein, The Quiet Re-
habilitation.
15  Kiril Tomof, ȃParadoksy sovetskoi muzykalȂnoi kulturyǱ řŖ-e gody, andǱ Sergei RachmaninofǱ “ 
Lifetime in Music (review)”, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 4 (2), pp. 466-480.
16  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 168.
17  Tamara Dragadze, “The Domestication of Reli-
gion Under Soviet Communism”, Socialism: Ideals, 
Ideologies, and Local Practice, ed. Chris M. Hann, 
London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 141-ŗśŗǲ Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Econ-
omy, Society and Religion in a Siberian Collective Farm, CambridgeǱ Cambridge University Press, ŗşŞřǲ 
Katherine Verdery, What was socialism, and what 
comes next?, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
However, the black and white portrayal of So-
viet life does not help us to understand such a 
complex society and is especially problemat-
ic when it comes to the analysis of everyday 
socialist culture. The Soviet Union and the 
whole socialist block did not exist in a vacu-
um, as contacts with the western world ex-
isted on a formal and informal level. Music, 
fashion and other spheres of “capitalist” mass 
culture were followed, copied and consumed 
by Soviet people, ironically and not always 
illegally.18 Despite the intention of design-
ing a new socialist cultural space, authorities 
and industry were too slow and inefective 
to create the socialist substitute for the more 
atractive western consumer culture. There-
fore, products of the west were known and 
valued.19 In very limited amounts, western 
music or consumer goods were legally avail-
able, or re-produced by Soviet artists, fashion 
designers or enterprises. Yurchak’s reading of 
Soviet internationalism demonstrates its am-
bivalence between the concepts of “bad” and 
“good” culture: “Ultimately, this means that one 
did not have to think of ‘socialist’ and ‘bourgeois’ 
cultural forms as inherently incompatible because 
their meaning could shift depending on how and 
where these forms were used.”20 As an example, 
Yurchak uses jazz music which was both con-
sidered as the protest music of African Ameri-
cans and as a “bourgeois” decadent music.21 A 
similar ambivalence existed across all spheres 
of life, especially culture. Moreover, the am-
bivalent position of western culture increased 
versity Press, 1996.
18  S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in 
the Soviet Union, 1917-1980, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1983.
19  Davis Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for 
Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press, ŘŖŖřǲ Vera S. Dunham, 
In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
20  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, p. 165.
21  Ibid., pp. 166-7.
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during the short period of relaxation or 
détente which is politically regarded as rath-
er unsuccessful.22 However, détente legalized 
western music, ilms and other art forms in the 
Soviet environment. From my childhood I re-
call reading newspaper articles harshly critical 
of the “bourgeois” governments of France and 
Italy. At the same time I grew up with French 
and Italian comedies, openly shown in Esto-
nian cinemas. Détente made it also possible 
for western music to receive some airplay on 
Soviet radio and to be released on the Melodiia 
record label.23 
The “deeper paradox of the socialist system” 
applies – among other things – to Soviet (light) 
music culture. It is di cult to say when the 
concept of estrada was born and this question 
is also beyond the scope of this article. Nev-
ertheless, the concept has multiple meanings 
and contents as shown by the scholar of Rus-
sian popular music David MacFadyen who 
discusses the Russian term estrada investigat-
ing the word’s French roots. MacFadyen ar-
gues that in the French tradition estrada means 
ȃsmall stageȄ, and deines it as ȃa wide rang-
ing term that includes pop music as well as 
modern dance, comedy, circus arts, and any 
other performance not on the ‘big,’ classical 
stage”.24 Indeed, estrada artists could have 
been stand up or circus artists and were often 
oicially named so. However, in the popular 
understanding of Soviet people, the term es-
trada was interchangeably associated with the 
term “popular music” or “pop music” and the 
term svezdy estrady (estrada stars) was general-
ly (but not exclusively) used to indicate suc-
22  Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: Good-
bye to Détente”, Foreign “fairs 59, 1980, pp. 500-521.
23  Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, pp. 125-
126, 166. It must be noted that no one I have spoken 
to in Estonia had heard about the Détente but the 
word used in Estonian was “pingelõdvendus”.
24  MacFadyen, Estrada?!, p. 3.
cessful and well-known singers. Estrada music 
was not always dance music but could also be 
for seated concert halls and take the form of a 
romantic song or ballad. Estrada as the broad 
Soviet pop music genre was sometimes very 
ironic, while some artists were deadly seri-
ous, some songs were extremely Schlager-like 
whereas others included elements of rock mu-
sic.25 The musical output is probably not as 
deining for the genre as the formǱ typical for 
estrada music was (and still is) that the sing-
ers were – as a rule – accompanied by huge 
orchestras dominated by wind instruments. 
While the nature of estrada is luid, there is 
also another phenomenon surrounding Soviet 
pop music – the vocal-instrumental ensemble 
(vokal’no-instrumental’nyi ansambl’) or VIA. It 
is generally agreed that the term was used for 
state approved rock collectives because the 
word “rock” was essentially forbidden in the 
Soviet Union. Due to the Soviet institutional 
seting, all music collectives had to be regis-
tered (more about this below) and because it 
was impossible to register as a “rock ensem-
ble” yet impossible to ignore the popularity 
of rock music, the concept of the VIA was in-
vented in 1966.26 However, there is evidence 
that the term VI“ was used for the irst time 
on a concert poster in 1964 by the seven-piece 
band Avangard from Donetsk, Ukraine, who 
would perform their own interpretations of 
western artists like Elvis Presley, The Beat-
les, Rolling Stones, Hollies or The Shadows.27 
25  Ingo Grabowsky, “Motor der Verwestlichung: 
Das sowjetische Estrada-Lied 1950-1975”, Osteuro-
pa 62, 2012, pp. 21-35.
26  David-Emil Wickström and Yngvar B. Steinholt, 
“Visions of the (Holy) Motherland in Contempo-
rary Russian Popular Music: Nostalgia, Patriotism, 
Religion and Russkii Rok”, Popular Music and Soci-
ety řŘ ǻřǼ, ŘŖŖş, pp. řŗř-řřŖ, here p. řŗŚǲ Troitskii, 
Back in the USSR.
27  Evgenii Iasenov, Zdes’ nachinalis’ VIA 2012, httpǱ//www.donjetsk.com/retro/ŗśşŘ-zdes-nachi-
nalis-via.html, accessed 30 December 2012.
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The scholars (and supporters) of Russian and 
Soviet rock tend to juxtapose the VIAs as “of-
icialȄ watered down rock as opposed to the 
ȃrealȄ or unoicial rock bands.28 (However, 
the opinion of VIA musicians is usually not 
asked for. Väino Land, the leader and initiator 
of the Estonian VIA Fix explained to me that 
VIAs were neither rock nor estrada but should 
be seen in the tradition of western bands like 
The Bee Gees or The Eagles. Their music was 
distinguishable by a high level of musician-
ship and complicated song structure.29 Line 
ups of the VIAs were usually large, containing 
six to twelve musicians. It was not unusual for 
a VIA to have three singers, string and wind 
instruments, keyboards, and to be accom-
panied by electric guitars. The music of one 
VI“ band could contain a mixture of diferent 
genres from folk, reggae, pop, rock or estrada. 
Their appearance was also not uniied. For in-
stance, the Belorussian group Pesniary not only 
performed psychedelic versions of folk tunes 
but also wore folk costumes on the stage. The 
Estonian band Fix had in its heyday various 
costumes for the band members encapsulating 
the image of a rocker, worker, estrada artist and 
so forth. Considering the nature of VIA-music, 
the assumption that VIA was a young musi-
ciansȂ atempt to play rock music within an 
ideologically determined oicial framework 
sounds more correct than the previously men-
tioned negative interpretation.30
In order to be oicially recognized or to have 
the status as a “professional” performer, all 
artists and bands had to be registered and 
were subject to various regulations. Estrada 
performers and VIAs had to belong to a cer-
tain enterprise (as club artists) or to a state 
28  Cushman, Notes from Underground; Steinholt 
and Wickström, ȃIntroductionȄǲ Troitskii, Back in the 
USSR.
29  Interview with Väino Land, 4 december 2012.
30  Grabowsky, “Motor der Verwestlichung”, p. 31.
concert agency (philharmony). Every Soviet 
republic and most big cities had their own 
philharmonic orchestra (Roskontsert, Estonian 
Philharmony, Moscow Philharmony, etc.) 
which was subordinated to the state concert 
agencies of Goskontsert and Sovkontsert. In or-
der to perform, every professional artist had 
to undergo ȃtariicationȄ ǻtariitseerimine in 
Estonian), a demonstration concert in front 
of a commitee that determined the ȃartisticȄ 
level of the performer. According to that lev-
el, performers were given a “category”. The 
musical “category” was important because 
it determined the activity and income of the 
performer. Artists with lower categories were 
allowed to perform only in factory clubs or 
houses of culture, whereas a higher category 
meant permission to perform all over the Sovi-
et Union and abroad. The higher the category, 
the higher was the salary tarif or punktitasu 
per performance. The tarif was paid indepen-
dent of the size of crowd and length of perfor-
mance. The ȃtariicationȄ was essential for de-
termining a musician’s position in the artists’ 
and bands’ community, because the category 
afected directly their travel possibilities and 
size of audience. Not only were lower catego-
ry artists unable to perform oicially outside 
their home republic, but because categories 
were given according to “artistic maturity” it 
also symbolized the quality of the band. 
VIAs and estrada artists not only had to prove 
their level of mastery but also register their 
repertoire. The bulk of a set list of a Sovi-
et performer had to contain works of Soviet 
composers (especially members of the Union 
of Composers) and only a small percentage 
was left for works of composers from other so-
cialist countries and an even smaller share al-
lowed for music of western origin.31 This reg-
31  Cited from Rothstein, “The Quiet Rehabilita-
tion”.
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ulation is often interpreted as a strategy for the 
ideological control over music to guarantee a 
correct ideological bias for the entertainment 
of the masses. “las, these regulations had a i-
nancial basis as well. “In the Soviet Union a 
well functioning copyright system existed,” 
explained Alar Madisson, long time vocalist 
and manager of Fix.32 “At every concert we 
had to ill in repertoire lists and the authors 
of these songs received money. When your 
songs were popular then all the bands played 
them and altogether the sum of money could 
be very substantial. Can you imagine how 
many thousands of roubles Raimonds Pauls 
earned with his ‘Alye rozy’ (Purple roses)? Ev-
ery restaurant band played it.” The role of the 
Union of Composers as the monopolist Soviet 
music publisher remains unstudied. However, 
in cooperation with other state institutions like 
Muzfond33 and Kompozitor publishing house the 
Union of Composers collected and distributed 
royalty money and was therefore interested in 
ensuring that the songs of its members were 
performed as a irst priority. This also explains 
why throughout the Soviet period the Union 
of Composers lobbied for the compulsory use 
of its members music.34 
A clear picture of the Soviet culture industry 
32  Interview with Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011.
33  Muzfond was a Soviet state cultural institu-tion whose task was to provide inances to Soviet composers. These inances were grants, loans, and 
stipends. The institution also managed houses, 
nurseries and vacation resorts to be used by mem-
bers of the Composers’ Union. All members of the 
Composers’ Union were automatically members 
of Muzfond, but Muzfond was allowed to admit 
members who had no Union membership. Muz-
fond received 5 percent of publication royalties and Ř percent from theatre box oices. It was also i-nanced through membership fees ǻsee Tomof ŘŖŖŜ, 
pp. 49-50).
34  Cited from Rothstein, “The Quiet Rehabilita-
tion”. Because the royalty money was paid on the 
grounds of a repertoire list, it was not uncommon 
that artists performed other songs but delivered 
lists with the “right” selection to avoid trouble with the oicials, see Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon.
remains elusive if the economic interests of 
concert agencies and the state record company 
Melodiia are not included. MelodiiaȂs proits 
remain a mystery akin to its erratic catalogue. 
The role and activity of the philharmonies or 
state music agencies must also be incorporat-
ed into the picture. The role of concert agen-
cies will be discussed later but they were sub-
ordinated to the planned economy similar to 
all Soviet enterprises and fulilling of the plan 
was – as a rule – accompanied with a high bo-
nus payment to its workers. Moreover, there is 
evidence from my interviews and in published 
sources that the philharmonies or music agen-
cies were engaged in organizing “black” con-
certs or events where the proit was directly 
distributed by the organizers and performers. 
Taking a closer look at the activities of institu-
tions whose oicial goal was to organize and 
oversee the correct ideological entertainment 
of Soviet people, the economic motivation of 
all these institutions cannot be ignored. 
Estonian invasion and music business
Estonia has a strong entertainment music tra-
dition oriented to western musical styles. In 
the 1930s, Estonia danced the foxtrot and tan-
go, popular dances everywhere in Europe.35 
This western orientation continued after the 
incorporation into the Soviet Union: in the 
1960s Estonia was swamped by the beat music 
and rock performed by “guitar ensembles”.36 
Estonian young people along with musicians 
tried to be up to date with contemporary de-
velopments in pop and rock throughout the 
Soviet era. In several memoires, people spoke 
of how new records appeared in Estonia with-
in a few months or even weeks after they 
35  Heino Pedusaar, Tardunud helide maailm, Tallinn: 
Koolibri, 2007.
36  Salumets, Rockrapsoodia.
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were released in the west and circulated via 
cassetes within the music loving community. 
Many people had relatives in the west who 
sometimes provided their Soviet kin with new 
music on cassete or vinyl LPs. The citizens of 
Tallinn were able to watch and listen to Finn-
ish TV and radio, and new music was record-
ed from these sources and re-recorded later by 
other people. It was not unusual for Estonian 
artists to re-record contemporary hits with Es-
tonian texts and this way new hits were spread 
among listeners.37 In the 1970s, Estonia had a 
healthy estrada and VIA scene, this music was 
played on TV and radio. Trend consciousness 
in music was accompanied with the western 
heritage that was relected in fashion, cuisine 
or architecture. For many people in the Soviet 
Union, Estonia and the Baltic States general-
ly embodied western culture. These republics 
were the “Soviet West”. When Yurchak writes 
about the “imaginary West” in Soviet culture 
as a non-reachable illusionary space, the Bal-
tic republics were the physical embodiment of 
those imaginings.38 This imagery was support-
ed by the Estonian self-isolation and distance 
from Soviet cultural life: Soviet music, theater 
or literature was not particularly popular in 
Estonia during the Soviet era and people pre-
ferred to read books or newspapers in their 
mother tongue. The only notable exception 
were Soviet ilms, which were consumed via 
state TV.
The irst Soviet Estonian artist to achieve huge 
37  For instance, Eurovsion winners were often 
re-recorded already on the night the song won the 
contest and played on the radio already the next 
day. The covering of western pop hits was inter-
preted by Estonian artist as a mission to introduce 
fresh music to the Estonian audience and regarded 
as resistance to Soviet cultural policy. See Margo 
Vaino and Jaak Urmet, Tühjad pihud: Gunnar Grap-
si elu ja muusika, TallinnǱ Kirjastus Pegasus, ŘŖŗřǲ 
T. Vahter, ȃKaruЦs istus vangitornis…Ȅ ŗşŞŖ - aasta, 
mis raputas Eestist, Tallinn: OÜ Hea Lugu ja Tarmo 
Vahter, 2015.
38  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever.
popularity in the Soviet Union was Georg Ots, 
an opera and estrada singer. Georg Ots’ suc-
cess in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrated to 
the Russian concert agencies that an accent 
and western style can be an exotic bonus that 
draws an audience all over the Soviet Union.39 
Later in 1974, in Tallinn, the band Apelsin 
was established. Apelsin played a mixture of 
country, rock’n’roll and estrada but neverthe-
less embodied for Russian music fans western 
rock music.40 As the long-time road manag-
er of the band, Aare Nahk, told me “Apelsin 
has always toured in Russia” and probably 
they were the irst Estonian band to enter So-
viet concert halls. In the early 1980s, another 
band, Fix, started to tour Russia, having their 
irst concert in Leningrad performing together 
with Valerii Leont’ev and other estrada stars. 
The self-isolation of the Estonian music scene 
is well relected by the recollections of Fix’s 
manager Alar Madisson: “We had no idea 
about Russian music whatsoever. We did not 
know Leont’ev at all. After the concert we un-
derstood that he was a irst class star in Rus-
sia.”41 
The phenomenon of the Estonian invasion can 
be seen in the context of changes in Soviet cul-
tural policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
As Christine Evans demonstrates in her article 
about Soviet mass culture, in that period, oi-
cials began to look for new concepts of enter-
tainment.42 New shows appeared on TV that 
included music and comedy. After Khrush-
chev’s “Thaw”, after the détente and the stabi-
39  Interestingly, Georg Ots was also immensely 
popular in Finland, being probably the only Soviet 
estrada artist who was regularly able to perform in 
a capitalist country. See Kulle Raig, Saaremaa valss: 
Georg Otsa elu, Tallinn: Varrak, 2002.
40  Troitskii, Back in the USSR, p. 117.
41  Interview in Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011.
42  Christine Evans, “Song of the Year and Soviet 
Mass Culture in the 1970s”, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History, 12 (3), 2011, pp. 617-
645.
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lization of society and increase in prosperity, 
Soviet people looked for a new kind of enter-
tainment. Western music appeared on Soviet 
TV and radio programs and people apparently 
wanted more.43
“s apparent from interviews and writen 
sources, TV shows like Song of the Year or LitЧe 
Blue Flame (Goluboi Ogonek) opened the door 
for the success of Estonian music, and for new 
genres of music in general. Especially a per-
formance in Goluboi Ogonek guaranteed suc-
cess and concert bookings all over the Soviet 
Union.44 These shows were aired on Central 
Television and watched throughout the whole 
country. Song of the Year and similar shows cre-
ated a framework that could rapidly be illed 
with new content once censorship weakened 
in the second half of the 1980s, and which 
could (and did) transition quite seamlessly to 
post-Soviet Russian television.45 This obser-
vation can be generally applied to the whole 
Soviet entertainment sector. The existence 
of western mass culture could not be denied 
anymore and oicials atempted to ofer a 
Soviet equivalent to western music, fashion 
or TV-entertainment, all of which helped to 
enable the later success of “domestic” west-
ern music. Anne Veski believes that she was 
discovered when Central TV showed a ilm 
in which she performed. She argues that Es-
tonian music was “exotic” for Soviet people, 
and it was more oriented to western pop and 
rock than towards ordinary Soviet estrada or 
VIA music.46 Musicians from Fix told me that 
they were even told not to sing in Russian 
but in Estonian or English. “If we wanted to 
have Russian music we would have booked a 
Russian artist”, one manager told them. “We 
43  Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City.
44  Evans, ȃSong of the YearȄ, p. ŜŘŖǲ Rinne, Laulev 
revolutsioon, p. 165.
45  Evans, “Song of the Year”, p. 620.
46  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 149.
were diferentȄ, “lar Madisson told me, ȃWe 
dressed diferently than Russian bands and 
we had a real western-style stage show. One 
of our best tricks was when the guitarist ran to 
the edge of the stage and then slid on his knees 
beneath the piano while playing a solo. That 
drove people mad”.47 When looking at videos 
on Youtube it appears that Estonian bands 
were visually remarkably diferent from the 
typical Soviet estrada artists. They tended to 
move around more on stage, wore western 
style stage costumes and in the case of Apel-
sin or Fix featured humor and irony into their 
shows. 
In the early 1980s several Estonian artists 
toured (gastrolirovali in Russian) continuously 
in Russia. They performed either solo concerts 
or in huge gala concerts with other artists. “A 
gala concert was an easy job,” comments Rein 
Lang, a former functionary of the Young Com-
munist League Komsomol, “You performed two 
songs but got paid for a full length concert”.48 
Speciic to Soviet show business was that art-
ists often had to perform several concerts a 
day over a period of three or four days. “When 
modern rock bands boast that they perform 
over forty concerts a year then I just laugh. We 
performed seventy concerts in a month,” told 
Arne Nahk from Apelsin.49 Tõnu AКrО, tСО sТnРОr 
of Apelsin opines that the record of the band 
was seventy-two concerts in eighteen days in 
Ukraine.50 Alar Madisson told me that the Es-
tonian record is held by Jaak Joala who in the 
mid-1980s performed twelve gala concerts in 
one day in Moscow, switching between two 
stadiums with a bus.51 Not only was the work-
load of Estonian performers big, the distances 
they had to cross were huge as well. During 
47  Interview with Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011.
48  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 156.
49  Interview with Are Nahk, 6 July 2010.
50  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 163.
51  Interview with Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011.
103Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
Aimar Ventsel
one season that lasted several months a band 
could have performed in the Far East, Central 
Asia, Ukraine and the Caucasus, constantly 
travelling by planes and trains.
”y the mid-ŗşŞŖs an un-oicial hierarchy 
among members of the Estonian invasion 
had formed.52 All my informants agree that 
the most popular Estonian artist in the Soviet 
Union was Jaak Joala. “Jaak Joala was num-
ber one. Then there was a huge gap and then 
came Anne Veski and Tõnis Mägi. And then 
the rest,” explained members of Apelsin. “Jaak 
Joala was worshipped like a god in Russia. He 
did not even walk three steps, he had always a 
white Volga53 to transport him,” remembered 
Arne Nahk.54 “Jaak Joala is damned talent-
ed. Of course he was successful,” said Väino 
Land.55 There is also an assumption that Soviet 
concert agencies were looking for non-Russian 
performers to have variety in their program 
and consciously promoted Jaak Joala. 
The role of Roskontsert and its boss Felix Kaz 
in the success of Estonian artists in the Soviet 
Union is undisputable.56 However, not only 
Roskontsert had a commercial interest in the 
relationship. All Estonian artists and bands 
successful in the Soviet Union had devel-
oped strategies and made business partners 
in show business. “Every band had its own 
contact person in Roskontsert, Goskontsert and 
Sovkontsert. Details were kept secret and not 
52  The list of the bands associated with the Esto-
nian invasion is relatively short, including artists 
like Anne Veski, Jaak Joala, Tõnis Mägi and the 
Magnetic Band, Vitamiin, Laine, Fix, Radar, Ma-
havok, Kuldne Trio, Nemo. Most bands operated 
under the Estonian Philharmony.
53  Soviet elite car.
54  Interview with Arne Nahk, 6 July 2010.
55  Interview with Väino Land, 4 December 2012.
56  The controversial nature of Mr. Kaz needs ad-
ditional research. When Estonian artists praise him 
as a great friend of the Estonian estrada (see Rinne, 
Laulev revolutsioon, p. 163) then Oleg Sapoznin told me that Mr. Kaz was just exploiting artists and the 
Estonian Philharmony refused to work with him 
(Interview with Oleg Sapoznin, 11 March 2013). 
shared”, VтТno LКnd told mО.57 These contacts 
were instrumental for both promotion and 
bookings. Simultaneously, the Estonian Phil-
harmony and its director Oleg Sapoznin or-
ganized concerts and tours using their own 
contacts with other Soviet concert agencies. 
But the initiative of bands was tolerated. “We 
allowed them to do what they wanted,” com-
mented Oleg Sapoznin.58
Such liberty and diferent business partners 
combined with stylistic diferences were the 
reason why Estonian bands built their fan 
bases in the big cities like Moscow or Lenin-
grad. While Magnetic Band or Fix were clearly 
rock oriented then Radar, for example, with 
its experimental sound were able to draw an 
audience looking for something diferent. 
Jaak Joala’s romantic image was contrasted 
with the Kuldne Trio semi-vulgar stage show, 
Anne Veski as the more or less classic diva was 
popular with older audiences, whereas Kare 
Kauk’s youthful disco appearance made her 
popular among young Russian and Ukrainian 
girls. Oleg Sapoznin argued that the varia-
tions in audience preferences were taken into 
account when tours featuring several diferent 
styles of bands were organized.59
Management skills and informal networks 
were of great importance for the success of 
Estonian artists but probably even more im-
portant was the music and performance. “You 
cannot fool a Russian audience,” told a band 
member of Fix. “They recognize immediate-
ly when you perform in a half-hearted way. 
Either you are ŗŖŖ% commited or people just 
leave. We always left the stage covered with 
sweat.” The selection of songs and orchestra-
tion of the stage choreography were careful-
57  Interview with Väino Land, 4 December 2012.
58  Interview with Oleg Sapoznin, 11 March 2013.
59  Interview with Oleg Sapoznin, 11 March 2013.
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ly discussed and planned.60 “When we had 
a short slot in a gala concert we usually per-
formed four or ive songs. Fix always started 
with a melodious tune, the next one was faster 
and the culmination of the performance was a 
rock song. The last song was slower, usually 
reggae, we cooled people down and prepared 
them for the next artist.”
Adopting a western style, using personal 
contacts and strong commitment may show 
how Estonian artists reached their populari-
ty. However, it does not tell us why they were 
interested in having an artistic career outside 
of their home republic. This aspect will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
We have played in every collective farm al-
ready…
“You know why we went to perform in Rus-
sia?” asked Alar Madisson. And raising three 
ingers, he explained ȃ”ecause of travelling, 
money and fame. We had achieved everything 
possible in Estonia, played in every club and 
village several times already. Russia was a 
new territory for us, the possibility to travel 
and see new places”, he added.61 During the 
short period of the Estonian invasion, Esto-
nian artists literally performed in every corner 
of the former Soviet Union, even in places dif-
icult or impossible to reach. “s entertainers, 
they performed often in so-called closed cities, 
industrial centers where one needed special 
permission to enter. Members of Apelsin told 
me how they toured the Russian Far East start-
ing their tour in Anadyr, the administrative 
center of Chukotka. Apelsin performed in cit-
ies in the border area, also often closed in the 
Soviet era.62 Several of these regions had very 
60  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 158.
61  Interview with Alar Madisson, 6 April 2011.
62  Collective interview, 6 October 2011.
litle or no tourist infrastructure and in many 
cases still lack it. Apart from the permissions, 
for an average Soviet citizen it was complicat-
ed to buy plane tickets to these destinations 
because local enterprises usually booked the 
lights for their own workers. “s for musi-
cians, travel arrangements were made by con-
cert agencies and therefore artists were able to 
enjoy the privilege of visiting the remote re-
gions.63 Moreover, Estonians also performed 
in holiday resorts on the coast of the Black 
Sea or in the cities of Central Asia. The best 
artists like Anne Veski, Fix or Magnetic Band 
were in some rare cases able to perform in oth-
er socialist countries or friendly African and 
American states like Cuba, Zambia or Zimba-
bwe.64 Depending on personal contacts within 
the concert agencies, many artists developed 
a certain regional focus: While Apelsin never 
performed in Central Asia then Fix was rarely 
seen in the Caucasus and the paths of touring 
Estonians often did not cross at all.
A serious motivating factor for touring the So-
viet republics was of course money. As men-
tioned above, according to the centrally ixed 
tarifs performers always received the same 
salary independent of the length of the con-
cert and audience numbers. Touring actively 
and performing several times a day, high cat-
egory musicians were able to earn substantial 
amounts of money. Avo Ulvik, who toured 
Russia for a long period explains that in Es-
tonia as a professional musician on an Esto-
nian Philharmony payroll he earned one hun-
dred rubles a month whereas during the tours 
he earned nearly 700 rubles, i.e. seven times 
more.65 Moreover, additional income was 
earned with illegal performances in clubs and 
private parties or at unoicial unregistered ǻor 
63  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 171.
64  E.g. Salumets, Rockrapsoodia, p. 238.
65  Rinne, Laulev revolutsioon, p. 172.
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khaltura) concerts where local cultural workers 
split the proit of the evening with the artists. 
Rock singer and drummer Gunnar Graps or-
ganized several tours where most concerts 
were khaltura.66 Apart from the music, Estonian 
artists found other possibilities to make mon-
ey. Rein Lang tells that touring artists made a 
proit from the Soviet shortage economy by 
bringing along fashionable clothes and other 
commodities from Estonia and selling them in 
remote Russian towns.67 Very often when Es-
tonian artists performed in closed industrial 
cities they were able to obtain imported goods 
like Finnish boots, etc. These were purchased 
in large quantities and brought back to Esto-
nia to sell on the black market.68 It is generally 
agreed that by intensive touring one was able 
to earn enough money to build a house or pur-
chase a car.69 
Last but not least, it was important to be part 
of the large scale show business, to perform for 
huge audiences. Anne Veski recalls: “In Russia 
you feel like a star. In Estonia you are just a 
singer.”70 Artists of the Estonian invasion per-
formed on a level that was unthinkable in Es-
tonia. A major part of the Fix folklore were the 
concerts in Omsk where the band performed 
twice a day each time for 20,000 people. Anne 
Veski’s biggest concert drew 36,000 listeners.71 
The experience of performing in front of a 
huge mass of people makes the artist emotion-
al even today, two decades later. “You know 
what is the biggest kick? You lip your ingers 
and ŗŖ,ŖŖŖ people lip their ingers. Then you 
say ȁOooo!Ȃ and ŗŖ,ŖŖŖ people repeat itȄ, told 
Alari Madisson. Huge concerts were accompa-
nied by life in luxurious hotels, fancy cars and 
66  Ibid., pp. 152-3.
67  Ibid., pp. 156-7.
68  Ibid., p. 181.
69  Ibid., pp. ŗŞřǲ ŗŞş.
70  Ibid., p. 182.
71  Ibid., p. 160.
the worship of fans. This all built an emotion-
al link with the Russian music scene and the 
country itself, an afection that several artists 
felt even when we recorded interviews.
Conclusion
In February 2010 Estonia was embroiled in a 
small scandal. The president of Estonia sent 
an invitation to “nne Veski to atend a recep-
tion in honor of the anniversary of the Esto-
nian Republic. During the reception the diva 
was supposed to receive a medal of honor. 
However, Anne Veski turned down the invi-
tation because she was booked for a series of 
concerts in Russia. As she explained, contracts 
were signed six months ago and there was no 
possibility to change the dates. The Estonian 
social media was full of angry comments that 
accused Anne Veski of unpatriotic behavior. 
Anne Veski is currently the only Estonian 
artist actively performing in Russia. In 1993 
managers of former famous Estonian bands 
organized a meeting with representatives of 
a Russian show business irm in MoscowȂs 
Estonian embassy, with the aim to restore the 
former fruitful relationship. It turned out to be 
a iasco. The time was over and Russian pro-
moters were no longer interested in Estonian 
artists.
It is surprising that the second smallest Soviet 
republic by territory and the smallest by size 
of population left such a lasting legacy on So-
viet and post-Soviet culture. The period of the 
Estonian invasion was short and the number 
of singers and groups limited, but the artists 
and songs are still remembered in many for-
mer Soviet republics. The popularity of Esto-
nian artists ofers a possibility to look behind 
the state controlled media and concert orga-
nizations. The Estonian invasion was not only 
the outcome of the individual ambitions of the 
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musicians, but closely related to changes in 
the larger political and cultural seting. With 
a closer reading it appears that Soviet culture 
and its structures were not so strictly con-
trolled and manipulated by the state, but full 
of contradictions and ambivalence. First of all, 
the methods and policies of the Soviet cultural 
and media institutions were not only ideologi-
cal. Behind the slogans of educating the mass-
es and inluencing peopleȂs political views ex-
isted a culture industry with the aim to make a 
proit and reach a bigger audience by ofering 
a wide range of entertainment. For that pur-
pose Estonian music was the substitute for the 
existing “imaginary West”. Artists were not 
subordinated to strict control that determined 
their appearance and music, as is believed. It is 
apparent that musicians were able to manipu-
late oicial regulations and pursue their own 
interests, whether musical or inancial. The 
agency of performers and mercantile politics 
of the Union of Composers, philharmonies or 
TV stations demonstrate the “deeper paradox” 
of Soviet life, the multiple sides and layers of 
Soviet culture. The paradox becomes deeper 
considering that most artists who were popu-
lar in the Soviet Union participated as leading 
igures in the Singing Revolution of the ŗşşŖs, 
recording several important patriotic songs. 
I believe that the analysis of the Estonian mu-
sical invasion helps us to understand how the 
presumably highly regulated and centrally 
controlled Soviet society functioned on an un-
oicial level. In the early ŗşşŖs, after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, there was a short 
debate about whether the Soviet Union can be 
discussed in terms of the existence of civil so-
ciety or not. In this discussion, anthropologists 
 
introduced a broader deinition than political 
studies scientists.72 A civil society in socialism 
means that people were able to ind spheres 
where they were able to make their own de-
cisions and manipulate or question oicial 
ideologies and practices. As it appears, Soviet 
people and institutions had developed a wide 
range of strategies and practices to follow in-
terests other than building socialism. Besides 
implementing the social plan, concert organiz-
ers were interested in proits, artists in money, 
glamour and fame. The complexity of the brief 
period of the Estonian musical invasion can 
help us to contemplate the nature of Soviet so-
ciety and its structures beyond the spheres of 
music and culture.
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Between E and U: Alfred Schnitke, Popular Culture and Serious 
Music in Late Soviet Socialism ǻŗş6Ş–ŗşŞŘǼ
Music is not only an acoustic phenome-non. It also has a social meaning, foster-
ing bonds between diferent people grouping 
around common musical practices.1 Music 
can be used to distinguish oneself from oth-
er social groups and practices. Accordingly, 
scholars often claim that “culture” is no sin-
gle entity but divided into a “highbrow” and 
“lowbrow” form. The German language ac-
knowledges this theory by spliting the mu-
sical world2 into “E” (ernst, serious) and “U” 
(Unterhaltung, popular). Whereas “U” refers to 
music whose only purpose appears to be plea-
sure and distraction, “E”-music allegedly aims 
at “higher” values such as cultural knowledge 
and intellectual skills. Talking about “E” and 
“U” is a social operation, separating “higher” 
from “lower” cultural practices. This distinc-
tion emerged during the twentieth century all 
over Europe and several protagonists from 
1  Christian Kaden, Soziale Horizonte von Musik: 
Ein kommentiertes Lesebuch zur Musiksoziologie, Kas-
sel: Bärenreiter, 2006; Christopher Small, Musicking: 
The Meanings of Performing and Listening, Middleton, 
Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1998, pp. 130–144. 
2  I use the term musical world as an analytical con-cept irst described by H.S. ”ecker, “rt Worlds, see. H.-J. Ziemer, Die Moderne hören: Das Konzert als ur-
banes Forum 1890-1940, Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
2008, pp. 23–25. 
the “E”-camp used it frequently.3 Advocates 
of E-music as well as U-music had some good 
arguments on their side. U-music provided 
the cultural commodity for the masses who 
were not able to make sense of the often elit-
ist compositions of Arnold Schoenberg, An-
ton Webern, Paul Hindemith and others. Al-
though heavily criticized as dichotomous and 
simplistic, talking about “E” and “U” remains 
widespread in the cultural studies.
In the Russian Empire, musical education had 
been largely inluenced by the German model 
and continued to be so during Soviet times.4 
ř  Cf. Friedrich Geiger and Frank Hentschel, ȃVor-
wort”, Zwischen “U” und “E”: Grenzüberschreitun-
gen in der Musik nach 1950, eds. idem, Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 7–9 and the contribu-
tions by Tobias Janz (pp. 85–103) and Helmut Rö-
sing (pp. 157–173) in the same volume. In Germa-
ny, especially after the Second World War, Theodor 
Adorno and his disciples were among the most im-
portant advocates of “E”-music. They insisted that 
modern music could help overcome the Nazi past. 
Among others: Frieder Reininghaus, “Das Neue 
kommt besonders vertrackt: Kohärenzen und Di-
vergenzen zwischen politischen und ästhetischen 
Avantgarden”, Musikkulturen in der Revolte: Studien 
zu Rock, Avantgarde und Klassik im Umfeld von ‚1968‘, ed. ”eate Kutschke, StutgartǱ Franz Steiner, ŘŖŖŞ, 
pp. 25–39, here pp. 29–36. Theodor W. Adorno, ȃVers une musique informelleȄ, Quasi una fantasia, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963, pp. 365–437 
and Theodor W. Adorno, Einleitung in die Musik-
soziologie: Zwölf theoretische Vorlesungen, Reinbek 
(Hamburg): Rowohlt 1968.
4  The conservatory of Saint Petersburg was largely 
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Therefore, speaking of “E” and “U” was com-
mon practice in the Soviet music discourse. 
However, on the ideological level, Socialist 
Realism demanded the dissolution of “elitist” 
and “popular-decadent” conceptualizations of 
culture in favor of Soviet mass culture. Fight-
ing “elitist” or “formalist” art was a Soviet rea-
son of state. Socialist Realism, which became 
an authoritative doctrine in the 1930s, demand-
ed composers and musicians to address their 
works to the masses. For them, formalism (l’art 
pour l’art) was the main enemy.5 In theory, the 
diference between ȃEȄ and ȃUȄ ceased to ex-
ist after the establishment of Socialist Realism 
in the Soviet cultural sphere and was only at-
tributed to the capitalist world.6 Does it make 
sense then to speak of “E” and “U” when ana-
lyzing the Soviet musical world? It seems to be 
remarkably diferent from the musical world 
of federal Germany or France where the ierce 
distinction between “E” and “U” became even 
sharper in the course of the twentieth century. 
The ȃE/UȄ-distinction is a powerful tool when 
analyzing the practical level of Soviet music 
production. As we will see, the well-known 
disjunction between composers of “serious” 
classical music (symphonies, operas, cham-
ber music) and composers of estrada (popular 
songsǼ often persisted, regardless of all eforts 
to abandon them. What is more, the taste of 
dominated by German professors in the 19th cen-
tury. Musical theory relied on the works of Adolph 
Marx, cf. Dorothea Redepenning, Geschichte der rus-
sischen und der sowjetischen Musik, Volume 1, Laaber: 
Laaber, 2008, p. 117.
5  On Socialist Realism in music see Marina Frolo-
va-Walker, “The Glib, the Bland, and the Corny: An 
Aesthetic of Socialist RealismȄ, Music and Dictator-
ship in Europe and Latin America, eds. Roberto Illiano 
et al., Turnhout: Brepols 2009, pp. 403–423. A com-
mon and widespread polemic against formalism is 
G[rigorii] Shneerson, O muzyke zhivoi i mertvoi, Mos-
cow: Sovetskii kompozitor, 1964.
6  Sovetskaia muzyka even had its own section of ar-
ticles analyzing and polemicizing the capitalist mu-
sical world which was called “Crisis of Bourgeois 
Music” (Krizis burzhuasnoi muzyki).
cultural elites never ceased to resemble typical 
bourgeois favors: They overtly favored clas-
sical music. The most important institution, 
i.e. the Composers’ Union of the USSR (Sojuz 
kompozitorov SSSR), continued to have depart-
ments for both serious and popular music (es-
trada), but the asymmetry in the treatment of 
the two fractions is obvious.7 Most of the of-
icial debates were concerned with problems 
of serious music. The publication practice of 
the union highlighted the persisting distinc-
tion between ȃEȄ and ȃUȄ as well. The oicial 
(academic) journal Sovetskaia muzyka (Soviet 
Music, 1933–1992) published articles on music 
history, music aesthetics, reviews of musical 
works, event announcements and much more. 
It addressed academic and musically educat-
ed readers who were familiar with musicolog-
ical terminology. The journal’s purpose was 
to communicate the current state of musical 
development and ideological demands to 
these people. In contrast, Muzykal’naia zhizn’ 
(Music life, 1957 et seq.) which was published 
by the Composers’ Union in cooperation with 
the Ministry of Culture, addressed a broad-
er readership.8 Established during the Thaw 
era the “critical-publicist, illustrated” journal 
tried to portray musical life in general. It was 
a direct response to the growing popularity of 
jazz and beat among young Soviet people and 
aimed at propagating the richness and diver-
sity of classical music in an understandable 
way. We cannot ignore that there actually were 
two camps. The Soviet musical world of the 
1950s and 1960s often was separated between 
composers of symphonies, chamber music 
and operas on the one side and composers of 
7  Kiril Tomof, Creative Union: The Professional Or-
ganization of Soviet Composers, 1939–1953, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 37.
8  Both the journal and newspaper were printed by 
the publishing house Kompozitor. 
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songs and estrada music on the other side.9 
A common thesis holds that the distinction 
between “E” and “U” is a key phenomenon 
of urbanization and the emergence of elite 
and popular cultures which wanted to distin-
guish themselves using particular social and 
cultural practices.10 According to systems the-
ory, social systems tend to build subsystems 
with their own modes of operation.11 In this 
speciic case the two subsystems of high and 
low culture began to approach each other not 
in the heyday of Socialist Realism, but only in 
the ŗşŝŖs. There was no more diferentiation, 
but mutual interaction between diferent so-
cial groups, ideas, norms and practices. As the 
Soviet Union reached a historical peak in ur-
banization and industrialization, “E” and “U” 
were moving towards each other.
In order to elucidate the melting of “E” and 
“U” since the 1970s, I would like to refer to 
the biography and work of “lfred Schnitke 
(1934–98). He is widely considered to be one 
of the most renowned Russian composers 
after Dmitri Shostakovich among musical 
enthusiasts as well as academic experts.12 
9 Ingo Grabowsky, “Motor der Verwestlichung: 
Das sowjetische Estrada-Lied 1950-1975”, Osteuro-
pa 62 (4), ŘŖŗŘ, pp. ŘŗȮřśǲ Michel “beßer, “Between 
Cultural Opening, Nostalgia and Isolation – Soviet 
Debates on Jazz between 1953 and 1964”, Jazz behind 
the Iron Curtain, eds. Gertrud Pickhan and R(diger Riter, Frankfurt am MainǱ Peter Lang, ŘŖŗŖ, pp. 
99–116. See also the article by Aimar Ventsel in this 
volume. 
10  Friedrich Geiger and Frank Hentschel relate 
the usage of “E” und “U” to a tradition rooted in 
the twentieth century. Geiger and Hentschel, “Vor-
wort”, pp. 7-8.
11  Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-Becker, Sys-
temtheorie: Eine Einführung für die Geschichts- und 
Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
2001, pp. 35–6.
12  Laurel E. Fay, ȃ“lfred SchnitkeǱ ShostakovichȂs 
HeirȄ, Upbeat for the Los Angeles Philharmonic 7 (3), ŗşşŖ, pp. ŞȮşǲ Yulia Kreinin, ȃ“lfred Schnitke as 
the Successor to Dmitri Shostakovich: To Be Your-
self in Soviet RussiaȄ, Schostakowitsch und die Folgen: 
Russische Musik zwischen Anpassung und Protest, eds. 
Ernst Kuhn, Jascha Nemtsov and Andreas Wehr-
meier, Berlin: Ernst Kuhn 2003, p. 161.
Recent musicological research highlighted 
SchnitkeȂs importance for the Soviet musical 
world of the 1970s and 1980s. His music and 
thought inluenced many Soviet classical com-
posers during the time of late socialism. Con-
certs including SchnitkeȂs works guaranteed 
a large audience.13 His biography is typical for 
a group of so-called “nonconformist” compos-
ers who were educated in the 1960s under the 
impression of the ongoing Thaw.14 After grad-
uating, they experienced setbacks and prob-
lems during the 1970s. These composers were 
neither overt dissidents nor fully integrated in 
the Soviet musical system. Instead, they lived 
under complex and often inconsistent circum-
stancesǱ beneiting from state protectionism 
over the arts but opposing ȃoicialȄ cultural 
demands.15 This group tried to build a musi-
cal world of its own which neither stood apart 
from oicial structures nor was completely in-
tegrated in them.16
Alfred Schnitke on popular music, popular 
music in Schnitke’s works
For “lfred Schnitke, things were quite clearǱ 
The formal border between “E” and “U” was 
unproductive and it was the task of contem-
13 Peter John Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musi-caЧǱ UnoiciaЧ Soviet Music During the Thaw, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 26–67. 
14  “lfred Schnitke, Soia Gubaidulina and Edison 
Denisov were later known as the “Moscow Troika”, 
but usually composers such as Arvo Pärt or Valen-
tin Silvestrov are also added to this group.
15  Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical, pp. 179–ŘŗŜǲ William Norbert Quillen, After the End: New 
Music in Russia from Perestroika to the Present, Berke-
ley, PhD University of California, 2010.
16  Gábor T. Ritersporn, Jan C. ”ehrends and Malte 
Rolf, “Open Spaces and Public Realm: Thoughts on 
the Public Sphere in Soviet-Type Systems”, Sphären 
von Öffentlichkeit in Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs, 
eds. idem, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003, pp. ŚŘř-Śśřǲ “lexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forev-
er, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 
126–158.
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porary composers to bridge this gap. In an in-
terview with Alexander Ivashkin, a longtime 
friend and musician, Schnitke saidǱ
“It is one of my life’s goals to bridge the gap 
between serious [E] and popular [U] music, 
and even if it breaks my neck.”17
Schnitke was fully aware of the dangerous 
aspects of this approach: It could result in 
disregard by fans of rock and jazz and refus-
al as “trivial” or “banal” by his composer col-
leagues. But his fear was without cause: In fact 
his composition relected a changed notion of 
culture that arose in late Soviet socialism. 
During his life, “lfred Schnitke gave count-
less interviews and talks which are an illu-
minating source for his self-appropriation 
and the interpretation of his works. Alfred 
Schnitke and his colleagues were surrounded 
by a musical world in which classical music 
had already lost its hegemony as the dominant 
form of musical art. It also did so in the So-
viet Union – not because of Socialist Realism, 
but because of newly emerging musical forms 
like jazz and especially rock.18 Schnitke recog-
nized the growing role of these developments 
when he stated that there was
[…] again one diferent sphere which comes into 
the museum from the standard outside world – the 
quasi-jazz, all this rockform music –, I am not sure 
if all this is living at all […].19
17  Alexander Iwaschkin, “‘… und wenn es mir den Hals brichtȁǱ Zum Gedenken an “lfred SchnitkeȄ, 
Musik-Texte: Zeitschrift für neue Musik 17, 1999, pp. 
27–8. My translations from German into English.
18  Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: 
The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetro-
vsk, 1960–1985, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Cen-ter Press, ŘŖŗŖǲ Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the 
Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, New York: Oxford University Press, ŗşşŖǲ Michael E. Urban and “ndrei Evdokimov, 
Russia Gets the Blues: Music, Culture, and Community in UnsetЧed Times, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2004.ŗş  “lfred Schnitke, Über das Leben und die Musik: 
Gespräche mit Alexander Iwaschkin, D(sseldorfǱ Econ, 
This quote is interesting because here 
Schnitke revealed his conception of ȃEȄ 
and “U.” The “standard outside world” 
consisted of all everyday surround-
ing inluences like popular music. On 
the contrary, classical music already be-
came a ȃmuseumȄ. Following Schnitke, 
this museum conserves and exhibits the past. 
In another interview, Schnitke seems to see 
his musical home, the world of classical music, 
as a fortress. Waves repeatedly pound against 
this fortress. They take parts of the stronghold 
with them, reshape it, but abate quickly as 
well. Schnitke thinks of jazz and opereta as 
two such waves:
Now we are deaЧing with the third wave [besides 
jazz and opereta]. It is aЧso fading. RocЦ has its 
function, ЧiЦe jazz and opereta had, and so it wiЧЧ 
be in future times.20
In the following, Schnitke even pathologized 
rock music. Responding to Ivashkin’s ques-
tion, if rock music had something pathological 
to it, he said:
Yes, sure. Rock features many interesting things. 
However, I cannot watch these grimace-makers 
ǻFrazenschneiderǼ on teЧevision anymore who pre-
tend to be in extremist situations. This has become 
almost unbearable.21
Schnitke apparently had severe problems 
with his atempts to link ȃEȄ- and ȃUȄ-mu-
sic. He constantly refrained from deining his 
own place in Soviet music culture. His state-
ments are full of inconsistencies. For him the 
“grimace-makers” were no serious members 
of the league of musicians. He strictly tried to 
1998, p. 243. 
20  Ibid., p. 244.
21  Ibid., p. 245.
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distinguish himself from them. His statements 
emphasize the confusion and disorientation 
inside the classical musical world caused by 
new notions of popular culture such as rock 
and pop. However, composers born in the 
1930s already lived during times in which 
popular music had an indisputable signii-
cance. If they did not want to be left behind 
new musical trends, they had to incorporate at 
least some new stylistic devices. This kind of 
composition could hope to reach a larger num-
ber of listeners. 
“ quick survey of SchnitkeȂs works already 
reveals the inluence of popular music styles 
and their importance. ”oth his irst symphony 
and his piano concerto, belonging to the major 
genres of SchnitkeȂs oeuvre, are riddled with 
jazz, rock and other Gebrauchsmusik (music for 
use). The composer used a technique he called 
ȃpolystylismȄ. Schnitke irst used this term 
in October 1971. He then held a lecture at a 
meeting of the International Music Council, a 
sub-organization of UNESCO. The lecture was 
titled “Polystylistic tendencies in contempo-
rary music”.22 Here, Schnitke explained how 
di cult it was to play the allusion game in 
contemporary composition:
[…] it may be that the adoption of a polystylistic 
method reduces the absolute, non-associative value 
of the work, creating the danger of self-consciously 
striving for efect. There are aЧso greater demands 
placed on the general cultural knowledge of the lis-
tener, who must be able to recognize the interplay 
of styles as something done deliberately.
22  “Polistilisticheskie tendentsii v sovremmenoi 
muzyke”. Earliest print: Muzyka v SSSR 2, 1988, pp. ŘŘȮŘŚǲ Valentina Kholopova and Evgeniia Chi-
gareva, Al’fred Shnitke: Ocherk zhizni i tvorchestva, MoskvaǱ Sovetskii kompozitor, ŗşşŖ, pp. řŘŝȮřřŗǲ 
English translation: Alexander Ivashkin, “ Schnit-
ke Reader, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002, pp. 87–91.
“t the same time, Schnitke admited indisput-
able beneits of this methodǱ
But in spite of all the complications and possible 
dangers of the polystylistic method, its merits are 
now obvious. It widens the range of expressive 
possibilities, it allows for the integration of ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ styles, of the ‘banal’ and the ‘recherche’ 
– that is, it creates a wider musical world and a 
general democratization of style.23
“ccording to Schnitke, polystylism allowed 
the incorporation of formerly neglected styles. 
Composing this way, these stylistic levels 
gained a new meaning. One example of this 
is SchnitkeȂs Concerto Grosso No.ŗ ǻŗşŝŝǼ. 
“ccording to Schnitke, it begins with a ȃba-
nal” theme in thirds that imitates a children’s 
song.24 Rubbing seconds of the two solo vio-
lins then dissolve this theme. The main at-
traction of the concerto is concealed in the 
rondo’s tango. On the one hand, this passage 
features typical elements of a tango, but it is 
alienated in instrumentation: a harpsichord 
plays the leading role, the venerable instru-
ment of baroque masters like Handel or Bach. 
Schnitke deliberately merges several stylis-
tic levels and musical languages. According 
to him, the intonated tango was his grand-
mother’s favorite.25 When writing about his 
work, Schnitke explainedǱ
Every banal passage [...] has a fatal function in 
this piece: it interrupts actually every development 
and triumphs also at the end. In our times where 
the most audacious and newest devices already 
seem blunted, the ‘banal’ gains in a confrontation 
in this way an expressiveness of a slightly demonic 
23  Ibid., p. 88.
24  Ivashkin, “ SchnitЦe Reader, pp. 45–47.
25  J(rgen Köchel, “Чfred SchnitЦe zum ŜŖ. Geburts-
tag: Eine Festschrift, Hamburg: Sikorski, 1994, p. 417.
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kind. The ‘banal’ belongs to life and I do not think 
it is necessarily right that trivial music has been 
ignored and turned of for many years by the de-
velopment of avant-garde music. However in my 
concerto grosso the ‘banal’ dominates in temporal, 
but not in spatial terms, but it works quasi from the 
outside interrupting and destroying. I would like to 
mention the tango as an example, or the sentimen-
tal song at the beginning which recurs again and 
again and at the end wrecks everything.26
SchnitkeȂs quote is remarkable for several 
reasons. He himself uses the term “banal” for 
what is called popular music in this paper. For 
him, the “banal” is the unquestioned center 
of musical development. The composer does 
not want to disconnect it from serious music 
as was the case in the ŗşśŖs. Instead, Schnitke 
integrates the “banal” into the meta-form of 
the neo-classical:
So into the framework of a neoclassical concerto 
grosso I introduced some fragments not consonant 
with its general style, which had previously been 
fragments of cinema music […]. ”ut aЧЧ of these 
themes are perfectЧy consonant with each other […] 
and I take them completely seriously.27
However, there actually is an implicit judg-
ment in SchnitkeȂs quotes. He makes this 
clear in some of his statements. In his mind the 
“banal” was dangerous because of its simplic-
ity and clichés leading to “paralyzed individ-
uality”.28 Banal music was the “Faustian evil” 
that masked the true and good.29 Schnitke 
26  Ibid.
27  Ivashkin, “ SchnitЦe Reader, pp. 45-6 (original: 
Dmitri I. Shul’gin, Gody neizvestnosti Al’freda Shnit-
ke: Besedy s kompozitorom, Moskva: Delovaia liga, 
1993, pp. 243–4).ŘŞ “lfred Schnitke, Über das Leben und die Musik, 
p. 201.
29  Dorothea Redepenning, „Inszenierungen von 
’Gut‘ und ’Böseȁ in “lfred Schnitkes Instrumen-
used diferent styles as tools to express dif-
ferent feelings, situations etc. He shared this 
functionalist approach with many of his com-
poser colleagues. “Banal”, “popular music” 
had its place in SchnitkeȂs music, but he had a 
certain hierarchy between the diferent styles 
in mind. His use of popular music therefore 
had its own agenda. It was the result of a the-
oretical and practical relection of cultural 
practices.
“E”, “U” and the tret’e napravlenie (third di-
rection)
In the 1970s, “E” and “U” were no clearly dis-
tinguishable fractions anymore. Soviet cultur-
al politics contributed to this by commiting 
Soviet composers to write both academic and 
popular music. The Soviet state forcefully ed-
ucated its citizens to become cultivated people 
and demanded its composers to contribute 
to this project. Even well-known composers 
of “serious” music like Dmitri Kabalevskii, 
Dmitri Shostakovich or Georgii Sviridov did 
not think of themselves as too important to 
serve “democratic” art and wrote popular 
music as well.30 Additionally, the 1970s in the 
Soviet Union saw the rise of a “phenomenon 
[...], which crossed genres and styles of difer-
ent levels”.31 One trigger was Andrew Lloyd 
Webber’s rock opera Jesus Christ Superstar. Al-
ready in 1971, magnitizdat (tapes) copies of a 
Russian version of the musical circulated. Lat-
er, the news broadcast Vremia even used one 
of its themes as a fanfare.32 Timothy Ryback 
holds that Jesus Christ Superstar was “every-
talmusik“, “Чfred SchnitЦeǱ “naЧyse, Interpretation, 
Rezeption, ed. Amrei Flechsig, Hildesheim: Olms, 
2010, pp. 71–91.
30  Redepenning, Geschichte der russischen und sow-
jetischen Musik, Volume 2, Laaber: Laaber 2008, p. 
699.
31 Ibid.
32  Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc, p. 241.
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where” in the Soviet Union throughout the 
1970s. According to Ryback, a whole hippie 
cult emerged around the rock opera. More 
tolerance towards popular styles seemed to 
arise among functionaries. In August 1973 the 
journal Inostrannaia Literatura (Foreign Litera-
ture) compared Jesus Christ Superstar with the 
works of Dostoevskii and Bulgakov and there-
by raised it into the spheres of high culture.33 
Even Shostakovich saw one performance of 
the musical in 1972 in London and spoke well 
of it. Successively, more and more composers 
thought of daring to mingle rock and classical 
music. A whole series of rock operas respec-
tively classical music with rock-styled pas-
sages emerged. This established a movement 
that is now described as the so-called tret’e 
napravlenie (third direction).34 Peter Schmelz 
demonstrated how Aleksandr Zhurbin’s rock 
opera Orpheus and Eurydice (Orfei i Evredika, 
irst performance ŗşŝśǼ assumed a pioneering 
role. Until 1979 this work was performed over 
800 times in the Soviet Union and celebrated 
frenetically. The newspaper Iunost’ (Youth) 
covered the irst performance including an en-
thusiastic review by Mikhail Provorov which 
also contributed to the immense success. But 
Zhurbin’s opera was not the only one. Today, 
Aleksei Rybnikov’s Junos i Avos is known even 
beter, and many more could be mentioned. 
Composers of “serious” music who saw them-
selves as being part of a long tradition start-
ing with Palestrina and Bach could not escape 
this development. Schnitke himself never 
missed an opportunity to hear a recording of 
Jesus Christ Superstar.35 He also asked Zhurbin 
33  Idem, pp. 149-50.
34  Levon Hakobian, Music of the Soviet Age, 1917-
1987, Stockholm: Melos Music Literature, 1998, p. řŗŚǲ Tamara Levaia, Istoriia otechestvennoi muzyki 
vtoroi poloviny XX veka, Sankt-Peterburg: Kompozi-
tor, 2005, p. 202.
35  Peter Schmelz, ȃȂCruciied on the Cross of Mass 
Culture’: Late Soviet Genre Politics in Alexander 
to give him a short version of his opera. One 
example for the merging of rock and classical 
music is SchnitkeȂs Requiem which was com-
posed in ŗşŝŚ/ŗşŝś.36 It was writen after the 
death of SchnitkeȂs mother and marks a new 
step in the development of his use of forms. 
The requiem was writen as stage music for 
Schiller’s Don Carlos and shares all atributes 
of the “classic” catholic requiem. The small in-
strumental ensemble is boosted by an electric 
guitar and a drum set, both of which join the 
ensemble at the end of the Credo. This was a 
slight provocation: The Christian statement 
of faith which is performed in a classic cho-
ral set culminates in rockbeats. We have no 
evidence how the auditorium perceived this 
antinomy. However, SchnitkeȂs biography 
clearly falsiies the hypothesis that he banal-
ized or mocked Christian values. In the 1980s, 
Schnitke was baptized and became a member 
of the Catholic Church. He became part of a 
newly emerged religious movement in Sovi-
et music and society.37 His use of rock instru-
ments was also inluenced by his family lifeǱ 
His own son Andrei became a rock enthu-
siast early on and was a typical exponent of 
YurchakȂs ȃLast Soviet GenerationȄ. Schnitke 
followed this development with interest and 
atention.38
The tret’e napravlenie was a very important part 
of SchnitkeȂs life. On the aesthetic as well as 
on the biographic level, mutual interaction be-
Zhurbin’s Rock Opera Orpheus and Eurydice”, 
Journal of Musicological Research 28, 2009, pp. 61–87, 
here: p. 68. Schmelz recounts a story by Georgii 
Sviridov, Muzyka kak sud’ba, Moskva: Molodaia 
Gvardiia, 2002, p. 151.
36  Aleksandr V. Ivashkin, “Чfred SchnitЦe, London: 
Phaidon, 1996, p. 34.
37  Natal’ia Gulianitskaia, Poetika muzykal’noi kom-
pozitsii: teoreticheskie aspekty russkoi duchovnoi muzyki 
XX  veka, Moskva: Iazyki slavianskoi kul’tury, 2002.
38  “ndrei Schnitke collaborated with his father in several musical projects were “lfred Schnitke com-
bined classical and rock elements. Ivashkin, Alfred SchnitЦe, p. 189. 
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tween rock and classical music occurred. The 
composer relected this development several 
times and gave his opinion on it. Things were 
complicated: The statements mentioned above 
lead to the conclusion that Schnitke had a di-
vision in “high” and “low” cultural styles in 
his mind. 
“n analysis of SchnitkeȂs composing tech-
niques should not stop at this point. Put in its 
wider context, SchnitkeȂs merging of ȃEȄ and 
“U” can serve as an apt topic for gaining new 
insights in late Soviet socialism. 
Music history as social history: New spaces 
in late socialism 
After Stalin’s death, a growing absence of con-
licts dominated the cultural system in the So-
viet Union.39 The militant batles against elitist 
and decadent culture of the Stalin era slowed 
down signiicantly. Ideological control, aes-
thetic demands and perception paterns had 
the chance to reconigure in a remarkable 
way. Popular music became the main pace-
maker of a new youth movement. The Sev-
enth World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957 
initiated an unprecedented cultural exchange 
‘across the blocs’.40 Since these days, jazz was 
accompanied by beat as a new musical wave. 
But telling ‘parting-the-iron-curtain-stories’ 
is not enough.41 There was no simple transfer 
39 Dietrich Beyrau, Intelligenz und Dissens: Die russi-
schen Bildungsschichten in der Sowjetunion 1917–1985, GчtingenǱ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ŗşşř, p. ŗśŜ.
40  Kristin Roth-Ey, “’Loose girls’ on the Loose? Sex, 
Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival”, Women 
in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Melanie Ilic, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ŘŖŖŚ, pp. ŝśȮşśǲ Juliane F(rst, 
“The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities 
in Soviet Youth Culture and Policy between Stalin 
and Khrushchev”, The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: 
Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrush-
chev Era, ed. Polly Jones, London: Routledge, 2006, 
pp. 135–153. 
41  Kristin J. Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How 
the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the 
Cultural Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
of western norms and practices to the Soviet 
Union. Instead, an individual culturally in-
formed adoption took place. Socialist singers 
and groups were as famous and well-known 
as Bill Hailey. The most famous form of pop-
ular music, the estrada, oscillated between 
ȃȁoicialȂ and ȁlyricalȂȄ, between ȃSovietȄ and 
“Western” styled songs.42 For musicians as 
well as music functionaries, western-style jazz 
and estrada represented a free creative space 
which was less restricted and formalized in 
contrast to mass songs or classical music. In 
addition, composing jazz and estrada was very 
proitableǱ Jazz musician Oskar Strok for ex-
ample earned twice as much per year as Tik-
hon Khrennikov, the chairman of the Com-
posers’ Union.43 
Jazz and rock atracted musicians and com-
posers because of their wide reach into Sovi-
et society and the relative free space in which 
they were created. Demographic factors 
played a role, too. After the end of World War 
II, the Soviet Union witnessed a baby boom in 
which the number of births rose explosively 
from the 1950s to the 1960s.44 Eastern social-
ist states therefore faced problems of youth 
and youth policy on a new qualitative level. 
Nikita Khrushchev called these young people 
“builders of communism” who were to over-
come the old world. Because of that, issues 
of education and moral principles were on 
the agendas of party and state.45 The path to 
large-scale repression and violence was closed 
2011, p. 10.
42  Grabowksy, “Motor der Verwestlichung”, p. 26.
43  Idem, p. 25.
44  Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet baby boomers: An Oral 
History of Russia’s Cold War Generation, Oxford: Ox-ford University Press, ŘŖŗŘǲ Juliane F(rst, Stalin’s 
Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emer-
gence of Mature Socialism, Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2010. 
45  Katharina Barbara Uhl, Building Communism: 
The Young Communist League during the Soviet Thaw 
Period, 1953–1964, DPhil Oxford, ŘŖŗřǲ F(rst, ȃThe 
Arrival of Spring?Ȅ, pp. 135–153.
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since the days of Khrushchev. Under Khrush-
chev and Leonid Brezhnev, cultural policies 
were dominated by moderate “laissez-faire”. 
Although functionaries clung to the older dis-
cursive patern such as Socialist Realism, they 
de facto allowed much wider free spaces. This 
ofered musicians new possibilities.46 Only 
under this precondition could composers of 
“serious” music lean towards popular music 
in the 1970s. 
* * *
This article demonstrated that there existed 
mutual interactions between “E” and “U” on 
the aesthetic level. One has to admit that it 
is a commonplace to talk about postmodern 
style-mixtures in the music of the 1970s,47 but 
analyzing speciic historical and biograph-
ic contexts nevertheless highlights new fea-
tures of late Soviet socialism. “E” and “U” 
came closer in new formats like the rock op-
era. Both “E” and “U” were part of the living 
environment (Lebenswelt) of young people in 
the Soviet Union.48 It was nothing special to 
absorb the “classic European heritage” of Mo-
zart and Beethoven in piano lessons and at 
the same time to hear the rifs of Pink Floyd, 
Deep Purple and other rock bands at Kom-
somol parties.49 The boundary between “E” 
46  Cf. Boris Belge, “Zwischen Polystilistik und SozrealismusǱ Die Schnitke-Rezeption in der So-
wjetunion 1974–1981Ȅ, Postmoderne hinter dem Ei-sernen VorhangǱ WerЦ und Rezeption “Чfred SchnitЦes im Kontext ost- und miteЧeuropäischer MusiЦdisЦurse, 
eds. Stefan Weiss and Amrei Flechsig, Hildesheim: 
Olms 2013, pp. 155–169. 
47  Alex Ross, The Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twen-
tieth Century, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, ŘŖŖŝ, pp. śŗśȮśśŞǲ Jчrn-Peter Hiekel, ȃ‚Postmoder-
ne‘ im Musikdiskurs: Einige Einsichten und An-
sichtenȄ, Postmoderne hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, 
eds. Stefan Weiss and Amrei Flechsig, pp. 15–35.
48  Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City.
49  Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, pp. 207-238. 
Many of the rock enthusiasts of the 1970s and 1980s 
probably had classical training in playing the violin 
or the piano. 
and “U” became more blurred than before. 
Many elements of popular culture such as 
jazz improvisations became integrated parts 
of high culture Ȯ SchnitkeȂs irst sympho-
ny’s second movement has a jazz improvi-
sation in the middle.50 At the same time, jazz 
musicians and rockers debated whether their 
musical styles should meet academic expecta-
tions and lamented the accompanying loss of 
spontaneity. The new concepts and practices 
of popular culture as well as tret’e napravlenie 
deinitely challenged the existing discourse of 
Socialist Realism. However, the dominating 
medium in which this process took place was 
not the writen form. Instead, we face a negoti-
ation without words, an often silent adaption 
towards new demands in cultural production.
Not all composers of the Brezhnev era walked 
over the bridge between “E” and “U.” Com-
poser Soia Gubaidulina for example insist-
ed on using only “serious” techniques in her 
compositions and focused on religious mate-
rial for innovation.51 Furthermore, the contact 
between classic and rock/jazz in the Soviet 
Union seems to be rather a rendezvous than 
a long-term union. In the days of Perestroi-
ka and after the fall of the Iron Curtain both 
camps again went their own ways. Schnitke 
for example moved to Hamburg where he was 
absorbed by the German classical music con-
text. Compared to the Soviet musical world, 
the divide between “E” and “U” persisted 
much stronger in Germany. The phenome-
50 Redepenning, Geschichte der russischen und sow-
jetischen Musik, Volume Ř, pp. ŜŞş-şŖǲ Jean-”enoît Tremblay, ȃ“lfred Schnitke and Musical Post-
modernism: The First Symphony as Case Study”, 
Postmoderne hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, eds. Stefan 
Weiss and Amrei Flechsig, pp. 93–107. 
51  Valentina N. Cholopova and Enzo Restagno, Soiia GubaiduЧinaǱ Monograiia, Moskva: Kompozi-tor, ŗşşŜ, pp. şş-ŗŖŜǲ “ntony Copley, Music and the 
Spiritual: Composers and Politics in the 20th Century, LondonǱ Ziggurat ”ooks, ŘŖŗŘǲ Michael Kurz, So-ia GubaiduЧinaǱ “ ”iography, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007. 
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non of SchnitkeȂs polystylist music was ab-
sorbed by this divide. From now on, he was 
known again as a “classical” composer and 
avant-gardist only.52 
Did Schnitke ȃbreak his neckȄ bridging the 
gap? Probably not. Against his own fears, 
SchnitkeȂs ambitions constituted his long-last-
ing fame. In the ŗşşŖs, Schnitke was the most 
played twentieth-century Russian composer in 
Germany. Recordings of his works sold very 
well. His success was not only based on his 
indisputable tremendous compositional skills. 
Schnitke felt the zeitgeist and knew when to 
break with elitist musical styles like serialism. 
In doing so, he responded to an altered per-
ceptional behavior in Soviet musical society. 
He also noticed the partial reconiguration of 
Soviet music life after twenty years of inten-
sive musical exchange between East and West. 
“t the same time, ironically, Schnitke was in 
some ways a disciple of Soviet-style musical 
ideology. Although this sounds rather provoc-
ative, in contrast to western composers Schnit 
tke addressed his music to larger audiences, 
 
52  SchnitkeȂs life and work after the fall of the 
Soviet Union urgently needs further research. Cf. 
Amrei Flechsig, „Polyperspektivischer Unterricht: “lfred Schnitkes Wirken als Kompositionslehrerȃ, 
Postmoderne hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang, eds. Stefan Weiss and “mrei Flechsig, pp. ŗřşȮŗśśǲ R. Flender, 
„Al’fred Shnitke v Gamburge“, Al’fredu Shnitke pos-
viashchaetsia, Vypusk 4, eds. Alla Bogdanova and 
Elena Dolinskaia, Moskva: Kompozitor, 2004, pp. 
107–109.
and in this spirit massovost’ (music for a great 
audience) was not foreign to him. Of course
Schnitke never would have called himself a 
socialist realist.53 But it is this special concept of 
musical composition that so many people, espe-
cially in Germany missed. For them, Schnitke 
remained a composer of the “E”-fraction. It 
is deinitely time to overcome this labeling. 
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Ways of Life at a Crossroads. Aksënov’s Ostrov Krym 
(Island of Crimea) 
The following article addresses aspects of 
everyday culture in the ictional space of the 
alternative Crimea. It takes the novel Ostrov 
Krym (Island of Crimea) as an example, tracing 
some of its references to cultural visions and 
habits, and the function they carry out for the 
text structure and the novelȂs efect. What we 
ind are dominant, historically still popular 
cultural ‘voices’ as the two main positions of 
the novel are caught between the western and 
the eastern world. The main tension, centered 
on the afair of the male and the female main 
character, conveys the traditional question of 
which way Russia should develop. Both cul-
tural layers and the narrative structure are 
characterized by antagonisms and ambiva-
lences, combining mass culture and high cul-
ture, sympathy and antipathy for the Soviet 
Union and for Crimea / Ȃthe WestȂ, respectively. 
Using this approach, the novel tries not to ro-
manticize Crimea as a southern, arcadian, per-
haps superior place in contrast to the Soviet 
Union, but as an indispensable part of it – and 
at the same time as a distorting mirror of the 
western world. This article tries to participate 
in the narrative’s discussion without coming 
too close to the proposed cultural concepts. It 
aims for a close reading which tries to avoid 
any policitally biased labelling of these visions. 
Aspects of popular culture in Vasilii P. 
Aksënov’s Ostrov Krym (Island of Crimea)
When exploring popular culture in the late So-
viet Union, it is worth taking ictional literature 
into account as well. By way of condensation 
and ǻre-Ǽproduction of knowledge, iction can 
be regarded as a parallel discourse to the em-
pirical world which condenses mass culture, 
subculture and also the so-called high cul-
ture in the case of Russian literature. My pre-
ferred terms ‘way of life’ / ‘everyday culture’ 
(in Russian: byt) comprise popular culture in 
the sense of mass culture, and subculture in 
the sense of alternative culture – their mean-
ing depends on the context as they overlap. 
In terms of Russian popular culture, we deal 
with a concept that grew in the second half 
of the nineteenth century from sympathy for 
narodnost’, the simple folk, peasant life and 
equitable forms of possessions. While authors 
like Gertsen, Chernyshevskii and Dobroliubov 
elaborated their utopian socialism in opposi-
tion to the tsarist regime, the ideal of justice for 
all classes has been implemented in the oi-
cial, state-controlled mass culture in the Soviet 
Union. In Soviet literature and arts the corre-
sponding aesthetical programme is known as 
the style of social realism proclaimed in 1934.
Abstract
Aksënov’s novel Ostrov Krym (Island of Crimea) plays with the idea that Crimea is not a peninsula 
but an isolated, non-Soviet, liberal island. The narrative tension, centred on the afair of the male and 
the female main character, asks whether Russia should develop towards the western or the eastern 
world. Aksënov’s novel can be read as part of the underground pop culture in the late Soviet Union 
as well as a space for discussion of its non-oicial, desired, demanded or dreaded cultural vectors.
Keywords: Aksënov,  Crimea,  alternative  vision,  Eastern  vs.  Western  Europe,  mass  culture  and 
high  culture.
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The deinition of popular culture leads us to a 
complex history of the term, reaching across 
Europe and based on its opposition to ‘high 
culture’. In the German-language countries 
the post-war discourse is determined by scep-
ticism towards the supericial and illusive 
mass amusement. Within this academic di-
vision a post-Herderian interest in mass cul-
ture (Volks- and Alltagskultur) rather emanates 
from empirical cultural studies, whereas ‘high 
culture’, including literature, is investigated 
mainly by theoretical orientated philologies.1 
While the later primarily focuses on aesthet-
ics of canonical works, British cultural stud-
ies have drawn atention to the social func-
tion of text genres outside the oicial literary 
canon. They instead belong to youth culture, 
for example song texts and sex-and-violence 
novels.2 In the beginning of the 1990s this ap-
proach was criticized for its naive optimism 
as mass culture inevitably involves consum-
erism and ideological appropriation.3 At the 
same time, the diference between ȁhighȂ and 
‘low’ cultures fades away with the increasing 
usage of plurimedial electronic mass media. 
In Russia of the twentieth century, literature, 
even artistically sophisticated literature, of-
ten seems to belong to both elite culture and 
cultural heritage familiar to millions of people 
such as poems and quotations often known 
by heart. Due to this culture of reception, the 
value of published and forbidden books, the 
density of intertextual references between 
1  For a detailed history of the term see: Her-mann Herlinghaus, ȃPopulär/volkst(mlich/ 
Popularkultur”, Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches 
Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, eds. Karl-Heinz ”arck et al., vol. Ś, StutgartǱ J. ”. Mezler Verlag, 
2002, pp. 832–884.
2  Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of 
Working-Class Life with Special Reference to Publica-
tions and Entertainments, London: Chato and Win-
dus, 1957, p. 251.
3  Lawrence Grossberg, We Gota Get Out of This 
Place: Rock, die Konservativen und die Postmoderne, 
Wien: Löcker, 2010 (1992). 
self-preserving text systems, and large-scale 
printing, the “good old” book deserves to be 
called a Soviet/Russian mass medium of the 
twentieth century. Thus, literature relects the 
typical Russian way of life and, at the same 
time, reading is part of everyday practices. 
In addition to that, literature provides poten-
tially polysemantical space for the interaction 
of cultural signs. Fictional explorations of cul-
ture arise when the text creates a semantical 
space for several cultural ‘voices’. The most 
interesting scenario does not aim to establish 
a hierarchy of certain messages, but lets the 
readers instead decide which position they 
would like to take towards the phenomena 
presented. As Raymond Williams, one of the 
cultural studies scholars, writes: “A culture 
has two aspects: the known meanings and direc-
tions, which its members are trained to; the new 
observations and meanings, which are ofered and 
tested.” 4 This batle between inclusion and ex-
clusion remains a trait of culture in general. 
Not only after the alphabetization and writing 
campaigns in the Soviet Union, but also before 
the October Revolution, literature and jour-
nalism were the main media of politically con-
troversial opinions on culture for centuries, 
despite waves of suppression and censorship. 
Actually, popular culture might be considered 
as a voice itself in a totalitarian state, as it is 
partly inside the oicial discourse and partly 
outside. The chosen writer and this novel were 
prominent representatives of a subcultural 
network of oicially hardly acknowledged 
writers in the late Soviet Union. It was not un-
til after StalinȂs death that the irst subculture 
– the so called stiliagi5 – appeared in the Sovi-
4  Raymond Williams, “Culture Is Ordinary“ (1958), 
Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism, ed. Robin Gable, London / New YorkǱ Verso, ŗşŞş, pp. 
3-14, here p. 12. 
5  The ‘stiliaga’-movement was a youth subculture 
in bigger cities in the USSR from the 1940s until the 
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et Union. Vasilii P. Aksënov (1932-2009), son 
of Evgenia Ginzburg, had a dissident back-
ground, and lived as a ‘stiliaga’ in the Soviet 
Union. This was part of the non-oicial pop-
ular culture, which was primarily available to 
the youth of the elite and was expressed by 
literature, too. Together with Viktor V. Ero-
feev he co-edited the underground almanach 
MetrOpol. After publishing prose like Kollegi 
(Colleagues, 1960) and Zviezdnyi bilet (Ticket to 
the Stars, 1961) in the magazine Iunost’, Aksën-
ov was considered as one of the authors con-
tributing to the Thaw ǻotepeЧȂǼ and a member 
of the so called Shestidesiatniki movement. 
Aksënov’s texts, which use slang and are not 
prudish, were read and welcomed by the 
young generation as an afront against the 
oicial aesthetics and values.6 He turned out 
to be an author some of whose works had to 
wait for decades to be published in the So-
viet Union and who had to leave his home-
land with the consequence that the state 
withdrew his citizenship in January 1981.7 
This biographical background represents 
one of the ‘cultural voices’ in Ostrov Krym.8 
The novel’s most striking assumption plays 
with a geographical idea: Crimea is not a pen-
insula but an island. In addition to that, it as-
sumes an alternative historical development 
by the suggestion that the Russian civil war 
ends when the tsarist forces are able to hold on 
to this southern piece of the old empire. After 
1960s. These young people were keen on the Amer-
ican way of life, western music and dance with the 
tendency to dress in a non-Soviet way and establish 
their own slang. For more information view the ar-
ticle by Gleb Tsipursky in this volume.
6  Viktor Esipov, “Chetyre zhizni Vasiliia Akseno-
va”, Vasilii Aksenov – odinokii begun na dlinnye dis-
tancii, ed. Viktor Esipov, Moskva: Astrel’, pp. 7-18, 
p. 9. 
7  Citizenship was returned to him in 1990.
8  Vasilii Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, Ann Arbor: Ardis 
ŗşŞŗǲ Vassily Aksyonov: The Island of Crimea, transl. 
by Michael H. Heim, New York: Aventura, 1984.
the Whites defeated the Red Army in 1920 they 
preserved an aristocratic Russia which was de-
veloping in a capitalist, liberal, economically 
and politically more successful way than the 
Soviet Union. This isolated, Swiss-like Crimea 
stayed neutral during and after World War II. 
The novel, originally published in samizdat, 
contributed to Aksënov’s popularity in Mos-
cow’s underground. It might reveal “the au-
thor’s frustration with the West’s gullibility 
in its relation to the Soviet Union”,9 relect-
ing the disappointment of the Shestidesiat-
niki and their lack of action. Writen in ŗşŝş 
shortly before his emigration, Ostrov Krym 
irst oicially appeared in “nn “rbor in ŗşŞŗ 
after Aksënov moved to the United States in 
1980. In the Soviet Union, it was only pub-
lished in ŗşşŖ in the irst issues of the mag-
azine Iunost’ – the bestseller of the year.
First of all, the book was understood as a 
critique of the Soviet invasion politics. Pri-
marily, Aksënov’s fantasy island provokes 
the stagnated Soviet oicial culture of the 
Brezhnev-era with an integrating approv-
al of both pre-revolutionary and western 
everyday culture. Looking back, the nov-
el anticipates the cultural period after 1985:
The reordering of popular culture since Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s advent to power in 1985 after the 
brief interludes of Andropov and Chernenko 
was marked by unprecedented freedom of 
expression – the cultural side of glasnost – and a 
legitimation by the authorities of spontaneously 
generated culture from below. This brought 
changes in reading habits, show atendance, iЧm 
and television viewing, musical styles, and non-
structured leisure; the quickening of amateur 
culture; and a decentralization of cultural life 
9  Konstantin Kustanovich, The Artist and the Tyrant: 
Vassily Aksenov’s Works in the Brezhnev Era, Colum-
bus: Slavica, 1992, p. 37.
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through the spread of electronic media. […]
The new popular culture – much of it legalized ‘old’ 
culture – contained strong currents of iconoclasm, 
demythologizing, and open irreverence. The ridicule 
of sacred icons that could previously be voiced only in 
underground anecdotes, paintings, and songs was 
now pubЧicЧy heard. For the irst time in memory, 
nude pictures and obscene lyrics appeared in public 
places as did heretofore unseen levels of shock and 
violence in movies and TV. This evoked counter 
currents of envy, resentment, and hostility.10
Moreover, the novel is an example of a belle-
tristic vision that has become common cultural 
knowledge, a part of Russian everyday culture. 
Zoia Boguslavskaia made a similar observation 
on Aksënov’s use of subcultural oral language: 
“˘˓ ˏˆ Ак˖ʺˑ˓ʵ ʵˑʺ˖ ʵ ˏˆ˘ʺ˕а˘˙˕˙ ʶ˓˕˓ʹ˖к˓ˇ 
ː˓ˏ˓ʹʺжˑ˩ˇ ˖ˏʺˑʶ ˑаˣаˏа ˦ʺ˖˘ˆʹʺ˖ˮ˘˩ˠ, ˘˓ 
ˏˆ ː˓ˏ˓ʹʺж˪ заʶ˓ʵ˓˕ˆˏа ˮз˩к˓ː ʺʶ˓ ʶʺ˕˓ʺʵ”.11 
“gain, ǻictionalǼ slang carries cultural and 
political connotation in the considered nov-
el as it stands for a new international youth 
culture (Iaki) in Crimea. Together with em-
bodiments of virulent cultural-political ideas 
by main igures, characters drawn in black-
and-white, an action-led dramaturgy, and, 
in terms of its genre, political tensions, the 
novel has an entertaining style of a pop-cul-
tural product like a spy novel or political 
thriller. “Writen in the Чate ŗşŝŖs, the Crimean 
noveЧ is a thoroughЧy ictionaЧ assessment of the 
same period, a parody on a James Bond fantasy.”12 
This impression arises straight from the begin-
10  Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertain-
ment and Society since 1900, Cambridge et al.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992, p. 178.
11  Ibid., p. 8: “Either Aksënov has transfered young 
people’s slang of the 1960s into literature or the 
young people have started to speak the language of 
his protagonists.” (My translation.)
12  Olga Matich, “Vasilii Aksënov and the Literature 
of Convergence: Ostrov Krym as Self-Criticism”, 
Slavic Review 47.4, 1988, pp. 642-651, here p. 643.
ning. In Ostrov Krym, popular culture delivers 
a means for the ‘popping up’ of converse cul-
tural-political ideas advocated by interacting 
protagonists and by historical coincidence. 
The nuance of ’pop-up’, a suddenly imposed 
proposition, starts with the ictitious, acciden-
tally emerging topography of an island. The 
narrative proposes that after the October Revo-
lution the Whites led to Crimea on foot across 
the frozen sea separating it from the Soviet 
landmass. The Bolsheviki were not able to fol-
low them because a British vessel, positioned 
in the Black Sea, shot at the ice, causing it to 
break under the feet of the pursuers. Therefore, 
its spatial structure determines the political 
development of Crimea as well as its economy. 
Like its extraordinary geography, its wealth 
seems to emerge of its own accord, when we 
follow the thoughts of the male protagonist 
Luchnikov, who introduces us to this place: 
’ʅ˘к˙ʹа ʵ˖ʺ-˘акˆ ʵзˮˏ˓˖˪ ˑа˦ʺ ʴ˓ʶа˘˖˘ʵ˓?Ȃ 
– ʵ ˘˩˖ˮˣˑ˩ˇ ˕аз ˖˔˕а˦ˆʵаˏ ˖ʺʴˮ ʁ˙ˣˑˆ-
к˓ʵ, ʶˏˮʹˮ ˖ ˟˕ˆ˙˫ˮ ʵˑˆз ˑа ʴˏаʶ˓ʹа˘ˑ˙˭ зʺ-
ˏʺˑ˙˭ зʺːˏ˭, ʶʹʺ ːʺˏ˪каˏˆ ˔˕ˮː˓˙ʶ˓ˏ˪ˑ˩ʺ, 
˘˕ʺ˙ʶ˓ˏ˪ˑ˩ʺ, ˓ʵаˏ˪ˑ˩ʺ, ˔˓ˣк˓ʵˆʹˑ˩ʺ ˔ˮ˘-
ˑа ˔ˏаʵа˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˩ˠ Ȃ˔˙ˏ˓ʵȂ ˆ ʶʹʺ ˔˓ ʵ˪˭˧ˆː˖ˮ 
ːʺ˖˘ˑ˩ː ʹ˓˕˓ʶаː ːʺʹˏʺˑˑ˓ ʵ ʴ˓ˏ˪˦ˆˠ Ȃка-
ʹˆˏˏакаˠȂ ʺзʹˆˏˆ ʹ˕˙ʶ к ʹ˕˙ʶ˙ ʵ ʶ˓˖˘ˆ зажˆ-
˘˓ˣˑ˩ʺ ˮкˆ. Аː˓˕аˏ˪ˑ˓ ʴ˓ʶа˘аˮ ˖˘˕аˑа.13
These landscapes appear like an exaggerated 
image of the prototypical ‘beautiful island’, 
especially as they form the seting for adven-
tures reminiscent of western political thrill-
13  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, pp. ŗŘ-ŗřǲ “ksyonov, The 
Island of Crimea, p. 8: “Where does all our wealth 
come from? Luchnikov asked himself for the thou-
sandth time, looking down over the land-of-plen-ty landscape doted with rectangular, triangular, 
oval, and kidney-shaped swimming pools and 
crisscrossed by winding back roads now bearing 
Cadillacs full of wealthy Yakis to their wealthy Yaki 
friends. Yes, an immorally rich country.” 
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ers, and they remain the focus of the novel, 
regardless of its shifts to Moscow and Paris. 
Dialogical entanglement of the protagonists
The novel’s dialogical structure within the tri-
angle Crimea – Moscow – Paris is underpinned 
by the main characters Andrei Luchnikov and 
TatȂiana Lunina who have a love afair, and 
whose interaction embodies the geocultural 
disruption between the island and the rest of 
Europe. Both work in the mass media, which 
is necessary for the dissemination of popu-
lar culture: Andrei is the editor-in-chief of a 
nostalgic magazine promoting the idea of a 
‘common destiny’ with Russia, while Luni-
na hosts the television programme Vremia in 
Moscow, and later on becomes a spy working 
for the Soviet Union in Crimea. They are both 
physical: Like Luchnikov, Lunina is dedicat-
ed to sports as a former professional athlete. 
Luchnikov, the leader of the party Common 
Destiny, represents the majority of the island’s 
population which longs for reuniication with 
the Soviet Union and expects a peaceful transi-
tion. He ofers a slow and non-violent reunion 
with the Soviet Union, which initially agrees, 
but then starts to invade Crimea forceful-
ly, eliminating all opponents. The end of the 
novel, in particular, is reminiscent of a sus-
pense-packed thriller: Andrei’s son manages 
to escape with his girlfriend and their baby, the 
symbol of a future reborn. The ending can be 
interpreted as either a tragic or happy end and, 
looking at it after the spring of 2014, as antic-
ipatory from both points of view – that of the 
Russian medial reception ǻpeaceful reuniica-
tion) and the western one (illegal occupation).
Due to the narrative’s changing personal point 
of view we are able to experience that place 
through the eyes of the protagonists but still 
from a distant perspective. ”oth igures can be 
called ‘experiencing mediums’ representing 
ambivalent cultural concepts around the Rus-
sian idea: Luchnikov stands for the pre-Soviet 
Russian idea with a tendency to sovietize it, 
and Lunina stands for the Soviet Russian idea 
with a westernizing tendency. Luchnikov is 
searching for the Russian ‘spirit’ but this en-
deavour is broken by ironic momentsǲ simi-
larly Lunina’s quest for the Crimean life with 
Luchnikov is foiled by her emotional return to 
her husband in Moscow. The partners comple-
ment each other, demonstrating how Soviet 
order longs for Crimea (Lunina) and how the 
Crimean order (Luchnikov) feeds a nostalgic 
atitude towards an ideal Russia ȁbehindȂ the 
Soviet Union. In sum, they contribute to the 
popularization of Crimea as a place of pleasure 
and passion, but also as one of unpredictability 
where fate / the sujet might suddenly change. 
The narrator takes a relatively outside position 
in a Bakhtinian sense, allowing us to watch 
from this perspective a low of diferent, even 
antagonistic ‘cultural voices’.14 The characters 
rarely speak for themselves in the irst person. 
With the introspection into the protagonists’ 
experiences, the narrator enters and conveys 
the traits of a speciic way of life on Crimea 
where their ambivalence increases: They are 
exposed to diferent everyday cultures in 
the laboratory of ictional space, transmiting 
contradictions and overlaps to the reader.
While Luchnikov mainly represents the 
Crimean order by taking it for granted, Lun-
ina is the narration’s guide through the 
Crimean world as a would-be local who in 
fact remains a stranger. With the help of her 
often naïve perception, the narrator not only 
informs the reader about the speciics of life 
14  ”akhtin has deined heteroglossy as a plurali-
ty of ‘voices’ without the author’s predominance. 
For further reading: Sylvia Sasse, Michail Bachtin 
zur Einführung, Hamburg: Junius-Verlag, 2010, pp. 
40-43.
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on the island but also provides insight into 
the richness of the Russian woman’s joyful 
emotional states bordering on dangerous sit-
uations Ȯ Lunina is a igure of female sacriice 
whereas Luchnikov tries to be the superhero.15
Superman in a simulacrum: Luchnikov’s So-
viet afair
Luchnikov’s positive and western traits refer 
to atributes of pop-cultural heroes. “s Olga 
Matich points out, Luchnikov “embodies all 
the archetypical talents of Aksënov’s super-
man.”16 Having a closer look at a) how Luch-
nikov is introduced in the novel and b) how 
his reunion (which is also readable on a politi-
cal levelǼ with his Soviet afair Lunina is intro-
duced, we witness LuchnikovȂs role as a igure 
between pre-Soviet Russia, the Soviet Union 
and Crimean/western byt. First of all, the joy 
of living on the island embodied by Luch-
nikov stands for the features of the Crimean 
way of life such as the desired (Soviet) Russia.
This superman is portrayed as a gentleman 
of past times and benchmark of the island’s 
hybrid culture: He combines physical aware-
ness, personal happiness and spiritual val-
ues, although the later are ironically con-
veyed as already anachronistic in the 1970s. 
The wedding of this James Bond-like hero – 
he meets his wife after being injured during 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956 – sets an ex-
ample for a new youth culture.17 His sexu-
al adventures later on strengthen his quest 
to remain young, atractive and successful. 
The very irst of the novelȂs ŗŚ chapters intro-
15  Although the novel itself has an extraordinary 
position and does not ressemble any other prose by 
its writer, Luchnikov is a typical character within 
Aksënov’s oeuvre.
16  Matich, “Vasilii Aksënov and the Literature of 
Convergence”, p. 647.
17  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 30.
duces a spectrum of protagonists representing 
the policital and cultural views to be discussed 
in the course of the novel. “In a typical example 
of convergence, the Soviet and western 1960s 
are brought together on the Russian island.”18 
We get to know three generations of the Luch-
nikov family as they meet at grandfather Ar-
senii’s house.19 The three ‘alpha-males’ – their 
names all start with an A – discuss the major 
policital trends on the island and, accordingly, 
three ways of life: The grandson Anton, who 
has just returned from a year of travelling 
the world, lives the hippie-like youth move-
ment called Iaki which is opposed to the idea 
of the reunion with Russia and orientated to-
wards the USǲ20 Andrei, in the middle, advo-
cates the reunion with the Soviet Union and 
the eldest, Arsenii, represents the preserva-
tion of the aristocratic way of life on Crimea. 
Andrei is at the center of the narration. From 
the very irst paragraph on, the narrator puts 
the reader on the same observation level as 
himself. Together we look down on the phal-
lic newspaper building – and at the narrator’s 
uncertainty when his book will be published:
ɪ˖ˮкˆˇ зˑаʺ˘ ʵ ˢʺˑ˘˕ʺ ʈˆː˟ʺ˕˓˔˓ˏˮ, ˖˕ʺ-
ʹˆ ʺʶ˓ ˖˙ːа˖˦ʺʹ˦ˆˠ а˕ˠˆ˘ʺк˘˙˕ˑ˩ˠ ˫к˖-
˔˕ʺ˖˖ˆˇ, ʹʺ˕зкˆˇ ʵ ˖ʵ˓ʺˇ ˔˕˓˖˘˓˘ʺ, ˔˓ˠ˓жˆˇ 
ˑа ˓ˣˆˑʺˑˑ˩ˇ ка˕аˑʹа˦, ˑʺʴ˓˖к˕ʺʴ ʶазʺ˘˩ 
Ȃʇ˙˖˖кˆˇ К˙˕˪ʺ˕Ȃ. К ˑаˣаˏ˙ ˑа˦ʺʶ˓ ˔˓ʵʺ˖˘ʵ˓-
ʵаˑˆˮ, ˑа ˆ˖ˠ˓ʹʺ ʹ˓ʵ˓ˏ˪ˑ˓ ˖˙ːʴ˙˕ˑ˓ˇ ˕ʺʹак-
ˢˆ˓ˑˑ˓ˇ ˑ˓ˣˆ, ʵʺ˖ˑ˓ˇ, ʵ к˓ˑˢʺ ˘ʺк˙˧ʺʶ˓ ʹʺ-
˖ˮ˘ˆˏʺ˘ˆˮ ˆˏˆ ʵ ˑаˣаˏʺ ʴ˙ʹ˙˧ʺʶ˓ ǻзаʵˆ˖ˆ˘ 
˓˘ ʵ˕ʺːʺˑˆ ʵ˩ˠ˓ʹа кˑˆʶˆǼ ː˩ ʵˆʹˆː ˆзʹа˘ʺ-
ˏˮ-˕ʺʹак˘˓˕а ˫˘˓ˇ ʶазʺ˘˩ ŚŜ-ˏʺ˘ˑʺʶ˓ Аˑʹ˕ʺˮ 
А˕˖ʺˑˆʺʵˆˣа ʁ˙ˣˑˆк˓ʵа ʵ ʺʶ˓ ˏˆˣˑ˩ˠ а˔а˕˘а-
ːʺˑ˘аˠ, ˑа Ȃʵʺ˕ˠ˓˘˙˕ʺȂ. Э˘ˆː ˖˓ʵʺ˘˖кˆː 
18  Matich, “Vasilii Aksënov and the Literature of 
Convergence”, p. 646.
19  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 42.
20  Ibid., p. 24.
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˖ˏ˓ʵʺˣк˓ː ˠ˓ˏ˓˖˘ˮк ʁ˙ˣˑˆк˓ʵ ˖ ˙ʹ˓ʵ˓ˏ˪˖˘ʵˆ-
ʺː ˆːʺˑ˓ʵаˏ ˖ʵ˓ˇ ˔ˏʺˇʴ˓ˇ˖кˆˇ ˔ʺˑ˘ˠа˙з.21
From the outset, the reader is confronted with 
Luchnikov’s inner ambivalence towards Crime-
an and Soviet life (managing the newspaper 
Russian Courier and founding the party Union 
of Common Destiny), his hyperbolic male power 
and his crucial function within the narration.
With some self-irony Luchnikov observes 
how he mistakes a traic light for a church, 
disapproves of Simpferopol’s modern aes-
thetics, for instance the unusual shape of a 
church, and misses the feeling of nostalgia 
in this town. Andrei does not fully appreci-
ate the simulacrum-like visuality and loss of 
traditional values of material culture and so-
cial practices on Crimea. Sticking to the gro-
tesque exaggeration of his dialogical style, the 
narrator stresses the imaginative character of 
the world Luchnikov lives in (what reminds 
us of the theatre stage on which Lunina will 
end up), hence showing Luchnikov’s search 
for depth and meaning behind the artii-
cial world of commerce and entertainment: 
ɪʹ˕˙ʶ ˔ʺˇзаж ˖˘аˏ ˕ʺзк˓ ːʺˑˮ˘˪˖ˮ. ʁ˙ˑˑ˩ˇ 
˔˕˓˟ˆˏ˪ ʈ˭˕˭-Каˮ зˑаˣˆ˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˓ ˕а˖˘ˮˑ˙ˏ˖ˮ, 
ˆ ˔ ˓казаˏ˓˖˪, ˣ ˘˓ ˖ ˘˓ˆ˦˪ ˔ ʺ˕ʺʹ ˓ ʴ˦ˆ˕ˑ˓ˇ ˏ ˙ˑ-
ˑ˓ˇ ˔ ˓ʵʺ˕ˠˑ˓˖˘˪˭, ˆ з˕ʺзаˑˑ˓ˇ каˑ˪˓ˑаːˆ ˆ  ˧ ʺ-
ˏˮːˆ кˏ˩ка˖˘˩ˠ ʶ˓˕. ʅ˦ʺˏ˓ːˏˮ˭˧аˮ ˑ˓ʵˆзˑа 
21  Ibid., p. şǲ Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, p. 3: 
“Everyone knows the Russian Courier skyscraper, 
insolent in its pencil-point simplicity among the 
wild monuments to architectural self-expression 
in downtown Simferopol. As our story begins – at 
the end of a hard night at the teletype machines, 
a spring night late in the present decade or early 
in the decade to come (depending on when this 
book comes outǼ Ȯ we ind the publisher-editor of 
the Courier, forty-six-year-old Andrei Arsenievich 
Luchnikov, in his suite atop the skyscraper. Al-
though he prefers more modest names for it, it is in 
fact a playboy’s penthouse.”
˔ʺˇзажа! За ɪ˓ˏ˓˦ˆˑ˖кˆː ˖ʺʹ˩ː ˠ˓ˏː˓ː 
ʵʹ˕˙ʶ ʵ˩˕˓˖ ˑʺкˆˇ ʴазаˏ˪˘˓ʵ˩ˇ ˆ˖˘˙каˑ. Шаʶ 
ʵ ˖˘˓˕˓ˑ˙ – ˆз ː˓˕ˮ ˔˓ʹˑˆːаʺ˘˖ˮ ˑʺʵʺʹ˓ːаˮ 
˔˕ʺжʹʺ ˖каˏа ˖ ʶ˕˓˘˓ː ˙ ˔˓ʹˑ˓жˆˮ… Т˓ʶʹа 
˓ˑ ʵ˖˔˓ːˑˆˏǱ Дˆ˖ˑʺˇˏ˫ˑʹ ʹˏˮ ʵз˕˓˖ˏ˩ˠ! ʅˑ 
˙жʺ ʶʹʺ-˘˓ ˣˆ˘аˏ ˓ʴ ˫˘˓ː ˆз˓ʴ˕ʺ˘ʺˑˆˆ 
к˓к˘ʺʴʺˏ˪˖к˓ˇ ˖к˙ˣа˭˧ʺˇ аʹːˆˑˆ˖˘˕аˢˆˆ. 
Так ˑаз˩ʵаʺː˩ʺ ȁА˕каʹ˩ ɪ˓˓ʴ˕ажʺˑˆˮȂ. 
Эк˓ʺ ˖ʵˆˑ˖˘ʵ˓ – ˑˆ ˓ʹˆˑ ˘˙˕ˆ˖˘ ˑ˖ 
заːʺˣаʺ˘ ˔ʺ˕ʺˠ˓ʹа ˆз ːˆ˕а ʺ˖˘ʺ˖˘ʵʺˑˑ˓ʶ˓ 
ʵ ˆ˖к˙˖˖˘ʵʺˑˑ˩ˇǱ ˔ʺ˕ʵ˓зʹаˑˑаˮ ˔˕ˆ˕˓ʹа 
ʵˏˆʵаʺ˘˖ˮ ˖ ˭ʹа ˣ ʺ˕ʺз ˆ ˖к˙˖ˑ˓ заːа˖кˆ˕˓ʵаˑˑ˩ʺ 
˔˕˓ʺː˩ ʵ ˖˘ʺˑаˠ. ɪˏˆʵаʺ˘˖ˮ ˆ ʹ˓˔˓ˏˑˮʺ˘˖ˮ 
заːʺˣа˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˩ːˆ ˆːˆ˘аˢˆˮːˆ. Кажʹ˩ˇ 
˦аʶ ˓˘к˕˩ʵаʺ˘ ˑ˓ʵ˩ʺ ʶ˓ˏ˓ʵ˓к˕˙жˆ˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˩ʺ 
˔ʺ˕˖˔ʺк˘ˆʵ˩. У ʴ˓ˏ˪˦ˆˑ˖˘ʵа ˔˓˖ʺ˘ˆ˘ʺˏʺˇ 
ʵ˓зˑˆкаʺ˘ зʹʺ˖˪ ˓˖˓ʴаˮ ˫ˇ˟˓˕ˆˮ, ˑʺ˓ʴ˩ˣˑ˓ʺ 
˖˓˖˘˓ˮˑˆʺ ʹ˙ˠа. ʃʺ заʴ˩˘а ˆ к˓ːːʺ˕ˢˆˮ. Таː 
ˆ ˖ˮː ʵ ˆзʶˆʴаˠ ˔˖ʺʵʹ˓ːˆ˕а ˕азʴ˕˓˖аˑ˩ ʴа˕˩, 
˕ʺ˖˘˓˕аˑˣˆкˆ, ʵˆ˘˕ˆˑ˩ ʹ˓˕˓ʶˆˠ ːаʶазˆˑ˓ʵ.22
In this description of a shopping center, by 
22  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, pp. ŚŚ-ŚŜǲ Aksyonov, 
The Island of Crimea, p. 48: “Then, abruptly, the 
landscape began to lose the contours he knew so 
well. It turned into a moonscape, crisscrossed with 
canyons and ravines. Unbelievable! Whole new 
conigurations! “ basalt boulder rising like an idol 
from behind a hill. Then two feet away – a com-
pletely uncharted hill sloping gently to the water, 
a groto at its base … Only then did he remember. 
Of course! The municipal board had grown tired 
of having nothing to do and thought up a Disney-
land for adults. Fantasy Arcades they called it, and 
it was totally obscene! No tourist could possibly 
distinguish between what was natural and what 
was artiicialǲ primeval nature made its appearance 
through skillfully masked openings in special pre-
fabricated walls and was then complemented by 
remarkable imitations. Every step opened new ver-
tiginous perspectives and vistas. The result in most 
visitors was a curious stage of being, a kind of eu-
phoria. And that’s where business came in. Tucked 
away in the cozy litle corners of this pseudoworld 
were elegant bistros, boutiques, even whole depart-
ment stores.”
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stressing the seductive power of imitations the 
narrator seems to refer to Grigorii A. Potëm-
kin ǻŗŝřş-ŗŝşŗǼ, an army oicer, politician 
and lover of Catherine the Great. Potëmkin 
showed rich scenery of Crimea when he had 
to present the results of his appropriation of 
the rather undeveloped peninsula to the Rus-
sian monarch and international diplomats. 
The perception of the clifs as art in Kokteb-
elȂ, together with the romantic atributes of 
moonlight, draw upon the symbolist poet 
Maksimilian A. Voloshin (1877-1932). How-
ever, the term “Disneyland for adults” decon-
structs the alluring atmosphere as the elusive 
feelings ǻȃeuphoriaȄǼ and the entire seting 
are not authentic. As E. Meila states: “О˖˘˕˓ʵ 
К˕˩ː Ȯ ˖ˆː˙ˏˮк˕ ʵ ʴ˓ʹ˕ˆˇˮ˕˓ʵ˖к˓ː 
˖ː˩˖ˏʺǱ ˆзʴ˩˘˓ˣˑ˓˖˘˪ ʵ˖ʺˠ ʺʶ˓ зˑак˓ʵ 
ʵʺʹʺ˘ к ˔˓˘ʺ˕ʺ к˓ˑк˕ʺ˘ˑ˓ˇ ˖˙ʴ˖˘аˑˢˆˆ ˆ 
а˙˘ʺˑ˘ˆˣˑ˓˖˘ˆ.ȃ23 Incidentally, the surnames 
of both protagonists imply a “shine” that re-
minds us of the moon or rays, respectively.
The above passage anticipates Luchnikov 
and Lunina’s break-up. At this intersection 
of the real and the artiicial world, of the past, 
present and future, of Crimea and Russia, 
Luchnikov meets (and deconstructs) Lunina 
while she is studying perfumes in a window 
display and identiies her as a Soviet citizenǱ
ʅ˘ʺˢ, ˖˩ˑ, ˏ˭ʴ˓ʵ˪, ˔˕˓˦ˏ˓ʺ ˆ ʴ˙ʹ˙˧ʺʺ 
– ʵ˖ʺ ˖˓ʺʹˆˑˆˏ˓˖˪ ˆ ʵзʴаˏаː˙˘ˆˏ˓˖˪ ˑʺ˔˓-
ˑˮ˘ˑ˓ˇ ˑаʹʺжʹ˓ˇ. ʅ˖˘˕˓ʵ ˆ К˓ˑ˘ˆˑʺˑ˘. 
ʇ˓˖˖ˆˮ… ʔʺˑ˘˕ жˆзˑˆ, ˖к˕ʺ˧ʺˑ˪ʺ ʹ˓˕˓ʶ. 
23  E. Meila, “Krym u Vasiliia Aksënova: Ot zhizni 
k tekstu i obratno”, Krymskii tekst v russkoi kul’tu-
re: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferencii. 
Sankt-Peterburg, 4-6th of Sept. 2006, eds. Nina 
Buhks and Mariia Virolajnen, Sankt-Peterburg ŘŖŖŞ, pp. ŘŘŜ-ŘřŚ, p. ŘřŖǲ htpǱ//lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=Şşŗŝ ǻaccess ŘŞ Sept. ŘŖŗŝǼ. 
“The Island of Crimea is a simulacrum in the sense 
of Baudrillard: the abundance of all its signs leads 
to a loss of a concrete substance and authenticity.” 
(My translation.)
– Таˑ˪ка, – ˖казаˏ ˓ˑ. – Даʵаˇ-ка ˔˓˖к˓˕ʺˇ ʵ˩-
ʴˆ˕а˘˪˖ˮ ˆз ˫˘˓ˇ ˣʺ˕˘˓ʵ˓ˇ к˓ːˑа˘˩ ˖ːʺˠа.24
His order towards her indicates that he tries 
to pull her out of the bizarre in-between 
state, ofering her a commited relation-
ship. The seting is symbolic. Lunina will 
remain between the two worlds of Soviet 
Union and Crimea, between her family and 
Luchnikov whom she eventually rejects.
“fter LuninaȂs husband inds out who his ri-
val is and casts Luchnikov out, the narrator 
shows Andrei’s state of mind from the inside. 
Suddenly, he reveals an emerging solidarity 
with the Iaki-movement Andrei’s son stands 
for, as the rejected hero projects his hatred 
of Lunina’s husband onto the Soviet Union:
ɪ˓˘ ː˓ˮ ˕˓ʹˆˑа ˆ ʵ˓˘ ː˓ʺ ˖ˣа˖˘˪ʺ – ʅ˖˘˕˓ʵ 
К˕˩ː ˔˓˖˕ʺʹˆ ʵ˓ˏˑ ˖ʵ˓ʴ˓ʹ˩. ʂ˩ ˑˆк˓ʶʹа ˑʺ 
˖˓ˏ˪ʺː˖ˮ ˖ ʵаːˆ, зак˓ˑ˓˔˓˖ˏ˙˦ˑ˩ʺ, ːˑ˓ʶ˓ːˆˏ-
ˏˆ˓ˑˑ˩ʺ, ˖ʺʵʺ˕ˑаˮ ˙ˑ˩ˏаˮ ˕˙˖˖каˮ ˖ʵ˓ˏ˓ˣ˪. ʂ˩ 
ˑʺ ˕˙˖˖кˆʺ ˔˓ ˆʹʺ˓ˏ˓ʶˆˆ, ː˩ ˑʺ к˓ːː˙ˑˆ˖˘˩ 
˔˓ ˑаˢˆ˓ˑаˏ˪ˑ˓˖˘ˆ, ː˩ ˮкˆ-˓˖˘˕˓ʵˆ˘ˮˑʺ, ˙ 
ˑа˖ ˖ʵ˓ˮ ˖˙ʹ˪ʴа, ˑа˦а ˖˙ʹ˪ʴа – ка˕ˑаʵаˏ ˖ʵ˓-
ʴ˓ʹ˩, ː˩ ˖ˆˏ˪ˑʺˇ ʵа˖, какˆː ʴ˩ ˘˓ˏ˖˘˩ː 
˖˘ʺкˏ˓ː ʵ˩, ˖˙кˆ, ˑʺ ʴ˕˓˖аˏˆ ˑаː ʵ ʶ˓ˏ˓ʵ˙!25
However, this incident does not stop Luch-
24  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. ŚŜǲ Aksyonov, The 
Island of Crimea, pp. 49-50: “Father, son, love, past, 
and future all blended together into a vague feeling 
of expectation and hope. The Island and the con-
tinent. Russia. The center of life, the place where 
all roads converged… ‘Tanya,’ he said, ‘let’s get the hell out of this hellhole of a fun house!Ȅ
25  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. ŗřřǲ Aksyonov, The 
Island of Crimea, p. 153: “Crimea is my only home, my pride, my joy. The Island of Crimea loating free 
among the waves. We shall never merge with you, 
you law-abiding, monumental, hulking, northern, Russian swine, you! WeȂre not Russian by ideolo-gy, weȂre not communist by nationalityǲ weȂre Yaki 
Islanders, we have a fate of our own. Our fate is 
the carnival of freedom, and it makes us stronger, no mater how thick the glass you bastards hurl at our heads!Ȅ
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nikov in his quest to embrace Soviet culture 
when he is in Moscow. He uses Sovietisms 
and tries to understand his ‘home country’ 
in order to feel like a ‘real’ Russian, for ex-
ample insisting on having a men’s talk in 
the sauna. Nonetheless, Luchnikov’s adjust-
ment to Soviet byt is characterized like bad 
mimicry. When he is seen by Lunina wear-
ing Soviet clothes, these artefacts make her 
react in a negative sense of estrangement26 
– just like when her husband is picking her 
up in Moscow on her return from Crimea.27 
Regardless of remarks by others who consider 
his atitude ridiculous,28 Luchnikov’s longing 
for the Soviet Union is presented as a stronger 
one than Lunina’s longing for Crimea. He is 
not only desiring but also acting on his dream 
by importing western pop-cultural goods like 
jazz records, jeans and shows, when he travels 
to Moscow.29 Taking Arjun Appadurai’s con-
cept of transculturality into account,30 Luch-
nikov fulills the expectations of his Soviet 
friends by transmiting the everyday culture 
of Crimea and the west to Moscow with goods 
like forbidden music, magazines, and other 
desired products. Once he forgets to buy west-
ern goods, he immediately develops a bad 
conscience when thinking of it. The narrator 
uses this opportunity to expand mockingly 
the long list of goods missed and longed for in 
the Soviet Union.31 To sum up, Luchnikov rep-
resents the convergence Matich writes about, 
mainly the western male adventurer as well 
26  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 187.
27  Ibid., p. 48.
28  The American Buxter is also used for a comment 
on Luchnikov’s vision: He explains that romantic nostalgia is supposed to be the best atitude of man-
kind. Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 184.
29  Ibid., p. 54.
30  Referring to Arjun Appadurai it might be called 
a case of a mediascape. (Arjun Appadurai, Modernity 
at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minne-
apolis et al.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996.)
31  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, pp. 99-100.
as the pre-revolutionary Russian aristocrat 
and the political activist living for the ideal of 
a Euro-Soviet Crimean hybridity. His Crimea 
stands for a cultural medium, an intersection 
between an old Europe and a new Russia.
 
Lunina, the failed spy in a blockbuster
For Lunina, who has an eccentric lifestyle with 
ups and downs in both places, it seems that the 
two worlds, Moscow and Crimea, are ambiv-
alent. Her experiences with Luchnikov repre-
sent an exception to her Soviet life in Moscow. 
Yet, what she experiences on Crimea without 
him is horrible, as she is not able to control 
her state of mind: Lunina fails to be a spy and 
a prostitute, becomes an actress in a movie 
without knowing and later on gets caught up 
in sexual violence. Thus, the allusion to Alek-
sandr Grin’s romantic fantasy Alye parusa (Red 
Sails, 1923), which was about a western no-
bleman arriving on a boat with red sails and 
taking his bride from Crimea with him, tran-
forms into an emotional disaster of self-loss.
Lunina also acts as cultural transmiter, un-
like Luchnikov: By travelling between both 
places and their cultures she is able to send 
her ‘Crimeanness’ to her Moscow environ-
ment by ǻliterallyǼ transmiting a subversive 
message through the way she looks at the TV 
images: “Такˆʺ ˏˆˢа ː˓ʶ˙˘ ˑʺзаːʺ˘ˑ˓, ʶ˓ʹ 
за ʶ˓ʹ˓ː, ʹʺ˖ˮ˘ˆˏʺ˘ˆʺ за ʹʺ˖ˮ˘ˆˏʺ˘ˆʺː, 
ˆзːʺˑˮ˘˪ ˔˖ˆˠ˓ˏ˓ʶˆˣʺ˖к˙˭ ˖˘˕˙к˘˙˕˙ 
ˑа˖ʺˏʺˑˆˮ.“32 “s the atractive woman, Lun-
ina is cast in the role of a sex object from the 
point of view of a typical male gaze in both 
worlds, she symbolically transports the 
Crimean atmosphere by way of her person-
32  Ibid., p. ŝşǲ Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, p. 
70: “Year by year, decade by decade, faces like that 
can imperceptibly alter the psychological structure 
of the population.”
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al habits, for instance her style of dress.33 It is 
striking that her ‘aura’ is not a political one 
Ȯ she is not trying to ight the system. Like 
Luchnikov, she could act subversively against 
the Soviet Union but actually both of them re-
main hopeful of a reasonable Soviet Russia. 
LuninaȂs atractiveness stands for the Russian 
absorption of some western leisure culture 
and also hints at the Black Sea coast, which in 
the nineteenth century started to develop into 
the Russian Riviera. We ind her interested in 
the luxurious everyday life on Crimea, but po-
litically she stays loyal to her homeland and, in 
terms of marriage, to her husband. Becoming 
a spy radicalizes both her patriotism for the 
Soviet Union and her fascination for Crimea. 
Now that she has permission to enter the most 
forbidden places, the narrator is able to sketch 
them.34 Through these stylistic means Aksën-
ov’s novel provides visions of several cities, 
which resemble small copies of western mega-
polises. Simferopol’, the regional capital with 
the westernized name ȁSimiȂ is architecturally 
the most interesting city.35 Feodosiia is the most 
stylish one, while Sevastopol’ has the most 
impressive skyscrapers, and Evpatoriia and 
Gurzuf have the most beautiful villas. While 
following Lunina on her trips the narrator em-
phasizes the exceptional features of the most 
western city, Ialta. This city stands for Crimea’s 
young generation’s ideology of demon-
strating Ialta as the most non-Soviet place.
Lunina’s shifting between the two worlds 
shapes their diferences, particularly when the 
reader observes her problems adapting to a 
new situation. This happens, for instance, after 
she returns from Crimea. Estrangement also oc-
curs when she looks at the positive sides of her 
33  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 49.
34  Ibid., p. 167.
35  This is already stated at the beginning of the 
novel. Ibid., p. 9.
regular Soviet life. After a devastating experi-
ence during the shooting of a movie that an-
ticipates the novel’s ending – a blockbuster on 
the Soviet annexation of Crimea – she mentally 
escapes Crimea and her afair with LuchnikovǱ
Уˏʺˣ˙ заʵ˘˕а ʵ ʂ˓˖кʵ˙, ˔˓˦ˏ˭ к ˣʺ˕˘˙ ʁ˙ˣ-
ˑˆк˓ʵа, ʈʺ˕ʶʺʺʵа ˖ ʺʶ˓ ˟ˆ˕ː˓ˇ ˔˕˓˖˘˓ ˑа ˠ˙ˇ, 
заʴʺ˕˙ ʹʺ˘ʺˇ ˆз ˔ˆ˓ˑʺ˕ˏаʶʺ˕ˮ, ˔˓ˣˆˑ˭ ːа-
˦ˆˑ˙ ˆ ʵ˖ʺ ˔˓ʺʹʺː к ʈ˙˔˙ ʵ ʔаˠкаʹз˓˕. ɩ˙ʹ˙ 
˘˕ʺˑˆ˕˓ʵа˘˪˖ˮ ʵːʺ˖˘ʺ ˖ ˑˆː. Т˓ˏ˪к˓ ˓ˑ ˓ʹˆˑ 
ːʺˑˮ ˆ˖к˕ʺˑˑʺ ˏ˭ʴˆ˘, ˆ ˮ ʺʶ˓ жʺˑа, а ˓ˑ ː˓ˇ 
ː˙ж, ˓ˑ ːˑʺ ʵ˖ʺ ˔˕˓˖˘ˆ˘, ˆ ˮ ʴ˙ʹ˙ жˆ˘˪ ʵ 
ˑа˦ʺː, ʵ ː˓ʺː ːˆ˕ʺ, ʶʹʺ ʵ˖ʺʶ˓ ˑʺ ˠʵа˘аʺ˘, ʶʹʺ 
ʵ˖ʺ ʵ˖ʺʶ˓ ʴ˓ˮ˘˖ˮ, ʹа-ʹа, ˫˘˓ ʴ˓ˏʺʺ ˑ˓˕ːаˏ˪ˑ˩ˇ 
ːˆ˕ǲ ˔˓˖˘˙˔ˏ˭ к˙ʹа-ˑˆʴ˙ʹ˪ ˔˕˓ʹаʵ˧ˆˢʺˇ 
ˆˏˆ кˏаʹ˓ʵ˧ˆк˓ː ˑа ˔˕˓ʹʴаз˙, ʴ˙ʹ˙ ʵ˓˕˓ʵа˘˪ 
ˆ ˣ˙ʵ˖˘ʵ˓ʵа˘˪ ˖ʺʴˮ ˑ˓˕ːаˏ˪ˑ˩ː ˣʺˏ˓ʵʺк˓ː.36
This accident shows that local Crimeans, un-
like Lunina, are conscious of their society be-
ing a model, a realized dream and theatrical 
stage for a possible future Russia. The feeling 
of being on a theatre stage goes along with the 
fear that the peninsula might become an inter-
national vertep (a Ukrainian puppet theatre), 
as Luchnikov’s colleague Gangut says.37 Final-
36  Ibid., p. ŗşŖǲ Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, 
p. 218: ȃIȂm going to catch the irst plane back to 
Moscow. Screw Luchnikov, screw Sergeev and Co. 
I’ll take the kids out of the Pioneer Camp, have the 
car repaired, and drive down to Tsakhkadzor with 
them to visit the Hub. I’ll go into training with him. 
He’s the only one who really loves me, I’m his wife, 
he’s my husband, he’ll forgive me, and I’ll go back 
to living in our world, my world, a world where 
you can’t get anything you need and everybody’s afraid of everything, the real world. IȂll ind a job 
selling fruits and vegetables and live a normal life 
of thievery.”
37  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. ŘŞǱ ȃɩʺзʵˆзˑ˩ˇ ʵ˨ʺзʹ, ʴʺ˖˔˓˦ˏˆˑˑаˮ ˘˓˕ʶ˓ʵˏˮ… Ȯ ʵ˖ʺ ˫˘˓, к˓ˑʺˣˑ˓, ˑʺʵʺ˕˓ˮ˘ˑ˓ ˓ʴ˓ʶа˧аʺ˘ ˑа˦ʺ ˑа˖ʺˏʺˑˆʺ, ˑ˓ ʹʺˑ˪ за ʹˑʺː ː˩ ˖˘аˑ˓ʵˆː˖ˮ ːʺжʹ˙ˑа˕˓ʹˑ˩ː ʵʺ˕˘ʺ-˔˓ː ˔˓ˣˆ˧ʺ ɫ˓ˑк˓ˑʶа.Ȅ Aksyonov, The Island of 
Crimea, p. 27: “Relaxed visa restrictions. Duty-free trade. It will do wonders for our cofers, all right, 
but at the rate we’re going, we’ll end up more a den 
of international iniquity than Hong Kong itself.”
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ly, the movie about the reuniication of Crimea 
with Russia, which was already planned in the 
irst third of the novel, becomes not only a vi-
sion: “ʅˑˆ ˖ˑˆː˙˘ ʶˆʶаˑ˘˖кˆˇ ʴˏ˓кʴа˖˘ʺ˕ ˓ 
ʵ˓˖˖˓ʺʹˆˑʺˑˆˆ К˕˩ːа ˖ ʇ˓˖˖ˆʺˇ. Т˕аʶˆˣʺ˖кˆˇ, 
ˏˆ˕ˆˣʺ˖кˆˇ, ˆ˕˓ˑˆˣʺ˖кˆˇ, ʹ˕аːа˘ˆˣʺ˖кˆˇ, 
˕ʺаˏˆ˖˘ˆˣʺ˖кˆˇ ˆ ȁ˖˭˕Ȃ, ʵ ˖аː˓ː ˖ʵ˓ʺː ˔˓˖˩ˏʺ 
˖˙˔ʺ˕-˟ˆˏ˪ː.”38 These atributes can be read 
as a commentary on the novel as rather “trag-
ic, lyrical, ironic, dramatic, realistic and sur-
realistic”, ending with the destruction of a 
hybrid Crimea and the end of a dialogue 
about its development. Finally, we are deal-
ing with an anti-utopia where values are 
turned upside down as liberal society even-
tually loses its freedom and independence.
Cultural hybridity of the Crimean way(s) 
of life
The Crimean way of life, represented by the 
protagonists, is politicized – culture goes 
along with expression of power, regardless 
of whether the protagonist uses it overtly or 
implicitly. The novel refers to popular culture 
in terms of symbols and their purposeful use. 
The omniscient narrator lets us observe these 
instrumentalization processes, for instance 
when Andrei gives a record to his father – the 
song Kakhovka reminds the elder of the Civil 
War – in order to let him approach the “Idea of 
a Common Destiny“ which Andrei is striving 
for.39 In his professional life Luchnikov relects 
38  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. şŗǲ Aksyonov, The 
Island of Crimea, p. 104: “A blockbuster. A good old-fashioned sweeping epic about the reuniica-
tion of Crimea and Russia. Tragic, lyric, ironic, dra-
matic, realistic, surrealistic – a sure winner.”
39  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 18: “ɉɪɟɥɸɛɨɩɵɬɧɵɦ ɨɛɪɚɡɨɦ ɫɨɜɟɬɫɤɚɹ ‘Ʉɚɯɨɜɤɚ’ ɫɬɚɥɚ ɥɸɛɢɦɨɣ ɩɟɫɧɟɣ ɫɬɚɪɨɝɨ ɜɪɷɜɚɤɭɚɧɬɚ. Ʌɭɱɧɢɤɨɜ-ɦɥɚɞɲɢɣ, ɤɨɧɟɱɧɨ ɠɟ, ɫ ɭɞɨɜɨɥɶɫɬɜɢɟɦ ɩɨɞɚɪɢɥ ɨɬɰɭ ɩɥɚɫɬɢɧɤɭ: ɟɳɟ ɨɞɢɧ ɲɚɝ ɤ Иɞɟɟ Ɉɛɳɟɣ ɋɭɞɶɛɵ, ɤɨɬɨɪɭɸ ɨɧ ɩɪɨɩɨɜɟɞɨɜɚɥ.” Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, p. 
15: “And so the Soviet song ‘Kakhovka’ came to be 
the favorite of an old provacuee. Needless to say, 
about how to use an artefact of mass culture, 
namely a dissident reportage about the ter-
rible cafés in the Soviet Union. Publishing it 
in his magazine would allow him to pretend 
that he advocates anti-Soviet propaganda. In 
general, the Russian patriot refuses to report 
negatively about everyday culture in the So-
viet Union, which he considers as his country, 
too.40 Popular culture, even if it partly ap-
pears supericial and emotionally exaggerat-
ed, cannot be separated from political culture.
Life on Crimea seems to embody the Russian 
as well as the Soviet longing for the west as 
a well-of paradise. Correspondingly, every-
day culture on the island consists of many ele-
ments of popular culture of the western world. 
Crimea’s byt can be regarded as the desired and 
complementary everyday culture of the Soviet 
Union, characterized by abundance and den-
sity.41 Its presentation in Ostrov Krym distends 
negative traits of western capitalism as both 
atractive and decadent through the prism of 
Crimea: consumerism of luxury goods, lei-
Luchnikov junior was happy to make his father a 
present of the record. For him it was one more step 
on the road to the Idea of a Common Fate he so 
zealously advocated.”
40 Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 36: “Дɚ, ɫɨɜɫɟɦ ɧɟ ɬɪɭɞɧɨ ɩɟɪɟɦɟɧɢɬɶ ɤɭɪɫ ‘ɄɭɪɶɟɪɚȂ, Ȯ ˔˓ʹ˙ːаˏ ˓ˑ. Ȯ ʃʺ˘ ˑˆˣʺʶ˓ ˏʺʶˣʺ, ˣʺː ˔˕ʺзˆ˕а˘˪ ˫˘˙ ˖˘˕аˑ˙, ˑа˦˙ ˖˘˕аˑ˙, ː˓˭, ʵ˓ ʵ˖ˮк˓ː ˖ˏ˙ˣаʺ. К˖˘а˘ˆ, ʵ заʵ˘˕а˦ˑʺː ˑ˓ːʺ˕ʺ как ˕аз ˆ ˆʹʺ˘ ˕ʺ˔˓˕˘аж ˓ ˖˓ʵʺ˘˖кˆˠ ʹ ˓˕˓ʶаˠ. Да-ʹа, как ˫˘˓ ˮ  заʴ˩ˏ, ˫ ˘˓ жʺ ʵˑ˙˘˕ʺˑˑˆˇ ʹˆ˖˖ˆʹʺˑ˘˖кˆˇ ːа˘ʺ˕ˆаˏ, ʺː˙ ˢʺˑ˩ ˑʺ˘. ȁɉɭɬɟɲɟɫɬɜɢɟ ɱɟɪɟɡ ɫɬɪɚɧɭ ɤɚɮɟȂ. Аˑ˓ˑˆː-ˑ˩ˇ ːа˘ʺ˕ˆаˏ ˆз ʂ˓˖кʵ˩, ˘аˏаˑ˘ˏˆʵ˓ʺ ˆзʹʺʵа-˘ʺˏ˪˖˘ʵ˓ ˑаʹ к˓˦ːа˕ˑ˩ːˆ ˖˓ʵʺ˘˖кˆːˆ ˔˕ˆʹ˓-˕˓жˑ˩ːˆ ка˟ʺ. ɩ˩˘˪ ː˓жʺ˘, ˫˘˓ʶ˓ ʹ˓˖˘а˘˓ˣˑ˓, ˣ˘˓ʴ˩ ˑа ˑʺ˖к˓ˏ˪к˓ ʹˑʺˇ ˖ʴʺ˕ʺˣ˪ ˖ʵ˓˭ ˦к˙˕˙?Ȅ 
Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, p. 37-38: “True, he 
thought, it wouldn’t take much to change the Cou-
rier’s politics. What could be easier than heaping scorn on that country, our country? “s a mater 
of fact, the feature on Soviet roads will be running 
tomorrow. Right, how could I have let it slip my 
mind? Dissident material. Priceless. ‘Fast Food on 
the Road – Soviet Style’ by Anonymous, Moscow. 
A clever Buchwald-type piece on the nightmares of 
the Soviet roadside café. Who knows? It may save 
my skin for a few more days.”
41  Meila, “Krym u Vasiliia Aksënova”, p. 228.
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sure activities, the lack of moral restrictions 
and a prevalence of mass culture seems to 
exaggerate traits of upper-class tourism. One 
example is Luchnikov’s friend Buturlin tell-
ing him he prefers Andrei’s son’s dandy-like 
way of life – drinking, enjoying women and 
sleeping – to that of his own children who 
play Haydn, Stravinsky, Rakhmaninov and 
Handel.42 Nevertheless, in these intellectual 
salons condemned by Buturlin, the aristocracy 
socializes like in the nineteenth century, con-
tinuing a tradition of Russian piano playing.43
Speaking with Olga Matich, Aksënov defends 
“the ultimate superiority of art to life”, as em-
bodied through Luchnikov and Buturlin.44 
Aksënov’s Crimea shows features of a techno-
logically, aesthetically and economically de-
veloped international but still Russian society: 
These Crimeans live without passports, speak 
several languages and are allowed to move 
freely.45 Here the elitism is evident, especially 
regarding access to symbolic resources such 
as education at the best European universities 
and the freedom of travel. It is a society for a 
select, aristocratic and well-to-do minority.
Liberal mass culture is depicted as atrac-
tive and criticized simultaneously. Crimea 
even seems to be a place of razvrat (depravity):
ɪ ˔ʺ˕ʵ˩ʺ ˔˓˖ˏʺ˖˘аˏˆˑ˖кˆʺ ʶ˓ʹ˩ ʅ˖˘˕˓ʵ ˔˓˘ʺ-
˕ˮˏ ˙жʺ ˖ʵ˓˭ ː˕аˣˑ˙˭, ˆ˖кˏ˭ˣа˭˧˙˭ ʵ˖ˮкˆʺ 
ʵ˓˔˕˓˖˩ ˟˓˕ː˙ˏˆ˕˓ʵк˙, ˑ˓ ˓˘ ˫˘˓ʶ˓ ˑʺ ˔˕ˆʴˏˆ-
зˆˏ˖ˮ, а, как ˑˆ ˖˘˕аˑˑ˓, ʹажʺ ˓˘ʹаˏˆˏ˖ˮ ˓˘ 
ʇ˓˖˖ˆˆ. ɪ˓зˑˆк ˓ʴ˕аз ˔˓ʹ˓з˕ˆ˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˓ʶ˓ зˏаˣˑ˓ʶ˓ 
ːʺ˖˘а, ːʺжʹ˙ˑа˕˓ʹˑ˓ʶ˓ ˔˕ˆ˘˓ˑа, Эˏ˪ʹ˓˕аʹ˓ 
аʵаˑ˘˭˕ˆ˖˘˓ʵ, ˦˔ˆ˓ˑ˓ʵǱ Таː ʴ˩ˏˆ аːʺ˕ˆ-
каˑ˖кˆʺ ʵ˓ʺˑˑ˩ʺ ʴаз˩, ˖˘˕ˆ˔˘ˆз˩, ʹжаз, ʴ˙-
ʶˆ-ʵ˙ʶˆ, ˖ˏ˓ʵ˓ː, К˕˩ː ʺ˧ʺ ʹаˏ˪˦ʺ ˓˘˓˦ʺˏ ˓˘ 
42  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, pp. 25-26.
43  Ibid., p. 174.
44  Matich, “Vasilii Aksënov and the Literature of 
Convergence”, p. 643.
45  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 57.
ʇ˓˖˖ˆˆ, ˔˓ʹ˘ˮˑ˙ˏ˖ˮ ʵ кˆˏ˪ʵа˘ʺ˕ ʵ˖ˮкˆː ˘аː 
ɫ˓ˑк˓ˑʶаː, ʈˆˑʶа˔˙˕аː, ɫ˓ˑ˓ˏ˙ˏ˙, ˖˘аˏ как 
ʴ˩ ˖ˆːʵ˓ˏ˓ː за˔аʹˑ˓ʶ˓ ˕азʵ˕а˘а, ˣ˘˓ ˓˘ˣа-
˖˘ˆ ˖˓˓˘ʵʺ˘˖˘ʵ˓ʵаˏ˓ ʹʺˇ˖˘ʵˆ˘ʺˏ˪ˑ˓˖˘ˆ.46
The heteroglossy of the novel is contained not 
only in the coexistence of diferences but also 
in the hybridity, as demonstrated particularly 
in the ictitious Crimean language containing 
many loanwords from English. The language 
ȃIakiȄ is deined as ȃ˖ːʺ˖˪ ˘а˘а˕˧ˆˑ˩ ˆ 
˕˙˖ˮ˘ˆˑ˩” (“a mixture of Tatar and Rus-
sian”).47 This language and national culture 
are considered to be the best possible: “Якˆ 
– ˫˘˓ ˠ˓˕˓˦˓, ˫˘˓ ˖˕ʺʹˑʺʺ ːʺжʹ˙ ’ˮк˦ˆ’ ˆ 
’˓кʺˇ’, ˫˘˓ ˟˓˕ːˆ˕˙˭˧аˮ˖ˮ ˖ʺˇˣа˖ ˑаˢˆˮ 
ʅ˖˘˕˓ʵа К˕˩ːа, ˖˓˖˘аʵˏʺˑˑаˮ ˆз ˔˓˘˓ːк˓ʵ 
˘а˘а˕, ˆ˘аˏ˪ˮˑˢʺʵ, ʴ˓ˏʶа˕, ʶ˕ʺк˓ʵ, ˘˙˕˓к, 
˕˙˖˖кˆˠ ʵ˓ˇ˖к ˆ ʴ˕ˆ˘аˑ˖к˓ʶ˓ ˟ˏ˓˘а.“48 At the 
same time, Iaki-nationalists suppress Russian, 
Tatar and English speaking cultures in order 
to establish a Iaki-culture and language. Ev-
idently, the novel ignores Ukrainian culture.
”esides the melting of diferent cultures, the 
novel is structured by balancing the forces 
between the Russian past, the Soviet present 
and a westernized conglomeration that could 
46  Ibid., p. śŜǲ Aksyonov, The Island of Crimea, pp. 
62-63: “Although during the early post-Stalin years 
the Island was no longer reduced to that one rigid, 
all-encompassing sentence, it did not thereby move any closer to Russiaǲ in fact, it moved farther away. 
It gained the reputation of a den of iniquity, a sus-
picious international playground, an El Dorado of 
spies and adventurers. With its American military 
bases and striptease joints, its jazz and boogie-woo-
gie, it seemed another Hong Kong, Singapore, Ho-
nolulu, a symbol of western decadence. And to a 
certain extent it was.”
47  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. ŘŘǲ Aksyonov, The Is-
land of Crimea, p. 20.
48  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. ŘŚǲ Aksyonov, The 
Island of Crimea, p. 22: “Yaki is a combination of 
‘okay’ and ‘yahşi’, a Turkish word for ‘good’. It is a 
nation currently taking shape here on the Island of 
Crimea and includes the descendants of Tatars, Ital-
ians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Turks, of the Russian 
army and the British navy.” 
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serve as a model for the future. This triangle 
is realized mimetically (arguing in dialogues 
about diferent political atitudesǼ, diegetically 
(de- and evaluating cultural features, mate-
rial objects, habits etc. of all involved cultur-
al codes), symbolically (with the help of the 
two main protagonists) and compositionally, 
too: from chapter to chapter the novel switch-
es locations, the action is set in the Soviet 
Union, mainly Moscow, Crimea and Paris. 
Speaking of ambivalence, Aksënov anticipates 
postcolonial concepts of hybridity, ambivalence 
and mimicry put forward by Homi Bhabha,49 
in particular the atraction and repulsion that 
characterizes the relationship between colo-
nizers and the colonized. Instead of imperson-
ators, ambivalence produces subjects “whose 
mimicry is never very far from mockery” and 
who “produce a profound disturbance of the 
authority of colonial discourse.”50 In these 
terms, Aksënov’s Crimea can be described as 
a third place in the sense of Edward Soja – a 
realized alternative amalgamation conveyed 
in a surrealistic style. While the ȃirstplaceȄ is 
a measurable, segmented material space and 
“secondplace” a purely mental construction, 
thirdplace is the space where all spaces are, capa-
ble of being seen from every angle, each standing 
cЧearǲ but aЧso a secret and conjectured object, iЧЧed 
with illusions and allusions, a space that is com-
mon to all of us yet never able to be completely 
seen and understood. [...] “ny atempt to capture 
this all-encompassing space in words and texts, for 
example, invokes an immediate sense of impossi-
bility, a despair that the sequentiality of language 
and writing, of the narrative form and history-tell-
49  Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Am-
bivalence of Colonial Discourse”, October 28, 1984, 
pp. 125-133.
50  ”ill “shcroft, Gareth Gri ths, Helen Ti n, 
Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, London, 
New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 13.
ing, can never do more than scratch the surface 
of Thirdplace’s extraordinary simultaneities.51 
The cultural hybridity of the island provokes 
two contradictory questions: Are we dealing 
with a mirroring parody of Soviet culture 
where high culture (music, opera, ballet and, 
last but not least: literature) is meant to be ac-
cessible to the masses? Or are we dealing with 
criticism of western culture, which lacks the So-
viet Union’s idealism, and thus any profound 
meaning of life? In its paradox simultaneity of 
ingratiation to western freedom and criticism 
of western mass culture, the novel actually 
performs a key concept of Russian culture.
Aleksandr Kabakov calls the novel a “warn-
ing” (“roman-preduprezhdenie”)52 and, besides, 
a “bytovoi roman” (“novel of everyday life”) 
in which the love stories do not appeal to 
the reader’s empathy as they are more sex-
ual than emotional.53 Although the political 
systems of Crimea and the Soviet Union are 
completely diferent in this novel, they resem-
ble each other in their non-transparency, sur-
veillance and power-driven decision-making. 
Assuming this parallelity, everyday culture is 
a means of identity shaping – it acquires the 
role of conveying the most striking difer-
ences you can experience between the island 
and its ‘Big Brother’ in both political spheres. 
Intercultural and intertextual points of con-
tact
As Michael Idov points out, the novel is tak-
en into account whenever Russia comes to a 
turning point as it captures the principal dual-
ity of Russia which “is both the island and the 
51  Edward Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles 
and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, London: Black-
well, 1996, pp. 56-58.
52  Aleksandr Kabakov and Evgenij Popov, Aksën-
ov, Moskva: AST, 2001, p. 369.
53  Ibid., p. 367.
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mainland, a reef of free thought and a colossus 
poised to stomp it out of existence”.54 To the con-
temporary Soviet reader, the novel has prob-
ably invited giggles of dizzy disorientation:
ȃ“ skyscraperȯin Simferopol! The idea that a 
newspaper can be called a ‘Russian’ (as opposed 
to ‘Soviet’) anything, let alone an ultra-bour-
geois ȁCourierȂ! Where in the world are we?
Where we are, in fact, is not in an earnest 
counter-historical what-if but instead inside 
the eternal fever dream of the Russian intel-
lectual: what Russia could have been if not for 
the path it chose. While Aksyonov paints the 
neighboring U.S.S.R. as an inferno of scarci-
ty, cruelty, and idiocy—somehow managing 
to sound like an outside observer (he wrote 
the book just before emigrating to the Unit-
ed StatesǼȯhe canȂt help gleefully stuing 
his imaginary Crimea with every cool thing 
that a Soviet hipster could think of: high-
speed freeways, a hopping jazz scene, swinger 
clubs, an auto industry producing Peter-Tur-
bo roadsters and luxurious Russo-Balt cars 
(an actual brand whose production ceased 
with the revolution), Novy Svet champagne, 
posh villas, Burgessian Russo-Anglo-Tatar 
youth slang, and a tony night club named 
after Nabokov. And then he proceeds to 
throw it all under the Russian tank tracks.”55
In this ictional Crimea, the Whites and their 
ofspring have established a pre-revolution-
ary society with three diferent political par-
ties, all antagonistic towards the Soviet Union. 
In the narrative, capturing the late 1960s and 
1970s, the island’s opposition towards the So-
viet Union is depicted as unstable. Herein we 
can indicate the crucial dialogical moment of 
54  Michael Idov, “The Novel that Predicts Russia’s 
Invasion of Crimea”, The New Yorker, 2 March 2014, httpǱ//www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/
the-novel-that-predicts-russias-invasion-of-crimea, 
accessed 25 October 2017.
55  Ibid.
a communication between the proposed vi-
sions. On the one hand, we encounter some 
airmation of the new Soviet Union without 
Stalin whereas, on the other hand, we face its 
renunciation as there is still some home for 
a return to pre-revolutionary society and an 
orientation towards Western European life. 
The novel does not align itself with a special 
– utopian or dystopian – tradition of writ-
ing on Crimea, as it contradicts its own pos-
itive picture at the end. It still corresponds 
with the so called Crimea-text which tends 
to glorify the peninsula as a Russian project 
of (over-) Europeanness and to regard it as a 
welcomed southern supplement to the north-
ern country, and, so to speak, its paradisiac 
garden.56 The Crimea-text, Aleksandr Liusyi’s 
term in accordance with Vladimir Toporov’s 
Petersburg-text (Peterburgskii tekst russkoi lit-
eratury),57 assumes an intertextual network 
of sujets, igures and symbols in the Russian 
literature of the classicism, romanticism and 
symbolism, coined by canonical poems, sto-
ries, pictures and becoming part of popular 
Russian culture, too.58 In sum, thanks to the 
intertextuality of medial representations, 
the ictional Crimea has grown into a pop-
ular, common and community strengthen-
ing locus amoenus, a vivid imagination of an 
arcadian place with high symbolical value.
Apparently, the novel’s polyphony is a paral-
lel to Aksënov’s trilogy Ozhog (The Burn, Ann 
Arbor 1980). Here, the narrative presents dif-
ferent social environments in Moscow, includ-
56  Kerstin S. Jobst, Die Perle des Imperiums: Der 
russische Krim-Diskurs im Zarenreich, Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, ŘŖŖŝ, p. ŗřŜǲ Elisabeth W. 
Clowes, Russia on the Edge: Imagined Geographies and 
Post-Soviet Identity, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 2011, p. 116.
57  Vladimir N. Toporov, Peterburgskii tekst russkoi 
literatury: izbrannye trudy, Sankt-Peterburg: Iskusst-
vo-SPB, 2003.
58  Aleksandr Liusyi, Krymskii tekst v russkoi litera-
ture, Sankt-Peterburg: Aletejja, 2003, p. 15: 195.
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ing its underground and dissident milieu, by 
using polyperspectivism, exaggeration, mix-
ing language codes and provocative allusions. 
As Per Dalgard states, the grotesque and poly-
phonic narrative with its overlapping of the 
fantastic and the realistic, of avantgardism and 
realism and its ambivalence towards the op-
posite ends of a spectrum, like the old vs. the 
new, the beginning vs. the end of the metamor-
phosis is fundamental to Aksënov’s works.59
Dalgård refers to Mikhail Bakhtin’s analy-
sis of the grotesque’s dialectical dimension 
as a means of estrangement that can have 
a satirical function dominating composi-
tion as well as style.60 The grotesque style 
tends to use folk and folklore elements.61 In 
the novel discussed here, these are supple-
mented by linguistic elements, material cul-
ture and social practices of Soviet and west-
ern everyday culture, hence contributing 
to the novel’s partly grotesque ambiguity. 
The novel’s western orientation appears to 
be anti-Soviet: Moscow and its function as an 
imperial capital are not taken seriously by the 
Iaki speakers who sharpen the de-ideologiza-
tion of Soviet speech paterns. This atitude 
spans from the ironic use of Soviet abbrevi-
ations and slogans62 to mockery of ‘Soviet’ 
literary style.63 Soviet literature is viliied by 
the narrator or provokes some nostalgia in 
terms of the interesting Soviet literature hav-
59  Per Dalgård, The Function Of The Grotesque In 
Vasilij Aksenov, transl. by Robert Porter, Århus: Ar-
kona 1982, pp. 5 and 11.
60  Ibid., pp. 14, 20, 24.
61  Ibid., p. 29.
62  Anatoly Vishevsky and Timothy Pogacar, “The Function of Conventional Language Patern in the 
Prose of Vassilii Aksenov”, Vasiliy Pavlovich Aksënov: 
A Writer in Quest of Himself, ed. Edward Mozheiko, 
Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1986, pp. 131-146, 
here pp. 135-7.
63  Ibid., p. 136. The authors tell the following ex-ampleǱ ȃFor instance, a KG” oicer in The Island of 
Crimea paraphrases the well known lines of Pavel 
Korchagin from Nikolay Ostrovsky’s How the Steel 
Was Tempered.” Ibid., p. 143.
ing disappeared as many of the Shestidesiat-
niki have left.64 Furthermore, the intertextual 
reference to George Orwell stresses the text’s 
orientation towards western political satire.
By contrast, the novel shows solidarity with 
pre-Soviet Russian literature as Aksënov’s 
style demonstrates similarities to that of 
Andrei Belyi and Nikolai Gogol’.65 There 
are also allusions to Mandelshtam and 
Chekhov.66 Actually, the question of geocul-
tural development has occupied Russian liter-
ature and philosophy since Peter the Great’s 
policy of Europeanization. Olga Matich states 
that Aksënov’s text represents a pronounced 
self-criticism and a kind of parody on oth-
er literary parodies of his time.67 The irony 
runs parallel to the grotesque ambivalence 
and can be read as anti-utopian pessimism: 
The novel leaves a rather non-entertaining 
message about a problematic future with 
the cultural and political dialogue interrupt-
ed. Aleksandr Kabakov stresses that Ostrov 
64  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, p. 58.
65  Aksënov’s poetic style has parallels to that of 
Nikolai Gogol: “1.) use of poetic devices: play with 
sound, rhythm, alliteration, repetition etc., 2.) retar-dation of the epic narrativeǲ lack of the convention-
al, logical-causal development of plot, character 
and action, replaced by 3.) development of a lyr-
ical theme shown in its various aspects, from dif-
ferent points of view, creating a mosaic of motives, 
symbols, themes etc.” Per Dalgård, “Some Literary Roots of “ksеnovȂs WritingsǱ “inities and Paral-
lels”, Vasiliy Pavlovich Aksënov: A Writer in Quest of 
Himself, ed. Edward Mozheiko, Columbus: Slavica 
Publishers, 1986, pp. 68-86, here pp. 69-70. 
66  Aksënov, Ostrov Krym, pp. 131, 165.
67  “In the broadest sense, then, Ostrov Krym re-lects the demythologizing tendency in post-Stalin 
Soviet literature, a tendency that began with the re-
vision of socialist realism and the Stalinist version 
of Soviet history. Although the novel contains dis-
sident political ideas and satirical images of Soviet reality, it is irst and foremost self-critical, demy-
thologizing Aksënov’s own utopian motifs of the 
1960s – the supermen heroes and beautiful ladies 
in western garb who put their faith in the magical-
ly simple convergence panacea. Exposing liberal 
ideology, Ostrov Krym presents grad secular causes in the name of the people as naive, peridious, and 
self-serving.” (Matich, “Vasilii Aksënov and the Lit-
erature of Convergence”, p. 651.)
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Krym occupies an outstanding position with-
in Russian literature of the twentieth century: 
Following the publication of Evgenii Zami-
atin’s My (We) from 1920, anti-utopian nov-
els were en vogue for a brief period, but for 
the next three decades no anti-utopias were 
published either in the USSR or in exile.68 
* * *
In Aksënov’s novel, the Soviet Union rep-
resents the Other with the ambiguity of a 
cultural double-bind. It represents the Russi-
anness Luchnikov is looking for, and the back-
ground for LuninaȂs imagination of a beter 
life. Interweaving the protagonists’ destinies, 
the narration demonstrates the aesthetical 
productivity of confronting diferent ways 
of life. Thus, the novel ofers not only an al-
ternative history, suggesting an anti-Sovi-
et, old-fashioned pro-tsarist concept,69 but 
an open discussion of three evolved cultural 
mindsets, which are all crucial for Russian 
self-conception: pre-revolutionary Russian, 
Soviet and European. There is actually a 
fourth: Crimean hybridity. Aksënov’s novel 
can be read as part of the underground pop 
culture in the late Soviet Union as well as a 
space for discussion of its non-oicial, de-
sired, demanded or dreaded cultural vectors. 
Leaving the novel’s opposition towards Sovi-
et culture aside, the heteroglossy of cultural 
issues makes this text interesting for cultural 
studies focusing on the late Soviet Union. We 
68  Kabakov and Popov, Aksënov, p. 366.
69  Aleksandr Kabakov says about Ostrov Krym and 
its writer: “Ɇɢɮɨɥɨɝɢɹ ɪɭɫɫɤɨɝɨ ɛɟɥɨɝɨ ɞɜɢɠɟɧɢɹ, ɚɩɨɥɨɝɟɬɢɤɚ ɰɚɪɫɤɨɣ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ. Ɍɨ ɟɫɬɶ ɨɧ ɧɚ ɤɚɤɨɟ-ɬɨ ɜɪɟɦɹ ɨɬɨɲɟɥ ɨɬ ɫɜɨɟɝɨ ɥɢɛɟɪɚɥɶɧɨɝɨ ɭɯɦɵɥɨɱɧɨɝɨ ɨɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ ɤ ɬɨɦɭ ɧɚɲɟɦɭ ɩɪɨɲɥɨɦɭ.“ Kabakov and 
Popov, Aksënov, p. 91.
can observe the negotiation of mass culture(s) 
as a prospective vision for the Soviet Union. 
The novel does not try to preserve, insist or
convince of one possible way, but rather asks: 
quo vadis? Exposing his readers to all possi-
bilities in an ambivalent, at times grotesque 
manner, Aksënov challenges them to continue 
the dialogue of Russian and Un-Russian ideas.
AяoѢѡ ѡhe юѢѡhor
Tatjana Hofmann studied Cultural, Slavonic 
and Germanic Studies at Humboldt-Universi-
ty in Berlin. Afterwards she wrote her PhD-the-
sis about the representation of Ukraine in 
contemporary prose (Literarische Ethnograien 
der Ukraine, Basel 2014). Since 2012 she has 
worked at the Slavic Department of the Uni-
versity of Zurich where she was editor mem-
ber of the literature magazine Variations. From 
2012 to 2014 she was associated in the project 
Region, Nation, and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary 
and Transcultural Reconsideration of Ukraine at 
the University of St. Gallen. She edited works 
by Sergei Tret’iakov. Currently she writes a 
study on Soviet journalism and travellogues. 
Crimea belongs to her areas of interests.
133Euxeinos, Vol. 8, No. 25-26 / 2018
by Peter Collmer
Pop and Politics in Late Soviet Society. 
Final remarks
More than ten years ago, Alexei Yurchak published his inluential study about 
late Soviet socialism.1 In Yurchak’s narrative, 
the persistence of the Soviet system after Sta-
lin’s death largely relied on a series of inter-
related paradoxes that undermined and at the 
same time stabilized the system. The ongoing 
formal reproduction of the system was ac-
companied by internal “displacements”: The 
more the dogmatic forms of the authoritative 
discourse were reproduced and ritualized 
since the 1950s, the more this discourse was 
detached from socialist realities, making room 
for alternative, less controllable interpretations 
of Soviet life. As long as Soviet people duly 
participated in the formal reproduction of the 
system, they were allowed to explore new cre-
ative ways of thinking and expressing them-
selves. Thus, being within and simultaneously 
outside the oicial discourse became a ȃdom-
inant mode of living during late socialism”.2 
This mode of living cannot be understood in 
simple terms of support or opposition; it was 
rather characterized by the dissolution of bina-
ry categories and by a multilayer relationship 
with the system.
What makes Yurchak’s interpretation of late 
Soviet socialism interesting for this publication 
is the fact that it can be referred to as a theoret-
ical framework for discussing Soviet pop. The 
above articles conceptualize post-Stalinist So-
viet popular culture as a set of cultural practic-
es that were atractive to many Soviet citizens 
even if – or just because of the fact that – they 
did not fully correspond with the demands 
of the system. They covered a vast ield of 
everyday activities and forms of self-rep-
1  Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It 
Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005.
2  Ibid., p. 288. 
resentation (fashion, music, dance, mass 
literature, leisure activities, gestures, man-
ners of speaking etc.), mostly inspired by the 
global spread and imitation of American and 
British lifestyles since the 1950s. Pop cultural 
practices were not necessarily directed against 
the Soviet party-state complex, but they were 
not entirely controlled by it either, appealing 
especially to young people as a sphere of free-
dom and sometimes subversive self-reassur-
ance.
Following Yurchak, Soviet pop could be seen 
as an alternative approach to socialist reality 
enabled by the “performative shift”3 of the 
authoritative discourse. As performing loyal-
ty gained importance over being loyal, new 
ways of identity building became possible. 
In such an understanding, Soviet pop culture 
was a context where people had the chance 
to express their thoughts, feelings and ati-
tudes without being restricted to the literal 
reading of a petriied ideology. However, the 
relation between the oicially promoted way 
of life and the manifestations of a new, grass-
root-driven popular culture remained compli-
cated and subject to a continuous process of 
negotiation.
While analyzing diferent aspects of So-
viet popular culture, most articles of this 
publication take Yurchak’s narrative into 
consideration, some of them even explicitly 
discuss the scopes – and the limits – of its ex-
planatory power. They all shed light on am-
bivalences and paradoxes that become visible 
when studying Soviet pop. In this context, the 
“paradoxicality” of the Soviet system does 
not only refer to obvious inconsistencies or 
contradictions of late Soviet socialism; it also 
3  Ibid., pp. 24-26.
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points to new complex forms of “normal life”4 
that developed in a speciic process of social 
and cultural modernization.
Paradox normalities
The two irst contributions focus on funda-
mental tensions that characterized Soviet life 
and culture after Stalin’s death in 1953. In his 
text on the Thaw period, Gleb Tsipursky deals 
with the fact that post-Stalinist authorities 
eased ideological constraints while at the same 
time exerting symbolic and physical violence 
against certain cultural practices that seemed 
to express an extreme devotion to west-
ern culture. Focusing on the example of the 
“stiliagi” (“style-obsessed” young people) and 
western-like fashion, the author shows how, 
since the 1950s, the boundaries of acceptable 
youth behavior were constantly challenged, 
negotiated and redeined. DanijeЧa Lugarić 
Vukas points to the concurrent living within 
and outside the system. A close reading of 
the poetry of the two famous Russian bards 
Bulat Okudzhava and Vladimir Vysotskii il-
lustrates how, for most Soviet people, resis-
tance and loyalty merged into a complex at-
titude towards the authoritative discourse – a 
discourse whose literal claims and meanings 
were increasingly met with indiference.5
Most articles are, in one way or another, con-
cerned with paradoxes resulting from the 
multifaceted western inluences on Sovi-
et life. Irina Mukhina shows that being close 
to the west or having easy access to western 
4  For tСО МonМОpt oП “normКl lТПО” Кnd “normКlТгКtТon” sОО Пor ОбКmplО KТrstОn BönkОr’s КrtТМlО Тn tСТs volumО.
5  HoаОvОr, tСО lТtОrКl rОКdТnР oП tСО КutСorТtКtТvО dТs-МoursО dТd not МomplОtОlв losО Тts ТmportКnМО. AММord-ТnР to SОrРОТ ZСuk’s tОбt Тn tСТs volumО, pОrsonКl dТКrТОs аrТttОn Лв вounР SovТОt pОoplО Тn provТnМТКl UkrКТnТКn toаns durТnР tСО 1970s Кnd 80s suРРОst tСКt tСОТr ТntОr-prОtКtТon oП tСО аorld аКs stТll СОКvТlв ТnluОnМОd Лв oП-iМТКl ТdОoloРв.
products did not necessarily result in a west-
ernization of Soviet identities. Her contribu-
tion about consumerism in Soviet port cities 
during the 1970s and 80s (including the case 
of “Baba Mania”, an old woman receiving il-
legal goods from sailors and reselling them in 
Novorossiisk) suggests that close intercultural 
contact did not blind Soviet people, but rath-
er sharpened their critical view on the west 
and the quality and usefulness of its products. 
Analyzing youth cultures in eastern Ukraine 
during the international détente of the 1970s, 
Sergei I. Zhuk demonstrates the striking fact 
that cultural westernization fostered the pro-
cess of russiication on the peripheries of the 
Soviet empire. Professional Russian media, 
Russian urban culture and the Russian lan-
guage played a key role in making western 
popular culture available to the Soviet youth 
in the province.
Other texts exemplify the paradox situation 
that western-inspired technologies and cul-
tural practices sometimes contributed or even 
consciously were used to strengthen the so-
cialist system. Kirsten Bönker’s article on TV 
consumption in late Soviet society shows how 
the massive spread of TV sets in the Soviet 
Union after the late 1960s made it possible 
to integrate a diverse audience into an emo-
tional community “in front of the screens”. 
TV programs presented a positive version of 
Soviet normality. By doing so, they promot-
ed a new appealing Soviet popular culture 
and sustained the cohesion of Soviet society 
rather than – as claimed by previous research 
– destabilizing it. This is remarkable, taking 
into account that early Soviet TV makers, as 
shown in Kristian Feigelson’s contribution, did 
not have a clear understanding of the impact 
of the new medium. One example of how So-
viet TV could turn western inluence against 
the west is given in Isabelle de Keghel’s article 
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on the popular television series “Seventeen 
Moments of Spring” (1973). The Brezhnev-era 
series about a Soviet spy who mingles under-
cover with the Nazi leadership during the Sec-
ond World War has certain features of a social-
ist James Bond movie. It draws the audience’s 
atention to foreign threats and reproduces of-
icial images of the capitalist enemy within the 
framework of the Cold War.
A number of articles elucidate the ability of 
late Soviet society to integrate antagonistic 
impulses and to create new complex normali-
ties. In his text about the “invasion of Estonian 
music” in the Soviet Union after the mid-sev-
enties, Aimar Ventsel shows how an informal 
proit-oriented music industry emerged with-
in the centrally controlled socialist econo-
my. Popular Baltic musicians who acted as a 
substitute for western pop stars throughout 
the Soviet Union were given opportunities to 
pursue economic interests and to manipulate 
oicial regulations. Boris Belge’s article about 
Soviet composer “lfred Schnitke ǻŗşřŚ-ŗşşŞǼ 
illustrates how, during late Soviet socialism, 
traditional elite culture and popular culture 
could merge into something new, into a “third 
direction” of cultural production that bridged 
the gap between traditional labels and tried to 
be “serious” and “popular” at the same time. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this spe-
ciic form of integration lost its formative con-
text and disappeared again.
Finally, on a more abstract level, the para-
doxes and antagonisms of Soviet society are 
discussed in Tatjana Hofmann’s analysis of 
“Ostrov Krym”, a novel by Vasilii Aksenov 
ǻwriten in ŗşŝşǼ. “ksenovȂs Crimea is con-
ceived of as a place between the worlds, an 
island where pre-revolutionary Russian, So-
viet and European traditions come together. 
Referring to Bakhtin, Hofmann speaks of a 
semantical space for diferent, even antagonis-
tic “cultural voices”. Their interplay points to 
one of the fundamental historical tensions that 
characterized both Tsarist and Soviet Russia’s 
relations with the west – the simultaneity of 
admiring and rejecting western culture. 
In view of the above, one of the obvious con-
tributions of this publication consists in re-
considering and further illustrating the am-
bivalences, tensions, and inconsistencies of 
late Soviet society. However, most articles 
also show that the citizens of the late Soviet 
Union did not necessarily experience their 
environment as fragmented or inconsistent. 
The study of popular culture in particular 
makes clear that the coexistence of various 
inluences, fashions, consumer habits and 
tastes was part of “normal” Soviet life.
Conclusions
”y focusing on speciic periods of time, geo-
graphical areas, cultural practices and leisure 
activities, the articles of this volume comple-
ment the already known, many-faceted pic-
ture of Soviet popular culture since the 1950s. 
They look at Soviet pop in the context of glob-
al trends in (youth) culture after the war and 
challenge narratives of a relatively uniform, 
gray and immutable way of life in the Soviet 
Union.
The articles shed new light on Soviet people’s 
agency. It becomes evident how the worldwide 
emergence of pop culture inluenced cultural 
life in the Soviet Union as well and provided 
ordinary Soviet citizens with inspirations and 
opportunities to explore new forms of acting 
and expressing themselves. In this context 
people were pushing the limits of what was 
oicially acceptable and contributed to re-
deining cultural and political norms. “t the 
same time, the discrepancies of everyday life 
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in the Soviet Union encouraged individuals 
to develop strategies of “navigating the sys-
temȄ, to take advantage of the oferings and 
deiciencies of the system and to build their 
own coherent living environment.
In general, the well-researched chronology of 
cultural negotiation processes since Stalin’s 
death6 becomes manifest also in this volume. 
During the early Thaw period (1953-56), the 
authorities allowed for a relaxation of ideolog-
ical control and new ways of cultural expres-
sion such as wearing western-like clothing. 
Gleb Tsipursky’s text illustrates how the Krem-
lin, in his atempt to build a socialist version 
of modernity, returned to an anti-pluralistic 
policy in the mid-1950s, stigmatizing alleged 
excesses of fashion-conscious young people. 
The early 1960s saw a renewed tendency to 
more openness that was relected for example 
in a certain de-politicization of TV production. 
A “turn toward militancy”7 followed under 
Brezhnev by the end of the decade. Isabelle de 
Keghel demonstrates how ilm production un-
der Brezhnev partly fell back to Stalin-era pat-
terns. The relaxation of international tensions 
in the 1970s enabled a cultural rapprochement 
with the west and, as shown in Sergei Zhuk’s 
article, made audio and visual information 
from capitalist countries more and more avail-
able even in provincial cities of the Soviet 
Union.
The articles conirm the usefulness of certain 
theoretical perspectives for the study of Sovi-
et popular culture. The idea of an “Imaginary 
West” can help understand the complex rela-
tionship between Soviet popular culture and 
its western sources of inspiration.8 As shown 
6  CП. Пor ОбКmplО GlОЛ TsТpurskв, Socialist Fun: Youth, 
Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in 
the Cold War Soviet Union, 1945-1970, PТttsЛurРС: UnТ-vОrsТtв oП PТttsЛurРС PrОss, 2016, p. 15.
7  IЛТd.
8  SОО Пor ОбКmplО YurМСКk, Everything Was Forever, 
by several authors, “western” stimuli that in-
luenced Soviet cultural life usually did not 
emanate directly from the west but from a dis-
torted image of the western world that devel-
oped in Soviet society after the war. This im-
age of the west remained anchored in Soviet 
ways of thinking, feeling and longing, thus re-
vealing more about living in the Soviet Union 
than about the west. It thereby becomes clear 
that Soviet pop did not just imitate a foreign 
model. Within the contact zone between the 
Soviet empire and the west, it rather constitut-
ed a new context based on entangling cultur-
al inluences. It drew on processes of cultural 
transfer and translation and contained numer-
ous transnational references.9
Researchers often concentrate on the cultural 
setings of Moscow and Leningrad. In contrast, 
some of the above articles show that cultural 
life in the urban centers was not representa-
tive for the entire Soviet Union. For example, 
Irina Mukhina points to the fact that residents 
of small port cities had a diferent understand-
ing of western lifestyles. They usually did not 
associate the consumption of western goods 
with resistance or subversion (as was more of-
ten the case in the capital cities) but conceived 
of them as a means of improving their social 
status within Soviet society. In this context 
it becomes obvious that the “west” was not 
imagined in an identical way throughout the 
Union. “n unrealistic, gloriied image seems 
to have developed within urban centers, in 
close correlation with people’s desires and 
tastes. However, direct confrontation with the 
real west could disenchant its imaginary fa-
cade, reassuring Soviet identities.
If it is common to look at Soviet pop against 
pp. 158-206.
9  For tСО МonМОpt oП tСО “МontКМt гonО” sОО MКrв Lou-ТsО PrКtt, “Arts oП tСО ContКМt ZonО”, Profession, 1991, pp. 33-40.
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the background of the Cold War and its 
“cultural front”, some of the above arti-
cles demonstrate that new forms of cultur-
al expression also had their important eco-
nomic dimensions. As shown in the texts of 
Aimar Ventsel, Irina Mukhina and others, the 
growing popularity of pop stimulated self-re-
inforcing dynamics of consumerism, black or 
grey markets and an intertwining of oicial 
institutions and informal proit strategies.
In the overall picture, this publication joins 
recent research in arguing that many facets 
of Soviet pop culture, even if inspired by the 
western “class enemy”, contributed to stabi-
lizing rather than destabilizing the Soviet sys-
tem.10 Popular cultural practices, shared tastes 
and new media such as television in particular 
facilitated the formation of emotional commu-
nities whose loyalty toward the Soviet system 
could be inluenced by satisfying selected con-
sumer needs, by ofering good entertainment 
and by using innovative technology to pro-
mote the promise of a bright socialist future.11 
In conjunction with the “performative shift” of 
the authoritative discourse, Soviet pop culture 
aforded Soviet citizens new opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
10  RОРКrdТnР tСО stКЛТlТгТnР ОfОМts oП nОа МonsumОr prКМtТМОs Тn tСО 1970s sОО Пor ОбКmplО NКtКlвК CСОr-nвsСovК, Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era, London, NОа York: RoutlОdРО, 2013.
11  RОРКrdТnР tСО potОntТКl oП tОlОvТsТon Пor ЛuТldТnР up ОmotТonКl МommunТtТОs sОО Пor ОбКmplО CСrТstТnО EvКns, “TСО ‘SovТОt WКв oП LТПО’ Кs К WКв oП FООlТnР: EmotТon Кnd InluОnМО on SovТОt CОntrКl TОlОvТsТon Тn tСО BrО-гСnОv ErК”, Cahiers du Monde Russe 56/2-3, 2015, pp. 543–69.
to socialize with each other, to interpret their 
lives and to express themselves within a cen-
trally controlled environment. In this sense, a 
successful Soviet version of pop could reduce 
the explosive power of people’s longing for 
the (imagined) west.
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